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Abstract 
 
 
With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
the relevance of the notion of sustainable development – that bridges 
environmental, economic and social dimensions - has risen to the status 
of programme for the international community. In this framework, a 
“fourth”, legal leg of sustainable development has been envisioned as a 
necessary complement to realise the 2030 Agenda, through the role of 
inclusive and effective institutions. 
The role of tribunals and of access to justice assumes a significance 
insofar as it guarantees the respect of the rule of law that has been 
highlighted as the fundamental aspect for achieving sustainable 
development. In this regard, experiences of national implementation of 
the principle of sustainable development in the field of human rights 
are crucial for understanding current developments and for studying 
legal systems that are mutually influencing and reinforcing each other.  
Concerning the guarantee of environmental rights, three main 
strategies can be outlined: the maintenance of general jurisdictions; the 
establishment of “green benches” as sections of ordinary tribunals 
dealing with environmental cases; the creation of specialised tribunals, 
with experts in scientific subjects and judges specifically trained in this 
field.  
In light of its experience of “low-yielding” judicial institutions, 
characterised by delays, backlogs and insufficient capacities of case 
management, India undoubtedly constitutes one of the leading cases 
for assessing the validity of institutional measures aimed at the 
application of the concept of sustainable development in the legal field. 
In this regard, the Parliament of India chose to pursue the third path 
and enacted the National Green Tribunal Act in 2010. The experience of 
India is thus analysed considering, on the one hand, the constitutional 
framework embodied in the protection of environmental rights within 
the right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, with Articles 
48A and 51A(g) and, on the other hand, the interpretation of the courts 
regarding international law principles (sustainable development, 
polluter pays and precautionary principle), that are statutorily applied 
by the National Green Tribunal. 
  xv 
The thesis thus analyses the advantages brought forward by the newly 
established tribunal - expanded access to tribunals, through new rules 
and a more flexible procedure; enhanced expertise due to the change in 
the composition of courts; consistency in decisions, thanks to the 
specialisation - as well as possible drawbacks caused by the resort to 
creeping jurisdiction and by the monopolisation of the interpretation of 
sustainable development by a single environmental court. 
  
  xvi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
Introduction 
 
 
2015 marked the beginning of a renewed phase in the life of the United 
Nations, with the convention of the Sustainable Development Summit, 
held from the 25th to the 27th of September, and the adoption of the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development. 1  After the fairly successful 
initiative of the Millennium Development Goals, aimed at reducing 
poverty and enhancing enabling tools for development, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations approved a new ambitious and 
universal agenda that should constitute the working programme 
toward the principal goal, poverty eradication. The plan to be 
implemented is made of 17 “Sustainable Development Goals” and of 
169 targets that integrate the three dimensions to be upheld, namely the 
economic, social and environmental aspects of development. Among 
these statements, Goal 16 deserves a particular mention insofar as it 
establishes an institutional ambition that was in the background until 
now. States and stakeholders are now invited to “promote peaceful and 
inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all 
and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. 
The inauguration of the programme that should lead the international 
community to a more equitable progress in the next fifteen years with 
the cornerstone of sustainable development is indicative of the 
relevance that the concept assumed as a guiding light in the realm of 
international law and politics and as the most comprehensive notion 
that bridges economic, social and environmental aspects. As known, 
sustainable development has been defined in the Brundtland Report in 
1987 as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.2 
Since then, the notion has been thoroughly employed in international 
and national law as the embodiment of the objective of public policies 
                                                          
1 United Nations General Assembly, Doc. A/RES/70/1. 
2 UN Document A/42/427, Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development. 
  2 
integrating economic development and environmental protection. 
Moreover, it has risen to the status of overarching principle, often 
interchangeable with environmental law itself.3 In this sense, the New 
Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable 
Development adopted by the International Law Association in 2002 is a 
testimony of the growing relevance of the concept and of a nascent 
“law of sustainability” that is overlapping with the more established 
field of international environmental law. The New Delhi Declaration 
expressed a series of principles aimed at the sustainable use of natural 
resources and at the protection of the environment that included the 
principle of equity, the eradication of poverty, the precautionary 
approach, the principle of good governance and of integration with 
human rights.4 
The necessity of integrating sustainable development within national 
systems brings to the forefront the linkage existing between good 
governance and human rights. Indeed, this was the core principle 
contained in the Ksentini Report on the human right to the 
environment, approved by the Commission on Human Rights in 1994, 
that “human rights, an ecologically sound environment, sustainable 
development and peace are interdependent and indivisible”.5 In this regard, 
experiences of national implementation of the principle of sustainable 
development in the field of human rights are crucial for understanding 
current developments and for studying legal systems that are mutually 
influencing and reinforcing each other. Indeed, the recognition of the 
principle of sustainable development at the national level and its 
application in observance of the rule of law is a stepping stone in 
strengthening its existence in international law. Moreover, the 
integration of sustainable development in domestic systems contributes 
                                                          
3 Prieur, M., Droit de l’environnement, droit durable, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2014, p. 
295. 
4  United Nations General Assembly, Doc. A/CONF.199/8, ILA New Delhi 
Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, 2 
April 2002. 
5 UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Draft Principle 1 on Human Rights and the 
Environment. 
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to the birth of a truly “environmental rule of law” constituted of 
procedural devices and substantive guarantees that are aimed at the 
protection of natural resources and of a safe environment.  
India undoubtedly constitutes one of the leading cases for assessing the 
validity of institutional measures aimed at the application of the 
concept of sustainable development in the legal field. The challenges to 
address by this country are manifold: first of all, the goal of eradication 
of extreme poverty, in a country where demography is ballooning; 
then, the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation linked to population 
growth; finally, the ecological threats to the environment and to human 
health caused by the change in modes of production and consumption, 
resulting in what Gadgil and Guha defined “a fissured land”. 6  To 
efficiently face these challenges, India possesses an atout maître that is 
fundamental in integrating sustainable development at the domestic 
level: a legal tradition characterised by the respect of the rule of law 
and a Constitution that guarantees access to justice and fundamental 
rights that include environmental rights and duties as a part of the right 
to life.7 
Among the institutional devices aimed at upholding environmental 
rights, the role of the judiciary as the guardian of legal principles and 
the protector against pollution and degradation of the environment is 
growingly relevant, especially in light of the poor implementation of 
laws. Concerning the guarantee of environmental rights, three main 
strategies can be outlined: the maintenance of general jurisdictions; the 
establishment of “green benches” as sections of ordinary tribunals 
dealing with environmental cases; the creation of specialised tribunals, 
with experts in scientific subjects and judges specifically trained in this 
                                                          
6 Gadgil, M., Guha, R., This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India, New 
Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1992. 
7 Austin, G., The Indian Constitution – Cornerstone of a Nation, New Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, 1966; Jain, M. P. Indian Constitutional Law, LexisNexis 
Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 6th Edition, 2010. 
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field.8 In 2010, the Parliament of India chose to pursue the third path 
and enacted the National Green Tribunal Act, implemented the 
following year with the creation of this specialised environmental court 
with a broad jurisdiction on civil matters relating to the environment. 
In a country where the role of the Supreme Court in protecting human 
rights has been paramount,9 the creation of a specialised jurisdiction 
intended at enhancing access to justice and adjudicating a considerable 
amount of disputes in light of international principles – including 
sustainable development10 – is an institutional innovation that deserves 
an enquiry insofar as it forms a precedent in attaining Goal 16 of the 
2030 United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development.     
Thus, the analysis herewith proposed will focus on the examination of 
the experience of India as far as the creation and implementation of a 
specialised court having jurisdiction in environmental matters is 
concerned, in light with the previous steps undertaken at the 
international and national level for the development of a right to a 
wholesome environment. As it is typical of a monographic work in 
Comparative Constitutional Law, the present analysis aims at 
delivering an assessment of a single experience – in this case, the 
passage from the activist judicial power of the Supreme Court to the 
establishment of a specialised environmental tribunal in 2010 – while 
taking into account both the external sources that led to the creation of 
the National Green Tribunal (as the role of international instruments 
and the similar examples of other countries related to environmental 
jurisdictions) and the domestic developments in the field of 
environmental law (in particular, the role of the tribunals in 
implementing environmental statutes – considering the activism of the 
Supreme Court of India and, since 2011, the new jurisprudence initiated 
                                                          
8  Amirante, D., Environmental Courts in Comparative Perspective: Preliminary 
Reflections on the National Green Tribunal of India, in Pace Law Environmental Law 
Review, 29, 2012, pp. 441-469. 
9 Sathe, S.P., Judicial Activism in India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2nd 
Edition, 2004; Verma, K, Verma, S.K. (eds.), Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of 
India – Its Grasp and Reach, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
10 Lok Sabha, The National Green Tribunal Act, Act No. 19 of 2010, Section 20. 
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by the National Green Tribunal). By investigating the analogies and 
differences of the two experiences (general jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court vs. specialised jurisdiction of the NGT), the study should shed 
light on the broader phenomenon of the effectiveness of the creation of 
specialised judicial institutions dealing with environmental cases. 
 
Theoretical framework 
With this in mind, the study will rely on a comparative method. As 
known, comparison in constitutional law is operationalised in two 
different ways: in a synchronic orientation or by means of a diachronic 
perspective.11 In our case, a distinction should be made between the 
two methods. As for the creation of the National Green Tribunal, a 
synchronic perspective on the experiences of other countries with the 
proposal and institution of environmental tribunals is imposed. 
Concerning the judicial production, the main analysis of the thesis will 
explore the differences of the experience of the Supreme Court and of 
the newly established Green Tribunal by means of a diachronic study 
of the two jurisprudential bodies – through a thorough assessment of 
the judgments made by the NGT since 2011, in order to outline its 
initial evolution. The study will thus aim at evaluating the effectiveness 
of the institutional change operated by the Indian Parliament, while 
keeping in mind the traditional judicial activism in the field of social 
and environmental rights. 
Basically, the thesis will be developed as a case study of the foundation 
of a judicial institution, firstly by briefly analysing the construction of 
the legal body on the environment prior to the creation of the court, 
then by focusing on its jurisprudence. If one considers the classes of 
methodological approach – classificatory, historical, normative, 
functional and conceptual12 – the study of the National Green Tribunal 
is mainly a historical work (for its inception), coupled by a functional 
analysis (for the corpus of judicial decisions).  
                                                          
11 Lanchester, F., Gli strumenti della democrazia, Milano, Giuffrè, 2004. 
12  Jackson, V.C., Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies, in Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012. 
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In fact, on the one hand, the first part of the thesis will be devoted to a 
historical understanding of the developments in environmental law for 
India, eventually leading to the decision of establishing a new judicial 
institution as a legal transplant/migration of the experience of the New 
South Wales of Australia (Land and Environment Court). On the other 
hand, the second part of the study will be based on a functional 
analysis. Although typical of large-N studies, the use of the functional 
method is also valid for detailed case studies. In our case, keeping in 
mind the classical political activism of the judicial institutions in India, 
especially concerning environmental matters, the aim is to assess how 
the operation of a different institution (the National Green Tribunal) in 
a pattern of a similar doctrine of environmental judicial activism 
enhances the effectiveness of judgments, the conceptual development 
of sustainable development and the actual impact on the plaintiffs, and 
generally on the constitutional system, for a more effective and 
comprehensive protection of fundamental rights.  
Moreover, an additional focus on both the historical and functional 
sides of the evolution of environmental law will be on the influence of 
international law in domestic courts and legislation, especially since the 
National Green Tribunal is bound to use also international law 
principles in its judgments, according to Section 20 of the foundational 
Act.       
 
Research questions and relevance 
The dissertation will engage critically with the themes of institutional 
change and particularly with the introduction of special jurisdictions in 
the field of the protection of environmental rights. If before the 
introduction of the National Green Tribunal the features of the judicial 
system (as far as the environment is concerned) resided in the absence 
of specialisation of the courts, the evolution of new procedures and the 
role of the bar,13 the introduction of a new judicial institution dedicated 
to environmental matters (and characterised by a broad jurisdiction) 
                                                          
13 Divan, S., and Rosencranz, A., Environmental Law and Policy in India: Cases, 
Materials and Statutes, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition, 2002. 
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should positively impact through a tentative enhanced effectiveness of 
the protection of rights. The NGT breaks with the traditional Euro-
American view of a generalist jurisdiction, in order to deal with cases 
by means of a court composed of both judges and environmental 
experts coming from the scientific field. 
The thesis delves into several interrelated subjects. Firstly, the 
dominance of the judicial system in enforcing environmental rights is to 
be considered, especially if compared with the apparent expansion of 
the legislation on those issues since the 1980s and the enormous 
development of administrative authorities, capable of dealing with the 
most challenging questions on paper, but in fact unable to answer to 
the needs of the system because of the lack of implementation.14 Then, 
the growing debate on rule of law and access to justice as an integral 
part of the concept of sustainable development comes at the forefront.15 
In this regard, the establishment of the NGT is certainly one of the most 
relevant achievements in the constitutional field for developing 
countries in the struggle for guaranteeing a development which is 
sustainable, hence relying on the respect of the rule of law - if one 
follows the logic behind Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals. 
For this, ensuring a fairer access to justice (due also to the creation of 
environmental sub-tribunals, as sections of the NGT, on a regional 
basis) to the citizens and highlighting the role of the judiciary as the 
watchdog of the rule of law (when faced to poor implementation of 
statute law) is certainly one of the main aspects of the proposed 
investigation. Finally, the aim of analysing the creation and working of 
a new court by means of both a historical and a functional perspective 
should be a further challenge in order to reach conclusions on a case 
study which is of a certain relevance in the field. In addition to these 
aspects, the mutual influence of international and domestic law is a 
crisscrossing force that delineates the evolution of environmental law in 
India and constitutes the fil rouge of the argument of the thesis.        
                                                          
14 Amirante, D., op.cit.. 
15 International Development Law Organisation, Achieving a Transformative Post-
2015 Development Agenda: The Contribution of the Rule of Law to Equity and 
Sustainability, Report of the Conference, 2014. 
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In light of such considerations, the experience of India is crucial for 
several reasons. First of all, the typical judicial activism of the Supreme 
Court as for the protection of rights was deemed insufficient for 
environmental rights by the apex tribunal itself, that suggested the 
creation of special courts. 16  The attempts at promoting reforms 
introducing a special jurisdiction, that started in the 1990s, produced a 
complete result only in 2010. This fact sheds light on the difficulties of 
putting forward an abrupt institutional change in major constitutional 
systems bearing with them the myth of the general jurisdiction, in spite 
of the critical situations concerning the protection of rights. Moreover, 
the peculiarity of India as a federal system constitutes an additional 
reason for considering it as a case study – keeping in mind the 
possibility of it being an example of a successful innovation in 
constitutional law for both big systems of the common law tradition 
and countries facing the challenge of sustainable development (such as 
Brazil or China, for instance). Another specificity of India lies in the 
traditional focus on the protection of the environment since the 
catastrophe of Bhopal, especially embodied by a strengthened attention 
by the judicial institutions of the country. 
 
Research paradigms for environmental courts 
Constitutionalists have delved into the analysis of the developments of 
the judiciary in environmental matters through a series of research 
paradigms. Often, these explanations of the rise of the role of the 
judiciary in the field of environmental law stem from a historical 
perspective, delivering an assessment of the single experiences from the 
international law side, the domestic one, or both. Thus, the 
comprehensive relevance of the judiciary is considered in the light of 
the international instruments adopted by the states introducing new 
                                                          
16 Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum vs. Union of India, AIR 1996 (5) SCC 647. For an 
assessment of the jurisprudence, see the study of the Law Commission of India, 
186th Report on Proposal to Constitute Environment Courts, 2003. 
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principles in the domestic legal systems. 17  The phenomenon of the 
explosion of specialised environmental jurisdictions is generally 
assessed through several approaches – and the case of India constitutes 
one of the capital examples in the global trend. 
Constitutionalists come to an agreement on the considerable growth in 
the number of specialised tribunals for the environment (around 360 in 
42 countries, in 2010). Following an authoritative classification of the 
phenomenon of the role of the judiciary in the field,18 three paths can be 
identified. First of all, the maintenance of general jurisdictions dealing 
with all cases, including those related to the environment; then, the 
internal specialisation of the courts, through the creation of “green 
benches” with judges trained in the domain of environmental sciences; 
finally, the creation of environmental courts, with a partial composition 
of scientific experts, characterised by the speed of the proceedings, the 
efficiency and the competence of the organisation. On this basis, the 
same author distinguishes between a Western model, epitomised by the 
myth of the generalist judge, and an “Australasian” model, more eager 
to develop new institutional solutions. While rejecting this geographical 
approach, that takes into account the fact that the most accomplished 
examples of environmental tribunals have their seat in the Australasian 
area (Australia, New Zealand and India), consideration should be made 
on the conditions facilitating the creation of specialised courts, namely 
the presence of a common law system, of a federal type of government 
and of a social sensitivity towards this kind of institutions (three 
characteristics shared by the three countries listed above). Moreover, 
the argument supporting the growth of specialised environmental 
jurisdictions in new democracies is certainly appealing, but does not 
find sufficient evidence if confronted with the experience of Australia, 
New Zealand and India, systems with a fairly old democratic tradition. 
                                                          
17 Carnwath, R., Institutional Innovation for Environmental Justice, in Pace Law 
Environmental Law Review, 29, 2012, pp. 555-565; Markovitz, K.J., and Gerardu, 
J.J.A., The Importance of the Judiciary in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 
in Pace Environmental Law Journal, 29, 2012, pp. 538-554. 
18 Amirante, D., op.cit.. 
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What is to be kept in the research paradigm of the studies on 
environmental tribunals is the general deeds arising from the 
establishment of those jurisdictions: fast tracks for discussion and 
decision of cases; enhanced expertise due to the change in the 
composition of those courts; expanded access to tribunals, through new 
rules and a more flexible procedure; consistency in decisions, thanks to 
the specialisation.19 The experience of the NGT, that will be the object of 
the present work, will attempt to shed light on these aspects. 
 
The debate over India’s judiciary and the protection of 
environmental rights 
Apart from the general trend sketched above, the establishment of the 
National Green Tribunal stems from the peculiar history of India and of 
its judiciary.  
In comparison with other apex judicial bodies in constitutional systems, 
the Supreme Court of India is certainly one of the organs with the 
broadest powers – from the draft constitution20 to the development of 
spaces of action that were only implied in the text of the fundamental 
law of India.21 With a view to implementing the “social” programme 
inscribed in the constitution, with the Fourth Part of the fundamental 
text axed on the “Directive Principles for State Policy”, the Supreme 
Court intervened in the legislative and political arena through its 
judgments. However, this judicial activism, taking a considerable place 
                                                          
19 Pring, G., and Pring, C., Specialized Environmental Courts and Tribunals: the 
Explosion of New Institutions to Adjudicate Environment, Climate Change and 
Sustainable Development, Working Paper, University of Denver, 2011. 
20 Shiva Rao, B., The framing of India’s Constitution – Select Documents, Volumes 1 
to 5, Delhi, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1967; Austin, G., The Indian 
Constitution – Cornerstone of a Nation, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1966; 
Basu, D.D., Introduction to the Constitution of India, Nagpur, LexisNexis 
Butterworth Wadhwa, 20th Edition, 2008; Amirante, D., India, Bologna, Il 
Mulino, 2007.  
21  Jain, M. P. Indian Constitutional Law, Nagpur, LexisNexis Butterworths 
Wadhwa, 6th Edition, 2010; Dhavan, R., Supreme Court and Parliamentary 
Sovereignty, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1976. 
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in the 1970s, has been extensively criticised, since the scope of action of 
the negative legislator had been substantially enlarged by the court 
itself, by means of a judicial review power seen as both a possibility to 
abrogate statutes and of suggesting new legislative actions, as a 
positive legislator.22 
On judicial review, if several limits to the powers expressly derived 
from the text itself, the so called “explicit limits” (having a reference in 
Article 13 of the Indian Constitution), the Supreme Court expanded the 
possibility of protecting fundamental rights and the structure of the 
Constitution from the amending powers of the Parliament in a 
landmark judgment, Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala, defining the 
“basic structure doctrine”. 23  Through the use of this doctrine as a 
standard of review in order to assess the limits of state power, the 
Supreme Court managed to establish and enlarge the hurdles placed in 
front of the legislative and executive powers to amend the Constitution 
– holding that the basic features of the Constitution (and especially the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Part III) shall remain inviolable.24 
This judicial activism, inherent in judicial review, eventually led to the 
enactment of a panoply of remedies in order for the Supreme Court to 
supervise the orders it delivered, in a manner considered as infringing 
the prerogatives of the executive and of the legislature. Setting the 
scene since the 1970s with such powers, the fields of environmental 
regulation and environmental case law, in their very first start, could 
not but be affected by these premises, especially in a socio-economic 
atmosphere characterised by a certain neglect of concerns towards the 
environment on the part of the authorities. 
                                                          
22 Sathe, S.P., Judicial Activism in India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2nd 
Edition, 2004; Verma, K, Verma, S.K. (eds.), Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of 
India – Its Grasp and Reach, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
23 Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1973, 4 SCC 225. 
24 A development which is parallel to the doctrine ideated by the German 
Federal Constitutional Tribunal, and suggested by German legal scholars with 
links to India, such as Dietrich Conrad. On this, see Krishnaswamy, S., 
Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine, 
New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
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As for the environment, the activism of the Supreme Court resulted in a 
thorough protection of citizens’ rights and in suggestions for the 
legislature to draft acts eager to enhance the defence of the 
environment. This was done less by taking advantage of the basic 
structure doctrine than by issuing writs for the protection of 
fundamental rights, on the basis of Article 32 of the Constitution,25 
defined by Bhimrao Ambedkar as “the very soul of the constitution and the 
very heart of it” – since the legislature had been substantially inactive in 
the field of environmental law. 
To this situation, the facts of Bhopal surely are a remarkable watershed. 
After the tragedy of Bhopal, Indian public authorities, whether 
pertaining to the legislative, the executive or the judiciary, gained an 
enhanced insight over environmental issues and apprehended the 
urgency not only of solving problems, but also of preventing harm. 
Landslide legislation followed – basically in two periods, in the 1970s26 
and then from the 1980s 27  – which was characterised by its poor 
implementation. 28  If the legislation was typically conceived for 
protecting the environment through state intervention and the 
imposition of limits to socio-economic activities, 29  the case of India 
followed the general experiences of common law countries – leaving 
the floor to legislative solutions implementing administrative organs 
and also control by the judiciary.30 India witnessed a series of thorough 
                                                          
25 For a comprehensive study of the system of writ jurisdiction, Ramachandran, 
V.G., Law of Writs, Lucknow, Eastern Book Company, 5th Edition, 1993.  
26 Parliament of India, Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; Water (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) 
Cess Act, 1977. 
27 Parliament of India, Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; 
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991. 
28  Sahasnaraman, P.B., Handbook of Environmental Law, New Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, 2nd Edition, 2012; Divan, S., Rosencranz, A., op.cit.. 
29 Cordini, G., Fois, P., Marchisio, S., Diritto ambientale – profili internazionali, 
europei e comparati, Torino, Giappichelli, 2008. 
30 In this sense, India introduced environmental rights in the Constitution and 
placed them in a framework of judicial protection that other common law 
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drafts of administrative institutions dealing with specific problems – 
each statute dealing with one issue and having one body supposed to 
follow suits on that specific environmental problem.31 
The result of this “overshooting” of legislative action was scarce 
implementation and a dominant role of the judiciary – as the 
constitutional guarantee of environmental rights allowed citizens to use 
judicial remedies such as the device of Articles 32 and 226 of the 
Constitution: the possibility for the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts to issue writs to protect rights and the expansive interpretation 
given to those norms rendered the Supreme Court “a public educator, 
policy maker, public administrator and, more generally, amicus 
environment”.32  
The extensive use of this kind of judicial remedies brought to an 
inflation of lawsuits – the court itself encouraging such actions thanks 
to its decisions enlarging the scope of environmental protection and the 
access to justice through innovative features (such as Public Interest 
Litigation, to be understood as the use of litigation for attaining social 
reform).33 Thus, the necessity of establishing a specialised court for 
environmental cases, already perceived in the 1990s and suggested by 
the Supreme Court itself, resulted in several attempts to create such 
tribunal and in the eventual enactment of the National Green Tribunal 
Act of 2010.  
                                                                                                                               
countries did not share – leaving this branch of rights a mere ordinary 
legislative protection. 
31  Divan, S., Rosencranz, A., op.cit., offer a detailed account of each of the 
branches of environmental law in India. 
32 Ibidem, p. 23. 
33 On Public Interest Litigation, deeply analysed in Chapter III, see Rajamani, L., 
Public interest environmental litigation in India: Exploring issues of access, 
participation, equity, effectiveness and sustainability, in Journal of environmental 
law, 19, 3, 2007, pp. 293-321; Feldman, D., Public interest litigation and 
Constitutional theory in Comparative Perspective, in The Modern Law Review, 55, 1, 
1992, pp. 44-72; Bhagwati, P.N., Judicial activism and public interest litigation, 
in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 23, 1984, p. 561; Denvir, J., Towards a 
political theory of public interest litigation, in NCL Review, 54, 1975, p. 1133. 
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Outline of the chapters 
Once exposed the main theoretical framework and research questions, 
it is possible to introduce the thesis outline. The structure of the thesis 
follows a division in five chapters: 
1) The review of the relevant international environmental law 
principles from the Stockholm Declaration in relation with the 
concept of rule of law and sustainable development; 
2) The analysis of the constitutional experience of India 
concerning the right to life and environmental rights, with a 
focus on legislative measures, administrative action and 
judicial decisions; 
3) The path toward the creation of the National Green Tribunal, 
through the evolution of the jurisprudence on sustainable 
development and the idea of a specialised court; 
4) Technicalities: access to justice, procedural devices and the role 
of experts in the NGT; 
5) Environmental principles in action: international and domestic 
law principles in the main streams of the decisions of the court 
since 2011. 
First Chapter 
The first chapter will lay out the international law foundations of the 
analysis. Starting from the first steps of contemporary international 
environmental law, the chapter outlines the concept of sustainable 
development in relationship with the constitutional notion of rule of 
law. The very recent developments of the concept of rule of law as 
understood in the United Nations documents show how the relevance 
of it gained momentum through the connection with a renewed vision 
of sustainable development, especially through the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. 
This chapter delves into the concept of sustainable development as 
understood from its emergence in the international arena, along with 
the draft of several international instruments concerning environmental 
law. It shows how the concerns for the protection of the environment 
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are shared among countries and how they enter and influence the 
single legal systems. This notion – an “umbrella concept”34 – will be 
further assessed in light of the integration of the rule of law as a fourth 
necessary aspect that blends economic, social and environmental 
concerns. The particular focus on human rights and access to justice – it 
being the main reason for the establishment of the National Green 
Tribunal in India – will be the main argument mirroring the process of 
intersection of the two legal systems (the international and the Indian 
ones) moving from the international and UN law notions to the 
domestic elaborations in the field of environmental rights in connection 
with sustainable development, in order to set the scene for further 
constitutional developments. 
Second Chapter 
The second chapter will be the core of the pure constitutionalist 
analysis of the legal system of India as for environmental topics. The 
starting point of the analysis is the concept of rule of law in the 
Constitution of India, as it constitutes the main innovation in the 
fundamental text arising from the independence from British rule. 
Although not directly related to the right to the environment as 
developed in the Indian system, the study will begin by the debates in 
the Constituent Assembly, as the elaboration of the rule of law is 
central in anchoring all individual and collective rights. Hence, 
notwithstanding its apparent irrelevance in the framework of the thesis, 
because of the time of the debates (end of the 1940s) if compared to the 
emergence of environmental rights (the 1970s), an analysis of the 
primary sources – centred on the right to life enshrined in Article 21 of 
the Constitution – will be helpful for shaping the subsequent parts of 
the dissertation and the argument. Moreover, the birth of the Indian 
Constitution as a peculiar social pact explains the developments of the 
legislation concerning the environment and of the judicial activism of 
the Supreme Court.  
                                                          
34  Sands, P., and Peel, J., Principles of International Environmental Law, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 3rd Edition, 2012. 
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The focus will then turn to the amendments to the Constitution 
introducing environmental rights and protection in the legal system 
and their legislative developments. The constitutional theory exposed 
beforehand and the international law framework shown in the previous 
chapter will be useful in explaining the introduction of Articles 48A 
and 51A(g) of the Constitution and their judicial interpretation in 
connection with Article 21. In addition to the amendments to the 
Constitution, the several texts enacted by the Parliament from the 1970s 
on environment will show how the measures chosen were mainly 
leading to the establishment of commissions entitled to control public 
and private action, with scarce success. Throughout the chapter, the 
vicissitudes of the legislative history will be thus traced back, showing 
the ineffectiveness of the institutions created, as well as the working of 
the administrative framework, characterised by a persistent 
elusiveness.  
Third Chapter 
The central chapter of the dissertation will be dedicated to the analysis 
of the environmental jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. As hinted in 
the introduction and in the literature review section, the role of the 
judiciary is capital in shaping the institutional developments of India. A 
first section of the chapter will deal with the expansion of the judicial 
decisions in the field of environmental protection, by attempting to 
deliver a systematisation of the whole corpus. A thorough study of the 
judgments since the 1970s and of the directions issued as part of its writ 
jurisdiction in cases pertaining to diverse fields of environmental 
protection will give the sense of the role of the Supreme Court, also 
with a view to the pronouncements of the apex court in relation with 
the international law instruments and concepts, that originated a 
peculiar construction of the notion of sustainable development. 
In parallel with its conceptual analysis, the Supreme Court 
endeavoured to suggest institutional developments related to 
environmental legislation to the Parliament, such as the proposal for 
environmental courts, leading to unsuccessful attempts as the National 
Environment Tribunal, that prepared the ground for the establishment 
of the NGT.  
The eventual creation of this court will be the object of a comparative 
study by considering the various environmental courts implemented so 
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far in the other constitutional systems. To this purpose, a comparative 
study of the New South Wales Land and Environmental Court and of 
New Zealand’s Environment Court imposes as the typology of tribunal 
chosen by the Indian legislature is very close to that implemented in the 
two countries – bearing in mind the hermeneutical distinction made in 
the literature between the ways of acting for creating specialised 
jurisdictions.  
Fourth Chapter 
The analysis of the working of the National Green Tribunal will be 
divided in two different moments: firstly, an appraisal of the 
procedural and technical peculiarities of the environmental court; then, 
a substantive analysis of the principle of sustainable development, 
precaution and polluter pays, with reference to actual cases and to the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. 
Hence, the fourth chapter is devoted to the technical devices that 
embody the effectiveness of Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, ensuring a fair access to justice. These “technicalities” are 
divided in two categories. On the one hand, the typical judicial 
instruments and characteristics: the scope of jurisdiction according to 
the cases liable to be admitted (jurisdiction ratione materiae), the subjects 
(ratione personae) and the time limits for filing a case (ratione temporis); 
on the other hand, the role of technical experts in the decisions, that 
constitute the watershed between the previous experience of the 
Supreme Court and the new National Green Tribunal. The analysis of 
the value of expertise in decision-making will be pursued following the 
elaboration of the Tribunal on the process of Environmental Impact 
Assessment, the administrative procedure leading to the approval of 
developmental projects. As it can be easily inferred, the weak link in 
the chain is indeed administrative implementation: to counter this 
tendency, the pathological phase is analysed by the judiciary by giving 
clear indications and directives on the manner institutions should apply 
regulations and international principles in the single cases. In this 
framework, the role of experts in courts is crucial, as they are the only 
instance that can scientifically assess the quality of decisions and 
constitute the main difference from previous experiences of 
environmental litigation. 
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Fifth Chapter 
Mirroring the first chapter and following the third, the final analysis of 
the dissertation consists of a systematisation of the body of judicial 
decisions of the National Green Tribunal. As the Tribunal is statutorily 
bound to apply the principles of sustainable development, precaution 
and polluter pays, its decisions carefully reflect this indication and 
constitute a precious example of implementation and elaboration of 
international principles in a domestic system. Hence, a study of the 
jurisprudential corpus will shed light on the continuity with the work 
of the Supreme Court (in the substantial interpretation of sustainable 
development and its linked principles as well as in the relevance of 
Article 21 of the Constitution) and on the enhancement in the quality of 
access to justice and of substantive justice itself, achieved thanks to a 
new institution. The analysis will thus delve into the decisions showing 
the different approaches - both human- and eco-centric - the Tribunal 
took in adjudicating the pathological situations presented in its first five 
years. 
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Chapter I 
The environment and sustainable development in 
international and constitutional law 
 
 
The institution and the current spread of specialised environmental 
jurisdictions is a phenomenon that relates to domestic legal systems, 
but has a solid theoretical basis in the concepts that emerged in 
international law from the 1970s. In particular, the notion of sustainable 
development and its elaboration in linkage with the idea of rule of law 
– particularly in the sources of the United Nations – are crucial in order 
to understand the institutional developments of the single countries. 
Thus, this first part will be divided in four sections. Initially, the 
analysis will dwell on the emergence of the principles of international 
environmental law, through both a short chronological presentation 
and a thematic analysis of the main crystallised notions. Then, the 
fundamental principle for the scope of the present work, the concept of 
sustainable development, will be the object of a second paragraph, 
starting from the introduction of the concept in the Brundtland Report 
and looking into the results of the Rio+20 Conference of 2012. As these 
last advances associated the principle of sustainable development to the 
notion of rule of law, the third part of the chapter will delve into an 
inquiry of this notion in the framework of constitutional law and in the 
unfolding of it in international law, by outlining its gradual 
introduction in the instruments drafted and approved by the competent 
organs of the UN system.  A final paragraph will be devoted to the 
introduction of environmental rights and the increased appeal for the 
enhancement of access to justice as part of the rule of law and as a right 
connected to environmental issues, in order to establish the link 
between sustainable development and access to justice. This linkage 
sets the scene for the implementation of the umpteen international 
recommendations on environment and rule of law in the domestic 
systems, that found their embodiment in India by the establishment of 
the National Green Tribunal. 
 
  20 
I) Principles of international environmental law 
 
a)    The emergence of international environmental law  
International environmental law as a distinct branch of international 
law has emerged only from the 1970s, with slow but growingly relevant 
advances since the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972.35  Before this first summit 
exclusively devoted to the subject, concerns on the protection of the 
environment had only been occasionally dealt with in international law 
and international relations, in connection with particular and localised 
issues (the two most relevant cases being the proceedings between the 
United States and Great Britain on the Behring Fur Seal arbitration and 
the Train Smelter case between the United States and Canada).36 Apart 
                                                          
35 Kiss, A-C., Sicault J-D., La Conférence des Nations Unies sur l'environnement 
(Stockholm, 5/16 juin 1972), in Annuaire Français de Droit International, Volume 18, 
1972, pp. 603-628. The Conference was convened by means of a Resolution of 
the General Assembly, proposed by Sweden, a country that had long been at 
the forefront of the environmental questions, as the other Scandinavian States. 
At the end of this conference, three instruments were adopted: a Declaration 
with 26 principles, an Action Plan providing 109 recommendations, and a 
Resolution for the institutional and financial provisions. The Conference has 
namely been a stepping stone for the creation of UNEP, the United Nations 
Programme on the Environment, created by UN General Assembly Resolution 
2997 (XXVII). See also Kiss A-C., and Sicault, J-D., Post Stockholm: Influencing 
National Environmental Law and Practice Through International Law and Policy, in 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 66, 1, 1972; Sohn, L., The 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, in Harvard International Law 
Journal, 14, 423, 1973. 
36 The first case concerned the exploitation of a specific resource, the fur seal, 
risking extinction. In 1893, an ad hoc international tribunal decided in favour of 
Great Britain on the impossibility of extending US regulation outside national 
jurisdiction but adopted specific regulation for the protection of that resource. 
The second case, arising from the transboundary effects of sulphur dioxide 
fumes produced by Canadian smelter plants in farms located in the State of 
Washington, was decided in favour of the US in 1941. On the origins of 
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from the single issues of the protection of specific resources or 
ecosystems (wildlife, seas and rivers) or concerning transboundary 
pollution, that forced the states affected to cooperate according to the 
principle of good neighbourliness and to adopt limited solutions, calls 
for a more globally sustained address to environmental protection 
found a first stage in Stockholm. 
Gathering representatives from both industrialised and developing 
countries, the Conference adopted a text on the 16th of June 1972, the 
“Declaration of Principles for the Preservation and Enhancement of the 
Human Environment” (Stockholm Declaration), containing general 
statements on the protection of the environment and on the issues of 
development. 37  The Stockholm Declaration is the first international 
document underlining the necessity of a “common outlook” and of 
“common principles” in order to deal with environmental policies. 
Although a definition of environment is not provided, the concept is 
characterised by two sides, natural and man-made, the latter affecting 
the former. It is this very understanding of the impact of human actions 
that brought to the adoption of the document, embodying the concern 
for inter-generational and intra-generational equity as a fundamental 
guidance.  
Among the 26 principles listed in the Declaration, a classification can be 
made according to the concerns to whom they respond. First of all, the 
issues concerning the protection of natural resources are dealt with in 
Principles 2 to 7, that distinguish between renewable and non-
                                                                                                                               
international environmental law, refer to Halvorssen, A.M., The Origin and 
Development of International Environmental Law, in Shawkat, A., Bhuiyan, J., 
Chowdhury, T., and Techera, E. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of International 
Environmental Law, London, Routledge, 2012; Sands, P., Principles of International 
Environmental Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 2nd Edition, 
Chapter II; Spatafora, E., Tutela ambientale (diritto internazionale), in Enciclopedia 
del Diritto, Vol. XLV, Giuffrè, Milano, 1992, pp. 441-464. On the relationship 
between sovereignty and international environmental law, Dupuy P-M, Sur des 
tendances récentes dans le droit international de l'environnement, in Annuaire 
Français de Droit International, Volume 20, 1974, pp. 815-829. 
37 UN Document A/Conf. 48/14/Rev. 1, 1972. 
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renewable resources and tackle traditional problems such as the 
extinction of species (Principle 4) and pollution (Principles 6 and 7). 
Then, a second category responds to the challenge of development for 
post-colonial states (Principles 8 to 10): the link between environment, 
development and social needs is already established, although in nuce, 
paving the way for the elaboration of the concept of sustainable 
development from the end of the 1980s.38 Apart from the substantive 
assertion of environmental criteria, a third set of principles focuses on 
policy (Principles 11 to 19). International statements have to be applied 
nationally: economic and environmental assessment is necessary in 
order to hamper environmental degradation and promote a 
development that meets the requirements of the people. Finally, albeit 
reaffirming states’ sovereignty over natural resources, the last 
principles provide for international cooperation, a fundamental shift 
from the single issues of international environmental law arising in the 
past, such as the Train Smelter case. In this scenario, the draft of bi- and 
multilateral treaties dealing with global environmental effects 
(Principle 24) is the most relevant and pervasive advance.  
The Stockholm Declaration provides the international community with 
a new understanding of environmental issues, seen for the first time as 
common threats to human development. Nevertheless, the nature of 
the declaration is that of a soft law instrument, without binding effect 
upon states: it constitutes, as Dupuy states, “the normative program for 
the world community” in the field of environment. 39  In fact, the 
document poses basic principles, that in later periods crystallised into 
customary international law (e.g. intergenerational equity), and calls for 
international cooperation among states, in order to further detail 
normative instruments on the protection and usage of the environment. 
The principles were stated but, as Philippe Sands noted, the documents 
                                                          
38 See infra, section II). 
39 Dupuy, P-M., Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, in Michigan 
Journal of International Law, 12, 420, 1990. 
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issued in Stockholm did not provide for assessed techniques so that 
states and international organisations could apply them effectively.40       
The legal consequences of the Conference on the Human Environment 
were basically two-fold: on the one hand, the Declaration resulted in an 
attempt by several states to translate soft law principles into binding 
domestic law;41 on the other hand, a blossoming of multilateral treaties 
on specific environmental branches, inaugurating one of the main 
characteristic of environmental law, the existence of separate regimes 
for different issues, some of them region-based. In fact, during the 
1970s and the 1980s, a series of international agreements on 
environmental protection were signed and entered into force. Among 
many, suffice it to cite the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), negotiated in 1973 within the cadre 
of the International Maritime Organisation; the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) of the same year; the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals; the Convention on Long-range 
Trans-boundary Air Pollution of the Economic Commission for Europe 
of 1979; the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982; 
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985, 
completed by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer of 1987. Those treaties establish both a “hard law”, listing 
specific commitments for states (e.g. CITES and UNCLOS), and binding 
commitments sketching guidelines and principles and institutions for 
furthering cooperation in the field, in the form of framework 
agreements (for instance, the Vienna Convention). 42  Thus, the first 
                                                          
40 Sands, P., op.cit., p. 38: “The Stockholm Principles are weak on techniques for 
implementing environmental standards, such as environmental impact assessment, 
access to environmental information and the availability of administrative and judicial 
remedies”. On the nature of soft law, Koivurova, T., Introduction to International 
Environmental Law, London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 58-60. 
41 For the case of India, see infra, Chapter II. 
42 Hossain, K., The International Environmental Law-making Process, in Shawkat, 
A., Bhuiyan, J., Chowdhury, T., and Techera, E. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of 
International Environmental Law, op.cit., pp. 61-76; Leanza, U., Caracciolo, I., Il 
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years of international environmental regulation were characterised by 
the sector-specific outline of the agreements, with the consequent 
absence of cross-cutting issues, although mitigated through the gradual 
formation of general principles (such as the no-harm principle in 
transboundary pollution and the sovereignty of states on natural 
resources).43 
Apart from the specific agreements, the trend toward the formation of 
general principles materialised only twenty years after Stockholm. In 
fact, the stepping stone in the field of international environmental law 
was certainly the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED, also known as Earth Summit), convened in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992, as a result of a renewed consciousness on 
environmental issues linked to the challenges of developing states arose 
since the end of the 1980s, with the several initiatives undertaken under 
the aegis of the United Nations.44 The Rio Conference rekindled the 
single issues dealt with in the most relevant international agreements 
while shaping them in a common framework of action. This meeting 
resulted in a series of international instruments adopted by consensus, 
reflecting the careful balance between developed and developing states 
and between the concerns for environmental protection and the 
aspirations toward economic development. First of all, three non-
binding documents: the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, a text including 27 principles descending from the 
Stockholm Declaration; the UNCED Forest Principles, arising from the 
concerns on deforestation; and Agenda 21, an action plan for the 
                                                                                                                               
diritto internazionale: diritto per gli Stati e diritto per gli individui, Vol. 2, Torino, 
Giappichelli, 2010, pp. 377-392; Kiss A-C., Les traités-cadre : une technique 
juridique caractéristique du droit international de l'environnement, in Annuaire 
Français de Droit International, Volume 39, 1993, pp. 792-797. 
43  Kiss A-C., Dix ans après Stockholm - une décennie de droit international de 
l'environnement, in Annuaire Français de Droit International, Volume 28, 1982. pp. 
784-793; Spatafora, E., op.cit.. 
44  For instance, the Brundtland Report that “inaugurated” the principle of 
sustainable development. See infra, section II). 
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incoming century. 45  The Rio Declaration marked some important 
improvements from the meeting of Stockholm, starting from the 
emphasis dedicated to the right to information (Principle 10) and to the 
role of citizens in each country and the statement of other principles of 
environmental law. Namely, the concepts introduced during the 
negotiations in Rio were the precautionary approach (Principle 15) and 
the common but differentiated responsibility of states (Principle 7, that 
introduced a new approach to improve the situation of the 
environment, by means of a bigger commitment of the industrialised 
States, responsible of environmental degradation in a higher share than 
developing countries).46 
In addition to the non-binding documents, the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development endeavoured to draft and adopt two 
specific treaties open to accession during the meeting: the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. Both conventions had been drafted by two 
different negotiating processes in the framework of Intergovernmental 
Committees that met between 1991 and 1992, in preparation of the 
UNCED. Although pertaining to separate fields of law, the two 
conventions are broader than those drafted in previous years, because 
of the general nature of the objects they deal with (biodiversity and 
                                                          
45 On the negotiations leading to the adoption of the documents in Rio, refer to 
Politi, M., Tutela dell’ambiente e “sviluppo sostenibile”: profili e prospettive di 
evoluzione del diritto internazionale alla luce della Conferenza di Rio de Janeiro, in 
Scritti degli allievi in memoria di Giuseppe Barile; Padova, Cedam, 1995, pp. 447-
580; Kjellén, B., A New Diplomacy for Sustainable Development, London, 
Routledge, 2007, pp. 35-38. 
46 UN Document A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1, 1992. On the Rio Conference, refer to 
Adede, A., International Environmental Law from Stockholm to Rio: an Overview of 
Past Lessons and Future Challenges, in Environmental Policy and Law, 22, 88, 1992; 
Marchisio, S., Gli atti di Rio nel diritto internazionale, in Rivista di diritto 
internazionale, 3, 1992; Porras, I-M., The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for 
International Co-operation, in Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law (RECIEL), 1, 245, 1992; Sand, P.H., International 
Environmental Law After Rio, in European Journal of International Law, 4, 1993, pp. 
377-389. 
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climate change, encompassing the whole natural environment), 
contributing to avoid the dispersion of the norms in numerous single-
issue multilateral conventions. Moreover, both texts reflect the 
developments of the principles of Rio, with the inclusion of articles on 
the precautionary principle and on common but differentiated 
responsibility of states.47  
The contribution of the Rio Conference was thus considerable: 
enunciations of rules on common resources of the international 
community were confirmed and given scope for application; a link 
between international environmental law and international economic-
commercial law was established; and all the actions for the enactment 
of the principles stated was embodied in an “action plan”, Agenda 21, 
which, in spite of its non-binding character, is permeated by strong 
statements that aim at securing the adherence to the expectations of the 
states.48 
The Conference on Environment and Development was both the origin 
of a special branch of environmental law, the law of sustainability, and 
the start of promising developments in the two leading areas of 
international environmental law, climate change and biodiversity. The 
                                                          
47 Conference on Biological Diversity, signed in Rio on June 5, 1992; United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, signed on June 9, 
1992. For a critical view of the first convention, Hermitte, M-A., La convention 
sur la diversité biologique, in Annuaire Français de Droit International, Volume 38, 
1992, pp. 844-870. Both the UNFCCC and the Biodiversity Convention can be 
ascribed to the typology of framework treaties, considered to be an instrument 
of soft law: the implementation of the content of the conventions is left to the 
will of the single parties; more particularly, the negotiation of further 
agreements or protocols is left to the meeting of periodical conferences of the 
states parties. See Kiss A-C., Les traités-cadre : une technique juridique 
caractéristique du droit international de l'environnement, in Annuaire Français de 
Droit International, Volume 39, 1993, pp. 792-797. 
48 On the characters of the Rio documents, refer also to Politi, M., op.cit., pp. 571-
580. The author proposes the thesis of the nature of “atypical instruments” of 
the non-binding documents adopted at UNCED, in particular as far as Agenda 
21 is concerned. 
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twenty years from the first to the second Rio Conference (“Rio+20”, or 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development) witnessed the 
attempt at defining and broadening the notion of sustainable 
development while finding instruments and means of implementation 
for applying the several principles of international environmental law. 
The main concerns in the field, object of the two multilateral treaties 
opened to signature in Rio, saw a growing production of instruments. 
In fact, already a decade after the general principles stated in Rio de 
Janeiro some results could be seen by means of the approval of 
protocols (for climate change, the Kyoto Protocol; for biodiversity, the 
Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety).49 Concerning climate change and the 
reduction of gas emissions, a further improvement could be observed at 
the periodic conferences of the parties to the UNFCCC. Opposed to 
this, on the side of the definition of sustainable development and of the 
other principles, the agenda focused more on implementation than on 
the drafting of documents. The World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, held in Johannesburg in 2002, is the demonstration of 
this trend, since the two declarations issued at the end of the conference 
were non-binding and dedicated to the topic of the implementation at 
the national level.50 The current unfolding of the discipline is thus two-
fold: on the one hand, the necessity of adopting additional international 
instruments is far from being exhausted; on the other hand, the side of 
implementation still witnesses a flawed application. Nevertheless, the 
path traced from the Stockholm Conference shows how the principles 
of environmental law were gradually enshrined in general international 
law, through treaties and soft law instruments, such as General 
Assembly recommendations.51 
 
 
                                                          
49 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 1998. Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, 2000. 
50 UN Document A/CONF.199/20*, 2002. 
51 On the nature of the resolutions of the UN General Assembly, see among 
many Crawford, J., Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 42. 
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b)   Principles of international environmental law  
The fragmented nature of international environmental law did not 
thwart the emergence of general principles. Besides the principle of 
sustainable development – which for its own nature encompasses the 
entirety of the subject – and the difficult task of defining the status and 
the scope of the other principles stated in international law sources, 
several notions arose and became part of customary international law – 
although the debate among scholars is open on their nature.52 Here, we 
will rely on the “non-orthodox” account of customary law (reflecting 
less the survey of state behaviours than the declarations and the verbal 
practice) to focus on the most relevant principles emerged from the 
1970s: ratione materiae, the precautionary principle; ratione temporis, the 
principle of intergenerational equity; ratione personae, the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and the polluter pays 
principle.  
The importance of these international principles arises in particular 
from the attempt of organising in a coherent structure the varied field 
of environmental law by means of them, providing a common thread. 
The principles have this nature of generality because of their meaning 
and content. As Boisson de Chazournes says, they purport a “high 
degree of abstraction and they have to be concretised on a case basis”.53 The 
principles are often part of agreements – and on such ground they have 
the nature of treaty law – but also of soft law documents – where they 
found their initial statement. In order to test their nature of customary 
law, it is opportune to consider the perspective of “declarative law”, as 
Bodansky assumes, not only through the practice of states, but mainly 
through the international negotiations of instruments, the role of 
guidance for the national legislator and the reflects in the decisions of 
                                                          
52 Bodansky, D., Customary (and not so customary) international environmental law, 
in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 1995, pp. 105-119. 
53 Boisson de Chazournes, L., Maljean-Dubois, S., Principes du droit international 
de l‘environnement, in Jurisclasseur Environnement et Développement Durable, 
Genève, 2011, pp. 1-20. 
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international and domestic courts (which should demonstrate their 
nature of customary law).54 
The precautionary principle is certainly one of the most contended for 
both its inherent content and the nature of customary law. The 
principle emerged as a response to the concerns about scientific 
certainty, capital in facing the global threats, from pollution to climate 
change and biodiversity. If already in Stockholm the problem of 
assessment and of the use of scientific evidence was posed in 
negotiations and resolved with the statement of Principles 18 and 20 – 
safeguarding the prerogatives of developing states in accessing 
technological innovation in order to enhance economic development – 
the Rio Declaration introduced the concept of precaution in Principle 
15. 55  Two sides of the precautionary principle can be highlighted, 
through a ratione temporis analysis: on the one hand, the notion of 
prevention (or anticipatory action), that comes into being when the 
threat is known and estimated before the undertaking of a certain 
action; on the other hand, in case of lack of scientific evidence, the 
precautionary approach should contribute to the safeguard of the 
environment by limiting potentially adverse actions or by promoting 
restrictive measures.56 
The extent of the notion is not defined in the text of the Rio Declaration 
(dealing with a general “precautionary approach”), although the content, 
if analysed in a comparative perspective with the subsequent 
international agreements referring to precaution, could be identified in 
four elements: risk, damage, scientific uncertainty and different 
                                                          
54 Bodansky, D., op.cit.. 
55 “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” 
56  Sands, op.cit., pp. 266-279. See also Hey, E., The Precautionary Concept in 
Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalising Caution, in Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review, 4, 303, 1992; Cameron, J., and Abouchar, 
J., The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the 
Protection of the Global Environment, BCICLR, 14, 1, 1991.  
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capacities.57 Risk is to be defined as the possibility of the occurrence of a 
danger. It is strictly linked to the uncertainty derived by the scientific 
studies, that cannot forecast unexpected events. Damage is the 
consequence of the risks unforeseen or underestimated (or estimated, 
when the risk was foreseen but the action nevertheless undertaken): the 
concepts of risk and damage force the authorities to attempt at defining 
a threshold that is linked to precaution. Precautionary measures are 
thus bound both to scientific knowledge (if dealing with prevention) 
and to scientific uncertainty and absence of data (if dealing with 
precaution stricto sensu). It is this very nature that renders the principle 
in constant evolution in line with scientific advances and impact 
assessment, impeding the statement of a constant definition. Finally, 
the question of the different capacities arises a posteriori, on the 
possibility of a state to apply the principle in relation to the economic 
and social situation of that country. In addition to these four elements, 
what is capital for a “strong” definition of the principle is the shift of 
the burden of proof: the new approach of the precautionary principle 
introduces the onus of proof that the activity carried out is not harmful 
to the environment upon the person (polluters, or polluter states) that 
wishes to realise such project. This interpretation is gradually imposing 
as one of the constituent characteristic of the principle, posing new 
challenges and a different paradigm to international trade law.58  
The debate among scholars on the nature of the notion is still ongoing. 
According to Philippe Sands, the precautionary principle is evolving, 
and it is still questionable whether it crystallised into a general 
principle of customary law: although there is evidence of state practice, 
international and national courts are not univocal in explicitly stating 
                                                          
57 Boisson de Chazournes, L., Precaution in international law : reflection on its 
composite nature, in Ndiaye, T.M., et al., Law of the sea, environmental law and 
settlement of disputes: Liber amicorum judge Thomas A. Mensah, Leiden, M. Nijhoff, 
2007, pp. 21-34; Boisson de Chazournes, L., Le principe de précaution : nature, 
contenu et limites, in Leben, C., Verhoeven, J., Le principe de précaution: aspects de 
droit international et communautaire, Paris, Panthéon-Assas, 2002, pp. 65-94. 
58 Sachs, N.M., Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from its Critics, in U. Ill. 
L. Rev., 2011, pp. 1285-1338. 
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and accepting its nature.59 Moreover, the statement of the principle in 
soft law instruments does not concur in assessing the precautionary 
principle as customary, because of the absence of obligation arising 
from them. Nevertheless, its diffusion in the most relevant conventions 
on environmental protection since the 1990s and the reference to it in 
several judgments (from the International Court of Justice in the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case to the WTO Appellate Body in the Beef 
Hormones case and the Indian judgment Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum 
v. Union of India and Others of 1996 – this latter clearly affirming the 
nature of customary international law)60 witness the essential character 
of the notion in the field of international environmental and trade law 
and the nature of emerging principle of customary law, in light with 
the most recent judgements issued by the International Court of Justice 
(Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay of 2010) and by the European Court of 
Human Rights (Tatar v. Romania case of 2009) and considering the 
different legal systems and instruments in which it is enshrined.61 
A second principle around which the debate on the nature is open is 
intergenerational equity. Time and fairness are the dimensions taken 
into account in this case: in order to safeguard natural resources for 
future generations, states have to leave the environment in a condition 
not worse than it previously was. Already in the Stockholm 
Declaration, the principle of intergenerational equity was considered 
one of the cornerstones of the text, the vagueness of the notion not 
being relevant for its impact: Principle 1 states that “man bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future 
generations”. The theory underlying the principle of intergenerational 
equity relies on the idea that we “hold the Earth in trust for future 
generations”, but “at the same time, we are beneficiaries entitled to use and 
                                                          
59 Sands, op.cit., pp. 278-279. 
60 See infra, Chapter III. 
61  de Sadeleer, N., et al., L’émergence du principe de précaution, in Journal des 
tribunaux, 6010, 2001, pp. 393-401; de Sadeleer, N., Réflexions sur le principe de 
précaution, in Zaccaï, E., Missa, J-M., (eds.), Le principe de 
précaution. Significations et conséquences, Bruxelles, Presses de l'ULB, 2000, pp. 
117-142.  
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benefit from it”, as Brown Weiss argues.62 Moreover, the principle can be 
divided according to intergenerational and intra-generational 
approaches: on the one hand, the responsibility lies for future 
generations; on the other, it is valid also toward present generations 
unable to enjoy a full access to natural resources. Finally, if one follows 
a ratione materiae analysis, three elements come to the forefront. The 
principle of intergenerational equity encompasses aspects of 
conservation of options, which means the necessity to maintain natural 
diversity; conservation of quality, that is stated in Principle 1 of the 
Stockholm Declaration; conservation of access, relating to the 
possibility to access the resources for present and future members of a 
generation.63   
This general principle of environmental law could be seen as a 
specification of the notion of equality of rights, stated in numerous 
international human rights documents starting from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, intergenerational equity was 
incorporated in several treaties and later found a further emphasis and 
specification in the development of the notion of precautionary 
principle, the main concern for the notion being its applicability. 
In line with the concerns of equity and fairness but in contrast to the 
principle of intergenerational equity, the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility deals with the protection of natural 
resources and the division of the burden with a focus on the subjects. 
From the notion of common heritage of mankind,64 that considers the 
environment as a indivisible unity, the concerns of the developing 
states for an equitable share of the economic responsibilities of the 
                                                          
62  Brown Weiss, E., Intergenerational equity: a legal framework for global 
environmental change, in Brown Weiss, E. (ed.), Environmental change and 
international law: New challenges and dimensions, Edited by Edith Brown Weiss. 
Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992, Chapter 12.  
63 Brown Weiss, E., op.cit.; Kravchenko, S., Chowdhury, T., Bhuiyan, J., Principles 
of International Environmental Law, in  Shawkat, A., Bhuiyan, J., Chowdhury, T., 
and Techera, E. (eds.), op.cit..  
64 Kiss, A-C., La notion de patrimoine commun de l'humanité, Leiden, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1982 ; Spatafora, E., op.cit.. 
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protection of the environment with a different legal treatment were 
eventually embodied in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration. 65  The 
statement of the principle was the result of long negotiations between 
developed and developing countries (particularly Brazil, India and 
China): while in Stockholm a vague remark on the different situation of 
the countries was inserted in Principle 23 with reference to the 
application of norms, in Rio the shift is patent. 
The notion of common but differentiated responsibility is composed of 
two elements:66 the shared obligation of states for the protection of 
resources and the differential treatment of states in dealing with the 
environmental issues according to their objective economic capacity. As 
for its nature, the principle is mainly addressed to interstate relations, 
without application in domestic legislation or courts. Notably, several 
treaties have reflected the differential approach, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change being the most consistent 
example. Recognising climate change as a “common concern of 
humankind” in the Preamble, the Convention is a pioneering instrument 
in sharing responsibilities among countries, separating developed 
(Annex I Parties) from developing countries (non-Annex I Parties). 
Several provisions demonstrate the application of the principle: in 
particular, Article 4.7 relates to the commitment of industrialised 
countries to transfer technology and financial resources to developing 
countries, and Article 4.1 allows developing countries the absence of 
                                                          
65  “States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different 
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility 
that they bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and 
financial resources they command.” 
66  Sands, P., op.cit., pp. 285-289. See also D. French, Developing States and 
International Environmental Law: The Importance of Differentiated Responsibilities, in 
ICLQ, 49, 35, 2000; Magraw, D., Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: 
Differential Contextual and Absolute Norms, in Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy, 1,  69, 1990. 
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quantitative commitments.67 Moreover, the follow up of the UNFCCC 
is the manifestation of the implementation of the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility, with the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol on the emission of greenhouse gases and the annual 
Conferences of the Parties, negotiating different commitments and 
reporting requirements for the national action plans.68    
Finally, a principle that has mostly domestic significance but also 
international recognition is the polluter pays principle.69 According to 
it, the responsible of acts causing pollution needs to compensate the 
costs of the action toward the environment. This approach, inaugurated 
by the OCDE in the 1970s and embodied in Principle 16 of the Rio 
Declaration, 70  aims at internalising the costs of the so called 
“externalities” arising from an investment or an action – the cost of 
environmental degradation, including prevention. The definition of the 
principle is contested ratione personae, since the notion as it is stated in 
the Rio Declaration hints at an application mainly domestic, with 
limited relevance in interstate relations. Three elements are to be 
                                                          
67 Kjellén, B. op.cit.. See also, Boisson de Chazournes, L., The United Nations 
Framework Convention on climate change : on the road towards sustainable 
development, in Wolfrum, R., Enforcing environmental standards : economic 
mechanisms as viable means?, Berlin, Springer, 1996, pp. 285-300. 
68 Boisson de Chazournes, L., De Kyoto à la Haye, en passant par Buenos Aires et 
Bonn: La régulation de l’effet de serre aux forceps, in Annuaire français de relations 
internationales, 2000, pp. 709-718; Breidenich, C., Magraw, D., Rowley A.,  
Rubin, J-W., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 92, No. 2, 1998, pp. 
315-331; Bodansky, D., The United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention: 
A Commentary, in Yale Journal of International Law, 18, 451,1993; Sands, P., The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, RECIEL, 1, 270, 1992. 
69 Sands, op.cit., pp. 279-285; Gaines, S.E., Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic 
Equity to Environmental Ethos, in Texas International Law Journal, 26, 1991, p. 463. 
70  “National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due 
regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment.” 
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considered for the definition of the polluter pays principle: firstly, the 
need for preventive action, that internalises the potential costs of 
damages caused to the environment; then, the rectification of 
environmental damage at the initial stage; finally, the cost of damages 
ex post.  
If the definition of the elements seems evolving from a commonsense 
approach that aims at the most comprehensive protection of the 
environment, the nature of the principle poses several questions: the 
polluter pays principle has been integrated in domestic legal systems 
by means of legislation, but its place in international law raises doubts. 
In contrast with the precautionary principle, and in spite of its 
complementary nature to this latter, international courts71 or arbitration 
proceedings have not referred to the polluter pays principle in 
judgments or awards, the principle finding its place in several 
international agreements (such as the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994). 
From this assessment, Sands concludes that the principle does not 
possess the status of customary international law and has not achieved 
the same international endorsement as the precautionary principle.72 
Nevertheless, the polluter pays principle has to be considered as a 
policy tool and a soft law principle that guides states and investors in 
their economic actions, through the introduction in domestic legislation 
and the consequent use in internal judgments.73 
The review of the principles analysed so far points out to some of the 
critical aspects of the subject and chiefly to the difficulty in classifying 
the emerging notions. In fact, the four principles are part of 
international environmental law, whether with the status of custom or 
of soft law, insomuch as they guide the behaviour of international and 
domestic actors. In addition to them, the evolution of international law 
                                                          
71 The exception is the European Court of Justice, that referred to the polluter 
pays principle in relation to the interpretation of EC directives or of state 
legislation. 
72 Sands, P., op.cit., p.280. 
73 The Indian Supreme Court being one of the national courts referring to the 
principle, namely in the case Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of 
India of 1996, on toxic chemical industries. See infra, Chapter III. 
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has contributed to another fundamental concept that is the object of the 
present work and aims at comprehending most of the notion presented 
thus far: sustainable development. 
 
II) Sustainable Development: a definitional conundrum?  
 
a) The origin of the notion: relating economics to the environment 
The notion of sustainable development has emerged from the late 
1980s, in a context characterised by the persistent concerns on 
environmental degradation, the will of both developed and developing 
states of maintaining and improving their economic performance and 
the evidence of the need for social action. The worldwide appearance of 
the concept relates to the Report “Our Common Future”,74 issued by 
the Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Environment and 
Development), defining the notion of sustainable development as: 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two 
key concepts: the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the 
world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of 
limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 
environment's ability to meet present and future needs.”75 
The concept could be analysed as nature-centred or human-centred: 
since the first characteristic is its relation to the environment and to 
natural resources, this seems to be the critical aspect of sustainable 
development. Nevertheless, a human-based construction is at the 
forefront. The key concepts, needs and limitations, are related to the 
role of humankind in the planet, especially of the people living in 
developing countries that strive to find their path toward a sustained 
                                                          
74 The original term came into prominence in 1980 in the World Conservation 
Strategy of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources. 
75  UN Document A/42/427, Our Common Future: Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development.  
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growth enabling to diminish the rate of poverty. Moreover, sustainable 
development as defined in the Brundtland Report finds its most solid 
link in the principle of intergenerational equity, stemming from 
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration. Although the starting point of 
the report is the assessment of global, “interlocking” crises that blurred 
the compartments of energetic, environmental, agricultural and 
commercial areas (§11), the focus is mainly human-centred, as the 
environment is seen as the milieu where the human development takes 
place. The very idea of limitations, the second key concept of 
sustainable development, demonstrate the human nature of the 
concept, as it is understood as relative to an era or a technological state 
that could evolve and a social organisation that is not fixed. 
While the Stockholm Declaration initially poses the challenges of 
environment, the Brundtland Report integrates economic aspects 
within the ecological framework, referring to “environment-development 
challenges” (§34). The areas of action identified in the document are the 
demographic growth in its connection with the exploitation of natural 
resources, food security, biodiversity, the energy pathway, 
industrialisation, production patterns and urbanisation. As it could be 
observed, the only issue essentially linked to the environment is 
biological diversity, a characteristic of the environment by itself, the 
other areas typically pertaining to the realm of human activity. 
From the understanding of the common threats and the intertwined 
aspects of sustainable development, the actions proposed in the report 
are two-fold: on the one hand, the use of multilateralism as a method 
for dealing with common environmental and economic issues affecting 
the entirety of the international community; on the other hand, the 
design of national measures in order to implement the principles 
gradually emerging from the international legal and political system. 
This double system arises from the evidence that the systemic features 
of the global challenges call for action at the international, national and 
local level. Concerning the actions to be undertaken, the report 
distinguishes between an “effects-oriented standard agenda”, tackling the 
degradation of environmental quality, and a policy design focused on 
the sources of environmental issues, in order to prevent degradation. 
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Several areas of action encompass the institutional and legal proposals 
of the Brundtland Report.76 First of all, common features for national 
institutions dealing with sustainable development. These should 
include the incorporation of sustainable development in the agendas of 
national policy and economic committees, the draft of annual reports 
on natural resources and the idea of a foreign policy related to the 
environment. At the international level, the report suggests the 
development of regional and global institutions and programmes, such 
as UNEP and environmental cooperation institutions in general. A 
third area of intervention is risk management and information, 
concerning not only public authorities, but also the scientific 
community and the non-governmental actors. Finally, strictly legal 
measures to be adopted at the national level should consist of 
legislation stating the respect of rights and responsibilities of 
individuals and states concerning sustainable development (such as the 
right to information and to participation in decisions, the extension of 
existing laws on the environment and the elaboration of procedures for 
dealing with environmental disputes). 
The Brundtland Report, introducing the concept of sustainable 
development, endeavoured to build a notion correlated to 
environmental law while at the same time integrating economic 
concerns. It is possible to see this as a first “phase” of evolution of 
sustainable development, that at its birth related to the field of 
environmental protection rather than to the other aspects of social and 
economic interest.77 This initial phase ended in 1992 with the Earth 
Summit: in Rio, the legal and political documents adopted, in spite the 
valence of some principles as a consolidation of international 
environmental law, spring from a renewed interest in liberal policies 
and deal extensively with economic aspects. It is the very concept of 
                                                          
76 The Brundtland Report lists six areas. Here the analysis will be focused on the 
main relevant aspects related to international and domestic law.  
77 However, the concept already raised criticisms because of a perceived lack of 
consistency, due to vagueness and to the assumption that sustainability could 
enter ipso facto in developmental goals. See Lélé, S.M., Sustainable Development: 
A Critical Review, in World Development, Vol. 19, No. 6, 1991, pp. 607-621. 
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needs, fundamental in the definition of sustainable development 
delivered in the Brundtland Report, that allow for shifts in the meaning 
of sustainable development: needs can be understood as 
environmental, social, economic or generally human; starting from this 
assumption, the notion of sustainable development can vary according 
to the theories and to the issues on top of the political agenda. 78 
Principle 27 of the Rio Declaration shows how this shift can be 
translated in action: assuming that there exist a branch of “international 
law in the field of sustainable development” to be developed, the consensus 
on the notion is not acquired. On the contrary, as Philippe Sands notes, 
indications on the content and on the nature of the concept, whether 
procedural or substantive, are absent from the Declaration of the Earth 
Summit.79  
The Earth Summit, devoted both to environment and development, 
contributed to the shift towards a definition of sustainable development 
that prominently put development on a higher ground. Exhausting the 
push towards the establishment of environmental principles, by means 
of a wide range of multilateral agreements (culminating in Rio with the 
discipline on climate change, biological diversity and, later, on 
desertification), the Rio Declaration introduced – as a soft law 
instrument – two innovations that were to be a key tool for starting the 
subsequent phases of the notion of sustainable development. As 
mentioned previously, Principle 27 opened the path to multiple 
definitions and applications. If this principle is read in junction with 
Principles 3 and 5 and the developments that followed the Earth 
Summit, the shift toward a purely anthropocentric vision becomes 
conceivable. On the one hand, Principle 3 introduces a right to 
development that brings the logic of the protection of rights and 
individual and collective positions in the discourse on environment and 
                                                          
78 See infra, section c), for the definitions of sustainable development. Refer also 
to Redcliff, M., Sustainable Development (1987-2005): An Oxymoron Comes of Age, 
in Sustainable Development, 13, 2005, pp. 212-227. The shift toward a centrality of 
liberal policies is highlighted in the text of Agenda 21. 
79 Sands, P., International Courts and the Application of Sustainable Development, in 
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sustainable development – integrating sustainable development in the 
field of human rights. On the other hand, the emphasis on poverty 
eradication as a precondition for sustainable development is a key 
factor for pushing forward the appeals for economic and social action – 
confirmed twenty years later in the final declaration of the Conference 
on Sustainable Development, that indicates poverty eradication as the 
main objective to be achieved. 
This double direction is manifest in the second document issued at 
UNCED – Agenda 21. 80  Since the motives for convening the Earth 
Summit relied on the assumption that all countries shared a common 
interest in the preservation of the environment, in spite of the factual 
situation dividing developed and developing countries as far as means 
of implementation and financial resources are concerned (epitomised in 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities), the 
Conference on Environment and Development approved a plan of 
action, a “dynamic programme” whose purpose is the application of 
measures for a sound development along the principles of the Rio 
Declaration. The document is divided in four sections: social and 
economic dimensions; management of resources; role of major groups; 
means of implementation. It is apparent that the social and economic 
aspects are on top of the list: the first concern in the agenda is the 
integration of developing economies in the international trade system, 
since the cooperation among states in the coordination of economic 
policies is deemed to be a precondition for growth and consequently 
for sustainable development (§2.2). 
The key statement relating to the three dimensions of sustainable 
development and their implementation is §2.6, indicating sound 
economic policies, an effective public administration, the integration of 
environmental concerns, the progress toward a democratic government 
and participation in decision-making process as the conditions for 
fulfilling the objectives of the Agenda (especially the economic part). 
Apart from the relevance of liberal policies and of a multilateral trading 
system, the concerns on environment and development are the object of 
a specific section (§8). What is required in order to integrated 
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environmental and developmental policies is a restructuration of the 
processes of decision-making at the national level, through reviews and 
plans to be adopted in all administrative branches, by keeping in mind 
the requirements of transparency and of broad participation, with a 
national strategy for sustainable development as an umbrella document 
for fostering the implementation of Agenda 21. Particular attention 
should be devoted to the draft of legislation, to be preferably improved 
through the integration of social, economic, environmental and 
scientific principles and the favour for framework legislation instead of 
piece-meal texts. 
As for the means of implementation, financial resources are obviously 
at the forefront (nation-based, but with the traditional emphasis on the 
requirements of official development assistance and of other 
international-based funding mechanisms), but legal instruments find 
increased relevance (§39). Apart from the domestic instruments 
referred to in the section for social and economic action, the field of 
international law is concerned with a supplementary effort. The call for 
the development of international law is reiterated, with a special accent 
on the integration of environmental instruments and principles with 
social and economic agreements and on the participation of developing 
countries in the process. Moreover, assuming the lack of 
implementation typical of soft law documents (where principle of 
environmental law are embodied) and the considerable number of 
multilateral treaties, Agenda 21 envisions means for reporting and 
monitoring the implementation of international law, suggesting the 
United Nations Programme for the Environment, or other international 
bodies, as possible institutions to be entrusted with this task. 
The Rio process thus witnesses of a strong will of states for renewing 
their commitments for the environment, especially through the 
conventional instrument, but also and prominently of an inclination for 
shifting the concept of sustainable development toward the evolution 
of international trade law – Agenda 21 being the tool for implementing 
this preference for economic issues and neo-liberal conceptions over 
purely environmental concerns. The follow up of the Conference 
consisted in the creation of a Commission on Sustainable Development 
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as a subsidiary organ of the Economic and Social Council81 , to be 
convened annually. The Commission was endowed with competences 
ranging from discussions of budgetary issues, agenda-setting, 
monitoring and identifying indicators for sustainable development to 
the incorporation of the Rio principles in Agenda 21,82 but testified of 
the lack of interest from states, that considered it as an organ mainly 
dealing with secondary environmental issues and lacking coherence 
because of the large competences. 
From the Earth Summit of 1992, the second occasion for a general 
conference took place in Johannesburg in 2002, with the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development from the 26th of August to the 4th of 
September. In the ten-year period between Rio and Johannesburg, 
action concerning the protection of the environment experienced 
insufficient means of implementation, not only as far as financial 
instruments are concerned, but also because of political decisions 
setting aside the relevance of Agenda 21. Similarly to the conventional 
experiences, characterised by the statement of principles often left to 
the states for definition, substantial application and temporal, flexible 
implementation, the plan of implementation set in Agenda 21 was still 
open for discussion and application. The Conference in Johannesburg 
constituted a manner to draw up an inventory of the results of a 
process lasting thirty years. 
As prefigured in the interpretation of Principles 3 and 5 of the Rio 
Declaration, environmental concerns were overshadowed by social and 
economic necessities. In contrast to the previous phase, the 
Johannesburg Summit evidenced the “conventional fatigue”: while 
multilateral instruments had been fundamental in bringing forward the 
calls for protecting the environment, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development made apparent the general agreement in limiting the 
instrument of multilateral treaties on environmental subjects, in spite of 
the awareness of the continuing degradation of the global environment. 
                                                          
81 By means of General Assembly Resolution 47/191. 
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Document E/CN. 17/1997/8, on the application and implementation of the Rio 
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This assessment testifies of the dispersion of the discipline among 
umpteen documents and international bodies and systems, with mixed 
results according to the scope of the provisions of each treaty. 
As a result of this shared analysis, the documents adopted in 
Johannesburg – a political declaration and a plan of implementation83 – 
did not provide for an advance in the field of sustainable development, 
but merely registered the state of the art at the beginning of the new 
millennium. The Johannesburg Declaration, as a linking point between 
the two Declarations of Rio, proclaims the prominence of economic 
concerns over plainly environmental issues: poverty eradication, 
changes in production and consumption and the management of 
natural resources are considered as objectives and requirements of 
sustainable development (§11). Concerns for environmental 
degradation are expressed only in §13, as a result of the globalisation of 
the world economy – that was praised in Agenda 21 as the precondition 
for achieving economic growth and sustainable development itself. 
Moreover, the second dimension introduced in nuce in Rio, the 
integration of human rights in the notion of sustainable development, 
are partially present in §19 and 20, on health and gender equality. 
Within this political framework, the Plan of Implementation reflects 
this blurred situation: in spite of the classical statement on the equal 
interdependence of the environmental, social and economic pillars of 
sustainable development, the focus is on poverty eradication and 
production patters. As a result of the strengthened support of the 
United Nations organs on good governance and human rights (§8, 9),84 
this dimension too is integrated in the actions concerning sustainable 
development, assuming the existence of a right to development with a 
subsidiary character that paved the way for future evolutions. The 
rhetoric of rights marks a watershed in the understanding of 
sustainable development, since it includes the notion in the wider range 
of activities of the United Nations for the new millennium. The 
reference to the “Millennium Declaration”, adopted by the General 
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Assembly on the 18th of September 2000,85 constitutes a bridge toward 
another paradigm shift for sustainable development: starting from the 
environmental concerns and pursuing its evolution according to 
economic conceptions, the notion of sustainable development sees 
linkages with the respect of human rights and the calls for good 
governance. In fact, the right to development is recognised in the 
Millennium Declaration with a particular mention (§24, “respect for all 
internationally recognised human rights, including the right to 
development”), opening the way for international and national policies 
on this aspect. 
In spite of this opening, the Plan of Implementation focuses on 
capacity-building from a predominant economic perspective: the means 
of implementation converge on the access and use of financial 
instruments and on the integration of countries in the trading system, 
more than on a fully comprehensive notion of capacities that takes into 
account the three dimensions of sustainable development (§81-136). 
The only mention of rights related to rule of law and the environment is 
made in §128: a right to access to justice and administrative 
proceedings and the principle of public participation in decision-
making processes is considered in line with the statements made at the 
Earth Summit of 1992. Nevertheless, a broader vision for institutional 
and legal measures is provided in §162-167, considering the role of 
national, regional and local authorities for the enhancement of rule of 
law and sustainable development, confirming the interpretation of a 
third paradigm shift at its infancy. 
In summary, the Johannesburg Summit confirmed the economic and 
anthropocentric vision of sustainable development, registering the end 
of the drive for environmental action as a means of itself. As far as 
international law is concerned, the absence of developments and 
advances is patent, since the summit exclusively dealt with political 
action and testified of the relativity of the understanding of the 
different notions pertaining to the domain of environmental law – 
which were overshadowed by socio-economic concerns. In spite of this 
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stalemate in legal evolutions,86 and especially as far as international law 
is concerned, the World Summit on Sustainable Development finds its 
relevance in opening the way for the integration of a fourth dimension 
in sustainable development, namely the accent on development seen as 
a human right connected to governance.   
                      
b) The shift of paradigm: Rio+20 
The period from the World Summit on Sustainable Development and 
the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in 
Rio de Janeiro from the 20th to the 22nd of June 2012, witnessed the same 
difficulties experienced from the Earth Summit. The Commission on 
Sustainable Development continued its tasks of promoting the notion 
of the UN level, but as for concrete results, implementation of Agenda 
21 and of the Johannesburg Plan was still incomplete, because of the 
absence of commitments and of a reporting mechanism built on a 
voluntary basis. The Rio Summit of 2012 was thus the catalysing 
moment for both making an assessment of the international action on 
the environment and for attempting at rescuing a tous azimuts 
definition of the concept of sustainable development that could finally 
bridge the three dimensions – namely the economic, environmental and 
social aspects of the notion, with the linkages to the rule of law. The 
final declaration of the conference, “The future we want”,87 outlines the 
results achieved so far and proposes new sectors to be connected with 
sustainable development. 
First of all, the social and civil dimension of sustainable development is 
put to the forefront, in order to further affirm the strength of the social 
dimension embodied in the notion. Instead of emphasising the 
environmental aspects of sustainable development and economic 
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growth, that were foundational of the documents approved in 
Stockholm in 1972 and in Rio in 1992, the resolution of 2012 focuses on 
the challenge of poverty for the world population – the eradication of 
poverty being the objective of sustainable development, as stated in 
Johannesburg. The notion proposed is clearly anthropocentric: “people 
are at the centre of sustainable development” (§5). As for the legal aspects, 
the linkage to human rights is clearly established, since the concept 
advanced in “The future we want” reaffirms rights linked to the 
anthropocentric vision and the objective of poverty eradication, such as 
the right to development, the right to food, the rule of law,88 rights 
related to women and the importance of democratic values (§8).  
As for the corpus of international law, apart from the general 
commitment to the respect of international law and the previous 
declarations adopted at the end of the summits, the most relevant 
principle reaffirmed is the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities (§15), still to be considered as the key for action at the 
international level, and the conventions issued from the Rio Conference 
of 1992 – the Framework Convention on Climate Change (epitomising 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities), the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat 
Desertification. This reaffirmation of differentiated responsibilities is 
nevertheless counterbalanced by the assessment of the uneven progress 
achieved so far, that calls for action at the national level, through the 
strengthening of legislation and institutions (§22).  
Another capital departure from the previous texts is the role of actors in 
the promotion of sustainable development. Instead of focusing only on 
governments, the Rio+20 Declaration lists a range of subjects favouring 
a bottom-up approach based on subsidiarity (§42): this soft law 
document addresses both local and community levels (vertical 
subsidiarity) as well as instances of civil society and private actors 
(horizontal subsidiarity). Particularly, for the role of institutions, the 
document outlines not only the relevance of the executive, but also the 
participative action of the public at the local level, including access to 
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justice through the judicial branch (§99). Moreover, principles of 
transparency and accessibility – typical of the rule of law understood as 
a concept for states – are considered to be applicable also to the private 
sector, for public-private partnerships and for corporations and 
enterprises (§46-47). 
Economically, the focus is on the notion of green economy (§56), aimed 
at encompassing the three aspects of sustainable development. 
Although consequent to the objectives and the principles stated in 
Stockholm and Rio, namely the respect of international law and of the 
national sovereignty on natural resources, the concept of green 
economy is consubstantial to the purpose of poverty eradication and to 
the renovated understanding of sustainable development with different 
approaches and paths for each country. Attention is paid to the 
traditional themes such as technology dependence (to be overcome) 
and management of natural resources, but the focus on the means 
comprises both international cooperation, national institutions and 
private stakeholders (from the micro to the macro level) – since the 
objective should be to sustain economic growth through a result-
oriented approach that takes into account the social needs of the 
populations. In order to achieve this and operationalise the notion of 
green economy, two main innovations find their place in the 2012 
declaration. On the one hand, financial instruments ought to be 
available so that sustainable development could be prioritised in 
national policies (§91, 253, 261). On the other hand, the new nation-
oriented approach underlies the creation of indicators that should be 
designed with the purpose of measuring the results (§76). 
As far as the social aspect is concerned, a green economy should consist 
of a universal access to social services. Key elements of a well 
implemented sustainable development path should include the 
enhancement of food security, linked to the human right to food (§108); 
access to sanitised water (§119); capacities for sustainable energy 
services (§126); an upgraded understanding of urban policies (§134), 
aimed at improving the quality of human settlements; health coverage 
(§139); access to education and protection of workers (§152). This list 
covers a significant number of issues related to sustainable 
development and to the experiences of developing countries in the 40 
years from the Stockholm Declaration, that include the environmental 
concerns in itself. 
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Finally, environmental issues are addressed as intrinsic to the concepts 
of development and sustainability. Key factors of concern for economic 
development are the preservation of oceans and seas, as a source of 
biodiversity (§158) and as a means for achieving food security (§173); 
climate change, traditionally seen as the threat constantly impacting on 
food security, eradication of poverty and sustainable development 
(§190); the management of forests and land, because of its double role 
in contributing to ecological balance and in maintaining human 
communities (§193, 205); biological diversity, inasmuch as it has a 
capital role in safeguarding ecosystems that contribute to social services 
(§197); finally, human activities endangering the planet, such as mining 
and the production of chemicals, that ought to be regulated in a sound 
manner, in order to protect the environment and human health (§213, 
227). 
The completeness of the Rio Declaration of 2012 calls for a shift of 
paradigm in the understanding of the implementation and 
measurement of sustainable development. “The future we want”, 
encompassing all the aspects of development seen from the human 
perspective, calls for actions on institutions and private actors at all 
levels. While the declarations of 1972 and 1992 were designed with the 
purpose of establishing principles of international law, Rio+20 is the 
result of the collection of the experiences of the twenty years preceding 
the summit, where the constant analysis resided in the lack of 
implementation of the principles. If the Stockholm Declaration marked 
the dawn of international environmental law and the Rio Declaration 
constituted the consolidation of environmental principles, the 
environment is not the main focus of the declaration adopted in 2012 
because environmental concerns and principles are intrinsic to the 
concept of sustainable development and to the understanding of the 
social needs expressed in the Brundtland Report. While several of the 
principles of environmental law crystallised into customary law or 
were embodied in a considerable number of multilateral agreements, 
Rio+20, following the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, focuses on 
the role of states and of their constituent parts and on the necessity of 
capacity building (§277). 
From the shift of paradigm the subsequent step was implementation, 
since the general assessment of the UN member states pointed at the 
drawbacks of the institutional experiences, bringing along them the 
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lack of clear definitions that resulted in the poor application of 
principles. The major organs dealing with sustainable development 
responded to the challenge by outlining a new strategy aimed at 
overcoming the Millennium Development Goals, to be substituted with 
the Sustainable Development Goals, paving the way for a process 
leading to 2030. 89  As a result, the General Assembly, by means of 
Resolution 67/203, requested the Secretary-General to issue a report on 
the working of the Commission on Sustainable Development, the organ 
of the Economic and Social Council supposed to be replaced by a high-
level political forum after the Conference of Rio+20. 
After twenty years of activity, the Commission, originally instituted as 
an organ mandated to deal with the newly born concept of sustainable 
development and to provide guidance for states and the UN system on 
integrating the notion in governance, proved capable of maintaining a 
prominent role for sustainable development in the international 
agenda, but was characterised by several shortcomings. While its role 
in furthering Agenda 21 and in monitoring progress made by member 
states has to be accounted by keeping in mind the breadth of the fields 
engaged in the process, the lessons learnt from the experience of the 
Commission on Sustainable Development can be summarised into 
three categories, namely the review and monitoring of Agenda 21, the 
setting of the policy agenda and the participation of major groups.90 
As for the task of monitoring national measures in line with Agenda 21, 
the Commission has not been able to equally assess all countries, 
because of the implementation of a system of voluntary reports 
deprived of clear guidelines. This uneven result stems also from the 
absence of fixed indicators for comparing data. As for the international 
level, the lack of coordination among international bodies (including 
those pertaining to the UN system) partly accounts for the poor 
implementation of Agenda 21. In contrast to monitoring issues, the 
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political track of the Commission has certainly been more relevant: in 
some cases, specific fields (e.g. forests, sea, energy) have successfully 
been put to the forefront of the political agenda. Nevertheless, the 
decision-making process of the Commission did not allow a progress in 
all fields, since all thematic issues – the agenda being exceedingly large 
– were dealt with in a single document, where lack of consensus on one 
topic blended the entirety of it. As a result, the three dimensions of 
sustainable development did not emerge and the organ was perceived 
as an environmental institution. Finally, considering the participation 
of major stakeholders, the same reasoning applies, since the 
environmental sector covered most of the arena. 
In order to overcome these drawbacks, the Commission on Sustainable 
Development was replaced by the new High-Level Political Forum on 
Sustainable Development, in the framework of the Economic and Social 
Council, on the basis of Resolution 67/290 of the General Assembly. Its 
main task is the negotiation and drafting of the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda, based on an integrated and people-centred approach in line 
with the principles enucleated in “The Future We Want”.91 The process 
stemming from Rio+20 and leading to the Post-2015 Agenda relies on 
two interlinked directions: on the one hand, an inclusive approach that 
takes into account the instances of the non-governmental actors 
through an “Open Working Group”; on the other hand, the traditional 
intergovernmental negotiation, enriched of the reflections of non-state 
actors. 
The Open Working Group issued a report containing indications and 
proposals for the implementation of sustainable development. 92 
Following the mandate of the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development and the principles of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and of intergenerational equity, the Open 
Working Group was in charge of proposing a set of Sustainable 
Development Goals that would substitute the Millennium 
Development Goals for the Agenda Post-2015. The result is a list of 17 
goals that can be hermeneutically classified into five categories: 
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essential goals (poverty eradication, hunger, health, water – Goals 1, 2, 
3, 6); spiritual goals (education and gender equality – Goals 4 and 5); 
economic goals (energy, growth, industrialisation, urbanisation, 
consumption – Goals 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12); environmental goals (climate 
change, marine resources, terrestrial ecosystems – Goals 13, 14, 15); 
legal goals (access to justice, rule of law and accountability – Goal 16). 
In addition to these objectives, Goal 17 aims at strengthening the means 
of implementation (financial and social) of sustainable development.  
The Sustainable Development Goals are an ambitious plan that lists 
actions and concepts without defining the aspects of sustainable 
development. A first summary that bridges the results of the Open 
Working Group and the intergovernmental process started in 2012 is 
the Report of the Secretary-General “The Road to Dignity by 2030”, that 
embodies the main conceptual achievements of the UN system for 
preparing the negotiations leading to the Post-2015 Agenda. 93  In 
reaffirming the anthropocentric character of sustainable development, 
the lessons learnt crystallised in “The Future We Want” and the 
relevance of the conditions of each country, the document is based on 
the five “transformative shifts” for the Post-2015 Development Agenda: 
the eradication of extreme poverty; the central role of sustainable 
development; the transformation of the economy; the establishment of 
accountable governance and the new global partnership for sustainable 
development (§37).  
In order to facilitate negotiations for the summit on sustainable 
development, six essential elements are derived from the proceedings 
of the Open Working Group: dignity, people, planet, partnership, 
justice and prosperity (§66). As stated in the Rio+20 Declaration, the 
eradication of poverty is the main goal linked to sustainable 
development, since the elimination of inequalities is deemed as the key 
challenge in every society. As for people and planet, the report of the 
Secretary-General quotes the domains linked to the social and 
environmental aspects of sustainable development, while prosperity is 
evidently correlated to the economic aspect of the notion. At last, justice 
and partnership are factors related both to procedure and substance: 
                                                          
93 UN Document A/69/700. 
  52 
procedurally, access to justice, democratic principles, accountability, 
participation and solidarity are a manner of attaining sustainable 
development; substantially, justice is conceivable as a part of the notion 
of rule of law, while partnership – between public and private actors – 
is an element of the paradigm shift inaugurated in Rio in 2012.  
As in “The Future We Want”, the document of 2014 focuses on the 
means of implementation, as a result of the developmental experiences 
of the past 40 years. Economically, the report relies more on 
international flows and financing for national policies: if the means of 
implementation are reflected (small and medium enterprises, financial 
regulation), emphasis is placed on official development assistance (§98). 
Institutionally, the document follows the conclusions of Rio+20, since 
the concept of capacity-building is centred on the enhancement of the 
performance of executive, legislative and judicial organs as well as 
private subjects (§129). 
Finally, “The Road to Dignity” underscores the necessity of building 
indicators for measuring progress on sustainable development. This 
conclusion is drawn from the discussions of the Open Working Group, 
that issued a considerable quantity of goals and targets and posed the 
question of measurement. Diverging from the mere statement of 
principles of the 1990s, the reports from Johannesburg pragmatically 
pose the problem of implementation and estimation of results, calling 
on states and civil society to present a set of indicators and on the UN 
system to develop a programme on data collection (§139, 143). The 
report thus focuses more on the “deliverables” than on the principles, 
in line with the paradigm shift of Rio+20. 
As a result of this hectic period of intense reelaboration of legal 
concepts and socio-economic instruments, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations approved the 2030 Agenda on the 25th of September 
2015: the text, “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development”,94 is a testimony of the manifest aim of the 
international community, driven toward a transformative agenda that 
takes into account the legal dimension, in order to “build peaceful, just 
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and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and that are based on 
respect for human rights (including the right to development), on effective rule 
of law and good governance at all levels and on transparent, effective and 
accountable institutions”.95 
Hence, the evolutionary path traced so far marks the relativity of the 
concept of sustainable development from the perspective of time and of 
subjects. The principle of sustainable development, unlike other 
principles of international environmental law, is characterised by a 
broader content and consequently by a lesser binding nature. In fact, 
the nature of the notion in international law is vastly discussed and is 
the object of numerous critiques. 
 
c) Definitional conundrums and legal status of sustainable 
development 
The notion of sustainable development, as outlined in its historical 
evolution, is aimed at the integration and interaction of three different 
fields of international law and politics – economy, environment and 
society – in a balanced manner. As observed previously, the balance 
has never been achieved and this assessment impacts on the definition 
of the notion, that could vary according to an interpretation stressing 
one dimension to the detriment of the other two, and on its nature as 
principle of international law. As Philippe Sands noted in a 
foundational definition, known as the integrative approach, 
international law in the field of sustainable development consists of “a 
broad umbrella accommodating the specialised fields of international law 
which aim to promote economic development, environmental protection and 
respect for civil and political rights”. 96  Its characteristics are non-
coherence, non-comprehensiveness and ambiguity, since the notion 
coalesces principles arising from different branches of international 
law. 
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In fact, the notion has also been considered as an oxymoron:97  the 
coordination of environmental concerns with developmental needs 
proves to be difficult to attain, if not unachievable. The very concept of 
sustainable development thus witnesses the same paradox: it should 
bear in itself the two facets of environment and development, but 
usually ends up in a broader coverage of the latter. For this purpose, 
the notion is disputed as for its nature: as analysed for the Brundtland 
Report, sustainable development, since it is based on the concept of 
needs, is an anthropocentric notion. In spite of this, several authors 
maintain that sustainable development, since it is related to 
environmental protection, should be based on an eco-centric view, 
considering that nature has an intrinsic value in itself.98 
The tension between an anthropocentric and an eco-centric vision of 
sustainable development resides in the theoretical understanding of the 
notion of justice. Sustainable development implies the adoption of 
solidarity and justice in international law, as far as the management of 
common goods in concerned: solidarity in the context of sustainable 
development means a form of inter-state relation that is cooperative; 
justice is to be understood as fairness to future generations – implying 
the principle of intergenerational equity – and as distribution of 
resources and burdens among the entire global community – with a 
view to prolonging the principle of intra-generational equity. The 
anthropocentric nature of sustainable development is derived from the 
two senses of justice, as inter- and intra-generational equity, aimed at 
safeguarding present and future generations. This is what Bosselmann 
calls “weak sustainability”. 
In order to envision an eco-centric sustainable development, 
Bosselmann proceeds with a theoretical step forward: since the 
intergenerational component of sustainable development aims at the 
protection of the environment for future generation, the safeguard of 
nature is to be seen as an end of itself, with an intrinsic value not to be 
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considered as an instrument for human activities. In this way, the focus 
of the notion shifts from anthropocentrism to eco-centrism.99 
In spite of the philosophical interest of this speculative analysis, its 
relevance for defining sustainable development in international law lies 
in the ability to catch discordances in the notion. Since sustainable 
development is based on the concept of needs and has evolved in an 
attempt to integrate environmental concerns but mainly referring to 
economic and social objectives (lastly through the objective of poverty 
eradication), the anthropocentric vision seems to be the most adherent 
to the concept. Nevertheless, the notion still remains elusive as for its 
content, and consequently for its status in international law. 
In international jurisprudence, the International Court of Justice has 
dealt with the principle of sustainable development in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros case of 1997.100 As known, the judgment of the ICJ concerned 
the suspension of the works on the project of two barrages on the 
Danube, planned to be jointly operated by Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia on the basis of a Treaty dating back to 1977. The Court 
was asked to address three legal aspects: first, the unilateral suspension 
of the project by Hungary on environmental grounds; then, the 
unilateral decision by Czechoslovakia to diverge the waters of the 
Danube in absence of consent by Hungary; finally, the legal effects of 
the Hungarian declaration stating the termination of the 1977 Treaty. 
Within this broad range of issues encompassing the law of the treaties, 
international responsibility, the regime of watercourses and 
international environmental law, the ICJ relied on the concept of 
sustainable development for suggesting a solution for future disputes. 
In particular, paragraph 140 of the judgment addresses the question of 
environmental protection at the international level. The Court takes 
into account the development of international law from the Stockholm 
Conference, “the new norms and standards (...) developed, set forth in a great 
                                                          
99 Beyerlin, U., Bridging the North-South Divide in International Environmental Law, 
in Zeitschrift für Ausländisches und Offentliches Recht, 66, 2006, pp. 259-296. 
100 International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997.  
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number of treaties in the last two decades”, that have to be applied not only 
to new activities but also to the continuation of activities started in past 
periods. Moreover, the ICJ tackles, although briefly, the concept of 
sustainable development, defined as the expression of “the need to 
reconcile economic development with the protection of the environment”. 
In spite of the significance of the statement – sustainable development 
finding here a first international judicial acknowledgment – the 
definition of the International Court of Justice is remarkable for its 
briefness and for its character of obiter dictum. As Philippe Sands notes, 
there is no indication as for the substantive content of the concept as 
well as for its status in international law: sustainable development is 
addressed as a concept, not as a principle or a rule.101 An advance in the 
understanding of sustainable development is delivered, though, in the 
separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, who joined the 
decision of the Court while elaborating on the “principle” (not on the 
concept) of sustainable development.102 
According to Weeramantry, sustainable development is a “principle 
with normative value”, implying as a juridical basis the right to 
development and the right to environmental protection and being part 
of modern international law. The role of the principle lies in the 
harmonisation of the “needs of development and the necessity to protect the 
environment”. Both the right to development and the protection of the 
environment are part of international law: the former is enshrined in 
the Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986, the latter is part 
                                                          
101 Sands, P., International Courts and the Application of the Concept of Sustainable 
Development, op.cit.. Refer also to Fuyane, B., Madai, F., The Hungary-Slovakia 
Danube River dispute: implications for sustainable development and equitable 
utilization of natural resources in international law, in International Journal of Global 
Environmental Issues, 1, 3, 2001, pp. 329-344; Maljean-Dubois, S., L'arrêt rendu par 
la Cour internationale de Justice le 25 septembre 1997 en l'affaire relative au projet 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie c./ Slovaquie), in Annuaire Français de Droit 
International, Volume 43, 1997, pp. 286-332. 
102 International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, Separate Opinion of Vice-
President Weeramantry.  
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of the human rights doctrine since it is correlated to the right to life and 
the right to health. Stemming from these assumptions, the principle of 
sustainable development coordinates the two rights insomuch as it 
leads to an interpretation of the right to development as a relative right 
– its relativity residing in the respect for the environment. In addition to 
the definition of sustainable development, Weeramantry delves into the 
status of the principle: thanks to its recognition in multilateral treaties 
(binding by their own nature), declarations, practice of states and 
international organisations and the existence of it as an heritage of 
different cultures, the judge states the “wide and general acceptance” of 
sustainable development as a principle of international law.  
This optimistic and forward-looking vision is not shared in the 
academic debate. While some authors support the view that sustainable 
development is a principle erga omnes (as in the Separate Opinion of 
Judge Weeramantry) or to be classified within the range of Art. 38, par. 
1, c), of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,103 it is generally 
considered that sustainable development has indefinite contours due to 
its cross-cutting essence and it is questionable whether it fulfils the 
threshold of normativity by virtue of the lack of criteria for determining 
the attainment of international standards and for the question of the 
enforcement on determining international responsibility in case of 
unsustainable practices carried on by states.104 A survey of the content 
of the principle (concept) of sustainable development has been made by 
Sands, that finds four recurring elements in the notion, namely the 
principle of intergenerational equity, the principle of sustainable use 
                                                          
103 Marchisio, S., L’ONU. Il diritto delle Nazioni Unite, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, p. 
380. See also Osofsky, H.M., Defining Sustainable Development after Earth Summit 
2002, in Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 26, 2003, pp. 111-128; Singh, N., Right to 
Environment and Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law, 
in Journal of Indian Law Institute, 29, 1987, p. 290. 
104 Conforti, B., Le Nazioni Unite, Padova, Cedam, 2012, p. 359; Boyle, A.E., 
Freestone, D. (eds.), International law and sustainable development: past 
achievements and future challenges, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999; Handl, 
G., Environmental security and global change: the challenge to international law, 
in Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 1, 1,1991, pp. 3-33. 
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(the exploitation of natural resources in a sustainable manner), the 
principle of intra-generational equity (accounting for the necessities of 
all states) and the principle of integration (the integration of 
environmental considerations into economic and social needs, and 
viceversa).105  
In this framework, sustainable development takes the contours of an 
“umbrella concept” where principles of international environmental 
law find a more or less coherent organisation. Notwithstanding the 
interpretive value of the survey effectuated by Sands, the principle of 
sustainable development has gained a larger role almost since its 
inception, by virtue of the reiterated emphasis not only on 
environmental considerations, but chiefly on socio-economic 
application. As Boisson de Chazournes notes, the principle has a status 
of its own and is destined to a growing role in international law, but its 
characters of generality and abstraction make its “normative threshold” 
depend on the concretisation enacted through legislation and judicial 
decisions.106  
The characters of generality and abstraction are thus at the origin of the 
discussions on the normative value of sustainable development. 
Notwithstanding this critique, in a perspective de lege ferenda,107 it is 
noticeable that the process starting from “The Future We Want” and 
leading to the draft of the Post-2015 Agenda shows how sustainable 
development has a multifaceted nature and now integrates four 
dimensions, the rule of law entering de facto as an additional aspect in 
the content of the notion. The evolution from 2012 witnesses the 
possibility of designing indicators and standards for measuring the 
attainment of the substantial dimensions of sustainable development, 
                                                          
105 Sands, P., Principles of International Environmental Law, op.cit., p. 253. 
106 Boisson de Chazournes, L., Maljean-Dubois, S., Principes du droit international 
de l‘environnement, in Jurisclasseur Environnement et Développement Durable, 
op.cit.. 
107 Refer also to Leanza, U., Caracciolo, I., Il diritto internazionale: diritto per gli 
Stati e diritto per gli individui, Vol. 2, Torino, Giappichelli, 2010, pp. 374-376. 
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in a way to assess it internationally.108 In contrast to this approach 
specifically tackling in abstracto the single elements composing the 
patchwork of sustainable development, another possibility lies in the 
mere analysis, on a case basis, of the decision-making process, by 
studying the elements of public participation, environmental impact 
assessment and intergenerational equity, as in the Separate Opinion to 
the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case.109 
Since Rio+20, sustainable development has thus become a 
notion/principle encompassing the main objectives of action of the 
United Nations, as a sound development has been integrated and is 
considered to be a condition also for peace and security. More 
specifically, it could be noted how the concept has substituted in 
international discourses the notion of human development, through the 
integration of human rights in the original backbone of sustainable 
development as elaborated by the Brundtland Commission. If human 
development was seen as a concept bringing together the interaction of 
human rights, democratic principles and social and economic 
development,110 sustainable development, due to the integrative nature 
underlines by Sands, has, on the one hand, synthesised the rhetoric of 
rights in the three dimensions of environment, society and economic in 
a procedural approach and, on the other hand, has added a fourth 
dimension, embodied in the substantive notions of rule of law and 
good governance. 
                                                          
108 Although the task seems herculean, due to the elaboration of 17 general 
goals, each of them implying additional specific targets. 
109  Cadin, R., L’evoluzione storico-giuridica del concetto di sviluppo nel diritto 
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Torino, Giappichelli, 2006; Dupuy, R. (ed.), Le Droit Au Développement Au Plan 
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A survey of the principle on the basis of the outcome of the Post-2015 
agenda negotiations results in the consideration of sustainable 
development as an “umbrella concept” aimed at the primary objective 
of poverty eradication and characterised by the systemic interaction of 
the pillars of development, democratisation, good governance (rule of 
law), human rights and environmental law, by means of the 
incorporation of the following principles: 
 The integration of environmental and economic aspects; 
 The principle of equity (inter- and intra-generational); 
 The principle of sustainable use of resources;111  
 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; 
 Procedural principles related to the rule of law and to human 
rights (public participation, access to justice, administrative 
action, e.g. environmental impact analysis). 
What could be looked at as the conundrum of sustainable development, 
integrating four dimensions that could be considered as mutually 
exclusive (and in state practice have often been so, as a result of a 
strengthened emphasis on the economic dimension to the detriment of 
environmental considerations),112 is in fact a tool for furthering not only 
the challenge of development – by the new theme of “green economy” 
as outlined in “The Future We Want” – but also for improving the 
standard of economic, social and environmental rights by 
strengthening the application of the rule of law at the international and 
national levels. This innovative dimension is the object of an in-depth 
analysis in the framework of both the international level, since the 
                                                          
111 A principle that, according to Beyerlin, may have assumed the status of 
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United Nations has endorsed the implementation of the notion also in 
interstate relations, and at the national level, as the rule of law is a 
concept derived from constitutional law as the basis of the relationship 
between a democratic state and its citizens. 
 
III) The Rule of Law at the national and international levels 
 
a) A constitutional perspective 
Notwithstanding the burgeoning production of documents by the 
United nations organs on the relevance of rule of law for the attainment 
of the objectives of the organisation and of the international community 
as a whole, the notion of rule of law is originally derived in the 
constitutional evolution of Western legal systems. 
The first detailed elaboration of the concept of rule of law is attributed 
to the British constitutionalist Albert Venn Dicey.113 According to his 
theory, the rule of law is articulated in three meanings: the absence of 
arbitrary or discretionary power, thanks to the predominance of regular 
law; equality before the law, which means the subjection of all citizens 
to the law as administered by the ordinary courts; the supremacy of the 
courts in defining and enforcing the rights of the individuals, since the 
principles of the constitution are the result of judicial decisions, giving 
more substantive protection.114  
                                                          
113 Already in the 13th century, Bracton, in the treaty De legibus et consuetudinibus 
Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England), formulated the idea of the 
superiority of the law (“ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub Deo et sub 
lege, quia lex facit regem”, “The King himself shall not be under men, but under God 
and under the law, since the law makes the King”). In modern times, the classical 
definition of rule of law is commonly referred to Dicey. 
114 Dicey, A.V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, London, 
Macmillan, 1961, 10th Edition (originally 1897). For further studies on the 
concept of rule of law and sovereignty in the English legal system, Leyland, P., 
The Constitution of the United Kingdom – A Contextual Analysis, Oxford, Hart, 
2012, 2nd Edition; Mattei, U., Il modello di common law, Torino, Giappichelli, 2006; 
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This definition, capital in stressing the three aspects pertaining to the 
domain of the pre-eminence of law in a legal system and in a 
democratic society, is nevertheless subject to criticism as it is a concept 
dating back to the end of the 19th century and peculiar to a specific legal 
system. In fact, the notion of rule of law has been historically 
developing in other European contexts, with contiguous meanings but 
different specifications – through the definitions of Etat de droit, 
Rechtsstaat and stato di diritto (and riserva di legge). If the main body of 
the notion – the supremacy of law over arbitrariness and the role of 
parliamentary assemblies in elaborating statute law generally valid – is 
acquired for all experiences, the rule of law is declined in different 
countries with several peculiarities: in England, the accent is on the role 
of judge-made law and on the limits toward state power, stemming 
from a tradition of constitutional documents restricting the 
prerogatives of the monarch (especially on due process), as the Magna 
Charta Libertatum and the Habeas Corpus; in Germany, the Rechtsstaat is a 
kind of self-restraint from the part of the State itself, that has taken 
upon itself all power but limits it in the interest of citizens; in France 
and Italy, the main concern is about parliamentary sovereignty on law 
and on the statement of liberties: through the principle of legality 
(légalité and riserve di legge), statute law itself guarantees freedoms as 
they are embodied in the law.115  
This variety of experiences shows how the main elements enucleated 
by Dicey are not univocal: while the principles of supremacy of law and 
of equality seem undisputed, the protection of the rights through 
judge-made law is clearly questioned by the systems developed in 
                                                          
115 For a comprehensive appraisal of the different constitutional experiences, 
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continental Europe. Moreover, the increase in the production of statute 
law for the protection of rights in England116 undermines the reliance 
on courts for the recognition of the essence of the rights. A common 
point in the notion of rule of law could thus be embodied in the general 
protection of rights through legal processes avoiding arbitrariness and 
guaranteeing equality. 
This definition carries in itself a normative approach, since it points to a 
particular content – the protection of rights to be stated – and not only 
to a specific process of law supremacy. A second debate in the realm of 
the rule of law is thus open: apart from the historical definition, 
questions arise about the content of the notion, understood from a 
formal or a substantive point of view. 
As Endicott argues, the elusiveness of the concept of the rule of law 
seems to cause the necessary impossibility to attain it.117 Apart from the 
definition stated by Dicey and the declinations of the single countries, 
the rule of law constitutes an unattainable ideal because of the 
vagueness of laws and of the changing character of legal practice. 
Notwithstanding this vision,118 it is possible to categorise the rule of 
law according to formal – law-making process, clarity and prospective 
nature – and substantive characters – on the content of the law, such as 
justice.119 Following the analysis by Paul Craig, the classical definition 
                                                          
116 For instance, since the approval of the Human Rights Act of 1998. 
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by Dicey bears a formal sense. The first principle of the rule of law – the 
absence of arbitrariness – although apparently substantive, brings with 
it a formal meaning, since the British constitutionalist did not take into 
account discretionary powers, but analysed the formal process of the 
passing of a law and of its application by impartial courts. As for 
equality, Dicey intended it as formal access to courts, bearing in mind 
the possibility for laws to reserve special treatment for particular 
categories (the Crown, for instance). Finally, the third principle stems 
directly from the previous two: individual rights are enforced by courts 
in the sense that a body of jurisprudence ensuring formal guarantees 
(and not specific substantive rights) could not be swept aside. 
Several authors share the premises of this formal conception of the rule 
of law. Among them, Joseph Raz maintains that the rule of law is a 
plain formal concept, encompassing procedural features such as 
openness, clarity, stability and generality, without delving into debates 
on the necessity of “good laws” or blending into it notions as 
democracy, justice or equality. 120  This view is shared by liberal 
theorists: Friedrich Hayek points to the fact that laws must be fixed and 
announced, as the main objective of a law lies in the possibility for an 
individual to foresee the actions of the state and to allow individual 
behaviours on the basis of such expectation. 121  Finally, Lon Fuller 
categorises the formal notion of rule of law by underlining eight 
characters of what he defines the “internal morality of law”: the 
existence of a system of rules;  publicity of rules; a prospective 
character (avoiding retroactivity); clarity; non-contradiction; 
practicability; stability; conformity of rules to administrative action.122 
These principles amount to an ideal-type of rule of law that is merely 
                                                                                                                               
attributes mentioned above, but they wish to take the doctrine further. Certain 
substantive rights are said to be based on, or derived from, the rule of law.” 
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Routledge, 2013; Hayek, F.A., The Road to Serfdom, London, Routledge, 1944. 
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formal: the eight dimensions allow for a consistent legal system 
characterised by integrity. 
The link between formal and substantive views of the rule of law could 
be found in this definition: the requirements of clarity, publicity, 
practicability and conformity carry with them the idea that there must 
be an interaction between the law-maker and the citizens, in order for 
the latter to be able to foresee and to rely on a legal set of rules.123 The 
emphasis on this kind of detailed procedure paves the way for a 
“thickening” of the concept: albeit classified in the “thin” conception of 
the rule of law, the definition provided by Fuller already gives a 
qualitatively relevant account of what the rule of law should be, and in 
our view this hides the accent on the necessarily democratic nature of 
the society in which this ideal-type of rule of law should be 
implemented. Without enquiring into the nature of “good”, “fair” or 
“just” laws, Fuller already places a high standard for identifying what 
constitutes a legal system following the rule of law. 
In this framework, a gradient between “thinner” and “thicker” 
conceptions of the rule of law (classifying the different studies by 
means of a more gradualist approach than dividing on the cleavage 
formal/substantial) has been introduced by Tamanaha. Starting from 
the general understanding that the rule of law has become a paradigm 
of the legitimating ideal in the political sphere in spite of the lack of an 
agreement on its definition, Tamanaha imagines a scale of the rule of 
law from the basic formal requirements up to the thickest model 
encompassing the ideals of a just and equal society. Thus, six models 
are provided: rule-by-law (the mere existence of a law – a concept 
usually opposed to rule of law in the documents of the United Nations); 
formal legality (laws with characters of certainty, clarity and 
generality); legality and democracy (introducing the element of consent 
into the definition – as Fuller underlie in his concept); a first substantive 
notion bringing forward the existence of individual rights; a second, 
                                                          
123 For a critique of these authors, refer to Krygier, M., Rule of Law, in Rosenfeld, 
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broader definition that includes justice; a final, comprehensive rule of 
law corresponding to the communitarian dimension of social welfare.124  
The last three classifications open the floor for the “contamination” of 
the rule of law by doctrines of human rights (individual and socio-
economic) and theories of justice. From a procedural point of view, 
stressed in the basic notion of Dicey, the developments of political 
thinkers such as Dworkin rely on the necessity of allowing a broader 
reach for the rule of law, that has to incorporate ideals of justice. 
According to this view, law-makers should respond to the demands for 
individual rights of the citizens and courts should decide legal matters 
according to the principles of justice ad not only on the basis of the 
mere procedure.125 This rights-based approach stands in opposition to 
the formalistic view, since it provides the rule of law with a content and 
an ideal: apart from being a method for legislation and adjudication, 
the rule of law becomes a substantive concept, that modifies the 
requirements themselves and underlies a different perception of what 
the law is or should be – a regulatory tool for general situations or an 
instrument for modifying specific positions. Thus, the generality and 
prospectivity of laws can be outmatched by the necessity of the law-
maker to guarantee specific rights or to ensure substantive equality and 
fairness. Within this framework, the rule of law is to be seen as a 
procedural mechanism for providing certainty to a legal system and to 
the citizens while bringing forward demands of rights and fairness. 
The substantive view opens a discussion on the position of the rule of 
law in development theories. As Ringer points out, debate has raged 
around the notion of rule of law in development studies insofar as 
theoretical definitions could often not match local realities in which 
efforts toward reform were implemented.126 In the projects favouring 
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the rule of law, key institutional elements such as the judiciary, access 
to justice, law enforcement and the penal and prosecutorial system 
were indicated as tangible realisations of the designed policies and as 
parts of a future stable democratic society. It is manifest that these 
attempts underlie a normative and ideological approach, since the rule 
of law is not seen as a procedural and formal concept, rather as an end 
that embodies the notions of respect for human rights and the value of 
democracy. What Ringer proposes, criticising both formal and 
substantial approaches to the concept, is a “thicker” definition of rule of 
law – similar to what has been stated beforehand on the critic to Fuller’s 
understanding of the rule of law, since a formal/procedural definition 
of rule of law hides a normative preference, in spite of its apparent 
neutral validity. In fact, both approaches seem elusive, as the former 
leaves aside the inherent ideal surrounding the concept of rule of law, 
while the latter poses risks of overcharging the notion with excessive 
normative theory. 
To achieve this clarifying goal, the two streams of literature on law and 
development are to be analysed. On the one hand, the capabilities 
approach uncovered by Amartya Sen is imbued of ethical concerns, but 
maintains an hermeneutical validity because of its inherent procedural 
and pragmatic value. The concept of capability-building identifies a 
method for the expansion of freedoms and the set of choices each 
individual possesses. The end is clearly ideal – the guarantee of a list of 
political freedoms, economic rights and transparency – the very same 
way of securing elementary rights is procedural, as it is the legal system 
that should enable citizens to attain rights (and capabilities) conducive 
to economic development.127 On the other hand, Douglas North, herald 
of the New Institutional Economists, focuses on the enforcement of 
property rights as the key for economic development. The achievement 
of economic growth is attained by means of the rule of law, in the sense 
that it builds institutions whose purpose is the process of social 
coordination for the clarification of property rights, avoiding abrupt 
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institutional change.128 In this conception too, the ideal of “good laws” 
exists  - here, insomuch as laws protect property – and a procedural 
part is provided, since the rule of law is seen as a method of law-
making and law-enforcement. 
These opposite views can be summarised in order to highlight the main 
characters of the rule of law for development. First of all, in opposition 
to formal understandings, the inherent existence of an ideal behind the 
concept of rule of law, that is fairness in order to achieve the goals of 
economic growth (or enhancement of capabilities, or poverty 
eradication, as it is referred to in the UN system). Then, the nature of 
the rule of law as a procedural tool for development, not as an eventual 
goal. Finally, the importance of institutions (especially the judiciary) as 
the architecture enabling a fully-fledged deployment of the 
potentialities of the rule of law. 
The historical path of the concept of rule of law, here briefly exposed, 
shows how a notion born the English legal system, with its own 
peculiarities, managed to travel different disciplines and contexts while 
maintaining the validity of its core elements. While the procedural 
requirements sketched by Dicey are still valid, the rule of law has 
grown in significance and meaning thanks to the intellectual enterprise 
of political theorists, constitutionalists and, lately, of practitioners of 
development theories. Moreover, the concept has not only travelled 
within domestic legal systems, but has also been applied at the 
international level. The following analysis will delve into the evolution 
of the rule of law in the United Nations instruments, so as to identify 
the links with the underlying development theories and the relative 
value of the notion for environmental rights and sustainable 
development.         
 
     
                                                          
128  North, D., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Development, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. North, D., Institutions and 
economic growth: An historical introduction, in World development, 17(9), 1989, pp. 
1319-1332. 
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b) The rule of law in the documents of the United Nations 
According to a recent stream of literature, 129  supported by the 
profusion of documents drafted within the UN system, the notion of 
rule of law has gained a double feature: the rule of law as identified by 
Dicey and developed in the formal meaning possesses not only a 
domestic validity, but also an international side. As Beaulac says, the 
core elements of the rule of law in Diceyan terms are externalised in 
order to be applied to the realm of international law.130 Within this 
framework, a certain degree of normativity should exist at the 
international level, considering international law as positive law 
endowed with certainty, stability and predictability and freedom from 
arbitrariness. Secondly, the creation of laws should be made according 
to stable principles and should address equally the range of subjects of 
the international system. Finally, a system of enforcement should exist 
with provisions on the presence of courts of general jurisdiction. 
In spite of the opinions concurring to assess that the formal elements of 
the rule of law at the national level are reflected in international law – 
advancing as evidences the large body of customary and treaty law as 
sources, the principle of sovereign equality of states and the existence 
of a general jurisdiction with the International Court of Justice (through 
the clause on compulsory jurisdiction) as the leading tribunal – the 
premises on the constitutional value of the rule of law lead to a 
rejection of this view for the purposes of the present work. The focus of 
the analysis will thus lie on the promotion of the rule of law in the 
discourse of the United Nations (in particular the General Assembly 
and the Secretary-General) as far as the domestic sphere is concerned. 
                                                          
129 Beaulac, S., op.cit.; Chesterman, S., An International Rule of Law?, New York 
University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 70, 2008; Kumm, 
M., International Law in National Courts: The International Rule of Law and the 
Limits of the Internationalist Model, in Virginia Journal of International Law, 44, 
2003-2004; Morin, J.Y., L'État de droit: émergence d'un principe du droit 
international, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995; Watts, A., The International 
Rule of Law, in German Yearbook of International Law, 36, 15, 1993. 
130 Beaulac, S., op.cit., p. 8. 
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The starting point of this enterprise, apart from general statements 
related to the realm of human rights law, is the first report of the 
Secretary-General on the rule of law, adopted by the General Assembly 
on the 14th of October 1994. 131  Weaving a fabric of human rights 
documents that starts with the Universal Declaration of 1948, the 
Report lists a flourishing number of constituent elements for securing 
rights through the rule of law. Among these, the three main categories 
are the constitutional elements, the electoral system and the legal 
system under the constitution. The “strong constitution” advocated by 
the Secretary-General should consist in a bill of rights that are 
justiciable, an independent judiciary and principles of non-
discrimination and separation of powers. Then, the electoral system to 
be envisioned should contain provisions on equal access and equal 
rights to public service and the guarantee of free, fair, recurrent and 
competitive elections. As fundamental element, the legal system should 
reflect the purpose of guaranteeing human rights and democratic 
values, encompassing civil, criminal and administrative law (§5). 
Finally, a fourth element to be noted is the attention paid to the 
formation of the judiciary and on the administration of justice in 
general (§43).132  
As it could be easily observed, the Report of 1994 identifies a 
substantive notion of rule of law. The aspects on equality and judge-
made law stressed by Dicey are incorporated into the protection of 
human rights as a dimension intertwined to the theoretical concerns on 
the establishment of a just society. This document has been the first of a 
series of annual reports endorsed by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, witnessing the growing role played by the rule of law 
                                                          
131 Which testifies the intrinsic relationship between rule of law and human 
rights, as a substantive notion of rule of law is taken into account. The Report is 
a consequence of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights 
(A/CONF.157/24), as the Secretary-General was asked with concrete proposals 
for enhancing and strengthening national structures for human rights and rule 
of law, a programme endorsed by the General Assembly by means of 
Resolution 48/132. 
132 UN Document A/49/512. 
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as a concept able to gather concerns on procedural legal means and 
substantive rights. While the focus of the reports has often been on the 
strengthening of the capacities of UN organs in this field (in the late 
2000s thanks to General Assembly Resolutions 61/39 and 62/70) and 
on the emphasis on the international arena (namely on the 
“international rule of law” and on transitional justice), 133  several 
substantive documents have been key instruments in supporting the 
spread of the rule of law in domestic systems, especially the 
Millennium Declaration, the World Summit Outcome and the 
Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the 
rule of law at the national and international levels. 
The Millennium Declaration, 134  as a foundational document for the 
future of the entire activity of the United Nations, devotes a section to 
“human rights, democracy and good governance” that epitomises the 
link between human rights, the rule of law and developmental issues. 
In fact, by setting as a goal the promotion of human rights and the 
strengthening of the rule of law as two related aspects, the Declaration 
also highlights the right to development as part of this legal-political 
framework, through nationally-based efforts (§24-25). This view is 
further reiterated in the World Summit Outcome of 2005,135 since the 
link between the concepts is crystal-clear: “good governance and the rule of 
law at the national and international levels are essential for sustained 
economic growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and 
hunger” (§11).136  
                                                          
133 For instance, the 2004 Report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and 
transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616) and the 2006 
Report of the Secretary-General “Uniting our strengths: enhancing United Nations 
support for the rule of law” (A/61/636 - S/2006/980). 
134 UN Document A/RES/55/2, already referred to for sustainable development. 
135 UN Document A/RES/60/1. 
136 Nevertheless, there is an unbalance (at least in terms of items listed) between 
developmental concerns and the other dimensions. Moreover, the rule of law is 
considered mainly at the international level.    
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These promising links – considered in the annual reports137 - find an 
accomplished embodiment in the Declaration of the High-Level 
Meeting of 2012. 138  Although permeated by the rhetoric of the 
international rule of law, as it reassess as fundamental the elements of 
sovereign equality of states, the interest for the rule of law of both states 
and other international actors, the document reflects the debate and the 
consensus among states on the interrelationships between rule of law 
and development: “rule of law and development are strongly interrelated 
and mutually reinforcing, (...) the advancement of the rule of law at the 
national and international levels is essential for sustained and inclusive 
economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and 
hunger and the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the right to development, all of which in turn reinforce the rule of 
law” (§7). Moreover, the declaration includes the procedural – but 
substantive for its implementation – aspect of the access to justice as a 
guarantee of human rights (§11, 13, 14).  
The Declaration of 2012, with the reports of the Secretary-General, 
demonstrate the nexus between the rule of law and sustainable 
development, with a view to the adoption of the Agenda Post-2015. As 
a final contribution to the assessment of the debate on these topics 
within the UN, it is useful to analyse the last report of the Secretary-
General, “Strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law 
activities”,139 highlighting the relevance of rule of law in the activities of 
the UN system and as a pillar for sustainable development – as well as 
for peace and security and for human rights. Three fundamental 
freedoms are listed in the document: freedom to live in dignity, 
freedom from fear and freedom from want (§8), each of them being 
reinforced by the rule of law. 
As from the freedom to live in dignity, its main object is the granting of 
human rights and their protection through the rule of law (§10). 
Principles pertaining to the domain of the rule of law are equality 
                                                          
137  UN Documents A/RES/63/64; A/RES/64/298; A/RES/65/318; A/RES/66/102; 
A/RES/67/290. 
138 UN Document A/RES/67/1. 
139 UN Document A/68/213/Add.1. 
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under the law, accountability before the law and the concept of fairness 
in protecting rights (§14): the basic factor underlying and making actual 
the rule of law is their implementation, that is linked to the enjoyment 
of human rights. As the report states, “the rule of law and human rights 
have an indivisible and intrinsic relationship” (§17). The guarantee of 
human rights is linked to the administration and access to justice: due 
process, as in the traditional and original notion of rule of law, ensures 
effectiveness of human rights, through a judiciary that is impartial, 
integral and independent (§27). 
The second dimension of the rule of law is linked to the freedom of 
fear, thus to the fundamental task of the United Nations, the 
maintenance of peace and security. In this sector, the rule of law has a 
dual value: on the one hand, it constitutes the means for strengthening 
states, and consequently to prevent conflicts (§42); on the other hand, it 
is crucial in post-conflict societies, in order to restore peace and rebuild 
solid institutions (§48). 
The third dimension is certainly the most pertinent to the principle of 
sustainable development. The rule of law is essential for achieving 
freedom from want and guaranteeing an inclusive and sustainable 
development (§62). On the aspects of the rule of law related to 
development, the emphasis is placed on the micro level: property rights 
and protection of land, enforcement of legal frameworks protecting 
individual and community legal situations, enhancement of access to 
justice140 and guarantee of transparency and accountability are the key 
inescapable elements in pursuing the goal of poverty eradication (§66-
75). 
The strengthening of the rule of law in the three dimensions is to be 
implemented at the international and at the national level. At the 
international level, three sets of actors are the institutions entitled to 
spread the principles of the rule of law: legally, international tribunals; 
economically, the international financial institutions; in general, the 
United Nations system as a whole, as a means for establishing 
responsive governance. At the national level, the building of sound 
                                                          
140 See infra, section IV). 
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institutions concerns both the executive and the judicial branches (§92, 
93) – with a particular stress on the enhancement of participation and 
access to justice, deemed as primary in guaranteeing human rights for 
everyone. 
The report of the Secretary-General is an additional tool for interpreting 
the notion of rule of law as linked to the Agenda Post-2015. The 
intertwining nature of the notions of sustainable development and rule 
of law, although not distinctly stated in the document, emerges by itself 
in the crosscutting issues dealt by the United Nations system. 
Finally, a brief overview in the political science literature concurs in 
shedding light in the global significance of the rule of law, in its 
relations to the concepts of access to justice, sustainable development 
and democratic societies (the latter being subsumed in the substantive 
notion of rule of law). According to political scientists, among the 
qualities of a democracy the first analytically worthy element in a 
substantive definition is the rule of law.141 The rule of law is defined as 
a procedural dimension, that nonetheless carries a substantive meaning 
insofar as it is the body itself in which substantive notions as freedom 
and equality are implanted. Among the main characteristics of the 
notion, prominent are the enforcement of legal norms, the supremacy 
of laws as public, universal, stable, non-retroactive and unambiguous. 
These attributes lead to several sub-dimensions of the concept, namely 
individual security and civil order, with a special focus on the 
guarantee of the right to life; the independence of the judiciary; the 
application erga omnes of the legal system; the existence of an efficient 
bureaucratic system that applies the laws; equal and unhindered access 
to justice for citizens.142  
                                                          
141  Morlino, L., Changes for Democracy. Actors, Structure, Processes, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011. More broadly, O’Donnell, G., Why the rule of law 
matters?, in Diamond, L., Morlino, L. (eds.),  Assessing the Quality of Democracy, 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, pp. 3-17; Maravall, J.A., The rule of 
law as a political weapon, in Maravall, J.A., Przeworski, A. (eds.), Democracy and 
the rule of law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 261-301; Sen, 
A., Democracy as a universal value, in Journal of Democracy, 10, 3, 1999, pp. 3-17. 
142 Morlino, L., op.cit., pp. 197-198. 
  75 
It is this very last aspect that is relevant for the analysis of the 
protection of rights in the legal system, and in our analysis for 
environmental rights as envisioned in the framework of sustainable 
development. Access to justice is one of the four pillars of the rule of 
law, as outlined in the World Justice Project, with governmental 
accountability, protection of rights through clear and stable legislation 
and processes of law-making and law-enforcement that are accessible, 
fair and efficient.143 The key aspects of the rule of law, and especially 
the universal principle of access to justice, is thus essential for the 
protection of fundamental environmental rights, as it is inferred from 
the thick conceptions developed in the consensual documents of the 
United Nations. 
 
IV)  Environmental rights and access to justice 
 
a) An international perspective 
As analysed thus far, in the field of international law the perspective of 
environmental rights can be only deduced from the suggestions made 
in non-binding instruments such as the declarations adopted in the 
occasion of world conferences and the resolutions approved by the 
main organs of the United Nations (often including reports drafted 
within the UN context). In fact, the body of documents we have been 
focusing on contains principles – some more consolidated, some 
emerging – that are addressed to the states for implementation in their 
legal systems, whether through positive norms or, seldom, through 
custom. 144  Notwithstanding the huge production of conventional 
                                                          
143 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2014; the fourth element of the working 
definition is: “Access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical 
adjudicators, attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient 
number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they 
serve”. See also O’Scannlain, D.F., The Rule of Law and the Judicial Function in the 
World Today, in Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 89, 3, 2014, pp. 1383-1402. 
144 For an interesting perspective on custom, refer to Orebech, P., (ed.), The Role 
of Customary Law in Sustainable Development, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. 
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instruments145 and the emergence of principles on environmental law, 
the relationship between the environment (and especially the notion of 
sustainable development) and human rights resides in the 
anthropocentric interpretation of the latter and in the documents 
drafted from the Conference on Environment and Development and 
the establishment of the Commission on Sustainable Development. 
The 1992 Rio Declaration, as noted above, marks a clear watershed in 
the unfolding of environmental law in the perspective of human rights 
law, starting from the statement of Principle 3 on the right to 
development. 146  However, the evolution of the link between the 
environment and human rights – excluding the noteworthy exception 
of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, negotiated and signed in the framework of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in 1998 147  - has 
mainly relied on domestic law. In fact, in the field of international law, 
in spite of the early statements on environmental rights in regional 
documents as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights of 
1981 – that dealt with the quality of the environment in Articles 16 and 
                                                          
145 See infra, section I-a). 
146 See infra, section II), and refer also to Marchisio, S., Il diritto internazionale 
dell’ambiente, in Cordini, G., Fois, P., Marchisio, S., Diritto ambientale – Profili 
internazionali, europei e comparati, Torino, Giappichelli, 2008.  
147  The Aarhus Convention is the most ambitious treaty in the field of 
environmental rights, as it provides not only for general principles, but sets 
minimum standards for access to information, participation in public decision-
making processes and access to justice in favour of citizens. For an assessment, 
Mason, M., Information disclosure and environmental rights: the Aarhus Convention, 
in Global Environmental Politics, 10, 3, 2010, pp. 10-31; Kravchenko, S., The 
Aarhus Convention and innovations in compliance with multilateral environmental 
agreements, in Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 18, 1, 
2007; Wates, J., The Aarhus Convention: a driving force for environmental democracy, 
in Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law, 2, 1, 2005, pp.1-11. 
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24148 - questions concerning detailed definitions and, all the more so, on 
enforcement, are left to the law of the single countries.149 
In addition to the reports on the rule of law that have been the object of 
the previous paragraph, a detailed elaboration on the manner for 
implementing and improving the range of environmental principles 
and rights in the framework of human rights comes from a review of 
the Commission on Human Rights of 1994, adopted by the UN 
Economic and Social Council, also known as the Ksentini Report.150 
Starting from the declared purpose of overcoming the dichotomy 
between human-centred and eco-centred approaches, the report fully 
analyses the juridical links of environmental issues and human rights, 
with a view to integrate them and to shed light in the relationship 
between environment and development. 
The Ksentini Report finds the link between human rights and the 
environment in Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration, insomuch as it 
states the inherent intertwining nature of the right to life to the 
                                                          
148 Article 16 (Right to Health): “Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the 
best attainable state of (...) health.”; Article 24 (Right to a General Satisfactory 
Environment): “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment 
favourable to their development.”; on the African Charter, refer to Ouguergouz, F., 
The African Charter of Human and People's Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2003; Ouguergouz, F., La Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des 
peuples: une approche juridique des droits de l'homme entre tradition et modernité, 
Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1993. 
149 An exception to this general statement is the famous case of the Ogoniland 
before the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. See Ebeku, K. 
S., The right to a satisfactory environment and the African Commission: recent 
developments, in African Human Rights Law Journal, 3, 1, 2003, p.149; Coomans, F., 
The Ogoni Case Before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
in International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52, 3, 2003, pp. 749-760. It is 
noteworthy to recall that the decisions of the African Commission are non-
binding, leaving open the concerns on enforcement. 
150 UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9. Fatma Zohra Ksentini was the Special 
Rapporteur on the subject. 
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environment, understood both in an eco-centric and in an 
anthropocentric way. Moreover, this link is confirmed by the theory of 
the indivisibility of rights as illustrated in the UN Declaration on the 
Right to Development (Article 6 states the indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights and fundamental freedoms, with the 
aim of reconciling civil and political rights with economic, social and 
cultural rights), including the right to environment and the right to 
development (§47-49). These rights are conceived as democratic and 
participatory (§70-71), encompassing individual and collective aspects 
and stressing the necessity of a sound access to information as an 
enabling condition for sustainable development (§72) and as a manner 
for reinforcing all fundamental rights. 
Notwithstanding the systemic approach on the mutual reinforcement 
of fundamental rights, the centrality of the right to life is reiterated in 
the report and emerges as the key element in integrating the 
environment in the whole picture. The relevance of environmental 
protection comes to the forefront when related to the right to life, as the 
latter is valid erga omnes and must thus be the object of positive actions 
from the part of states in order to safeguard it from detrimental 
environmental measures that are the main threats to it (§172-175). As a 
specification of the right to life, the report also mentions the right to 
health (§176) and the problem of food security (§188). Moreover, the 
other human rights to be considered in the framework of the 
environment-development debate are particularly interesting. Among 
them, the right to information, embodying public access to information 
and the coherent obligation of the states to disclose such information 
(§203), assumes a higher stance insofar as fundamental rights and 
human security are hindered when information on environmental 
threats is not provided. In addition to the right to information, the right 
to participation surges as an additional democratic right related to the 
environment (§217), as it encompasses decision-making processes 
(including environmental impact assessments) and judicial activity. 
Finally, while asserting the universal nature of environmental rights, 
the report stresses the fundamental role of national legislation, and of 
constitutions above all legal instruments, for stating the substantive 
content of these rights and for effectively enforcing them, starting from 
the general right to a satisfactory environment (§241). In the end, the 
list of rights proposed includes the rights analysed so far with the 
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insertion of an express provision on access to justice (Article 20, “all 
persons have the right to effective remedies and redress in administrative and 
judicial proceedings for environmental harm or the threat of such harm”).  
Notwithstanding the non-binding nature of the catalogue of 
environmental rights set by the Ksentini Report (depriving them of 
enforcement mechanisms), the categorising enterprise delivered in the 
report results in a major advance in the discourse on the protection and 
enhancement of the environment since it provides, from mere 
declarations on rights and principles, a substantive set of specific 
environmental rights that find their origin in the right to life. Moreover, 
the set of rights could be understood not only in a framework imbued 
in the logic of environmental and economic perspectives, but also in 
light with the concerns on public health and of the consequent right to 
individual health. 151  Taken from this point of view, the dichotomy 
between eco-centric and anthropocentric visions could be overcome: 
protection of the environment and of human health are to be seen as 
complementary, since actions undertaken for safeguarding the 
environment are also beneficial to the promotion of health. In this 
sense, Onzivu makes a point in listing the negative effects of 
environmental threats – use of chemical and biological agents, air and 
water pollution, climate change – on human health and in underlining 
how positive measures to prevent these threats concur to the 
preservation and amelioration of ecosystems and, consequently, of 
human conditions. Environmental protection is thus to be achieved 
through the panoply of international treaties and international law 
principles,152 but by means of domestic instruments implementing the 
agreements reached at the international level. 153  Besides becoming 
Parties to international conventions, national measures impose 
                                                          
151 A perspective already included in Agenda 21. 
152 See infra, sections I) and II). 
153 Onzivu, W., International Environmental Law, the Public's Health, and Domestic 
Environmental Governance in Developing Countries, in Am. U. Int'l L. Rev., 21, 4, 
2006, pp. 597-684. See also Shelton, D., Human rights, health and environmental 
protection: linkages in law and practice, in Health and human rights working paper 
series, WHO, 1, 2002, pp. 3-24. 
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themselves as the enabling tool for the actual embodiment of rights and 
the improvement of human and ecological conditions. In fact, 
international environmental agreements are mainly focused on the 
damages produced than on the relief for human beings and on 
prevention directly addressed to people, a concern dealt with in human 
rights treaties. 154  As Shelton remarks, in light with the distinction 
between instruments on human rights and on environmental damage 
and protection, at the international level advances in environmental 
rights occurred by means of four approaches: the incorporation of basic 
human rights in international environmental instruments, mostly at the 
regional level (it is the case of procedural rights, as in the Aarhus 
Convention); the inclusion of an environmental dimension in human 
rights treaties, also through interpretation; the elaboration of a new 
right to a safe environment by combining environmental law and 
human rights law (a perspective adopted at the constitutional level, not 
internationally); 155  finally, the articulation of legal duties upon the 
individuals that include environmental protection.156 
Thus, in order to provide a comprehensive discipline on environmental 
rights, attention has to be focused on national law: on the one hand, the 
insertion of provisions related to the environment in a country’s 
constitution and the enactment of appropriate legislation constitutes a 
thorough advance in the field; on the other hand, administrative 
measures and judicial action are capital in implementing and protecting 
environmental rights. 
 
                                                          
154  Osofsky, H.M., Learning from environmental justice: A new model for 
international environmental rights, in Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 24, 2005, 
pp. 1-71. 
155 The exceptions being the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
providing an explicit guarantee of environmental quality (Art. 24) and the 
Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the American Convention 
on Human Rights that listed the right of everyone to live in a healthy 
environment (Art. 11). 
156  Shelton, D., Human rights and the environment: What specific environmental 
rights have been recognized?, in Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y, 35, 2006, pp. 129-171. 
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b) The domestic dimension 
In consonance with the developments in international law, the 
entrenchment of environmental rights in domestic legal systems started 
in the 1970s, following the global movement characterised by 
increasing concerns on the state of the environment.  In parallel with 
the difficulties in defining the object of environmental law, the analysis 
on comparative constitutional law meets challenges in grasping and 
curtailing the fields of studies concerning the environment. The 
normative framework varies according to the degree of guarantees 
granted to environmental rights. A set of “strategies”, characterised by 
a considerable degree of abstraction by virtue of the encompassing 
aspects of the notion of environment, can be outlined: firstly, the use of 
general statement on the protection of the environment, seen as a duty 
of the state; then, the definition of a right (or of more rights) of citizens 
to enjoy a safe and balanced environment; finally, the recognition of 
this right (or those rights) in a way apt to weight up economic rights 
with environmental rights, posing limits to the former.157 In fact, these 
strategies are declined into three different methods or approaches of 
ascertaining the protection of the environment, according to the degree 
of enforceability: policy directives, posing duties upon state authorities; 
procedural rights or duties; substantive rights.158 
Following the historical evolution of constitutional law in recent years, 
the interventions on inserting constitutional environmental rights are 
differentiated between countries integrating environmental provisions 
since the beginning (constitutions originating from the Third Wave of 
democratisation), countries amending their fundamental texts in order 
to provide rights and principles connected to the environment 
(protection, sustainable development or intergenerational equity)159 and 
                                                          
157  Cordini, G., Profili di diritto ambientale comparato, in Cordini, G., Fois, S., 
Marchisio, S., op.cit., pp. 105-107. 
158  May, J., Daly, E., Vindicating fundamental environmental rights: Judicial 
acceptance of constitutionally entrenched environmental rights, in Oregon Review of 
International Law, 11, 2009, pp. 365-440. 
159 It is the case of India, that amended its constitution in 1972 (although the 
principles on the environment are also derived from the right to life, see infra, 
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those deriving environmental rights from original provisions, 
especially the right to life and the right to health.160 The main point of 
providing norms on the environment in a constitution, as Brandl and 
Bungert observe, resides in the advantages deriving from the 
enshrinement of those rights (or provisions on duties) in a text 
hierarchically superior to statute law. Thus, being granted the highest 
rank in the normative system, environmental rights cannot be 
superseded by statutes or administrative decisions, are amendable only 
by means of a qualified majority and – metajuridically - also constitute 
a model that aims at influencing the citizens in their behaviour and 
identity, for the nature of a constitution as the fundamental law of the 
land.161  
In order to clarify the dimensions of environmental rights, it is useful to 
list all the constitutionally relevant provisions that apply to 
environmental protection, summarising the discourse on rights held at 
the national and international level: 
 Right to life (as the fundamental norm upon which 
environmental rights are based); 
                                                                                                                               
Chapter II), of Colombia, that inserted the notion of sustainable development in 
the Constitution of 1991, and of France, whose Parliament approved a Charter 
for the Environment (to be considered as part of the Constitution, into force 
from 2005), containing most of the international principles and the right to a 
safe environment. 
160  As in Italy: the right to a safe environment has been derived from an 
evolutionary interpretation of Articles 2, 9 and 32 of the Constitution, in order 
to understand the notion of environment as a fundamental value. Refer to 
Cecchetti, M., La disciplina giuridica della tutela ambientale come “diritto 
dell’ambiente”, in Federalismi – Rivista di diritto italiano, comunitario e comparato, 
2006, e Caravita, B., Diritto dell’ambiente, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2003. 
161 Brandl, E., Bungert, H., Constitutional entrenchment of environmental protection: 
a comparative analysis of experiences abroad, in Harvard Environmental Law 
Review, 16, 1992. 
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 Right to health (since norms on health are often contained in 
constitutions that do not explicitly provide for environmental 
protection); 
 Right to a safe and balanced environment (or duty to guarantee 
a safe and balanced environment, for constitutional texts 
drafted from the 1970s, following the Stockholm Declaration); 
 Provisions on food security (mainly based on the developments 
on the subject within the United Nations and connected to 
economic rights);162 
 Rights to information and participation on environmental 
issues; 
 Right to remedies before courts on environmental litigation. 
Notwithstanding the clarifying nature of the list, these “categories” of 
environmental rights shall not be considered as absolute, since they are 
interrelated to the existence of other socio-economic rights and to the 
essence of the notion of sustainable development and to the principles 
of international law that are applicable in domestic systems. As noted 
above, the gist of the argument on environmental rights is the 
definition of environment itself and the links to economic and social 
rights. From the perspective of legal theory, the ecological concerns of 
the man on the state of nature are a break from the Western tradition of 
human liberties, since environmental rights necessarily pose limits to 
economic rights and subsequent activities – the international law 
perspective on the gradual establishment of principles such as the 
polluter-pays principle or the precautionary principle testifies of these 
theoretical difficulties. 
As a consequence, environmental principles and rights were often 
stated as an aspiration or a goal rather than as positive law, especially 
when they emerged. The only method to uphold environmental rights 
                                                          
162  The debate on the right to food as connected to economic, social and 
environmental issues is flourishing lately, due to the negotiations for the 
Agenda Post-2015.  
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was to connect them to the general rule of law doctrine (an approach 
employed not only domestically, but also in the international arena by 
the United Nations).163 From the list of rights and duties, the most 
difficult to attain was the right to remedies in courts (or administrative 
bodies, according to the legal system of each country), since the 
formulation of environmental rights was not apt to enshrine them as 
positive, substantive rights that could be actionable in courts, but as 
general aspirations or procedural rights. Thus, internally, 
environmental rights could be integrated in the framework of 
protection guaranteed by the respect of the rule of law.164 From this 
point, questions arose about the necessity of establishing constitutional 
rights on the quality of the environment, as they could be deemed 
redundant in systems guaranteeing the right to life and following the 
principles of the rule of law.165 
To overcome these debates, a reference to the conceptual aspects of the 
definition of a right to environment in international human rights law, 
set by Philippe Cullet, is fruitful also for our analysis of domestic law. 
Noticing the general necessity to link environmental concerns and 
human rights, for the latter to display an enhanced realisation, Cullet 
enucleates several “avenues” for the integration of the environment in 
human rights. First of all, the reinterpretation of those rights in line 
with the purpose of the protection of the environment. Then, the 
introduction of procedural, technical rights to the corpus already 
existing. Finally, the formal addition of a proper right to 
                                                          
163 See infra, Section III). 
164 For a critical view, Tarlock, A.D., The Future of Environmental Rule of Law 
Litigation, in Pace Environmental Law Review, 19, 2001, pp. 575-612; Gaba, J.M., 
Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to Future Generations: Future 
Rights and Present Virtue, in Columbia Journal of. Environmental Law, 24, 1999, p. 
249. Refer also to Mushkat, R., Contextualizing environmental human rights: a 
relativist perspective, in Pace Environmental Law Review, 26, 2009, pp.119-179; 
Hayward, T., Constitutional Environmental Rights, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2004; Tarlock, A.D., Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, in Journal 
of Land Use & Environmental Law, 2004, pp. 213-254. 
165 May, J.R., Dale, E., op.cit., pp. 378-380. 
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environment.166 In line with the previous list of rights related to the 
environment, the inception of the theoretical structure of the 
integration of environmental rights is the universality of the right to life 
and the impossibility of guaranteeing the full enjoyment of it without 
considering environmental concerns. These concerns are understood as 
both eco-centric and anthropocentric, as consideration is put on both 
the intrinsic value of nature and on the damages created to individuals 
and societies, from the right to food and water to the right to health. 
Nevertheless, the encompassing nature of a right to environment does 
not allow for the definition of it as “synthetic”, owing to the fact that it 
is constituted by specific characteristics: the duty to refrain from certain 
activities and to promote policies enabling an improvement of 
environmental conditions and the essence of a right that is addressed to 
individuals, collective groups and future generations. 
Conceptually, the right to environment has been recognised in several 
ways. Purely, the right to environment is linked to the quality of life 
and to aspects pertaining to the domain of health. In wider 
formulations, coming from the international discourse on environment 
and development, this right embraces social, cultural and economic 
concerns – a trend that is dominant from the elaboration of the notion 
of sustainable development. Nevertheless, the main aspects pertaining 
to the right to environment are identified in a general principle of 
solidarity, since the environment is a common good, and in the 
embodiment of the precautionary approach. These two features show 
the specificity of environmental rights (considering also the derivative 
rights to information, participation and access to justice that effectively 
complete the scenario of the right to environment), to be theoretically 
considered as distinct from socio-economic rights. 
Finally, emphasis should also lay on the rights connected to 
environmental protection such as the right to information and 
participation. A right to information can be individually configured as 
a right to receive information and to be able to gather information, 
conversely connected to the requirements, placed upon the state, of 
                                                          
166 Cullet, P., Definition of an environmental right in a human rights context, in 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 13, 1995, pp. 25-40. 
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non-interference in activities concerning the collection of information or 
of spreading information on environmental projects. As for the right to 
participate in environmental decisions, the right is to be divided 
between the mere right to be part of the procedure (e.g. to be heard in a 
phase of a process) and the right to be incisive in decisions.167 It is 
noteworthy that these rights, albeit procedural, are a key tool for 
realising the general statements characteristic of the right to 
environment. 
Thus, notwithstanding the debate on the existence and the essence of 
environmental rights and on the human-centred or eco-centred 
approached, the specificity of environmental rights emerged for the 
inherent transformative nature of environmental rights, in a catalogue 
of third generation rights that encompassed social, economic and 
cultural rights, posing duties of protection and of positive actions upon 
states. Overcoming this debate, the emergence of them and the 
interpretation given at the national and at the international level show 
the relevance of environmental protection and the changing nature of 
its elements, according to the threats globally evolving. In this sense, 
the necessary degree of abstraction of the term environment becomes a 
useful tool for interpreting norms in the future and for leaving to the 
legislation the task of widening or narrowing the scope of the rights, 
from the overarching end of comprehending all human activities to the 
curtailment of single aspects. 
By virtue of their transformative nature and of their difficult 
entrenchment in constitutions, the definition of environmental rights, 
regardless of the specific characteristics, has been left to the action of 
administrative and judicial powers. In spite of the inconsistency of 
judicial enforcement of rights that are considered as aspirational, courts 
have often ruled in favour of the existence of specific environmental 
rights (as those listed above) on the grounds of the respect of the rule of 
law, of the international environmental law principles and upon 
                                                          
167  Shelton, D., Human rights and the environment: What specific environmental 
rights have been recognized?, op.cit.. 
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national norms allowing individuals to present lawsuits and internal 
standards for governmental and individual action.168  
Apart from the enactment of constitutional reform, in the framework of 
legislative policy the tools for ensuring the right to environment are 
basically two: administratively, the enactment of provisions 
implementing the use of the Environmental Impact Assessment; 
judicially, the guarantee of access to justice in tribunals.169 
In the domain of administrative law, the Environmental Impact 
Assessment is an instrument that helps reducing the impact of an 
activity aimed at development by evaluating ex ante the consequences 
on the environment. It is a methodology used to anticipate and 
minimise the effects of economic activities on the environment, 
understood physically, biologically and socio-culturally. The three core 
principles of the EIA are integrity, utility and sustainability, in order to 
guarantee a decisional process that is fair, credible and apt to safeguard 
the environment. Following the procedural rights previously analysed, 
an EIA foresees several phases that include public participation and 
access to information.170 Thus, the Environmental Impact Assessment 
constitutes a possible embodiment of procedural rights that enables the 
realisation of the statements included in the substantive right to 
environment. 
In addition to the procedural methods employed in the executive 
branch, the capital instrument in guaranteeing environmental rights is 
access to justice. As emphasised in the documents of the United 
Nations, access to justice is capital in ensuring the effectiveness of 
                                                          
168 Shelton, D., Developing substantive environmental rights, in Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment, 1(1), 2010, pp. 89-120. 
169 These introductory remarks will be the object of a deeper analysis in the 
following chapters, with a focus on the Indian experience. 
170 Biswas, A.K., & Agarwal, S.B.C. (eds.), Environmental impact assessment for 
developing countries, Elsevier, 2013; Sahasranaman, P.B., Oxford Handbook of 
Environmental Law, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 79-102; 
Wood, C., Environmental impact assessment: a comparative review, Pearson 
Education, 2003. 
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rights, especially as far as environmental rights are concerned, since the 
practice of national courts is often the only means for rendering 
effective those rights through the work of tribunals in widening or 
curtailing the scope of the definitions provided for in constitutions or 
legislation. It is evident that the respect, protection and enforceability of 
rights is the main objective of the judicial instrument and the only 
manner to provide a solid ground to the substantive right to 
environment. To achieve this, several procedural aspect come to the 
forefront. First of all, the locus standi before courts – the possibility for 
plaintiffs to present claims to a tribunal. In environmental litigation, the 
doctrine of standing is crucial, as the violation of environmental rights 
is not always characterised by a direct harm on a subject (that is the 
typical motive for access to justice), but could involve human beings 
only indirectly, and difficulties arise in the identification of defendants 
(the state, but also privates, thus allowing a horizontal application of 
constitutional and legislative norms). Here too, the essence of rights as 
anthropocentric and eco-centric poses concerns, overcome in national 
systems in different ways – some legal systems allowing a wider scope 
for the rules of standing through enhanced technicalities, including 
public interest litigation and access by non-governmental organisations 
with an interest in environmental matters. Moreover, an additional tool 
for favouring access to justice is the use of interpretive principles of 
environmental law (for instance, the precautionary principle and the 
polluter-pays principle) in the judicial process leading to a ruling. 
Finally, the right to effective remedies constitutes the third facet of 
access to justice. Because of the specificities of environmental rights, in 
some legal systems new kinds of remedies have been introduced, such 
as the writ of continuing mandamus in India (and lately in the 
Philippines)171 or the establishment of specialised courts devoted to 
environmental litigation.172 
                                                          
171 See infra, Chapter III). 
172 In addition to the bibliography already quoted, see Banda, M., Improving 
Access to Justice: Recent Trends and Developments in Procedural Environmental 
Rights, Discussion Paper, 3rd UNITAR-Yale Conference on Environmental 
Governance and Democracy, New Haven, 2014. 
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This last measure has been the choice of India for upholding the rule of 
law in environmental matters and implementing the canons of a truly 
environmental democracy.173 In a context characterised, internationally, 
by the continuous support to national solutions eager to effectively face 
the calls for a higher protection of environmental rights and for the 
implementation of solutions congruent with the achievement of 
sustainable development, and internally, by a strong judicial activism 
and the creation of innovative measures on the part of the Supreme 
Court, the legislature responded to the challenges posed by an 
increasing resort to judicial measures with the establishment of a 
National Green Tribunal, entrusted with the task of dealing with a wide 
scope of environmental litigation.  
 
 
  
 
 
  
                                                          
173  On the characteristics of an “environmental democracy”, see Siclari, D., 
L’evoluzione dei pilastri della “democrazia ambientale”: “partecipazione pubblica” e 
“accesso alla giustizia”, in Dereito, Vol. 20, n. 1, 2011, pp. 43-83.  
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Chapter II 
Environmental law in India: constitutional and legislative framework  
 
 
In spite of the absence of provisions directly related to the environment 
in the very detailed Constitution of India, a constitutional tradition 
characterised by the respect of the right to life and by a certain 
openness to international influence bolstered the inclusion of a right to 
a healthy environment and fostered the elaboration of legislative and 
administrative instruments that could effectively embody the spirit of 
the international movement born in the 1970s. In order to coherently 
assess the development of the Indian legal system in the field of 
environmental and sustainability law, it seems appropriate to refer to 
the constitutional debates leading to the draft of the Constitution of 
1950, a text that illustrates the value of the concept of the rule of law 
and its adaptation to the emergence of “new” rights. Thus, a first 
section of this chapter will be devoted to the elaboration of the right to 
life in the Indian constitutional tradition, by shedding light on the 
peculiar nature of the foundational document as a social pact 
guaranteeing a broad and extensive range of rights and by studying the 
insertion of environmental rights in the Constitution of India (namely 
Articles 48A and 51A(g)). Then, the second part of the chapter will 
focus on the legislative texts enacted by the Parliament and on the 
administrative instruments designed to implement environmental 
protection and rights in the different fields. 
 
I) Legal theory: right to life and the environment in the 
Constitution of India 
 
a) The Indian tradition of fundamental rights 
Although the rights enshrined in the Constitution of 1950 are clearly 
derived from the Western tradition, and especially from the experiences 
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of the United States of America and of Ireland,174 the ground upon 
which the Bill of Rights was installed was characterised by a rich 
history and a civilisation that, legally, blended the ancient Hindu texts 
with the Mohammedan tradition brought by the Persian conquerors 
and the principles of justice, fairness and good conscience that governed 
the working of the Courts in absence of specific provisions.175  
Early in the debates of the Indian National Congress, the question of 
the organisation of independent India was put to the forefront, in light 
of the consciousness of the leading figures that the local tradition of 
custom could not be erased in the legal system. In spite of consistent 
indications that the draft of the Constitution would have to rely on 
Western elaborations – “the Congress had never been Gandhian”, 176  as 
referred to by Granville Austin in his account of the work of the 
Constituent Assembly – and that the Objectives Resolution presented 
by Jawaharlal Nehru at the opening of the Assembly embraced the 
guarantee of fundamental rights within the goals to be attained,177 the 
reality of a social system that relied on custom and on the “Gandhian” 
ideals rendered inevitable the reading of those constitutionally 
entrenched rights with the local tradition. 
Indeed, such a reading is opportune in the framework of the analysis of 
environmental rights, as it allows a more complete understanding of 
                                                          
174 See infra, paragraph b), and on the birth of the Indian Constitution Austin, 
G., The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, New Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 50-83. 
175 For a brief sketch of the development of the Indian legal system before the 
independence, Nariman, F.S., India’s Legal System: Can it be saved?, New Delhi, 
Penguin Books, 2006, pp. 1-39. 
176 Austin, G., op.cit., p. 39. 
177 Parliament of India, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume II, Report of the 
22nd of January 1947: “This Constituent Assembly declares its firm and solemn 
resolve to proclaim India as an independent Sovereign Republic and to draw up for her 
future governance a Constitution (...) wherein shall be guaranteed and secured to all 
the people of India justice, social, economic, and political; equality of status, of 
opportunity, and before the law; freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, 
vocation, association and action, subject to law and public morality”. 
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the width of those provisions concerning the environment and of the 
application of the legislation enacted in the last forty years. The 
existence of an “Indian tradition” – although apparently to the 
background in the constituent period – is in fact crucial in assessing the 
record of India for environmental protection as well as the role of the 
institutions in the operationalisation of those principles. The 
intertwining of various legal traditions - religious and secular – made 
the Indian system a complex one,178 whose peculiarity deserve a special 
mention, notwithstanding the criticisms toward this approach that 
postulates a certain continuity between Indian tradition (whether 
coming from a Hindu, Mohammedan or Buddhist background) and the 
modern legal system.179  
The basis of Hindu law is the concept of dharma, that carries with it the 
double meaning of legality and of morality. 180  Indeed, as a pure 
distinction between law and social elements cannot be made, it is to be 
noted that in the Hinduist conception of human behaviour there is 
tripartite distinction among sastra, or “rules”: dharma-sastra, dealing 
with moral norms; artha-sastra, the rules on politics and trade; kama-
                                                          
178 On the complexity of the Indian system and the interaction of different 
models, see Francavilla, D., Il Diritto nell’India Contemporanea: Sistemi 
tradizionali, modelli occidentali e globalizzazione, Torino, Giappichelli, 2010, pp. 13-
19.  
179 For this thesis, that assumes a substantial difference between traditional 
Hindu law and contemporary legal system, see Menski, W., Hindu Law: Beyond 
Tradition and Modernity, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2003; from the same 
author, acknowledging a certain influence of traditional law, Menski, W., Hindu 
Law, in Law and Justice, Christian Law Review, 45, 2010 (“Hindu law concepts, 
however, invisibly but deeply, continue to influence the entire structure of Indian civil 
and criminal laws, including particularly the Constitution of 1950”). 
180 Panikkar, R., Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?, in Philosophical 
Foundations of Human Rights, 1984, quotes the following: “The meaning of the 
word dharma is multivocal : besides element, data, quality and origination, it means 
law, norm of conduct, character of things, right, truth, ritual, morality, justice, 
righteousness, religion, destiny, and many other things.” See also Chatterjee, M., The 
Concept of Dharma, in Facts and Values. Springer Netherlands, 1986, pp. 177-187. 
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sastra, on corporal subjects.181 These notions derive from a panoply of 
compilation of Vedic literature that postulated the existence of an order, 
rita, that permeated Hindu law.182 In this framework, the category that 
is closer to legal analysis is that of dharma, a Sanskrit concept that could 
be translated by “justice” (which is itself rendered as nyaya in Sanskrit) 
or by “code of conduct”, but also as “duty”. However, notwithstanding 
the difficulties in apprehending the notion, the main characteristic of 
these proto-legal rules lies in their prominence with respect to artha-
sastra and kama-sastra.  
The principles prescribed by the dharma, from a variety of ancient 
texts, 183  include non-violence, truth, purity and control. Within this 
order, the dharma would have been aimed at protecting the rights of the 
individuals and the regulation of human conduct, as a sort of 
organisational rule that would have restrained individual behaviours 
with respect of the liberty and the interests of other people pertaining 
to the same society. However, it should be considered that this notion 
related to a period characterised by the absence of a single power that 
could enforce rules; thus, the classification of dharma as simple rules of 
conduct seems more appropriate, also with a view to the consideration 
of moral elements within the notion.184 The relativisation of the concept 
is all the more valid if one follows Menski in rejecting to report ancient 
Hindu categories to modern legal practice and in analysing the dharma 
as an evolutionary criterion that varied according to custom and caste, 
                                                          
181 David, R. e Jauffret-Spinosi, C., Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains, 
Paris, Dalloz, 2002, p. 375. 
182 Menski, W., Comparative Law in a Global Context – The Legal Systems of Asia and 
Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edition, 2006, p. 204. 
183  Including a number of smriti, codifications, as the Manusmriti (the first 
“code” made up of cogent rules), the Yajnavalkyasmriti and the Naradasmriti, see 
Jois, M. R., Legal and Constitutional History of India – Ancient Legal, Judicial and 
Constitutional System, Delhi, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1984. 
184 Menski, W., Comparative Law in a Global Context – The Legal Systems of Asia and 
Africa, op.cit., p. 206. 
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thus being deprived of the necessary binding value that a legal norm 
should possess.185 
Notwithstanding the predominant character of duty in the meaning of 
dharma,186 the wide connotation of it could expand as to include the 
existence of a “rule of dharma” in pre-British times.187 Moreover, if one 
has to draw a parallel between the Indian tradition and the Western 
idea of rights, dharma seems to be the term that is most functionally 
similar to that of right,188 and the one that allows an understanding of 
rights that is broader than the plain Western liberal tradition. Indeed, as 
stated by M. P. Singh, “dharma is not only the basis of human rights in the 
Indian tradition but it is also a model of universality of those rights”.189 
The idea of duties as connected with rights should not be construed as 
a hindrance to the conception of liberties in the Indian constitutional 
system, rather as a manner of making those rights as universal as 
possible, since the notion of duties represents the attempt for the 
formation of a social order based on harmony, not only among people, 
but also with respect to nature. In spite of the denial of the individual 
autonomy as understood in the Western tradition, the reliance on more 
communal grounds for the establishment of rights certainly concurs to 
re-evaluating the question of the environment, of nature, within the 
constitutional discourse. Moreover, the absence of a liberal tradition 
based on individualism should be nuanced, as the request for a Bill of 
Rights was part of the independence movement and was fulfilled by 
the Constituent Assembly.190 Historically, the notion of rights did not 
develop as in the West because of the lack of antagonism between the 
                                                          
185 Menski, W., Comparative Law in a Global Context – The Legal Systems of Asia and 
Africa, op.cit., pp. 214-215. 
186 Derrett, J.D.M., Hindu Law, in An Introduction to Legal Systems, London, 1968. 
187 The expression is from Kulshreshtha, V.D., Landmarks in Indian Legal History 
and Constitutional History, Lucknow, Eastern Book Company, 9th Edition, 2005, 
p. 487. 
188 See Panikkar, R., op.cit.. 
189 Singh, M.P., Human Rights in the Indian Tradition: An Alternative Model, NUJS 
Law Review, 2, 2009, pp. 145-182. 
190 Singh, M.P., op.cit., p. 171, and infra, paragraph b). 
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individual and the state, as the latter had never assumed a pervasive 
position as it did in the Occidental experience. To put it in the words of 
M.P. Singh, “the position of the individual vis-à-vis the state in India is just 
the reverse of the West; (...) the state must take positive steps to secure to him 
his autonomy and dignity. The realization of the human rights in India is not 
as much a question of individual’s claim against the state as of the 
responsibility of the state. Whether the individual asks for his rights or not the 
state must secure them to him.”191  
The idea of dharma and of duties, albeit restricted in the elaboration of 
the Constitution of 1950, is a starting point for reflections on the 
integration of environmental subjects within the fundamental text of 
India. Although the Constituent Assembly relied on the Western 
tradition to draft the list of rights to be constitutionally protected, and 
the assertion that Gandhian ideals had been rejected for lack of 
pragmatism – a choice that was criticised as it left to the background 
the Indian tradition192 – the social pattern upon which the Constitution 
was to be woven was imbued of those values. While initially lost in the 
classical statements of liberties, the concepts of duties and of harmony 
were to resurface in the 1970s and to be inflected also for environmental 
matters. 
 
b) The Constituent Assembly and the elaboration of the right to life 
In a historical and institutional context characterised by the inclination 
toward the draft of a document with evident links to the British 
tradition,193 the Constituent Assembly was convened at the end of 1946. 
Thanks to its activities, that spanned for a period of three years, India 
endeavoured to independently regulate its own government for the 
first time in modern history with the approval of the Constitution of 
1950. Although a consistent part of the Constitution derived from the 
                                                          
191 Singh, M.P., op.cit., p. 173. 
192 Kane, P.V., History of Dharmasastra, Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research 
Institute, 1968, Vol. V, Part II, pp. 1664-1665. 
193  Austin, G., op.cit., pp. 39-49, for the rejection of a possible “Gandhian 
Constitution”. 
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Government of India Act of 1935 – especially the provisions related to 
the form of government – the fundamental text of 1950 introduced 
anew a capital innovation in the legal system: a Bill of Rights 
characterised by a detail that reflects the challenges to be overcome by 
the newly empowered statesmen and by the whole country, and a 
system of judicial review of those rights and “directive principles” (that 
originally ought not to be actionable before courts, as they were 
deemed as objectives for substantial actions on the part of the 
Executive)194 that endowed the citizens with the possibility of rendering 
those human rights concrete.  
Indeed, the calls for the affirmation of fundamental rights were part of 
the struggle for swaraj, independence, since the foundation of the 
Indian National Congress in 1885. Although the embodiment of a 
coherently designed right to life was only achieved later in the history 
of the independence movement, the first draft Constitution of India Bill 
of 1895 provided for a nucleus of rights for Indian citizens. In this non-
official text, supposedly elaborated by Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak,195 the focus is driven toward the institutional regime, but a bulk 
of liberties can be outlined, in particular the equality of rights, habeas 
corpus, the right to property, freedom of expression and the right to 
education.196 
While the Congress devoted most of its energies in countering the 
British projects for the distribution of powers – epitomised by the 
                                                          
194 See infra for the distinction between the two categories, that was derived 
from the Irish Constitution of 1937. 
195 Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) was later the President of the 
Home Rule League and the author (along with Muhammad Ali Jinnah) of the 
Lucknow Pact, that ensured unity between Hindus and Muslims in 1916. 
196 Shiva Rao, B., The Framing of India’s Constitution – Select Documents, New 
Delhi, The Indian Institute of Public Administration, Volume 1, “The 
Constitution of India Bill, 1895”, pp. 5-14. The source concerning the authorship 
of the text is Annie Besant, the President of the Theosophical Society and a 
member of the Indian National Congress. 
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system of dyarchy between the centre and the provinces197 – the quest 
for a list of rights recognised by the Government found fertile ground 
only in 1925, through the Commonwealth of India Bill. This text 
originated by the ferment that led to the “National Demand” 
pronounced by Motilal Nehru (the then Head of the Opposition in the 
Central Legislature)198 in favour of the drafting of a constitution by 
Indians and contained the first official declaration of rights. Deriving its 
essence from the classical liberal tradition, Article 4 of the 
Commonwealth of India Bill indicated as fundamental rights the liberty of 
person and of its property, the freedom of conscience, of religion and 
expression, the right to free education and the principles of equality 
before the law and equality of sexes.199 
Although pressed by the most pragmatic problems of reversing the 
situation created by the dyarchy system, the Congress pursued its 
strategy of calling for the convention of a conference for the draft of a 
swaraj constitution. These attempts crystallised in the Nehru Report, a 
document issued by a special committee of the Congress in order to 
enucleate the principles of a Constitution for India, in opposition to the 
British initiative of the convention of the “Simon Commission” – a body 
charged with the study of establishing an advanced responsible 
government but that excluded Indians. Also in this case, the definition 
of fundamental rights (the object of paragraph 4 of the Report) refer to 
the essential list sketched in the Commonwealth of India Bill, through the 
identification of a right to personal liberty coupled with the right to 
                                                          
197 A system introduced by the Government of India Act of 1919 that divided 
subjects between the Central Government and the Provinces and that further 
separated subjects of local institutions between transferred competences 
(administered by the Provincial Governor with the concurrence of the local 
legislative bodies) and reserved prerogatives (exercised by the Governor 
without intervention from the popular body).  
198 Motilal Nehru (1861-1931), the father of the First Prime Minister of India, 
Jawaharlal, was one of the fundamental leaders of the Indian National 
Congress. 
199 Shiva Rao, B., The Framing of India’s Constitution – Select Documents, op.cit., 
Volume 1, “The Commonwealth of India Bill”, p. 44. 
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property. Nonetheless, the Nehru Report elaborates on the conditions 
of the exercise of a proper right to life for the first time. Indeed, 
paragraph 4 of the Report includes the right to a writ of habeas corpus 
and the duty upon the Parliament to legislate on health, protection of 
workers, welfare of children and mothers and on retired and 
unemployed people200 – a bulk of rights that anticipate the formation of 
the “Directive Principles of State Policy” in the Constitution of 1950 and 
that demonstrate the coherence of a constitutional construction that 
integrated the concerns leading to the elaboration of second generation 
rights within the legal system. Indeed, as stressed by Austin, this was 
the first “close precursor of the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution”201 
and set the scene for an advance in this field with the Karachi 
Resolution, approved by the Congress in 1931. This text marked the 
favour for a comprehensive Bill of Rights 202  that included positive 
liberties as anticipatory of the Directive Principles of the 1950 
Constitution.  
Notwithstanding this ferment inside the Indian National Congress, 
these proposals found little ground in the legislative activity within the 
competent institutions. The very many initiatives led between 1928 and 
1935 (as the Simon Commission and the Round Table Conferences)203 
generated the Government of India Act of 1935, a text that was certainly 
fundamental insofar as it established an institutional system for India 
that allowed popular government in Provinces, but that proved 
insufficient in encountering the demands of the Congress, as the British 
statute was considered “wholly unsatisfactory as it has been designed to 
                                                          
200 Shiva Rao, B., The Framing of India’s Constitution – Select Documents, op.cit., 
Volume 1, “The Nehru Report”, pp. 59-60. 
201 Austin, G., The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, New Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, p. 57. 
202 The title of the declaration approved in Karachi was, in fact, “Resolution on 
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perpetuate the subjection of the people of India”.204 The Congress pursued 
its strategy of requesting the convention of a Constituent Assembly and 
proved successful only with the start of the Second World War, that 
substantially triggered the nationalist movement. Notwithstanding the 
existence of offers from the British side since 1940,205 the deadlock was 
solved only in 1945, with the colonial power starting a path of 
disengagement from the subcontinent. 
Indeed, the essence of the troubles originated from the communal 
problem that ultimately led to the partition between India and 
Pakistan. Thus, in these years, the question of constitutional rights lost 
momentum within the nationalist movement in favour of the framing 
of solutions to the reallocation of States within the subcontinent. The 
capital document in this sense is the so called “Sapru Report”, the result 
of the work of a committee that was made public in December 1945 and 
provided for a pragmatic federal response to the unrest in India, but 
also for a substantial constitutional scheme on liberties.206 In line with 
the focus on the communal divisions, Chapter VII of the Sapru Report 
referred to the problem of discrimination and equality as a cause of 
such tensions and proposed an outline of rights that could be included 
in the Constitution of India, namely: 
“(a) the liberties of the individual; 
(b) the freedom of Press and association; 
(c) equality of rights of citizenship of all nationals irrespective of birth, 
religion, colour, caste or creed; 
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(d) full religious toleration, including non-interference in religious beliefs, 
practices and institutions; 
(e) protection to language and culture of all communities."207 
It is this very list that constituted the first outline for the elaboration of 
a complete set of fundamental rights in the future Constitution. 
Although the absence of a proper right to life is remarkable, this latter 
is clearly the silent outset of the liberties declined in Chapter VII of the 
Report.  
Finally, preparations for a Constituent Assembly that could delve into 
all the aspects of the draft of a fundamental text restarted only when it 
was clear that the communal problem was solved through the partition 
and the absence of the Muslim League to this project. Thus, the 
Constituent Assembly started its work on the 9th of December 1946 and 
nominated a special committee devoted to the issues of fundamental 
rights – an idea that was brought forward by the Constitutional 
Adviser of the Congress, B.N. Rau,208 in September 1946. Already in 
preliminary notes on the future Constitution, B.N. Rau and K.T. Shah209 
analysed the most relevant Bills of Rights in modern Constitutions and 
endeavoured to present a draft that could be used as a guidance for the 
Constituent Assembly. In particular, Shah enucleated the existence of 
the right to life as isolated from the right to personal property (a step 
from the purely liberal tradition that had not been undertaken 
beforehand) and linked to the principle of equality: “the most sacred of all 
such (fundamental) rights, the right to life – its dignity, sanctity and fullness – 
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is not absolute and unconditional. For the same right of every individual 
imposes an equal obligation of all to respect it for all its fellows.”210  
Following these suggestions, the Constituent Assembly nominated an 
Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, 211  that subsequently 
elected five additional subcommittees, including one particularly 
focused on fundamental rights. This subcommittee, analysing the 
question of liberties through various drafts, presented its conclusions to 
the Advisory Committee in April 1947. The peculiar structure of the 
Indian Constitution, separating justiciable and non-justiciable rights, 
was discussed and approved in this very subcommittee. Indeed, as the 
matter of including a Bill of Rights in the Constitution was deemed 
surpassed by the obvious need of providing fundamental rules for the 
protection of the life of the citizens and for its enhancement, the manner 
through which achieving such list of fundamental rights was still a 
point in the agenda. Moreover, the existence of a right to life to be 
singled out as a cornerstone of the constitutional foundation was still 
not evident in the debate surrounding these issues. 
Hence, several drafts were put before the subcommittee by some of its 
members. While the common feature of all these documents lies in the 
relevance of access to justice as a means of rendering valid the rights to 
be constitutionally enshrined, they differ in “strategic” considerations. 
The draft presented by K.M. Munshi,212 while stressing the absolute 
necessity of the enforceability of rights and the requisite of speedy 
remedies through the instrument of writs, bypassed the existence of a 
pure right to life in favour of long and detailed provisions on equality 
and citizenship – right to life being part of a list of “rights to freedom” 
(Article 5 of the draft) that encompass freedom of opinion, of assembly 
and the habeas corpus. In his draft, Munshi devoted several articles to 
second generation rights, but did not address the distinction between 
                                                          
210 Shiva Rao, B., The Framing of India’s Constitution – Select Documents, op.cit., 
Volume 2, “Preliminary Notes on Fundamental Rights, September-December 
1946”, p. 48. 
211 That met for the first time on the 27th of February 1947. 
212 Kanaiyalal Maneklal Munshi (1887-1971) was an active participant in the 
Indian National Congress and a later Governor of Uttar Pradesh. 
  102 
rights and directive principles, considering all rights within the scope 
of justiciability and thus apparently granting the right to constitutional 
remedies for all liberties.213 
While another draft elaborated by Harnam Singh214 was less complete 
and avoided the matter of enforceability of fundamental rights,215 the 
most accomplished elaboration was delivered by Bhimrao 
Ambedkar,216 the father of the Indian Constitution, that presented a 
memorandum and a list of articles based on macro-categories. Indeed, 
Ambedkar managed to resolve in the first articles of the tentative 
Indian Constitution both the matters of human rights and territorial 
division, as the latter encompassed the question of minority rights. 
While presenting the questions of Indian States and the Union and of 
the representation in the State bodies as initial and final clauses, 
Ambedkar treated the issue of proper fundamental rights in Article II, 
Section I, of its draft. Here, the constitutionalist detailed a list of rights 
focused on equality and citizenship. Right to life was dealt with as a 
right to security and to protection against detention in paragraph 10 of 
the Section, in a row of provisions that encompassed different aspects 
of freedoms. To counterbalance the restricted character of the proper 
“Bill of Rights”, the relevant part of the project presented by Ambedkar 
was the section on remedies (Article II, Section II), providing for a 
Supreme Court endowed with the power of issuing prerogative writs 
and for a series of duties upon the State recalling socialist echoes – from 
the nationalisation of key industries to the organisation of agricultural 
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activities – a proposal that, in the words of its drafter, “marks a departure 
from the existing constitutions”.217 
Facing this scenario, the sub-committee discussed the different 
proposals with the aim of focussing on the main points of a Bill of 
Rights with clear ideas. In fact, if there was consensus on the idea of 
providing a machinery for enforcing rights – through the identification 
of an independent and superior court empowered to uphold 
fundamental rights if infringements occurred – the debate on the list of 
justiciable rights was still open. In the course of the discussions, the 
question of the right to life was initially deferred, as a logical place 
within the draft could not be found, and then represented as clause 4 in 
Article V: “No person shall be deprived of his life, liberty and property 
without due process of law.” 218  Subsequently, the matter of the 
enforceability of rights was resolved in a double direction: on the one 
hand, Article XIII of the draft presented the right of access to the 
Supreme Court for the enforcement of rights through prerogative 
writs;219 on the other hand, the subcommittee decided in favour of a list 
of “Directive Principles of Social Policy” to be included in Article XIV 
of the draft. This list contained guiding rules devised for legislating and 
governing and deprived of the possibility to be enforced by courts.220 
Thus, the Sub-Committee presented the report to the Advisory 
Committee on the 3rd of April 1947, with a project of articles that 
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distinguished between justiciable and non-justiciable rights in separate 
chapters: the right to life was here provided for as one of the rights to 
freedom, in a classical liberal vision that comprehended in the same 
notion the protection of life and property, as adapted from Amendment 
V to the Constitution of the United States.221 As noted by B.N. Rau, the 
effect of this right, coupled with the provision granting access to the 
Supreme Court for the protection of fundamental rights,222 would result 
in an inflation of cases before the apex court, as the general clause of 
due process of law would entail litigation in various fields not covered 
by specific provisions.223 The Sub-Committee finally approved the text 
on the 16th of April 1947, outlining the derivation of the tentative Bill of 
Rights from the American and Irish experiences while keeping “in view 
the complexity of Indian conditions and the peculiarities of the Indian 
situation”.224 
The report of the Sub-Committee was further discussed by the 
Advisory Committee on the 21st-22nd of April. Within this body, 
questions on the enforceability of rights and on the breadth of the right 
to life arose too. Clause 12 of the Draft Article, on the right to life, 
liberty and property, was the object of a joint scrutiny with Clause 11, 
on the “right to security”. The Advisory Committee decided to delete 
the latter, deeming Clause 12 (“No person shall be deprived of his life, 
liberty and property without due process of law”) sufficient for protecting 
fundamental rights. What is relevant in the debate within this body is 
the early acknowledgement of the potential open nature of the Article. 
Through an analysis of American constitutional history, the members 
of the Advisory Committee admitted how a plain clause on due process 
of law could lead to a comprehensive interpretation “in the direction of 
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social utility”. 225  Moreover, questions concerning the scope of due 
process and the possible intrusive behaviour of the three powers – the 
legislative and the executive for possible abuse of power and 
deprivation of liberty, the judiciary for broad interpretation of the norm 
– led to the separation of the property clause from the part on life and 
liberty.226 
The Advisory Committee thus presented to the Constituent Assembly 
an Interim Report that contained the right to life in its Clause 9 as a 
justiciable fundamental right.227 On the 29th of April, the Constituent 
Assembly undertook the study of this draft report clause by clause: on 
the matter of the right to life, the text adopted the day after, without 
substantial debate, read: 
“No person shall be deprived of his life, or liberty, without due process of 
law, nor shall person be denied the equal treatment of the laws within the 
territories of the Union.  
Provided that nothing herein contained shall detract from the powers of 
the Union Legislature in respect of foreigners.”228 
After the approval of the interim report on fundamental rights and the 
termination of the work of all the Sub-Committees, the Constituent 
Assembly ordered the Constitutional Adviser to prepare a draft 
Constitution, that was eventually delivered to a Drafting Committee on 
the 27th of October 1947, with a reduced membership (only seven 
members) and the Chairmanship attributed to Ambedkar. The 
provision on the protection of life and liberty appeared in the newly 
presented draft as Article 16, with discussions focussing on the 
definition of liberty as “personal liberty”, in order to prevent 
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exceedingly wide judicial constructions.229 The final Draft Constitution 
reported a formulation, in its Article 15, that varied from what had 
been proposed earlier, insomuch as it characterised liberty as personal 
(in order to curtail interpretations that could encompass other 
freedoms) and specified due process as “procedure established by law”.230 
The Drafting Committee further confirmed the presence of a detailed 
norm on constitutional remedies (Article 25, later approved by the 
Constituent Assembly as Article 32) and the separation between 
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy. 
The Draft Constitution was presented to the Constituent Assembly on 
the 26th of February 1948. Within the Drafting Committee, K.M. Munshi 
later insisted for the modification of the wording on due process, but no 
change was made at this stage.231 Finally, the text was introduced in the 
Constituent Assembly by Ambedkar on the 4th of November 1948. 
Through a detailed allocution, the father of the Indian Constitution 
acknowledged the difficulties of the task of the Drafting Committee in 
elaborating a Bill of Rights for the newly independent nation. Though, 
by drawing a parallel with the American experience, Ambedkar 
defended the peculiarity of the Draft Constitution – its length and detail 
for describing rights – and the novelty of inserting Directive Principles, 
provisions that do not possess binding force but are characteristic of the 
form of State of India, opting for a social vision that could uphold the 
challenges of eradicating poverty and sustaining a fair development, if 
read in contemporary terms.232 
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The matter of the right to life was again in the agenda of the 
Constituent Assembly on the 6th of December 1948. The wording that 
was disputed in the Drafting Committee, “No person shall be deprived of 
his life or liberty without due process of law”, gained momentum again as it 
was considered to guarantee an enhanced protection of fundamental 
rights by the Courts. Notwithstanding this debate, the relevant  point to 
be noted is the acknowledgement that Article 15 (then Article 21 of the 
Constitution) was “the most fundamental of the Fundamental Rights in this 
Chapter, because it is the right which relates to life and personal liberty 
without which all other rights will be meaningless”.233 The question was 
resumed a week later, with a speech delivered by Ambedkar himself 
that weighted the pros and cons of the introduction of due process in 
the clause, as “the introduction of the phrase” brought to the forefront the 
issue “whether the judiciary should be given the additional power to question 
the laws made by the State on the ground that they violate certain fundamental 
principles”.234 The proposed amendments were then negatived and the 
text was finally adopted with the formulation: “No person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established 
by law”. 
The approval of Article 21 as a key provision in the Constitution was 
thus met with a certain reserve on the part of the members of the 
Assembly. Notwithstanding the caution demonstrated by the 
constituent body in formulating such an important right, the role of this 
provision in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court would prove that 
in spite of the literal expression, the right to life in the Indian legal 
system had to be interpreted along with the spirit of the many 
provisions in the fundamental text that allowed a positive intervention 
from the State. Indeed, if the Directive Principles were adopted but 
welcomed by severe criticism from those who wished to make those 
provisions justiciable, the Constituent Assembly accepted the 
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orientation proposed by the Drafting Committee but still managed to 
introduce new provisions in the list of Principles. 
One of these provisions, related to agricultural activities, comes to the 
forefront for the analysis of environmental rights, as it proved to be a 
basis for the expansion of constitutional protection also to the 
environment. The provision is contained in Article 38-A, that was 
farther approved as Article 48 of the Constitution, on the steps to be 
taken for preventing cow slaughter and for organising agriculture. 
Upon the last discussion of this Article, that dealt with both economic 
and religious issues, the text approved read: “The State shall endeavour to 
organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and 
shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and 
prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught 
cattle”.235 Here, it is noteworthy the attention driven to the issue of 
protection, that would pave the way for the insertion of environmental 
rights in the Constitution – indeed, the Forty-Second Amendment 
would later introduce constitutionally entrenched environmental 
provisions as Article 48A. 
The debates within the Constituent Assembly show how the issue of 
rights was crucial in reshaping the form of State of the new Indian 
democracy. For the present analysis, it should be noted how the 
constituent fathers focused on three aspects of the protection of human 
rights. First of all, the issue of access to justice was tackled consistently 
through the introduction of a machinery for protecting rights – 
sanctioned in Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution – that allowed a 
person to access directly the highest Courts through the request for 
prerogative writs. Secondly, the distinction between Fundamental 
Rights and Directive Principles, derived from the Irish Constitution, 
introduced a scheme according to which the legislation enacted for 
concretely implementing those Fundamental Rights would have to be 
answerable to social directions aimed at favouring fairness – thus 
making Directive Principles, although legally different, substantially 
binding. Thirdly, the detail in drafting rights, aimed at preventing 
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abuses from the legislative and executive branches, was overtaken in 
practice by the strength of the Directive Principles, that guided 
legislative action as well as judicial interpretation, and by the 
omnipotent role of the Supreme Court, thanks to the device of Article 
32. The system created by the Constitution of 1950 thus made possible a 
vast enterprise of constitutional integration that included 
environmental rights and protection as primary actors.  
 
c) The introduction of environmental rights 
The prevision of Directive Principles in the Constitution, 
notwithstanding their Irish origin, could be welcomed as an 
acknowledgement of the Indian tradition and of the need of a collective 
dimension for a series of prerogatives that could not be exercised 
autonomously. The evolution of Indian jurisprudence, in parallel with 
the subsequent amendments to the Constitution, confirmed this 
possible tendency, in opposition with the provision contained in Article 
37 of the Constitution, that prevented enforceability for Directive 
Principles for they imposed positive obligations on the state. 
More precisely, the Supreme Court of India did not depart from the 
obligation arising from Article 37 of the Constitution, but integrated 
and harmonised in a way that Directive Principles could trace the 
“scope of action” of Fundamental Rights. This scheme of harmonisation 
and complementarity proved to be the door through which 
environmental principles could enter the Indian legal system à part 
entière. This evolution, dating from the 1970s, with the judgments Golak 
Nath vs. State of Punjab236 and Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala237 
marked the beginning of a more activist role played by the Supreme 
Court.238 
                                                          
236 Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643. 
237 Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461. 
238  Jain, M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, Gurgaon, LexisNexis Butterworths 
Wadhwa Nagpur, 6th Edition, 2010, p. 1490-1495. 
  110 
Concurrent to the evolutionary jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, 
the Forty-Second Amendment to the Constitution, approved in 1976 
during the emergency period,239 responded to the quest for regulating 
environmental protection with two provisions on this issue. On the one 
hand, Article 48, on agricultural organisation, was followed by a new 
Article 48-A as a Directive Principle on the environment that read: 
“Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and 
wild life. The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment 
and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.” On the other hand, 
the Parliament approved a new Section of the Constitution devoted to 
“Fundamental Duties”, an addition that reconciled the Indian 
Constitution with the tradition of dharma that was evocated above. 
While the insertion of duties was deemed unusual in a text inspired by 
liberal constitutionalism and was considered as a feature of socialist 
constitutions, these provisions added value insomuch as from 1976 the 
implementation of duties through legislative action could not be 
declared conflicting with Fundamental Rights unless the divergence 
between the two categories would have proven patent.240  
Among the duties provided for by the Forty-Second Amendment,241 
Article 51A(g) reported in the Constitution the international discourse 
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introduced in Stockholm by inserting the ecological dimension of 
environmental protection. Indeed, now a duty “to protect and improve the 
natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have 
compassion for living creatures” was placed not only as a driving 
principle for the state, but also for its citizens. Although in Parliament 
the debate on the wording of the provisions had been aimed at 
enriching Article 48A with details on the object of the term 
“environment”, as to include the conservation and development of 
natural resources and the express mention of environmental pollution 
as a result to avoid, the texts were defended by the Government by 
stating that the essential nature of the wording was sufficient for 
Directive Principles and that the draft already encompassed those 
aspects highlighted in the debate.242  
The approval of the Forty-Second Amendment thus opened the path 
for a truly substantive environmental jurisprudence that relied on the 
combined reading of Article 21 with the clauses herewith presented. 
The joint reading of the classical definition of the rule of law with the 
provisions claiming environmental protection as a constitutional value 
made possible for the Supreme Court to use Article 21 as a tool for 
enhancing the welfare of Indian citizens. 243  The apex tribunal 
fundamentally introduced in the Constitution three additional rights: 
the right to a wholesome and safe environment, the right to livelihood 
and a right to “environmental equality” or to ecological balance that 
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bears resemblances with the principle of inter- and intra-generational 
equity (although the latter could be contested because of the absence of 
direct reference to Article 21 and considered as an additional guiding 
principle).244 The separation made between these rights responds to a 
hermeneutical need to distinguish three different areas of “action” of 
environmental protection, namely the concerns on health (paralleled by 
the idea of safety), the more specific scope destined to the exercise of 
the right to life (“livelihood”) and the idea of equality and equal 
enjoyment of the environment that is couched in the concept of 
ecological balance. 
Thus, the tripartite classification hereby proposed aims at assessing in 
broad lines the opus of the Supreme Court: although the categorisation 
of environmental rights can slightly vary,245 the relevant argument to be 
stressed is that the expansion of Article 21 as to encompass an 
“environmental rule of law” was made following several steps that 
allowed a broader interpretation of the notion of personal liberty. While 
in the judgment Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India246 the Supreme Court 
assumed the necessity of a test of reason and justice for restricting 
liberties, thus upholding the principles of natural justice,247 the apex 
tribunal enlarged the scope of personal liberties by interpreting the 
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right to life as implying a right to environmental protection being 
inextricably linked to the enjoyment of a decent life. 
Concerning the right to an ecological balance, the first assumptions on 
the existence of such right were delivered by the Court without 
reference to Article 21, but only relying on the environmental clauses 
inserted in 1976 as in the famous case Rural Litigation and Entitlement 
Kendra, Dehradun vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 248  also known as the 
Dehradun Quarrying case.249 While the Supreme Court comprehensively 
analysed the facts leading to the filing of Writ Petitions250 – the alleged 
illegal limestone mining activities carried out in forest areas – it 
eventually referred, as obiter dicta, to Articles 48A and 51A as the 
provisions guaranteeing environmental protection, as a duty for both 
institutions and citizens. 251  Indeed, the Court acknowledged the 
existence of a cultural tradition protecting the environment,252 in light 
with the interpretation of the Indian legal system that has been 
previously presented, and the damages provoked to life and property 
by the modification of the ecological balance.253 
                                                          
248 Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 
AIR 1988 SC 2187. 
249 Concerning environmental rights, the analysis in this Chapter will only rely 
on several landmark cases, as a more detailed study on the role of the judiciary 
in defining environmental protection and sustainable development will be the 
object of Chapter III. 
250 Namely, W.P. (Civil) Nos. 8209 and 8821 of 1983. 
251 Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun vs. State of Uttar Pradesh: “the 
problem of forest preservation and protection was no more to be separated from the life 
style of tribals. The approach required a shift from the dependence on law and executive 
implementation to dependence on the conscious and voluntary participation of the 
masses.” 
252 Ibidem: “Our ancestors knew that trees were friends of mankind and forests were 
necessary for human existence and civilization to thrive. (...) That is why there is 
copious reference to forests in the Vedas and the ancient literature of ours. In ancient 
times trees were worshiped as gods and prayers for up-keep of forests were offered to the 
Divine.”  
253 Ibidem: “The treeless expense of land provides an environment least conductive to 
healthy living. Tree leaves recharge the atmosphere with life giving oxygen, take away 
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The relevance of ecological balance derived from the Forty-Second 
Amendment was again stressed by the Supreme Court in Sachidananda 
Pandey vs. State Of West Bengal & Ors., 254  or the Calcutta Zoological 
Garden case. On the possibility of granting land that was possessed by 
the zoological garden of the city to a private company that ought to 
build tourism facilities that would disturb the ecology, the Court 
confirmed the active value of Articles 48A and 51A:“Whenever a problem 
of ecology is brought before the Court, the Court is bound to bear in mind Art. 
48-A of the Constitution, the Directive Principle which enjoins that "The State 
shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the 
forests and wild life of the country," and Art. 51-A(g) which proclaims it to be 
the fundamental duty of every citizen of India "to protect and improve the 
natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have 
compassion for living creatures." When the Court is called upon to give effect 
to the Directive Principle and the fundamental duty, the Court is not to shrug 
its shoulders and say that priorities are a matter of policy and so it is a matter 
for the policy-making authority.”  Although the case was dismissed, as the 
tribunal considered that the West Bengal Government and the Taj 
Group (the private company that bought the land) acted bona fide and 
respecting the prescribed limits, this judgment was an occasion for 
confirming the necessity of an “ecological test” for economic activities 
that could alter the ecological balance. 
The statement of concerns on the ecological balance was again 
delivered by the Court in 1996, with the case State of Himachal Pradesh 
vs. Ganesh Wood Products & Ors..255 Here, the installation of a number of 
small-scale katha factories was studied in light of the national and 
international evolution of environmental law. Indeed, the Court aptly 
                                                                                                                               
excess carbondioxide and transmit moisture to the atmosphere by way of transpiration. 
(...) In a barren, unprotected surface the rain drops hit the soil directly and the water 
flows torrentially (... resulting) in disastrous floods in lower areas causing damage to 
life and property.” 
254 Sachidananda Pandey vs. State Of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1109. 
255 State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Ganesh Wood Products & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 149. 
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delved into the kernel of the concept of ecological balance 256  and 
considered that institutions and private citizens shall be bound by the 
imperatives of economically and ecologically sustainable activities, as 
Article 51A hinted, 257  and that the imperatives of intergenerational 
equity must be fulfilled. 258  Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the 
principle of intergenerational equity and barred the construction of 
additional katha factories.259 
According to the constitutional interpretation that has been analysed so 
far, it could be argued that the absence of reference to Article 21 of the 
Constitution impinges on the definition of the right to an ecological 
balance as such. However, notwithstanding the critical view on the 
nature of the notion, it is evident how the principle entered the Indian 
jurisprudence and the constitutional interpretation of several rights, 
including the right to life as such.260 
                                                          
256 Ibidem: “The considerations of environment and ecology and preservation of forest 
wealth are absolutely relevant considerations which the government must keep in mind 
while devising its policies and programmes.”  
257 Ibidem: “Suffice to refer to Article 51-A of our Constitution which makes it a duty of 
every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, 
rivers and wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures.” 
258 Ibidem: “This digression was necessary to put in proper perspective the obligation of 
the State and the significance of the concept of "sustainable development" and "inter- 
generational equity" vis-a-vis the legal submissions made on the basis of principles of 
natural justice, estoppel and so on.” 
259 Ibidem: “so long as there is no commitment on the part of the Government to supply 
khair wood to the proposed factories, there is no harm in approving any and every 
proposal that comes before it. (...) It is contrary to public interest involved in preserving 
forest wealth, maintenance of environment and ecology and considerations of 
sustainable growth and inter-generational equity. Afterall, the present generation has 
no right to deplete all the existing forests and leave nothing for the next and future 
generations.”  
260 This view can also be found in the Indian jurisprudence that followed the 
Dehradun Quarrying case. In T. Damodhar Rao And Ors. vs. The Special Officer, 
Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, see also infra, the High Court of Andhra 
Pradesh held that “In R. L. & E. Kendra, Dehradun v. State of U. P., the Supreme 
Court in an application under Art. 32 has ordered the closure of some of these quarries 
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If the principle of ecological balance as a right could be contested, this 
is not the case of the two rights abovementioned. Indeed, the right to a 
wholesome and safe environment and the right to livelihood (or to a 
decent life) are indisputably derived by the three provisions so far 
analysed and constitute a specification of the right to life. Concerning 
the right to a wholesome environment, the first comprehensive 
reference to the relevant articles of the Constitution was made in the 
landmark case related to the tragedy of Bhopal, Charan Lal Sahu Etc. vs. 
Union of India & Ors..261 While in a previous judgment, Union Carbide 
Corporation vs. Union of India262 - where the appellant questioned the 
basis on which the Supreme Court quantified the overall settlement as a 
reasonable sum and the validity of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster 
(Registration and Processing of Claims) Act that contributed to 
granting a speedy relief to victims263 - the apex tribunal already upheld 
the reasons of the victims, in Charan Lal Sahu the Court confirmed its 
views and made reference to the relevant constitutional provisions. 
Two main ramifications of Article 21 can be outlined: on the one hand, 
the procedural device of inscribing the right of representation of 
victims to the Central Government was deemed constitutional as an 
effective way for ensuring access to justice;264 on the other hand, the 
                                                                                                                               
on the ground that their operations were upsetting ecological balance. Although Art. 
21 is not referred to in these judgments of the Supreme Court, those judgments can 
only be understood on the basis that the Supreme Court entertained those 
environmental complaints under Art. 32 of the Constitution as involving violation 
of Art. 21's right to life.” 
261 Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Vs. Union Of India & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 613. 
262 Union Carbide Corporation vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 273. 
263 In particular, Section 3 of the Act guaranteed the substitution of the Central 
Government to victims in their representation and actions for claims in the case. 
264 Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Vs. Union Of India & Ors.: “conceptually and from the 
jurisprudential point of view, especially in the background of the Preamble to the 
Constitution of India and the mandate of the Directive Principles, it was possible to 
authorise the Central Government to take over the claims of the victims to tight against 
the multinational Corporation in respect of the claims. Because of the situation the 
victims were under disability in pursuing their claims in the circumstances of the 
situation fully and properly. (...) 
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express reference to environmental provisions cum the right to life as to 
ensure a right to a wholesome environment: “In the context of our 
national dimensions of human rights, right to life, liberty, pollution free air 
and water is guaranteed by the Constitution under Articles 21, 48A and 51-
A(g), it is the duty of the State to take effective steps to protect the guaranteed 
constitutional rights. These rights must be integrated and illumined by the 
evolving international dimensions and standards, having regard to our 
sovereignty, as highlighted by Clauses 9 and 13 of U.N. Code of conduct on 
Transnational Corporations. The evolving standards of international 
obligations need to be respected, maintaining dignity and sovereignty of our 
people, the State must take effective steps to safeguard the constitutional rights 
of citizens by enacting laws.” Thus, the right to a wholesome environment 
has been recognised by the Supreme Court as a complex construction 
that is composed of a double inspiration, international and 
constitutional, and of a double direction: on one side, the right itself; on 
the other, the specular duty of the state to uphold and protect such 
right. 
This evolution in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, in the wake 
of such a dramatic event, was announced in previous judgments of 
State Courts. In particular, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in T. 
Damodhar Rao And Ors. vs. The Special Officer, Municipal Corporation of 
Hyderabad,265 a case dealing with urban planning that limitedly mirrors 
the Calcutta Zoological Garden case,266 made express reference to the “law 
of ecology and environment” as a force impacting on the common law 
concept of ownership and on its correlated right. Indeed, a right to life 
that encompass a right to a sound and balanced environment was 
                                                                                                                               
“The fact that the provisions of the principles of natural justice have to be complied 
with, is undisputed. This is well-settled by the various decisions of the Court. The 
Indian Constitution mandates that clearly, otherwise the Act and the actions would be 
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and would also be destructive of Article 
19(1)(g) and negate Article 21 of the Constitution by denying a procedure which is 
just, fair and reasonable.” 
265  T. Damodhar Rao And Ors. vs. The Special Officer, Municipal Corporation of 
Hyderabad, AIR 1987 AP 171. 
266 T. Damodar Rao concerns the change of legal destination of a recreational 
park into a residential area. 
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prefigured by the tribunal as a constitutional right arising from Article 
21: “environmental law has succeeded in unshackling man's right to life and 
personal liberty from the clutches of common law theory of individual 
ownership. (...) It would be reasonable to hold that the enjoyment of life and its 
attainment and fulfilment guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution embraces 
the protection and preservation of nature's gifts without life cannot be enjoyed. 
There can be no reason why practice of violent extinguishment of life alone 
should be regarded as violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution. The slow 
poisoning by the polluted atmosphere caused by environmental pollution and 
spoliation should also be regarded as amounting to violation of Art. 21 of the 
Constitution.” 
Moreover, a similar development was envisaged by the High Court, in 
a judgment on limestone quarrying that explicitly encompassed all the 
recent evolutions concerning the constitutional guarantee on the 
environment. Factually, Kinkri Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh267 is 
probably the most accomplished review of environmental rights as 
constitutionally binding for both authorities and citizens. By recalling 
the landmark judgment Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, the High 
Court reconstructed the legal theory behind the Stockholm Conference, 
the Forty-Second Amendment and its links with the right to life, and 
highlighted the prescription for the state to protect the environment 
under Article 48A of the Constitution (“Article 48-A which prescribes that 
the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to 
safeguard the forests and wild life of the country”), its Drittwirkung under 
Article 51A(g) - the value of this principles also in the relations between 
citizens (“Part-IVA, which enshrines the Fundamental Duties, provides 
similarly in Article 51A, Clause (g), that it shall be the duty of every citizen of 
India to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, 
rivers and wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures”) and the 
existence of a right to a sound environment derived from the right to 
equality and the right to life (“if (...) the environment and the natural 
wealth and resources by the adoption of a long-term perspective planning is 
not heeded (...) there will be (...) a violation of the fundamental rights conferred 
by Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution”). 
                                                          
267 Kinkri Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 HP 4. 
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With this background, the Supreme Court moved to consolidate the 
existence of proper environmental rights deduced from the catalogue of 
Fundamental Rights. Indeed, the reading of the constitutional 
protection of the environment as a human right based on Article 21 of 
the Constitution and actionable by means of Article 32 was further 
confirmed in Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti vs. State of 
Uttar Pradesh And Ors., 268  where the Supreme Court dismissed a 
petition on alleged environmental pollution but stated that “every 
citizen has a fundamental right to have the enjoyment of quality of life and 
living as contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Anything 
which endangers or impairs by conduct of anybody either in violation or in 
derogation of laws, that quality of life and living by the people is entitled to be 
taken recourse of Article 32 of the Constitution.” However, deviating from 
the corpus of judgments of the High Courts, in these cases, the 
significant development in the jurisprudence is the fact that the apical 
judiciary only relied on Article 21 as the provision from which the right 
to a wholesome environment stemmed. Eventually, the derivation of 
this right found a coherent elaboration based on Article 21 in Subhash 
Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Ors.,269 on the effects of the discharge of 
industrial effluents in rivers. The construction presented in Chhetriya 
Pardushan Mukti was herewith maintained – while the petition was 
dismissed – as the Supreme Court confirmed the centrality of Articles 
21 and 32 of the Constitution as the key provisions for a substantive 
protection of human rights, and in particular, for environmental cases, 
for the right of enjoyment of unpolluted air and water (thus for a sound 
environment). Indeed, in the words of the Court, “Article 32 is designed 
for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights of a citizen by the Apex Court. It 
provides for an extraordinary procedure to safeguard the Fundamental Rights 
of a citizen. Right to live is a fundamental right under Art. 21 of the 
Constitution and it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and 
air for full enjoyment of life. If anything endangers or impairs that quality of 
life in derogation of laws, a citizen has right to have recourse to Art. 32 of the 
                                                          
268 Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti vs. State of Uttar Pradesh And Ors., 
AIR 1990 SC 2060. 
269 Subhash Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 420. 
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Constitution for removing the pollution of water or air which may be 
detrimental to the quality of life.” 
The sanction of the right to a wholesome environment as a fundamental 
right was accompanied – and, chronologically, preceded – by the 
elaboration of a third environmental liberty, the right to livelihood, as 
a complementary aspect of the right to life at the crossroad between 
environmental and social concerns. The right to livelihood was in fact 
the object of patient scrutiny on the part of the Supreme Court, without 
immediately referring to Article 21, in several judgments. Criptically, 
the first sketch of the right could be derived from the landmark Ratlam 
Municipality case,270 where the Supreme Court upheld the reasons for 
the elaboration of a right to decent life that included an environmental 
component, although in absence of connection with any of the rights 
listed in the Constitution and with reference to the action of public 
institutions.271 
However, the pivotal decision in establishing a precise right to 
livelihood was Olga Tellis & Ors vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation,272 a 
case dealing with the displacement of pavement dweller from Bombay, 
a decision of the local Government that had been challenged in court on 
                                                          
270 For a detailed analysis, see Chapter III. 
271 Municipal Council, Ratlam vs. Vardhichand, AIR 1980, SC 1622, (1980) 4 SCC 
162: “Human rights under Part III of the Constitution have to be respected by the State 
regardless of budgetary provision. (...) A responsible municipal council constituted for 
the precise purpose of preserving public health and providing better finances cannot 
run away from its principal duty by pleading financial inability. Decency and dignity 
are non-negotiable facets of human rights and are a first charge on local self-governing 
bodies.” 
The imperative of decency and dignity as part of the right to life under Article 
21 was established by the Supreme Court in Francis Coralie Mullin vs. the 
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746, where – on preventive 
detention – it held that “the right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted 
to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just physical 
survival. (...)the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that 
goes along with it.” 
272 Olga Tellis & Ors vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180. 
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the ground of the violation of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court upheld this contention by stating that “if the right to 
livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest 
way of depriving a person his right to life would be to deprive him of his means 
of livelihood to the point of abrogation” and sustained the prevision of fair 
procedures for displacing people from their habitations, a point that 
would assume relevance with regard to Environmental Impact 
Assessment procedures. 273  While these cases only dealt with the 
nucleus of the right to life – namely the deprivation of personal liberty 
proper – the extension of the right to livelihood to environmental issues 
found an initial root in Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Vs. Union Of India & Ors., 
where the right was considered to be part of the constitutionally 
protected rights.274 
The Indian judiciary thus elaborated a “basket” of environmental rights 
that could adhere to the development of international law and be part 
of the most central of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the 
Constitution, the right to life, that matured from a classic procedural 
right of the liberal tradition to a full-fledged socially and 
environmentally consistent right. Although the categorisation among 
the authors may differ, the insertion of environmental rights in the 
fabric of the Indian Constitution testify the rapid reception of 
international principles and their adaptation into the national system, 
also in connection with the open nature of Article 21 of the 
Constitution. In addition to constitutional evolution, what is still more 
impressive in the Indian record is the legislative activity that followed 
the Stockholm Conference, that contributed to the creation of a truly 
local branch of environmental law and to remarkable body of 
jurisprudence on the protection of the environment.   
 
                                                          
273 See infra, Section II. 
274 The submissions for the appellant in the case Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Vs. Union 
Of India & Ors. read: “The right to life and liberty includes the right to sue for 
violations of the right, it was urged. The right to life guaranteed by Article 21 must be 
interpreted to mean all that makes life livable, life in all its fullness. According to 
counsel, it includes the right to livelihood.” 
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II) Legislative strategies for the protection of the environment 
After having appraised the constitutional interpretation that 
endeavoured to include environmental rights in the fundamental 
charter, the following section will deal with the legislative measures 
taken by the Parliament of India in the field of environmental 
protection. The most relevant pieces of legislation – on water, air, 
forests, wastes and the general management of the environment – will 
be analysed in order to provide a guidance for the study of the 
enforcement of the discipline through the judiciary. Although the main 
piece of legislation in the field is the Environmental Protection Act of 
1986, this Act was chronologically preceded by two fundamental 
single-issue laws, the Water and the Air Act, that provided for a first set 
of rules and institutions preventing and moderating the adverse impact 
of economic and human activities on the environment. Thus, while the 
Constitution provided for the main orientations on environmental 
issues, the Parliament was now entrusted with the task of setting the 
rules for the creation of an administrative machinery that could uphold 
environmental rights and that could guarantee the implementation of a 
substantial “environmental rule of law”.   
 
a) Setting the administrative machinery: the Water (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution) Act of 1974 and the Air (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution) Act of 1981      
Even anticipating the amendments to the Constitution, the Water 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974275 was the first of a 
series of pieces of legislation stemming from the conclusions of the 
Stockholm Conference and from the perceived urgency by the 
population for action against pollution.276 As the Constitution of India 
entrusts the discipline of water in the powers of the States (specifically, 
                                                          
275 Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, Act No. 6 of 1974, amended 
by Acts No. 44 and 53 of 1988. 
276 Divan S., Rosencranz, A., op.cit., pp. 60-61. The debate on the necessity of 
legislation on water was already ongoing 10 years before the enactment of the 
Act. 
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Entry 17 of List-II, which is the State List), the Water (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution) Act has been approved by the Parliament thanks 
to the provisions of Articles 249(1) and 252(1) of the Constitution, that 
allow the central legislature to enact laws on subjects pertaining to 
States if a majority of two-thirds of the Rajya Sabha or if State 
legislatures decide so. 277  The Water Act basically introduced two 
innovations in the environmental discipline of India: on the one hand, 
the establishment of Pollution Control Boards at the State level (with 
the addition of a Central Board charged with the coordination of the 
regional boards and the regulatory powers of those latter for Union 
Territories); on the other hand, the existence of limitations to economic 
activities by setting environmental standards and by envisioning 
penalties for those avoiding implementation of these standards. 
First of all, it is capital to define the scope of the act as far as the object 
is concerned. While in the Constitution the term “pollution” was not 
included, as the provisions of the Forty-Second Amendment contained 
only the express reference to environmental protection, pollution is 
defined in Section 2(e) of the Water Act as “such contamination of water 
or such alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of water or 
such discharge of any sewage or trade effluent or of any other liquid, gaseous 
or solid substance into water (whether directly or indirectly) as may or is likely 
to, create a nuisance or render such water harmful or injurious to public health 
or safety, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural or other 
legitimate uses, or to the life and health of animals or plants or of aquatic 
organisms”. The range of activities concerning water pollution is thus 
very broad, as it encompass legitimates uses, domestic and industrial. 
The key element in the definition of pollution is that of “nuisance”, 
relying the Water Act to the concept of public nuisance as expressed in 
Section 268 of the Indian Penal Code. Moreover, the definition of water 
is specified in Section 2(j) as to include rivers, water courses, inland 
water, sub-terranean and sea waters (the latter if specified through 
notification in the Official Gazette by State Governments). 
As anticipated, the main innovation of the Water Act resides in the 
constitution of boards for the prevention and the control of pollution 
                                                          
277 In 1974, 12 States had approved resolutions in this sense. 
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(here after, Pollution Control Boards or PCB), at the central and local 
levels. On the one hand, Section 3 empowers the Government to 
appoint a Central Pollution Control Board with a varied composition as 
to include experts in environmental protection, members representing 
the Government, members of the State Boards, representatives of 
private interests (agriculture, fishery, industry) and of State-owned 
companies. On the other hand, section 4 provides for the institution of 
State Boards, with a composition reflecting that of the Central Boards as 
far as expertise and interests are concerned (with State officials instead 
of Government officials). At the organisational level, the Boards have to 
meet at least every three months and, in case of urgency, when the 
Chairman deems opportune to convene the Board (Section 8). 
Moreover, the division of tasks within the Boards is characterised by a 
certain degree of flexibility. External persons can be associated to the 
work of the PCB for particular purposes on a temporary basis (Section 
10) and committees within a Board can be constituted not only by 
members of the PCB, but also by external persons whose contribution is 
deemed necessary. 
Concerning the functions of a Pollution Control Board, Sections 16 to 18 
of the Water Act are very detailed. For the Central Board, its main 
purpose is the promotion of the “cleanliness of streams and wells” (Section 
16). To achieve this goal, the CPCB has advisory, technical, 
coordination and residual functions. First of all, the CPCB is endowed 
with the function of advising the Central Government on water 
pollution. Then, it has the charge of providing assistance to State 
Boards, to promote research on matters concerning water pollution and 
its prevention or abatement and to collect data so as to prepare guides 
on treatment of waters. A third function is basically organisational, as 
the CPCB has to coordinate State Boards and resolve disputes among 
them and to devise a national plan for the prevention and the control of 
water pollution. Finally, the residual function of the Central Board lies 
in the performance of functions proper to a State Board, should the 
latter have defaulted in its functions and should an emergency 
threatening the public interest have arisen.278 
                                                          
278 Section 18(2) of the Water Act, as amended in 1988. 
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In parallel with the functions of the Central Board, State Boards also 
have advisory functions towards State Government in matters related 
to water pollution (Section 17). In contrast with the Central Board – 
being the closest institution to the citizen level – State Boards possess 
function more directly related to the actual protection of the 
environment. A panoply of functions are thus entrusted to these 
institution: the planning of programmes for the prevention and control 
of pollution in the State; the initiation of investigations and researches 
on water pollution; the power to inspect sewage and trade effluents 
and to review plans for the treatment of waters; the setting of standards 
for the quality of waters and the elaboration of methods for treatment 
of effluents, also in agriculture and on land. Moreover, the capital 
instruments of a State Board are the possibility of disposing orders for 
the discharge of wastes into waters and for requiring people to adopt 
new systems for sewage and trade effluents and to advise the State 
Government on the location of plants whose activities are likely to 
pollute waters. 
Following the functions attributed by the Act, State Boards are 
endowed with several pervasive powers, namely of information, of 
inspection, of restriction and of emergency. First of all, the Boards (and, 
consequently, its officers) are empowered to conduct surveys of areas 
concerned by water pollution (actually or potentially) and to measure 
the flow of water, to issue directions to people in order to deliver 
information on waters abstracted and on the working of system of 
treatment of plants (Section 20). In connection with this power of 
survey, the officers have to follow a specific procedure set in Section 21 
of the Act. The requirements to take samples (also with a view to use 
them as evidence in legal proceedings) are designed as follows: the 
officer must notify the person in charge of the plant (or an agent) and 
take the sample in presence of him/her;279 then, the sample must be 
divided into two parts and sent to a laboratory recognised by the State 
Board; finally (Section 22), the report of the laboratory should be sent to 
both the Board and the occupier (or his/her agent). Apart from this 
                                                          
279 Although sub-section 4 provides also for the case of absence of the occupier 
of or his/her agent. 
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power of mere information, a second prerogative concerns the entry 
and inspection of plants. Officers of a State Board have a right to enter 
any place to fulfil the functions of the Board, in order to assess the 
compliance to the rules set in the Water Act and examine whether 
offences have been or are about to be committed (Section 23).  
In addition to this, a third category of powers – certainly the most 
pervasive – has been here defined as “powers of restriction”. In fact, the 
State Board has the right to prohibit the entrance of persons in areas 
(streams) for disposal of pollution (Section 24, with several exceptions 
concerning land rights and natural occurrences), to establish industries, 
operations, processes or treatment systems that are “likely to discharge 
sewage or trade effluents into a stream” (Section 25), to bring into use new 
devices for the discharge of sewage or to begin to make new 
discharges. In order to be allowed to establish operations or to pursue 
them, the occupier must make an application for consent to the State 
Board (Section 25(2-3). This application is taken in charge by the PCB, 
that instructs an enquiry ending with the issuance of an order granting 
plain consent or consent bound by restrictions on the points of 
discharge or on the nature, composition and volume of such 
discharge.280 Finally, in order to operationalise the procedure in later 
time, the Water Act specifically confers to the State Boards the power of 
refusing or withdrawing the consent (Section 27), while it endows the 
occupier to appellate the order to a different authority from the PCB281 
and it also grants the State Government a power of revision of the 
orders issued by the Board. Furthermore, a corollary of these measures 
followed with the amendment of 1988, granting the PCB the power not 
only of restricting, but also of giving directions for closing, prohibiting 
or regulating industries, operations and processes and of stopping or 
regulating the supply of primary services such as water and electricity 
                                                          
280 For plants built before the entry into force of the Water Act, Section 26 
provides for the necessity of a grant of consent, whose procedure is set by 
notification in the Official Gazette.           
281 A provision that has to be read together with Section 58 of the Act, barring 
jurisdiction to civil courts. Only criminal courts and writ courts are then 
empowered to deal with such matters. 
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(Section 33A). Finally, as a conclusive tool, emergency powers are also 
part of the “package” of the prevention and control of water pollution. 
On the one hand, State Boards are empowered to execute necessary 
measures that have not been undertaken by any person being granted 
consent for operation with imposed conditions (Section 30). On the 
other hand, a PCB is allowed to carry out operations apt to remove, 
remedy or mitigate pollution in case of emergency (Section 31) and to 
make application to courts for restraining pollution (Section 32). 
The exhaustive nature of the Water Act deploys its effects through the 
sanction mechanism provided for in Sections 41 to 49. The failure to 
comply with the directions issued by the PCB for lesser offences (linked 
to the power of information) is punishable with imprisonment (up to a 
term of three months) or with a fine, while the penalty for offences 
linked to the non-compliance of an order or direction – and to the 
contravention of provisions on the necessity of consent – amounts to a 
term between eighteen months and six years (Sections 41-42 and 43-44). 
Moreover, when companies and Government Departments too are 
concerned with offences, the person being in charge of them is deemed 
to be guilty of the acts committed (Sections 47-48). 
All things considered, the Water Act of 1974 constitutes a revolutionary 
tool for preserving and improving the quality of the environment. As 
exposed beforehand, the statute indicates a broad sphere of application 
as far as water and activities connected to water pollution are 
concerned. Moreover, it establishes the institution of specific Boards 
endowed with substantial powers, including the possibility to close 
industrial plants, and provides for a mechanism of sanctions that 
effectively closes the system. 
Reflecting the comprehensive discipline for matters concerning water 
pollution, the Indian Parliament approved similar provision for air 
pollution seven years later. In fact, the Air (Prevention and Control of 
Pollution) Act of 1981 282  follows the path undertaken from the 
Stockholm Declaration for the “preservation of natural resources of the 
                                                          
282 Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, Act No. 14 of 1981, amended 
by Act No. 47 of 1987. 
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earth which (...) include the preservation of the quality of air and control of air 
pollution”, as stated in the Preamble of the Act. In opposition to the 
Water Act, the Air Act extends its effects to the entire territory of India, 
as it has been adopted on the basis of Article 253 of the Constitution of 
India (namely, the power of the Parliament to legislate for the 
implementation of international agreements). 
The Air Act follows the same pattern of the Water Act and resembles it 
in most features. In principle, the law defines air pollution as “any solid, 
liquid or gaseous substance (including noise) present in the atmosphere in 
such concentration as may be or tend to be injurious to human beings or other 
living creatures or plants or property or environment” (Section 2(a)) and 
emission as “any solid or liquid or gaseous substance coming out of any 
chimney, duct or flue or any other outlet” (Section 2(j)). Here too, the 
statute aims at encompassing several situations causing pollution, from 
everyday individual matters (such as automotive pollution) to 
emissions provoked by industrial plants. Moreover, the express 
mention of noise within the notion of air pollution enlarges the scope of 
the Act also to human emissions caused by activities different from 
industrial operations (including religious activities, protected by Article 
25 of the Constitution – on the freedom of conscience – but subject to 
the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules of 2000).283 
The institution charged with the task of monitoring air pollution and of 
administering the rules provided for in the Act is a Pollution Control 
Board. As for water pollution, there is a division between a Central 
Pollution Control Board and several State Boards. According to Section 
3, the Central Pollution Control Board is the same body in charge under 
the Water Act of 1974. Thus, the appointment of members follows the 
same rules and the functions of the Board trace those of the previous 
Act, but with an additional focus on air pollution (Section 16). As far as 
State Boards are concerned, in the States where a Water Pollution 
Control Board already existed, the functions and powers granted by the 
                                                          
283  The question of noise emission is also part of the jurisprudence of the 
National Green Tribunal, several cases concerning the right to profess a religion 
being brought before the environmental jurisdiction because of the 
infringement of the Rules of 2000.  
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Air Act are extended to that body (Section 4). Where a PCB is not 
constituted, the Air Act provides for the establishment of a State Board 
through the appointment of members comprising the same categories 
ex Section 4 of the Water Act (Section 5). For matters of organisation, 
the provisions of the Air Act are identical to those of the Act of 1974 as 
for meetings, committees and external participants. 
Functions and powers too are designed with a view to homogenise the 
discipline of water and air pollution. The Central Board has the general 
task of improving the quality of air and of preventing, controlling and 
abating air pollution in India (Section 16(1)). The main purpose is then 
declined in the different schemes already set for water pollution – 
planning, inspecting, coordinating and setting standards for pollution. 
As far as State Boards are concerned, the functions enumerated in 
Section 17 range from the typical advisory competences (to State 
Governments) to the inspection of plants, of pollution control areas and 
to the establishment of standards for the quality of air to be enforced. 
The provisions on powers are nevertheless slightly more detailed, as air 
pollution encompasses a series of human activities distinct from the 
discipline of water pollution. First of all, Section 19 empowers States to 
declare air pollution control areas, where only the use of approved 
fuels is allowed. Then, the following Section endows States with the 
power to give instructions for respecting standards for automotive 
emissions, through registration of motor vehicles by the concerned 
authority. Moreover, the classical power of restriction has been 
maintained. Some categories of industrial plants are bound to apply for 
consent in order to be established and operate in an air pollution 
control area (Section 21). Following the grant of consent, the occupier 
has to comply with several conditions – such as the installation of 
control equipment and the erection of chimneys, if necessary. Finally, 
the other powers of PCB under the Water Act are maintained: the 
power to make applications to court; the power of obtaining 
information, of entry and of inspection; the possibility of appeals and 
the power to give directions (including the closure, prohibition or 
regulation of plants and the stoppage of the supply of services, Sections 
22A to 26 and Sections 31-31A). 
Finally, the Air Act sets a system of penalties that resembles the 
mechanism of sanctions provided for in the Water Act. For lesser 
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offences – related to the power to obtain information – the punishment 
is set to a maximum of three months with a fine. For offences related to 
Sections 21, 22 and 31A – compliance with the restrictions set by the 
PCB, emissions in excess of the standards, non-compliance with the 
directions given by the Board – the punishment ranges from eighteen 
months to six years (Sections 37-38). Here too, the bar of jurisdiction for 
civil courts is established and a difference is set for companies and 
Government Departments as far as accountability is concerned. 
As these two major pieces of legislation show, the Parliament of India 
endeavoured to find a balance between the reasons for economic 
development and the constitutional tradition of the right to life as 
innovated by means of the Forty-Second Amendment and by the 
international discourse on the right to a safe environment. What 
emerges is a legislation that provides for limits to economic activities 
and for enforcement of standards by the application of sanctions, but 
through a piece-meal approach. The role of these provisions has been 
central for environmental protection, as main litigations arose from the 
non-application of these measures.284 
In addition to this, the protection of the environment also lies in the 
existence of traditions on the sanctity of the land and of natural 
resources in general.285 In fact, the Water and the Air Acts provide for 
the protection of the environment mainly as far as industrial activities 
are concerned. As the Constitution did not provide for a specification of 
the categories of resources to be protected, several areas of concern 
were still left unregulated. Thus, important pillars of environmental 
protection with relations to human activities, such as the struggle 
against the degradation of land and forests and the management of 
cities, are to be analysed in order to assess the value of single-issue 
legislation when meeting the challenges of urbanisation.    
       
                                                          
284 See infra, Chapters IV and V. 
285 Refer to the Introduction for a brief summary of the Indian tradition on the 
protection of nature.  
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b) Specialised legislation: the management of land and economic 
activities 
While water and air pollution were problems emerging from the 
industrialisation of the country and, consequently, were dealt with in 
periods when environmental challenges emerged at the global level, the 
legal discipline of lands and forests finds its origins already in the 
colonial period and in the years immediately following the 
independence. In fact, legislation on the use of lands developed as soon 
as the impact of human activities affected the environment, with the 
double purpose of preserving the nature and of managing a sound use 
of resources – a problem that originated from the early industrialisation 
carried out since the British Raj.286 
The first statute dealing with the protection of natural resources is the 
Forest Act of 1927, that consolidated previous legislation dating back to 
1878 (with subsequent amendments). 287  The Act of 1927 classified 
forests into four categories (Section 2): reserved forest, protected forest, 
unclassed forest and village forest. According to Section 3, a reserved 
forest is a forest-land or waste-land which is the property of the 
Government, or over which the Government has rights of property, 
that is constituted by a notification stating certain limitations and over 
which the Government has appointed a Forest-Settlement officer with 
powers of enquiry on possible claims and rights by any person and of 
admitting and rejecting such claims (Sections 8 and 11). Protected 
forests (Section 29) are similar to reserved forests, but in this case the 
Government directly issues a notification and make rules on the 
regulation of certain activities – such as cutting trees, granting licences, 
cultivation, mining, installation of industries. The last categories pertain 
to residual lands that are derived from the previous two: unclassed 
forests are wastelands where the rules on protected or reserved forests 
can be extended by the Government (Section 28A); village forests are 
reserved forests that the Government may assign to a village 
community with the rights proper of the Government itself (Section 28). 
                                                          
286 Gadgil, M., Guha, R., This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India, New 
Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1992. 
287 Forest Act, Act XVI of 1927. 
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The powers of the Government are both regulatory and sanctioning: it 
can control the transit of timber, prohibit the felling of trees, impose 
duties and fines while also encouraging public-private partnerships for 
the development of forests (Section 81).288        
This initial regulation was followed by another specific statute on 
forests, the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980, approved with a view to 
limiting the growing degradation of natural resources due to economic 
development, and particularly the decline in forest lands.289 Opposed to 
the Forest Act of 1927, the statute of 1980 shifts powers from State 
Governments to the centre – a change derived from the 42nd 
Amendment Act of 1976, that shifted the competence on forests from 
the State List to the Concurrent List in the Indian Constitution. In fact, 
the Act extends its application to the entire territory of India (Section 1, 
excluding Jammu and Kashmir) and empowers only the Central 
Government to approve the issuance of orders by other authorities 
(starting from State Governments) concerning changes in the 
classification of forests, in the assignment of lands to privates or other 
state bodies and in the use of forests for economic purposes (e.g. 
cultivation, Section 2). In order to pursue this goal, the Act provides for 
the constitution of an Advisory Committee at the central level (Section 
3), whose main competence is the grant of prior approval of orders by 
the State Governments. Moreover, the Act of 1980 grants the Central 
Government the power to make rules on matters concerning forests, 
that have to be approved by both Houses of Parliament (Section 4).  
What is peculiar in the legislation on forests is the attempt at 
centralising the competences – a movement which stands in opposition 
to the general framework of the Water and Air Acts, that encourage 
decentralisation in order to keep environmental policies to a level closer 
to the citizens. Nevertheless, it should be observed that, factually, the 
discipline on forests remains circumscribed within the norms of the Act 
                                                          
288  The latter is an innovation deriving from the 2010 amendment (Forest 
(Amendment) Act 2010, Act XVII of 2010). 
289 Forest (Conservation) Act, Act No. 69 of 1980, amended by Act No. 69 of 
1988. 
  133 
of 1927. 290  Moreover, the choice for decentralising environmental 
policies is confirmed by the legislation on land pollution and on the 
management of cities (particularly concerning urban wastes). In 
particular, several industrial activities have been regulated so as to 
safeguard the environment and human health. The most relevant piece 
of legislation in this field is the Mines and Minerals (Development 
and Regulation) Act of 1957, that has been amended in 2015.291  
The Mines and Minerals Act, extending to the whole territory of India 
(Section 1), broadly deals with the economic activities concerning 
mining, whether of minerals or of oils (natural gas and petroleum). The 
Act places a burden upon the operators to obtain a licence or a lease in 
order to undertake prospecting and starting operations (Section 4). 
According to Section 10, prospecting licences or mining leases are 
granted by State Governments, but several exceptions and limitations 
exist. First of all, special rights are recognised for those already 
possessing a reconnaissance permit or a prospecting licence in order to 
obtain a mining lease (Section 11). Then, for minerals such as coal and 
lignite, the Central Government is empowered to select companies by 
competitive bidding (Section 11A). As in the Forest Act, there exist a 
division of competences between the centre and the periphery. The 
powers of the Central Government consist in the regulation of the grant 
of permits, licences and leases (Section 13) and in matters concerning 
the protection of the environment (Section 18), while the State 
Governments are competent with the rules on quarrying and mining 
for minor minerals (Section 15). Nevertheless, Sections 17 and 17A cast 
special powers in the Central Government for particular cases, that are 
reserved to the centre, and Section 20A empowers it to issue directions 
to State governments concerning the conservation of mineral resources 
                                                          
290 Diwan, S., and Rosencranz, A., op.cit., p. 291.  
291 Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, Act No. 67 of 1957, 
as amended, recently, in 2010 and 2015 (Acts No. 34 of 2010 and No. 10 of 2015). 
The most relevant innovation of 2015 is the constitution of District Mineral 
Foundations, bodies charged of the development of the areas surrounding 
mines and financed by a part of the revenues deriving from the exploitation of 
mines.   
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and the sustainable exploitation of them. In spite of these larger 
powers, the ambivalence between competences is maintained through 
Section 23C, that empowers State Governments to make rules for 
preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals, and 
Section 26, that allows delegation of powers to subordinate authorities 
(not only State Governments). 
As one could see, concerning land pollution, the protection of the 
environment is embodied in the procedure to be undertaken in order to 
establish an economic activity and in the obligation to take precautions 
cast in several documents: generally, the Mineral Conservation 
Development Rules of 1988; for specific resources, the Coal Mines 
Regulations of 1957, the Metalliferous Mines Regulations of 1961, the 
Oil Mines Regulations of 1984 (amended in 2011), the Atomic 
Energy (Working of Mines, Minerals and Handling of Prescribed 
Substance) Rules of 1984 and the Granite Conservation and 
Development Rules of 1999. General regulation is set in the Mineral 
Conservation Development Rules (as amended up to 2011), that 
applies to all minerals except from petroleum, natural gas, coal, lignite, 
minor minerals and those substances dealt with in the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1962 (Section 2). Apart from the procedures for reconnaissance, 
prospecting and mining operations, a special chapter of the rules is 
devoted to the environment, prescribing the duty to take “all possible 
precautions for the protection of environment and control of pollution” 
(Section 31) upon holders of licences or leases. In detail, operators have 
certain specific duties, as the separate removal of top soil and its 
reutilisation or storage for rehabilitating the land in the mining area 
(Section 32), the restoration of land before the abandonment of mines 
(Section 34), the control of ground vibrations (Section 35), air, water and 
noise pollution (Sections 37 to 39) and the planning of measures for the 
restoration of flora (Section 41). 
Concerning the other economic activities related to minerals, similar 
rules on the environment – for prospecting, mining, storage and 
pollution (whether air, water or noise) – are provided for granite 
(Sections 29 to 37 of the Granite Conservation and Development Rules 
of 1999). For oil and natural gas, apart from the more detailed 
procedure for granting applications (through a Board of Mining 
Examination, Section 13 of the Oil Mines Regulations), special norms on 
the control of operations are set in Sections 103 to 108 for the 
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prevention of fire and for the use of flammable material. It should be 
noted that the rules provided for in these pieces of legislation are 
chiefly aimed at the protection of workers and only have a secondary 
environmental purpose, if compared to the procedural requirements for 
granting permissions.  
The existence of a Board of Mining Examination is confirmed in each 
statute previously referred to. Moreover, the same typology of “social” 
rules apply for coal and for metalliferous mines in general. These are 
rules that provide for safety for all dangers connected to the activities 
around and within the mine – specifically for fire, dust, gas and water. 
Following the Coal Mines Regulations of 1957, as amended in 2011, fire 
is dealt with in Section 137, that sets general precautions on the use of 
certain flammable materials and for arrangements on detection and 
extinction of fires, in case the event occurs. Moreover, these precautions 
are strengthened by specific provisions on surface and underground 
activities (Sections 138-139). As far as dust is concerned, the manager of 
a mine has the duty to minimise these emissions to a limit that 
considers human health (Section 146). Finally, the rules on gas and 
water are mainly focused on the security within the workplace 
(Sections 150 and 152-153). In the case of metalliferous mines, the same 
provisions apply, on the basis of the Metalliferous Mines Regulations, 
approved in 1961 and lastly amended in 2012. In fact, following the 
enactment of the Coal Mines Regulations, a second statute on 
Metalliferous Mines was approved with a scope of application 
extending to “every mine other than a coal or an oil mine” (Section 1). In 
this case also, provisions for the same dangers are set in Sections 139 to 
151. 
Finally, the survey of economic activities more directly affecting the 
environment should be completed by a reference to atomic energy. 
India, as known, has been focused on the development of the atomic 
energy industry since its independence.292 In order to regulate such 
                                                          
292 The first programme for the study of the matter had been started since the 
early years after the independence, as an initiative supported by Jawaharlal 
Nehru himself. In 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission was created, under the 
direct responsibility of the Prime Minister. See Guha, R., op.cit., p. 216.  
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issue, the Parliament enacted the Atomic Energy Act in 1962 “to provide 
for the development, control and use of atomic energy”.293 In opposition to 
the statutes typically dealing with environmental matters, the Atomic 
Energy Act – considering the strategic relevance of the subject – 
centralises the regulation of atomic energy. The Central Government is 
indeed in charge of the production, development, use and disposal of 
such resource and of those products (radioactive substances or 
minerals) needed to produce atomic energy (Section 3), by itself or by 
means of a specialised authority. Therefore, the Government has also 
powers of control and of inspection (Sections 5, 7 and 8). The most 
environmentally relevant norms are designed in Section 17 of the Act, 
concerning nuclear safety. The Central Government is thus empowered 
to issue regulation on the prevention of injuries to the health of people 
and on the production, treatment, transport and storage of radioactive 
waste – subject to penalties ranging from imprisonment for a term 
which may extent to five years or to a fine or both, as specified in 
Section 24. 
The general framework set in 1962 found a more detailed discipline in 
two different Acts of the 1980s: the Atomic Energy (Working of the 
Mines, Minerals and Handling of Prescribed Substances) Rules of 1984 
and the Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules of 
1987. Concerning the working of mines, the Rules of 1984 prescribe 
specific procedures and requirements for the grant of licences by the 
Central Government – with reference to environmental issues, the key 
requirement concerns the long-term storage of wastes, in geological 
formations or in man-made systems (Section 4-xvii), whose safety 
should be addressed by a thorough analysis of the conditions and of 
the risks. In addition to this fundamental requirement, the Working 
Rules introduce a “Radiological Safety Officer” as the person in charge 
of the safety of employees and of the environment surrounding the 
plant (Section 8). These provisions are reinforced by the Rules of 1987 
on the disposal of waste. Here too, the Government posed restrictive 
conditions on the people authorised to pursue this activity, on the 
                                                          
293 Atomic Energy Act, Act No. 33 of 1962, amended by Act No.59 of 1986 and 
Act No.29 of 1987. 
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locations and on the quantities of such waste (Section 3). Moreover, the 
Waste Rules as well identify a Safety Officer, designed by the 
competent authority, with advisory functions on the handling of 
substances and with duties of inspection and assessment on radiations, 
buildings and hazardous situations (Sections 12-13). 
This survey of the legislation on economic activities and on natural 
resources shows how India endeavoured to draft and enact specific 
discipline for each branch of environmental matters. What was left – as 
it emerges from the analysis of all the different pieces of legislation – is 
a comprehensive discipline for wastes, that are approached on a 
piecemeal basis (whether dust from mines or radioactive wastes). In 
particular, a global regulation for wastes was especially needed for 
cities, suffering from the growing level of urbanisation India was 
witnessing. The response to poor sanitation and poor management of 
waste was the Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and Handling) 
Rules of 2000 (“MSW Rules”), adopted for “every municipal authority 
responsible for collection, segregation, storage, transportation, processing and 
disposal of municipal solid wastes” (Section 2). In line with an attempt at 
decentralising the protection of the environment – which is all the more 
necessary in a subject such as waste management – the MSW Rules 
pose the responsibility on the “collection, storage, segregation, 
transportation, processing and disposal of municipal solid wastes” upon the 
municipalities  and under the control of the State Boards established by 
the Water Act (Section 4). According to this Section, the municipality 
shall present an application to the State Board for the creation of 
facilities dealing with the processing and disposal of waste and then 
furnish an annual report on its activities. In turn, apart from the grant 
of authorisations, State Boards are entrusted with the monitoring of the 
“compliance of the standards regarding groundwater, ambient air, leachate 
quality and the compost quality including incineration standards” (Section 
6). In addition to these local bodies, the control system is closed by the 
duty of coordination on implementation and standards assigned to the 
Central Pollution Control Board.    
The MSW Rules were born as a tentative solution to the phenomenon of 
opposition towards the installation of facilities for waste treatment, by 
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means of a committee empowered to discuss a management plan for 
cities. 294  The initiative has been certainly crowned by success, if 
compared to the previous era of waste mismanagement, but the review 
of the discipline in the 2010s was perceived also at the governmental 
level, following an order of the National Green Tribunal on a case 
concerning municipal solid waste in Himachal Pradesh. 295 
Consequently, in 2013, the Ministry of Environment and Forests 
notified a draft MSW Rules that should have superseded the Rules of 
2000 – a project endowed with clarity and with a more stringent 
regulation of the matter. First of all, Section 4 of the draft clarified the 
authorities involved in the management of waste, from the top to the 
local level. For the governmental level, the Ministry of Environment is 
thus in charge of the periodic review of the rules, in coordination with 
the Ministry of Urban Development; at the State level, each Secretary 
for Urban Development shall ensure the implementation of the MSW 
Rules and the preparation of a solid waste strategy. Concerning the 
technical bodies, the division of tasks between Central and State 
Pollution Control Boards is maintained. At the local level, the duties of 
the municipalities are further specified: apart from the general task of 
the disposal of municipal solid waste, municipal authorities are 
entrusted with more stringent duties for obtaining authorisations, for 
complying with standards and for seeking environmental clearance for 
project facilities to the State Level Environmental Impact Assessment 
Authority. Moreover, Section 5 of the draft Rules explicitly opens up to 
the private sector, as it makes the municipality responsible for 
“engaging agencies or groups working in waste management including waste 
pickers” too. Finally, as far as regulation is concerned, specific standards 
are set in Section 8, prescribing the collection biodegradable and non-
biodegradable material, user-friendly storage spaces, the prohibition of 
manual handling and the limitation of landfill. 
The Ministry of Environment submitted this very advanced project – as 
for the diversion from landfills and the decentralisation of the processes 
                                                          
294 Sahasranaman, P.B., op.cit., p. 252. 
295  http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/municipal-solid-waste-rules-
amendments-moef-asked-formulate-new-draft. See infra, Chapter V.  
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– to comments by the public in July 2013. In spite of the innovative 
characteristics of the new text, the draft Rules were stayed by an order 
of a division bench of the Karnataka High Court in October 2013, 
following a public interest petition presented by the Environmental 
Support Group based in Bangalore. The main ground for this decision 
is the distance between the text proposed by the MoEF and the 
progressive directions issued by the Karnataka High Court in cases 
concerning solid waste management.296 The amendments to the MSW 
Rules are thus still pending, while progressive interpretation for the 
correct implementation of the rules is being delivered by courts. 
As a strategy, the single-issue approach is unquestionably helpful in 
tackling specific problems – some necessitating a central-based 
solution, such as the handling of atomic energy, some more directly 
affecting the daily life of citizens and dealt with at the level of 
municipalities, as the MSW Rules. While the reaction to the Stockholm 
Conference has resulted in the enactment of the most urgent legislation 
on water and air pollution and on the approval of constitutional 
amendments explicitly enshrining environmental rights in the 
fundamental law of India, a piece of legislation entirely devoted to the 
environment only passed in 1986, with the Environment (Protection) 
Act. 
 
c) The general discipline: from the concept of public nuisance to 
the Environment (Protection) Act  
Only following the tragedy of Bhopal in 1984 did the Government of 
India provide for a comprehensive statute on environmental law with a 
broad scope, on the basis of Article 253 of the Indian Constitution, 
always with a view to implement the decisions taken in Stockholm in 
1972. 297  As stated by Divan and Rosencranz, the Environment 
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(Protection) Act of 1986 is both an umbrella and an enabling 
legislation, insofar as it guarantees coordination between the different 
activities of the Central and State bodies dealing with environmental 
issues (such as the Central and State Pollution Control Boards) and it 
allows the elaboration of policies for environmental protection (and 
regulation, the Municipal Solid Wastes Rules being an example of this 
activity).298  
In fact, after some years from the approval of the Water and Air Acts, 
the regulation of several activities in light of environmental needs was 
still in the agenda. Although the Water and Air Acts proved to be 
progressive pieces of legislation, several critical issues could be pointed 
out.299 First of all, in the working of the Pollution Control Boards, the 
power to revoke consent had been rarely used, and even in case of a 
revocation of consent, the applicant could initiate a second procedure 
aimed at obtaining a grant of authorisation while continuing its 
activities. Then, the objectivity of Boards was jeopardised by the 
presence of officials appointed by the Government, who often were in 
charge of other assignments. A further critique came from the point of 
view of public participation, severely lacking – a matter that has always 
been treated with attempts at improving the situation.300 Moreover, the 
possibility of enforcing the laws was constrained by the fact that State 
Boards could not impose penalties on their own, but only by initiating 
judicial proceedings. Finally, the set of standards was dependent on 
administrative discretion – a question that is constantly in the agenda 
of environmental protection.  
The issues on the agenda were thus two-fold: on the one hand, the 
existence of a variety of subjects needing an umbrella legislation; on the 
                                                                                                                               
Industrial Disaster, Trafford, 2006, and the classical investigation account by 
Lapierre, D., Moro, J., Il était minuit cinq à Bhopal, Paris, Laffont, 2001. 
298 Divan, S., Rosencranz, A., op.cit., p. 66. 
299  Abraham, C. M., and Rosencranz, A., An Evaluation of Pollution Control 
Legislation in India, in Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 11, 1986, pp. 101-
119. 
300  See infra, Chapter III, on the various judgments dealing with the 
participation of the public to projects affecting the environment. 
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other hand, the question of improving the legislation on the 
environment. It should be noted, however, that before the enactment of 
the Environment (Protection) Act, the subject was already understood 
in the framework of general rules, under the notion of public 
nuisance.301 Nevertheless, it was desirable to set an ensemble of rules in 
a single Act dealing with the environment. As mentioned earlier, 
environmental protection was intended as part of single acts dealing 
with the regulation of economic activities. If the Water and Air Acts 
symbolise a first departure from this orientation, and the Environment 
(Protection) Act constitutes the image of a “revolutionary” legislation 
ideally encompassing the whole subject, legislative sources for building 
a framework for environmental protection already existed. In fact, the 
common law notion of public nuisance already provided for a basic 
overview of environmental issues and it is still nowadays the root for 
the draft and enactment of environmental law statutes.302 This concept 
of criminal and tort law can indeed, as Sahasranaman states, provide “a 
mechanism for controlling environmental pollution”.303 
In general, a public nuisance can be defined as an “unreasonable 
interference with a general right of the public”304 – in our cases, with the 
right to a healthy environment.305 Prosser, in his article, that reviewed 
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School of Law Research Paper No. 05/2011, 2011. 
303 Sahasranaman, P., op.cit., p. 269. 
304 Divan, S., Rosencranz, A., op.cit., p. 112. 
305  For a common law, and especially American, perspective, refer to the 
foundational article by Prosser, W.L., Private Action for Public Nuisance, in 
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 6, 1966, pp. 997-1027; Bryson, J. E., Macbeth, 
A., Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law, in 
Ecology Law Quarterly, No. 2, 1972, p. 241; Hodas, D.R., Private actions for public 
nuisance: Common law citizen suits for relief from environmental harm, in Ecology 
Law Quarterly, No. 16, 1989, p. 883. The authors distinguish between private and 
public nuisance, the former deriving from the interference of other private 
properties to one’s own private property, the latter occurring in case of 
interferences with a right enjoyed by the public. 
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the notion from the 16th century and adapted it to the challenges of a 
nascent environmental litigation, defines it as “always a crime”, being 
potentially “a tort, provided that the plaintiff can plead and prove that he has 
suffered some "special" or "particular" damage”.306 In India, the notion was 
codified in Section 268 of the Penal Code, that reads as follows: 
“A person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an 
illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the 
public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, 
or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to 
persons who may have occasion to use any public right. A common nuisance is 
not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or advantage.” 
For environmental purposes, public nuisance could be configured into 
several offensive acts such as the pollution of the air, the discharge of 
effluents in waters, the production of noises that cause disturbances in 
the environment and for the health of those affected by them. People 
pursuing such conducts would thus be considered liable to prosecution 
for public nuisance. Moreover, Section 268 of the Indian Penal Code 
also considers omissions as occurrences leading to public nuisance, 
thus allowing prosecutions against occupiers avoiding to set the 
suitable standards for environmental protection. 
This provision is accompanied by its correspondent procedural norm. 
Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 empowers 
magistrates to pass a conditional order to remove nuisances.307 The 
                                                          
306 Prosser, W.L., op.cit., p. 997. 
307 Section 133. Conditional order for removal of nuisance. 
(1) Whenever a District Magistrate or a Sub- divisional Magistrate or any other 
Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this of behalf by the State Government, on 
receiving the report of a police officer or other information and on taking such evidence 
(if any) as he thinks fit, considers- 
(a) that any unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be removed from any public place 
or from any way, river or channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public; or 
(b) that the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the keeping of any goods or 
merchandise, is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and that 
in consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or such goods 
or merchandise should be removed or the keeping thereof regulated; or 
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remedy is speedy, since the directions given by the judiciary are of 
immediate applicability, but only provisional, as the occupier can 
oppose evidence and the magistrate is then constrained to initiate 
judicial proceedings. The order of the judge is then made final only 
                                                                                                                               
(c) that the construction of any building, or, the disposal of any substance, as is likely to 
occasion configuration or explosion, should be prevented or stopped; or 
(d) that any building, tent or structure, or any tree is in such a condition that it is 
likely to fall and thereby cause injury to persons living or carrying on business in the 
neighbourhood or passing by, and that in consequence the removal, repair or support of 
such building, tent or structure, or the removal or support of such tree, is necessary; or 
(e) that any tank, well or excavation adjacent to any such way or public place should be 
fenced in such manner as to prevent danger arising to the public; or 
(f) that any dangerous animal should be destroyed, confined or otherwise disposed of, 
such Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person causing such 
obstruction or nuisance, or carrying on such trade or occupation, or keeping any such 
goods or merchandise, or owning, possessing or controlling such building, tent, 
structure, substance, tank, well or excavation, or owning or possessing such animal or 
tree, within a time to be fixed in the order- 
(i) to remove such obstruction or nuisance; or 
(ii) to desist from carrying on, or to remove or regulate in such manner as may be 
directed, such trade or occupation, or to remove such goods or merchandise, or to 
regulate the keeping thereof in such manner as may be directed; or 
(iii) to prevent or stop the construction of such building, or to alter the disposal of such 
substance; or 
(iv) to remove, repair or support such building, tent or structure, or to remove or 
support such trees; or 
(v) to fence such tank, well or excavation; or 
(vi) to destroy, confine or dispose of such dangerous animal in the manner provided in 
the said order; or, if he objects so to do, to appear before himself or some other Executive 
Magistrate subordinate to him at a time and place to be fixed by the Order, and show 
cause, in the manner hereinafter provided, why the order should not be made absolute. 
(2) No order duly made by a Magistrate under this section shall be called in question in 
any Civil Court. Explanation- A" public place" includes also property belonging to the 
State, camping grounds and grounds left unoccupied for sanitary or recreative 
purposes. 
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after showing sufficient evidence of the nuisance.308 The powers of the 
judge are thus broad and, according to the Supreme Court (in the 
Ratlam Municipality case),309 the magistrate is compelled to issue such 
orders under Section 133, whenever the judicial authority receives 
information on public nuisances, supported by sufficient evidence.  
In spite of the wide powers concerning the removal of public nuisance 
and the enactment of specific legislation dealing with water and air 
pollution, in 1986 the Environment (Protection) Act was approved. As 
in the case of Section 268 of the Indian Penal Code on public nuisance, 
the Environment (Protection) Act310 indicates broad definitions for its 
main objects of regulation in its Section 2. First of all, the environment 
“includes water, air and land and the inter-relationship which exists among 
and between water, air and land, and human beings, other living creatures, 
plants, micro-organism and property”. While broad, the merit of the new 
legislation resides in the specificity of it, as the legal system is 
innovated through the insertion of provisions on the environment itself, 
in opposition with the general concept of public nuisance. The statute 
further covered a legal vacuum – albeit not with a constitutional value – 
insomuch as the environment is clearly defined, while Articles 48-A 
and 51-A(g) are silent on the issue.  
If compared to the Stockholm Declaration, the EPA is to be considered 
more eco-centric, as it does not put an emphasis on “human 
environment”, but rather focuses initially on the environment itself to 
further extend the definition to the relationships with human beings. 
This point of view is carried on also to the definition of pollutant and 
pollution. “Environmental pollution”, in fact, means the presence of 
environmental pollutants, signifying “any solid, liquid or gaseous 
substance present in such concentration as may be, or tend to be, injurious to 
environment”. Although the statute clearly underlies the existence of 
threats to the environment posed by human activities, the formulation 
of the main definitions is general in its nature, in order to focus more on 
                                                          
308 Divan, S., Rosencranz, A., op.cit., pp. 112-113. 
309 Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand, AIR 1980, SC 1622, (1980) 4 SCC 
162. See infra, Chapter III. 
310 Environment (Protection) Act, Act No. 29 of 1986. 
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the result than on the cause of pollution. Notwithstanding the debate 
between the eco- and anthropo-centric character of the norms, the main 
feature of the EPA is its nature of lex specialis. In fact, Section 24 enables 
the Act (and all the rules and orders passed under its regulation) to 
override any other norms approved.  
As an umbrella legislation, the EPA entrusts to the Central Government 
a wide range of instruments to combat pollution. Section 3 of the Act 
lists a series of measures (that are not exhaustive) apt to protect and 
improve the environment that include: 
 The power to coordinate actions undertaken by States and 
other authorities; 
 The power to plan and execute a nation-wide programme for 
preventing and fighting pollution; 
 The power to indicate qualitative standards for the 
environment and quantitative standards for the discharge of 
pollutants; 
 The power to approve procedures to prevent accidents (a clear 
reference to the Bhopal tragedy) and to handle hazardous 
substances; 
 The power to inspect plants and processes – in order to 
determine possible offences under the Act or to examine 
equipments and material in general (Section 10); 
 The power to give directions (directly or through other 
authorities) for the prevention, control and abatement of 
pollution, including the closure or regulation of industries and 
of water and electricity (Section 5);311 
 The power to create an authority for dealing with the 
enforcement of the EPA – although the Government has left 
                                                          
311 The EPA was the first piece of legislation expressly introducing such powers, 
that were later extended to the Water and Air Acts with the amendments of 
1987-1988. 
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the question of implementation to the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests. 
As far as the enabling volet is concerned, Section 6 of the EPA 
empowers the Central Government to issues rules for regulating 
pollution, including the standards of water, air and land; the limits for 
pollutants in certain areas; the procedures and limitations for handling 
hazardous substances; the limitation on the location of industries and 
the safeguards for accidents. Moreover, Section 25 too enables the 
Central Government for making rules under the premises of the Act, 
detailing the as well the possibility to delegate competences to other 
authorities – as expressly provided for in Section 23 – and the different 
activities concerning investigations and inspections (use of samples, 
laboratories, notification of offences, reporting powers). 
The last crucial aspect is the enforcement of the rules. As in the other 
Acts dealing with environmental pollution, some norms specifically 
tackle offences. In the EPA, Sections 15 to 17 prescribe penalties for the 
violation of provisions of the Act and of the rules, orders and directions 
adopted thereunder by singles, companies and Governmental 
Departments. As a general rule, the offences under the EPA are to be 
punished with imprisonment for a term extending to five years or with 
a fine, or both (Section 15) and with the possibility of extending the 
term to seven year in case the contravention continues. As for 
companies and governmental bodies, the directors, managers or heads 
of public bodies are considered to be liable and thus punishable 
accordingly. As in the Water and Air Act, civil courts are barred from 
having jurisdiction on violations of the EPA (Section 22).    
The Environment (Protection) Act is to be read in connection with the 
other statutes on the environment and with a view to underlining the 
deployment of its full potential as an enabler for the protection of the 
environment. On the one hand, the Water Act, the Air Act and the EPA 
share many common features. Firstly, the powers conferred to the 
Central Government and the possibility of delegating powers – mainly 
by means of creating Pollution Control Board as the main agencies for 
enforcement at the local level. Then, the large scope of these pieces of 
legislation, encompassing all kinds of pollution. Finally, the apparatus 
of sanctions, that is parallel in the three texts. However, on the other 
hand, what characterises the EPA is its enabling nature, since the Act of 
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1986 is to be seen as a trunk from which spring the different branches of 
environmental legislation, by means of the combination of Sections 6 
and 25 of the Act – granting the Central Government the possibility to 
draft norms valid nation-wide, while guaranteeing the implementation 
at the local level. 
 
d) Implementing legislation: the Environmental (Protection) Rules 
and the introduction of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure   
As a result of this multifaceted activity aimed at providing India with a 
bulk of legislation that could uphold the challenges of industrialisation 
and urbanisation in an environmentally sound manner, the first 
embodiment of the EPA was the enactment of the Environment 
(Protection) Rules of 1986,312 whose purpose was the establishment of 
standards, as required by Section 7 of the EPA. The Environment Rules 
provide for the specific procedures for setting standards, issuing 
directions and posing restrictions. As for the standards, Section 3 of the 
Rules refers to six Schedules annexed to the text. These Schedules deal 
with different activities and types of pollution. The first Schedule is 
focused on industrial activities in general, ranging from chemical to 
textile and from oil to pharmaceutical industries. The third Schedule 
(Schedule II being omitted by the 1993 amendment) indicates the level 
of noise permitted in the different areas (industrial, commercial, 
residential and “silence” zones), in order to set standards for air 
quality. Schedule IV also pertains to the field of air pollution, but as far 
as smoke from motor vehicles is concerned. In addition to these, the 
following annexes are centred on the discharge of environmental 
pollutants: Schedule V indicates the authorities in charge of the respect 
of the Rules according to the different plants or objects (e.g. mines, 
factories, ports); Schedule VI distinguishes between effluents in water 
and gas wastes; finally, Schedule VII returns on air pollution with 
standards in the concentration of lead, carbon monoxide, sulphur 
dioxide, oxides of nitrogen and particulate matter. Section 3 specifies 
                                                          
312 Amended in 1987, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001 and 
2009. 
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the timing of compliance to the Rules and the limitation on raw 
materials (coal) used by thermal plants, while setting the power to 
decide more stringent standards upon State Boards. 
As for the issue of directions, Section 5 of the Rules empowers the 
Central Government (or the competent authority) to prohibit or restrict 
the location of industries and the carrying on of operations in certain 
areas, on the basis of specific requirements – air, water and noise 
pollution; biological diversity; land use; foreseeable discharge of 
pollutants. According to Section 4, directions shall be written and 
specific as for the actions to be taken and the time of compliance. 
Procedurally, there should be the possibility of filing objections on the 
part of the occupier. In conclusion, usual norms on the procedures for 
information are set in the last Sections. 
The Environment Rules are thus the basic norms implementing the 
EPA. Nevertheless, additional Rules have been provided by the 
Government of India so as to allow a more comprehensive protection of 
the environment and the prevention of pollution. As referred to 
beforehand, the Municipal Solid Waste Rules and the Noise Pollution 
(Regulation and Control) Rules supplemented the Environment Rules 
for specific topics. Moreover, apart from the single-issue norms, the 
main development following the Rules of 1986 was the attempt at 
setting the Environmental Impact Assessment procedure as mandatory, 
a copernican revolution for the operationalisation of sustainable 
development.  
Indeed, the problem of enforcement was crucial insofar as the 
regulation of economic activities passed through the existence and the 
realisation of controls that could account for the modification of the 
environment not only during the activity itself, but also for the results it 
could produce afterwards, Thus, in 1994 the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests issued Notification No. S.O. 60 (E.) – then amended in 
1997313 – for the regulation of Environmental Impact Assessment in 
                                                          
313 The amendment of 1997 introduced a first degree of decentralisation insofar 
as the environmental clearance for thermal power plants was shifted to the 
States. 
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several categories of projects, under Section 3 of the EPA and Rule 5 of 
the Environment Protection Rules. By means of this notification, 
procedural and substantial hurdles were placed for pursuing economic 
activities and projects that could jeopardise the environment. Thus, 
environmental clearance is to be considered mandatory for 
modification of activities increasing the level of pollution and for any 
project related to a list (Schedule I) of economic enterprises. The range 
of projects and activities requiring a prior assessment of environmental 
soundness is directly correlated to their considerable relevance and 
impact, and include: 
 Nuclear power plants; 
 Hydroelectric plants and related activities such as river 
valley projects; 
 Thermal power plants; 
 Transport infrastructure as highway projects, airports, ports 
and harbours; 
 Chemical industries: petroleum refineries and intermediate 
products, pesticides, pharmaceuticals and synthetic rubber; 
 Exploration of oil and gas; 
 Asbestos; 
 Metallurgical industries (iron, steel, aluminium, copper, 
etc.); 
 Mining projects; 
 Several industries deemed environmentally “demanding”, 
such as the manufacture of paint, dyes, pulps, cement and 
foundries). 
The Notification of 1994 sets a procedure for the grant of the 
environmental clearance. The first step is the presentation of an 
application to the MoEF – specifying the location of the project, 
alternate sites, objectives and the impact on lands, air and waters – with 
a project report that includes an EIA report. Moreover, for the 
categories considered as highly pollutant (mining, thermal power 
plants, hydro-power plants, irrigation projects, ports, prospection of 
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major minerals), an application containing the indication of the site 
should be made already when carrying on investigations.  
The second phase of the procedure is the evaluation of the reports by 
the Impact Assessment Agency, a body constituted within the MoEF 
that has the power of establishing, if necessary, an ad hoc Committee of 
Experts for a specific project. The Committee of Experts, constituted by 
a maximum number of 15 people having expertise in ecological 
sciences, pollution control and social sciences (including 
representatives of NGOs), is empowered to conduct inspections on site, 
before, during and after the commencement of operations. After a 
period of 90 days, the Impact Assessment Agency prepares an EIA 
report providing recommendations relying upon the assessment made 
of the documents contained in the application and on data and 
investigations pursued by the Committee of Experts or by the IAA 
itself. The procedure is completed, immediately before the publication 
of the EIA report, by a public hearing before the State Pollution Control 
Board. The public hearing procedure – set in Schedule IV of the 
Notification – is characterised by the notice of the publicity of the 
environmental hearing in the newspapers, the participation of residents 
and environmental groups but by the mere procedural nature of it. At 
the end of this procedure, the MoEF issues an environmental clearance 
if the projects is considered sound for the environment and the health 
of the residents. 
The EIA Notification of 1994 provided a first tool for guaranteeing the 
environment in the preparation and conduction of large projects and of 
highly pollutant activities. Nonetheless, several shortcomings could be 
pointed out. Firstly, the dilution of the initial mandatory character of 
the public hearing (the Notification, dated 27 January, had immediately 
been amended on the 4th of May of 1994).314 Then, an excessive degree 
of centralisation, if compared with the provisions of the Water and Air 
Acts. Finally, the difficulty in implementing the notification, witnessed 
by the Impact Assessment Agency, due to a general lack of institutional 
capacity - a feature that is evident if one looks at the history of 
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environmental litigation.315 In order to overcome these critical aspects, 
several amendments were approved, eventually leading to a 
reformulation of the discipline through the EIA Notification of 2006, 
for a more comprehensive and decentralised model of Environmental 
Impact Assessment. 
Firstly, the EIA Notification is clearer as for its content. Definitions of 
the activities to be considered within the scope of the rules. Section 2 
provides for the indication of projects needing prior environmental 
clearance – namely all projects listed in the new Schedule, the 
expansion and modernisation of previous projects and the change in 
product in existing projects. While the categories of projects are similar 
to those of 1994 – infrastructure, chemical, mining, etc. – the EIA 
Notification of 2006 differentiates between two categories of activities: 
Category A for matters to be dealt with at the central level and 
Category B for projects to be evaluated at the local level. Within this 
framework, in the Central List are included: 
 Oil and gas exploration projects; 
 Nuclear power plants; 
 Chemical projects related to oil, pesticides and fertilisers; 
 Asbestos and soda ash industry, 
while in the “exclusive competences” of States would fall: 
 Paint industry; 
 Matters of municipal interest – building projects, township 
development projects, solid waste management, common 
effluent treatment plants; 
 Isolation of hazardous chemicals (until a certain threshold); 
 State highways. 
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Environmental Impact Assessment Review, No. 35, 2012, pp. 23-36. See also infra, 
Chapter III. 
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The rest of the highly pollutant economic activities – metalliferous 
mining, hydro-electric and thermal power plants, synthetic chemicals, 
infrastructures (airports and ports) – is assigned either to the central or 
to the local levels according to the dimensions or the location of the 
projects (“the spatial extent of potential impacts and potential impacts on 
human health and natural and man-made resources”, section 4). These new 
regulations, that aim at a broader decentralisation of the processes, are 
combined to the creation of a new body dealing with the EIA 
procedure, the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority 
(SEIAA), to be constituted in each State according to Section 3 of the 
EPA. The SEIAA, composed of 3 members (a State officer and two 
experts), is in charge of the decisions on granting environmental 
clearances under the recommendations of Expert Appraisal 
Committees (EAC, institutions having a similar role of the Impact 
Assessment Agency under the Notification of 1994, constituted both at 
the central and at the local levels). These Committees shall be 
constituted by 15 members that are expert in environmental fields – 
divided between “professionals” and proper “experts” (possessing at 
least fifteen years of experience in engineering, technology, architecture 
or law and with work specialisations in environmental quality, risk 
assessment, project management, environmental economics or life 
sciences.  
The procedure leading to the grant of environmental clearances is 
innovated and detailed in the text of 2006. The process includes four 
phases: screening (only for Category B projects), scoping, public 
consultation and appraisal (Section 7). 316  The first stage of the 
environmental clearance process is the screening of the application. As 
in the case of 1994, the application has to follow a particular scheme, 
that has been further detailed in 2006 – including the size and the 
expected cost of the project, requirements for land and water use as 
well as other natural resources, production of solid wastes, release of 
pollutants, an estimation of the impacts of the work and an analysis of 
the environmental sensitivity of the project. This screening of the 
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the object of Chapter IV, Section II. 
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application consists in an initial scrutiny on the part of the State Expert 
Appraisal Committee, in order to determine the necessity of proceeding 
toward the preparation of an Environmental Impact Assessment report. 
The second step of the procedure, the scoping of the application, has a 
nature similar to the screening (in fact, for Category A, the phases are 
condensed into the plain scoping). During this phase, the project 
proponent must present an application (as described beforehand) with 
a pre-feasibility report and the Terms of Reference that address all 
relevant critical points as for the environment, in order to prepare an 
EIA report. According to the information provided by the applicant, the 
EAC sets the Terms of Reference and communicates them to the 
applicant (including through online publication). The EAC has the 
power to reject the application even in this stage, without pursuing to a 
comprehensive EIA report. 
After having set the Terms of Reference, the third stage is the public 
consultation – a phase that has been ameliorated and strengthened 
from the previous rules of 1994. According to Section 7, the role of 
public consultation of local affected subjects as well as those who are 
“plausible stakes” in the impacts of the project/activity is greatly 
enhanced, as this phase is deemed mandatory for Category A projects 
and for Category B1 – projects that passed the first phase of screening. 
Several categories are nevertheless excluded from this obligation, such 
as projects for irrigation, expansion of roads and highways, building 
projects in townships and strategic projects. As in the text of 1994, the 
responsibility for carrying on the consultation lies in the Pollution 
Control Boards, that are asked to proceed first with a locally based 
public hearing, then with the analysis of answers provided by other 
people affected by the project, in a period not exceeding 45 days from 
the request of the applicant. The public hearing must be conducted by a 
district magistrate with the assistance of an officer of the Pollution 
Control Board and it must be started by a presentation of the project by 
a representative of the applicant. It is to be noted that this phase has a 
more “dialogic” character, as the applicant has the duty to modify its 
EIA draft, as well as its Environmental Management Plan (EMP), 
according to the critical points outlined by the public consultation, and 
then present the new drafts to the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC). 
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The presentation of the new EIA and EMP drafts constitutes the fourth 
and last step of the procedure, the appraisal of the project undertaken 
by the EAC (Central or State EAC, according to the relevance of the 
project). The requirements set in the Notification of 2006 are the 
transparency of the appraisal – that should comprehend the 
documentation concerning all the steps of the procedure – and the final 
approval, by the EAC, of “categorical recommendations” to be delivered 
to the competent authority for the grant of environmental clearance or 
for its refusal. Then, within forty-five days, the authority shall 
communicate the results of the EIA to the applicant – normally, it 
accepts the recommendations made by the EAC. 
In addition to the normal procedure for an EIA, the Notification of 2006 
adds a fifth phase, concerning post-environmental clearance 
monitoring (Section 10). In fact, in order to guarantee a proper 
implementation of the project following the recommendations made by 
the EAC, the applicants/project managers should provide a report to 
the concerned authority twice a year. Moreover, in opposition to the 
rules of 1994 – that set the validity of the environmental clearance for 5 
years, the new Notification sets different periods of validity, from 5 
years for most of the projects to 10 years for river valley projects, until 
30 years for mining. 
The Notification of 2006 (with minor amendments in 2009, 2011 and 
2012) constitutes the basic text for the procedure of Environmental 
Impact Assessment. While, in general, legislative provisions in the 
India system are fairly detailed and amended as to improve the system 
from previous inadequacies (including the guidelines developed by the 
MoEF), the critical point of the whole construction is the lack of 
enforcement. In spite of a strong judicial system,317 the practice of EIA is 
variable as for coordination between bodies, the phases of screening 
and scoping (because of the absence of definition of impacts and 
pollutants), the quality of the EIA reports (notwithstanding the detailed 
forms directly provided in the Notification of 2006) and the 
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ineffectiveness of public participation.318 Moreover, as stated in studies 
dealing with non-legal aspects,319 the most relevant question about the 
effectiveness of the protection of the environment as outlined so far lies 
in the lack of enforcement, notwithstanding the solidity and the 
creativity of the judicial system and the existence of a comprehensive 
panoply of legislative instruments. A repeated absence in the system, 
originating the poor enforcement, is the hiatus between the EIA 
legislation, responding to the single activities, and the existence of both 
broad categories of projects that should be coherently addressed and 
single projects. For instance, the Terms of Reference in a EIA report 
should be drafted as to be fitting like a glove the project and the 
environmental concerns it could pose. To do this, the procedure should 
be more broadly open to all relevant stakeholders, including NGOs,320 
in order for the EIA to be fully respondent to the needs of the local 
actors. 
Taken as a whole, on paper, the Indian legal system seems to prove 
undeniably consistent with the international standards set from the 
Stockholm Conference. The attention to environmental issues – 
stemming from the Indian tradition – dates from the independence and 
has been declined in a wide range of constitutional and legislative 
documents. Constitutionally, the cornerstone of the Bill of Rights, the 
right to life, has been rapidly associated to environmental protection 
and has later developed – by means of the combined interpretation of it 
with the principles and duties on the environment introduced in 1976 – 
in single constitutionally entrenched provisions as to respond to the 
“international wave” of the 1970s that brought environmental rights to 
the forefront of the constitutional agenda. As far as legislation is 
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concerned, India witnessed both a piecemeal approach, especially 
during the period immediately following the Stockholm Conference, 
and a more inclusive strategy with the enactment of the EPA and of the 
EIA Notification.  
If constitutional and legislative action have been almost immediately 
undertaken, the lion’s share in environmental affairs had to be taken by 
the administration, responsible for the implementation of the “basket” 
of rights, principles and detailed provisions for environmental 
protection. In this field, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, 
created in 1980, and the homologues at the State level, have proved to 
be a key player in the elaboration of legislation and guidelines for 
implementation. Moreover, the creation of Pollution Control Boards, 
progressively enlarged in competences and dimensions, has been a 
crucial point for the application of the rules and for the diffusion of 
environmental awareness in the country. However, the amount of 
jurisprudence on environmental matters, that will be the object of the 
next chapter, is an evidence of difficult implementation of 
environmental provisions and of a challenged life for a development 
that could efficiently balance economic interests with ecological 
imperatives. The missing points in the picture are mainly twofold: on 
the one hand, a still limited decentralisation that should bolster 
environmental legislation and its implementation, excessively reliant 
on the directives of the centre.321 On the other hand, apart from the 
existence of an apparatus of norms susceptible of enforcement, 
participation in the processes is the key aspect for a correct 
implementation of environmental policies. Where the legislative and 
the executive powers have achieved mixed results, the judiciary would 
prove more creative in proposing solutions and in setting 
environmental concerns in the political agenda. 
 
  
                                                          
321  Gupta, S., Environment Ethics, Policies and Inclusive Environment Protection 
Mechanism in India (With Special Reference to Environmental Inquisition), in Journal 
of Environment and Earth Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2015, pp. 112-118. 
  157 
Chapter III 
The judiciary and the establishment of the National Green Tribunal 
 
 
The solidity of the legislative system, coupled by weak administrative 
implementation, has been the key element for the judiciary to take the 
lion’s share in matters of environmental protection. The High Courts 
and the Supreme Courts – aided by the mechanism of writ petitions ex 
Article 32 of the Constitution – succeeded in ensuring a minimum level 
of enforcement of environmental norms and used their powers 
creatively, as to push administrative bodies to implement the rules and 
to urge legislative actions that could promote a better level of health 
and environmental protection, including through the establishment of 
new institutions such as specialised tribunals. The present chapter will 
thus delve into the study of the path leading to the creation of the 
National Green Tribunal of India. The first part focuses on an overview 
of the main strategies and tools of the courts to ensure an enhanced 
access to justice and a proper understanding of environmental matters 
during the judicial proceedings – namely, the theory of liabilities and 
the recourse to tort action, the statutory remedies, the access by writ 
petitions, the recourse to Public Interest Litigation and the role 
technical committees and of amici curiae in the proceeding. The second 
part further enlarges the scope of the analysis in the single leading 
cases of environmental litigation in India through writ jurisdiction, in 
order to look into the causes and the consequences of the judicial 
decisions for the public and the legal innovations purported by the 
jurisprudence. Finally, the third paragraph will rely on a comparative 
analysis – both diachronic and synchronic – of the attempts at creating 
specialised environmental tribunals so as to explain the developments 
leading to the establishment of the National Green Tribunal and the 
specific features of it. 
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I) Remedies and critical points: judicial strategies for 
environmental litigation 
 
a) Common law causes of actions and the theory of liability 
Notwithstanding the panoply of laws enacted from the 1970s, the lack 
of administrative enforcement322 leaves space for judicial action, in case 
the citizen decides to resort to courts. In this event – apart from the 
most commonly used resort to writ petitions323 – several roads open up, 
each with specific characteristics and proceedings: 
 Under the law of tort, an action for private nuisance, 
negligence or liability against the polluter; 
 Under criminal law, an action for public nuisance;324  
 With limitations to cases arising from incidents in hazardous 
industries, an application under the Public Liability 
Insurance Act of 1991;325 
 For environmental clearances, the resort to the National 
Environmental Appellate Authority;326 
 The traditional resort to filing writ petitions under Articles 32 
and 226 of the Constitution, in cases of violations of 
fundamental rights;327 
 As an extension of the former point, in case of common 
grievances concerning the violation of basic human rights 
                                                          
322 As addressed in Chapter II on Environmental Impact Assessment. 
323 See infra, paragraph b) and Section II. 
324 Refer to Chapter II, Section III, paragraph c). 
325 See infra, and Section II, paragraph c). 
326 See infra, Section II, paragraph c). 
327 See infra, paragraph b). 
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caused by activities led by the Executive, a Public Interest 
Litigation action.328  
The law of torts, entered in the Indian legal system in the 18th century, 
as known and as it can be derived from the definition, deals with the 
redress of torts, civil wrongful acts recognised by law, not arising out of 
contracts or statutes, that result in injuries to another person or 
property and that can be redressed by the award of damages to the 
injured person.329 As stated by the Supreme Court in Jay Laxmi Salt 
Words (P) Ltd vs. State of Gujarat,330 “Winfield331 has defined tortious law 
arising from breach of a duty primarily fixed by law; this duty is towards 
persons generally and its breach is redressable by an action for unliquidated 
damages. In general, torts consist of some act done without just cause or 
excuse. "The law of torts exists for the purpose of preventing men from hurting 
one another whether in respect of their property, their presence, their 
reputations or anything which is theirs." Injury and damage are two basic 
ingredients of tort.” 
As Divan and Rosencranz state, the resorts that a plaintiff can obtain 
are basically two; damages and injunctions. Since damages – pecuniary 
compensation correlated to the action undertaken by the defendant – 
are generally low in India,332 the most effective remedy in tort actions 
lay in the injunctions that courts can grant. Injunctions consist of 
processes where a person, the defendant, is faced by the obligation to 
restrain from continuing to act in a manner prejudiciable to the 
                                                          
328  See infra, paragraph c). The classification proposed in this analysis is a 
remodulation of the “environmental lawyer’s procedural armoury” identified 
by Divan and Rosencranz, p. 87. 
329 For reference on tort law, Hedley, S., Tort, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011; Steele, J., Tort law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2010. For India, Lakshminath, A., Sridhar, M., Ramaswamy Iyer’s The Law 
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330 Jay Laxmi Salt Words (P) Ltd vs. State of Gujarat, 1994 SCC (4) 1, JT 1994 (3) 492. 
331  Winfield, P.H., A Text-book of the Law of Tort, Sweet & Maxwell, 1950; 
Winfield, P.H., The Law of Tort, in Law Quarterly Review, 51, 1935, p. 249. 
332 The fines provided for in the Water and Air Acts can give a measure of the 
magnitude of eventual damages in civil suits. 
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environment, either temporarily or permanently. The principles that 
govern the grant of injunctions are three: the existence of a case where 
the plaintiff is very likely to succeed; the probability of permanent 
injury; a “balance of convenience” – the damages to the plaintiff being 
superior to the results of the measures ordered by the court.333 
This enlargement of tort law to environmental cases finds its basis in 
the concept of nuisance. Originally, the notion was applied to private 
cases involving the interference of a party on the enjoyment of land by 
another party – thus being part of tort law. This general character of the 
notion led to the attraction of cases dealing with environmental 
damages to privates into tort law. In addition to the concept of 
nuisance, three other causes of action in the doctrine of tort law can be 
analysed in the framework of environmental law: negligence, strict 
liability and absolute liability.334 
Negligence is defined as the breach of a duty of care on a plaintiff’s 
good by a defendant. In order to bring to court an action for negligence 
in environmental cases, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
owed to him/her a “duty of care” to avoid the damage caused, that 
there existed a breach of this duty, and that there was a causal link 
between the breach and the damage. As it could be imagined, the 
critical point in the proceeding resides in the existence of a causal link, 
to be proved, between the damage and the act of the defendant – 
assuming the absence, in the behaviour of the defendant, of a standard 
of care. In this sense, it should also be noted that acts of negligence can 
also result in nuisance or in breaches of strict liability. In the first case, 
the injury caused to the plaintiff also interferes with his/her right of 
enjoyment of land, whereas, in the framework of strict liability, the act 
of negligence is also characterised by the escape of anything dangerous 
                                                          
333 Divan, S., Rosencranz, A., op.cit., pp. 89-90. 
334 See, for instance, Maloney, F.E., Judicial protection of the environment: a new role 
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which the defendant has brought on the land (Rylands vs. Fletcher 
case).335 
In India, the most relevant case on negligence in environmental 
pollution is the Mukesh Textile Mills case. In particular, the defendant 
was the owner of a sugar factory that stored molasses, eventually 
escaping and emptying into a water channel that irrigated the plaintiffs’ 
lands. 336  The court argued that the action of the defendant was 
negligent – thus underlying a breach of the duty of care – and 
condemned the defendant to damages. A second case occurred in 1999, 
when the Supreme Court of India recognised as negligence the acts of 
the Delhi Municipality in failing to ensure safety to road users – 
particularly, the falling of trees on the roads, killing one person, 
resulted in a breach of the duty of care (Sushila Devi case).337 
The second cause of action is strict liability. As it was shown in Rylands 
v. Fletcher, a person is held as strictly liable in case he/she accumulates 
something with the risk of causing harm, and the escape of this 
substance produces damage as a consequence. Nevertheless, this 
definition is limited by several exceptions that differentiate negligence 
from strict liability: an act of God (a natural disaster), an act of a third 
party, fault or consent by the plaintiff, the natural use of land by the 
defendant and statutory authority. According to the Supreme Court, in 
the Jay Laxmi Salt case, “injury or damage resulting without any intention 
yet due to lack of foresight etc. is strict liability” – and the rule arose as a 
“judicial development of the liability in keeping with growth of society and 
necessity to safeguard the interest of a common man against hazardous 
activities carried on by others”.338  
                                                          
335 Rylands v. Fletcher, House of Lords, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), on injuries caused 
by the escape of hazardous substances. It is the foundational case in England 
for the doctrine of strict liability, enlarging the scope of tort law.  
336 Mukesh Textile Mills (P) Ltd. v. H. R. Subramaniya Sastri, AIR 1987 KANT 87. 
337 Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Sushila Devi, AIR 1999 SC 1929, 1933. 
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It was this very necessity of following societal developments and of 
safeguarding common/public interests that led to the elaboration of 
two additional figures: in tort law, the notion of absolute liability of the 
polluter; in criminal law, the concept of public nuisance. Absolute 
liability was born as a concept stricter than strict liability with the 
expansion of hazardous industries, especially those dealing with 
chemicals. In India, the doctrine was first elaborated by the Supreme 
Court in the Shriram Gas Leak case,339 one of the litigations brought 
forward by M.C. Mehta, a public interest attorney that successfully 
pleaded before the Supreme Court in several landmark environmental 
cases. The case involved a writ petition under Article 32 of the 
Constitution for compensation of victims of damages caused by a plant 
owned by Shriram Foods and Fertilisers. Pending the writ petition, a 
gas leak occurred, so applications were filed for award of compensation 
to the victims. The matter thus involved Articles 21 and 32 of the 
Constitution, as environmental accidents impinged on the right to life 
of the citizens – the accident of the Shriram case affecting the people 
(and, consequently, their fundamental rights) on a large scale.340 
Considering the relevance of the case, and its possible reflections on the 
Bhopal gas tragedy, the Supreme Court perfected the doctrine of strict 
liability set in Rylands vs. Fletcher in order to respond to the necessity of 
guaranteeing principles of liability for large enterprises producing 
hazardous substances. In the judgment, Chief Justice Bhagwati – 
considering the case as exceptional and deserving a particular 
treatment, including the award of compensation – stressed the “old-
fashioned” character of the rule of strict liability341 and allowed the 
introduction of absolute liability in the Indian law of torts. According to 
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the judge, “We in India cannot hold our hands back and I venture to evolve a 
new principle of liability which English courts have not done. We have to 
develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary to construct a new 
principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and 
which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently 
dangerous industries. (...) An  enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or 
inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and 
safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding 
areas owes an absolute and nondelegable duty to the community to ensure that 
no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous 
nature of the activity which it has undertaken. (...)if any harm results on 
account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate 
for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had 
taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence 
on its part. (...) Such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which 
operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in 
Rylands v. Fletcher.” The Supreme Court thus innovated the legal 
system by introducing this new notion through a petition under Article 
32 of the Constitution. Notwithstanding this assumption, the resort to 
civil courts – as it should be procedurally pursued concerning tort law – 
has been maintained, since compensation can be claimed before the 
Supreme Court following the procedures for a writ petition, but 
damages are to be obtained before civil courts. As this mechanism and 
this theory was developed in the wake of the Bhopal incident, the 
notion of absolute liability has been applied by the Madhya Pradesh 
High Court in the Union Carbide case342 and has also been integrated 
into statute law. 
In fact, the Public Liability Insurance Act of 1991343, whose purpose was 
the grant of a speedy relief to the victims of accidents caused by the 
handling of hazardous substances, provides for the rule of absolute 
liability in its Section 3. In any claim for relief, “the claimant shall not be 
required to plead and establish that the death, injury or damage in respect of 
which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default 
                                                          
342 Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India, Civil revision No. 26 of 1988, 4 
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343 The Public Liability Insurance Act, Act No. 6 of 1991. 
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of any person”.  Moreover, the Act establishes powers of control in the 
hands of courts, that under Section 11 are allowed to examine 
applications by the Government on possible contraventions to the 
prohibition of handling hazardous substances, with powers of issuing 
orders or directions for restraint. In light of the jurisprudence and of the 
crystallisation into pieces of legislation, absolute liability is thus to be 
considered a principle “entrenched” in nowadays environmental tort 
law.     
Apart from these tort law remedies between privates, that are relevant 
in the Indian legal system as far as environmental protection is 
concerned – and reserving writ jurisdiction to a dedicated analysis – the 
most relevant notion in common law is that of public nuisance, as a 
derivation from private nuisance.  As it was developed from a tort law 
concept, but codified in the Indian Penal Code, the notion can be 
considered as both a tort and a crime. 344  Indeed, Schwartz and 
Goldberg define the behaviours encompassing public nuisance as a 
“quasi-criminal conduct that, while not illegal, is unreasonable given the 
circumstances and could cause injury to someone exercising a common, 
societal right”.345 In the Indian jurisprudence, the Ratlam Municipality 
case has been paramount in entrenching public nuisance in 
environmental crimes346 - demonstrating the active role of the Supreme 
Court in enlarging the scope of broad definitions and in presenting 
tailor-made interpretation for environmental purposes and for 
upholding the rule of law. In fact, the court considered public nuisance 
as “a challenge to the social justice component of the rule of law (...) because of 
pollutants being discharged by big factories to the detriment of the poorer 
sections”. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court clarified its powers and the interrelations 
between the notion of public nuisance and the crimes provided for in 
                                                          
344 See supra, Chapter II, Section II. 
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the Acts adopted from the 1970s. In Gobind Singh,347 the apical tribunal 
delved into the powers of the magistrate and limited the scope of 
conditional orders under Section 133 – which are mandatory, but to be 
issued with reasonable terms (in this specific case, the demolition of an 
oven and the prohibition to pursue the economic activity of the 
defendant). Indian courts further developed the application of these 
rules: as for the relations between the power of the magistrate and that 
of a Pollution Control Board, the relevant cases are Nagarjuna Paper 
Mills,348 where the High Court of Andhra Pradesh maintained that a 
magistrate was empowered to regulate pollution according to the norm 
of public nuisance – while the plaintiff (the company) affirmed the 
exclusive power of Pollution Control Boards in cases of air and water 
pollution – and State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kedia Leather, 349  on the 
question of the implied repeal of Section 133 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure by the Water and Air Acts. Also in this case, the Supreme 
Court distinguished between the two sets of norms: “the provisions of 
Section 133 of the Code are in the nature of preventive measures, the 
provisions contained in the two Acts are not only curative but also preventive 
and penal. The provisions appear to be mutually exclusive and the question of 
one replacing the other does not arise.”     
In doing this, the Supreme Court ensured a variety of remedies for 
environmental litigation, since the Indian legal system provided for 
both general, common law norms that had been judicially adapted to 
the purpose of the protection of the environment and of human health 
and for special legislation aimed at protecting the right to life enshrined 
in Article 21 of the Constitution and at preventing potential harm to the 
citizens and the environment in general. Moreover, the array of 
remedies was not only limited to the division of fields between 
different norms, but resulted in an expansion of the methods for access 
to justice and participation to courts, such as the device of public 
interest litigation and the role of the amici curiae in the proceedings.   
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b) Writ jurisdiction 
Before looking into the vast scope of Public Interest Litigation as 
developed by the Indian Supreme Court, it is opportune to review the 
main characteristic of constitutional litigation as devised by the 
Constitution of 1950, as PIL is part of the broad ambit of writ 
jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. 
As known, the Indian Constitution draws from the common law 
tradition the use of prerogative writs for the protection of individual 
rights, a feature that was present in the Indian legal system from the 
enactment of the Indian High Court Act of 1861, with reference to the 
High Courts installed in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.350 In fact, the 
English legal system provided for several writs – brevis, written orders 
from the courts – that enabled a tribunal to require a party to perform 
an act or to cease to do such specific act. Among those remedial tools, 
the relevant categories are the writ of habeas corpus, the writ of 
mandamus, the writ of certiorari, the writ of prohibition and the writ of 
quo warranto.351 
During the drafting period of the Constitution, Bhimrao Ambedkar had 
been a firm supporter of the presence of provisions, constitutionally 
entrenched, that were aimed at guaranteeing access to justice for the 
protection of human rights. In fact, the father of the Indian Constitution 
defined Article 32 (Article 25 of the Draft Constitution) – that concerned 
the right to constitutional remedies – as the soul of the Constitution, the 
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Article “without which this Constitution would be a nullity”.352 The right to 
constitutional remedies, considered as the last of the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the text of 1950, is indeed the cornerstone of the rule 
of law in India. 
It is noteworthy to report the text of the first two clauses of Article 32, 
in order to review the interpretation of the right to constitutional 
remedies in the Indian legal system: 
Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part. 
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, 
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo 
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of 
any of the rights conferred by this Part. 
The Constitution provides for the access to the Supreme Court (and 
also to the High Courts under Article 226) through appropriate 
proceedings, which means that the applicant should move to the Court 
basing its request on a specific purpose related to the protection of 
fundamental rights. The provision is to be interpreted in the sense that 
the tribunal is not concerned with the form of the application (the 
Supreme Court being open to numerous methods of filing petitions, 
including through letters).353  
The fundamental character of this provision lies not only in the 
innovative practice of introducing such element in the Constitution, but 
in the broad scope of access and devices for upholding the protection of 
fundamental rights. Indeed, Article 32 empowers the Court with 
original jurisdiction in matters concerning human rights, with an array 
of remedial tools. Clause 2 lists the five principal categories of writs, 
but is not exclusive, as the norm suggests an enlargement of those 
                                                          
352 Parliament of India, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, p. 953. See supra, 
Chapter II, Section I. 
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decisions of the Court – enumerating orders, directions and writs and 
underlying the possibility of evolution of prerogative writs “in the 
nature” of those listed, furthering a wider variety of writs than those 
devised in the English system.  
As M.P. Singh reports, the Court is not only empowered to issue 
injunctive orders, but is also entitled to provide remedies or relief to 
breach of rights already committed. 354  Moreover, the possibility to 
access justice lies in two different territorial jurisdictions, one 
pertaining to the territory of India as a whole, under Article 32, for the 
Supreme Court, and one for High Courts, under Article 226, related to 
the jurisdiction of the single States. The two Articles operate 
independently of each other, as the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts 
is parallel to that of the Supreme Court: the avoidance of overlapping of 
cases is realised through the principle of res judicata, according to which 
the disposal of a writ petition under Article 226 bars the recourse to 
another writ petition under Article 32, thus guaranteeing that the same 
case is not judged twice. Additionally, a difference between Article 32 
and Article 226 resides in the larger scope of the latter, as it provides 
not only for fundamental rights, but also for “any other purpose”.355  
In matters related to the environment, the resort to writs is generally 
restrained to three kinds: certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The writ of 
certiorari is an order of the Court (Supreme Court or High Court) that 
directs an inferior tribunal or authority to transmit to the superior 
Court the record of the proceedings pending before it, in order to 
scrutinise and to eventually quash the record.356 In this sense, certiorari 
has the purpose of restraining public authorities from acting in a way 
that exceeds their mandate. The main concern in this field is the 
definition of which authorities are to be considered, as certiorari may be 
issued against bodies having exceeded their powers but having the 
duty to act judicially. This “duty to act judicially” has been widely 
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interpreted by the Supreme Court as to include all activities having a 
quasi-judicial character, such as the order of making representations, of 
making enquiries or of considering evidence.357 Thus, when issuing a 
writ of certiorari, the Court must consider this functional test of the duty 
to act judicially by looking at the effective nature of the role performed 
by the authority, with a tendency to review also administrative acts and 
proceedings, following the concept of natural justice and the 
requirement of fairness.358 
The writ of prohibition follows a similar logic, as it is designed to counter 
the excessive power of public authorities. As noted by M.P. Singh, 
several features are proper of the writ of prohibition. Firstly, it is a writ 
aimed at commanding another court to refrain from doing an action 
that it is bound to do, as asserting jurisdiction over a case for which that 
tribunal is not competent for. Secondly, it shares with the writ of 
certiorari the character of being directed to a judicial or quasi-judicial 
body, but not to executive authorities. Thirdly, ratione temporis, in 
opposition to certiorari, a writ of prohibition is issued for a proceeding 
that is pending before another tribunal, while a writ of certiorari is aimed 
at quashing a judicial decision that has already been taken.359 Lastly, the 
writ of prohibition follows the same practice of certiorari as far as the 
connotation of the authorities as judicial or quasi-judicial is 
concerned.360 
The third most recurrent remedy under Articles 32 and 226, on 
environmental matters, is the writ of mandamus. As the name suggests, 
this writ is aimed at commanding any governmental, judicial, 
corporation or public authority to do or to refrain from doing an action 
that is considered an obligation under law.361 As the writs analysed 
earlier, it is a remedy that is based on the principle of natural justice, as 
it ensures that defects of justice arising from a proceeding are 
eliminated. The requirements for the issue of a writ of mandamus are the 
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359 Singh, M.P., V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India, op.cit., pp. 653-655. 
360 Divan, S., Rosencranz, A., op.cit., p. 127. 
361 Singh, M.P., V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India, op.cit., pp. 655. 
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existence of a legal right of a person, that is thus aggrieved by a denial 
of such right; then, the duty that the applicant seeks to enforce must be 
public (arising from the Constitution, statute law or common law and 
excluding contracts) and mandatory (not discretionary); moreover, it 
should be issued when there is no alternative available remedy. It 
derives from the character of public duty that a writ of mandamus cannot 
be issued against private persons. Finally, the previous requirement for 
the issue of such writ lies in the existence of a demand by a petitioner 
and a refusal from the concerned authority.362  
What is peculiar of India is the transformation of the writ of mandamus – 
a remedy that is quick if compared to a common law suit and originally 
exceptional, as it is resorted in case other remedies are not available – 
into a tool for protecting the environment on a recurrent basis, thanks 
to the elaboration of the concept of “continuing mandamus”. As a 
character of judicial activism, the Supreme Court developed this writ in 
the nature of a writ of mandamus, whose purpose is the continued 
protection of the environment thanks to the issue of frequent interim 
directions of the same content, with a view to monitoring the situation 
until a final decision is taken.363 The Court started this practice in the 
case Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India & Others, with directions 
that are passed on a recurrent basis.364 It is this very creative power of 
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the Courts that highlighted the relevance of writ jurisdiction for the 
protection of environmental rights, extending not only to fashioning 
innovative remedies, but changing and broadening the rule of standing 
before the tribunals, thanks to the device of Public Interest Litigation. 
 
c) Public Interest Litigation 
As seen above, the Constitution of India provides for access to higher 
courts in Article 226 (for High Courts) and Article 32 (for the Supreme 
Court) in cases of human rights violations, by means of writ 
petitions.365 This kind of constitutional litigation – separated from the 
civil litigation described earlier – constitutes an additional tool for 
guaranteeing an enhanced access to justice to the citizens (especially 
those with lower possibilities) and possibly the most relevant method 
in environmental litigation. In this field, the Supreme Court has 
devised a powerful remedy for enlarging the scope of litigation and the 
categories of subjects that could address the higher courts for obtaining 
justice: Public Interest Litigation (PIL). 
The opus of some of the Justices of the Supreme Court between the late 
1970s and the early 1980s – chiefly Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice 
Bhagwati366 – Public Interest Litigation consists of a relaxation of the 
rules of locus standi, the judicial evaluation of the interest of a person in 
the controversy proposed to the attention of the court. Until the 1970s, 
the Supreme Court maintained the traditional doctrine of standing, that 
narrowed access to justice only to those with a sufficient interest in the 
case – “the person aggrieved”. In light of the social demands coming 
from the lower strata of the population, the court endeavoured to 
modify the traditional rules, particularly for cases dealing with the 
environment. This resulted in an expansion of standing, motivated by 
                                                                                                                               
advance the cause of justice. The medium of "continuing mandamus", was a new tool 
forged because of the peculiar needs of this matter.” 
365 See supra, Chapter II, Section II, and infra, Chapter III, Section I, paragraph 
b). 
366 Cooper, J., Poverty and Constitutional Justice: the Indian Experience, in Mercer 
Law Review, No. 44, 1992, p. 611. 
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the need to uphold the rule of law, in order to hear and redress the 
wrongs caused to the rights of the underprivileged, by means of a 
public action – described, following the definition by Cunningham, as 
“representative standing”.367  
The two Justices mentioned before are to be considered as the fathers of 
this evolution in constitutional procedural law. In fact, in two 
judgments of the Supreme Court, the new doctrine of locus standi is 
clearly evoked. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar vs. Union Of India,368 the 
Court delved into the characteristics of the locus standi under Article 32 
of the Constitution and the question of the remedies available to the 
citizens – in dealing with access to justice in a case concerning the sale 
of public property for a lower price, causing loss of employment. The 
Court argued, then, that “the question whether a person has the locus to file 
a proceeding depends mostly and often on whether he possesses a legal right 
and that right is violated. But, in an appropriate case, it may become necessary 
in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations to take a 
broader view of the question of locus to initiate a proceeding be it under Article 
226 or under Article 32 of the Constitution.” As developed (...) by Krishna 
Iyer, “the approach to Arts. 14 and 32, with its fascinating expansionism, is of 
strategic significance, viewed in the perspective of Third World jurisprudence. 
(...) Where does the citizen stand, in the context of the democracy of judicial 
remedies, absent an ombudsman? (...) The Court cannot wait and, despite 
allergy to minimal decisional law-making in vacant spaces, the rule of law in 
this virgin area cannot leave the fertile field fallow. (...) Locus standi must be 
liberalised to meet the challenges of the times. Ubi just ibi remedium must be 
enlarged to embrace all interests of public-minded citizens or organisations 
with serious concern for conservation of public resources and the direction and 
correction of public power so as to promote justice. (...) The argument is, who 
are you to ask about the wrong committed or illegal act of the Corporation if 
you have suffered no personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation? 
(...) Public interest litigation is part of the process of participate justice and 
                                                          
367 Cunningham, C.D., Public interest litigation in the Supreme Court of India: A 
study in light of the American experience, in Journal of the Indian Law Institute, No. 
494, 1987. 
368 Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar vs. Union of India, AIR 1981, SC 344. 
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'standing' in Civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the 
judicial doorsteps.  
This liberalisation of the doctrine of standing for social reasons had 
been further confirmed by Justice Bhagwati in S.P. Gupta vs. Union of 
India,369 a case concerning the appointment of judges. The Supreme 
Court then challenged “the basic postulate of the argument (...) that it is 
only a person who has suffered legal injury who can maintain a writ petition 
for redress and no third party can be permitted to have access to the Court for 
the purpose of seeking redress for the person injured” and held that “it may 
therefore now be taken as well established that where a legal wrong or a legal 
injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of 
violation of any constitutional or legal right (...) and such person or 
determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability 
or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the 
Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for an 
appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and 
in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class 
of persons, in this Court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal 
wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons.”  
Moreover, in the same judgment, the Court acknowledged the 
development of social, meta-individual rights and categorised the 
violations of those rights as “public injuries”, characterised by the fact 
that the “acts complained of cannot necessarily be shown to affect the rights of 
determinate or identifiable class or group of persons”. To check these 
injuries, “if public duties are to be enforced and social collective 'diffused' 
rights and interests are to be protected, we have to utilise the initiative and zeal 
of public-minded persons and organisations by allowing them to move the 
court and act for a general or group interest, even though they may not be 
directly injured in their own rights. It is for this reason that in public interest 
litigation -- litigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury, 
enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, 'diffused' rights and 
interests or vindicating public interest, any citizen who is acting bona fide and 
who has sufficient interest has to be accorded standing. What is sufficient 
                                                          
369 S.P. Gupta vs. President of India And Ors., AIR 1982, SC 149, 1981 Supp (1) SCC 
87, 1982 2 SCR 365. 
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interest to give standing to a member of the public would have to be 
determined by the Court in each individual case.”  
Hence, the Court innovated procedural access by allowing cases 
presented by citizens having a simple “sufficient interest”. As noted by 
Divan and Rosencranz, the Court implicitly made a distinction between 
representative and citizen standing. According to the former, the 
enlargement of locus standi responds to the need of standing for the 
underprivileged by means of representation by volunteers. According 
to the latter, as a derivation from representative standing, a person 
could file a writ petition not as a representative of the poor and 
oppressed, rather “as a member of the citizenry”, in his/her right of 
redressing the abuses purported by executive authorities. 370  The 
difference is, nonetheless, blurred in practice, the material point being 
the possibility of accessing the courts in order to enforce the rule of law. 
The main features of PIL are thus the vindication of public interests, the 
possibility of access to justice for poor and unrepresented classes, the 
expanded locus standi and the flexibility of the procedure. 
The last aspect is probably the second key element in assessing the 
success of PIL in India. As a matter of fact, the flexibility of the 
procedure of filing a PIL lies in the absence of codification of the rules 
governing this tool – an attempt of passing a Parliamentary Bill on PIL 
failing to reach approval in 1996.371 As stated also by Bhagwati in the 
S.P. Gupta case, the Court may accept writ petitions in any form, 
including letters and telegrams. 372  Moreover, in 1988, the Supreme 
Court issued certain guidelines to be followed for presenting petitions 
to be considered as PIL. 373  In particular, the apex tribunal, while 
maintaining flexibility as to the form of petitions, limited the categories 
                                                          
370 Divan, S. Rosencranz, A., op.cit., pp. 136-137. 
371  Deva, S., Public interest litigation in India: a critical review, in Civil Justice 
Quarterly, No. 28, 2009, p. 38. 
372 Deva, S., op.cit., p. 24, and Sahasranaman, P.B., op.cit., p. 63. 
373 These Guidelines have been further modified in 1993 and in 2003. 
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of PIL to those that most directly affect the lower strata of the 
population.374 
In this regard, procedurally, apart from the curtailment of categories, 
the Court has established a “PIL Cell” that is charged with the scrutiny 
of all writ petitions submitted as PIL, in order to accept only those that 
fall within one of the ten categories listed in the Guidelines and inscribe 
them in a bench. This measure derives from the overload of the 
Supreme Court in PIL cases and in the abuses in filing writ petitions 
that hide merely private interest. 
In fact, since its inception, the history of Public Interest Litigation can 
be divided into three phases: a first period, in the 1980s, when PIL cases 
                                                          
374  http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/circular/guidelines/pilguidelines.pdf. The 
categories are: 
 Bonded Labour matters; 
 Neglected Children;  
 Non-payment of minimum wages to workers and exploitation of 
casual workers and complaints of violation of Labour Laws (except in 
individual cases);  
 Petitions from jails complaining of harassment, for (pre-mature 
release)* and seeking release after having completed 14 years in jail, 
death in jail, transfer, release on personal bond, speedy trial as a 
fundamental right; 
 Petitions against police for refusing to register a case, harassment by 
police and death in police custody; 
 Petitions against atrocities on women, in particular harassment of 
bride, brideburning, rape, murder, kidnapping etc.;  
 Petitions complaining of harassment or torture of villagers by co- 
villagers or by police from persons belonging to Scheduled Caste and 
Scheduled Tribes and economically backward classes; 
 Petitions pertaining to environmental pollution, disturbance of 
ecological balance, drugs, food adulteration, maintenance of heritage 
and culture, antiques, forest and wild life and other matters of public 
importance; 
 Petitions from riot-victims;  
 Family Pension.  
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properly responded to the need of the disadvantaged and the action of 
the judiciary resulted in the recognition of rights and remedies to 
redress violations; a second phase, roughly corresponding to the 1990s, 
characterised by an institutionalisation of the procedure by specialised 
actors (lawyers and NGOs), by a broadened scope of action – also 
against privates, and by a overarching judiciary that mandated 
directions pertaining to the legislative power; a third phase, started in 
the 2000s, witnessing a ballooning resort to PIL for almost every issue, 
balanced by a certain restraint by the judiciary. 375  Because of its 
flexibility and of its inherent nature of judicial device, PIL has shown 
both positive and negative aspects – especially as far as environmental 
litigation (the eighth point of the Guidelines of the Supreme Court) is 
concerned. 
As already stated, PIL was born as a result of judicial activism of the 
higher courts,376 as a way to alter the rules of the game when deemed 
necessary to uphold the rule of law and the protection of fundamental 
rights.377 Many are the positive contributions to the Indian legal system 
and to the society as a whole. Firstly, PIL has been an effective 
instrument for guaranteeing human rights and for enlarging the 
protection of the right to a wholesome environment. 378  Then, 
procedurally, it has been a successful device for enhancing access to 
justice, since lower classes could eventually file suits to courts, 
regardless of material impediments. Finally, it has granted the judiciary 
a certain legitimacy through ordering measures eager to fulfil the 
environmental needs of those asking for redress of hazardous 
situations. 
Notwithstanding these positive aspects, several critical points arose in 
the unfolding of the creativity of the higher courts. Judicial activism is 
certainly useful in upholding the rule of law, but an encompassing role 
                                                          
375 Deva, S., op.cit., p. 29. 
376 Sathe, S.P., Judicial activism in India, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
377 Cassels, J., Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting 
the Impossible?, in The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1989, 
pp. 495-519. 
378 See infra, Section II. 
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of courts in drafting orders that contain legislative or executive 
measures impinges in the traditional check and balance rule enshrined 
in the Constitution. 379  By analysing the results of PIL using the 
framework of Anant and Singh – that divide judicial activism between 
interpretational, legislative and executive judicial activism 380  – it is 
manifest that Indian Courts expanded their action in the realm of the 
legislative and executive powers, while the judiciary should normally 
restrain its competences within the interpretation of norms. 
Secondly, this very feature of PIL offers scope for critiques as far as 
effectiveness is concerned. From a law and economic perspective, the 
courts, when delivering orders and directions that specify measures to 
be complied with by executive agencies or private persons, are not in 
the best position to assess the effectiveness of a measure if compared 
with other options.381 Considering the informational advantage of the 
legislator and of administrative agencies in setting environmental 
standards, as the process of law- or regulation-making ought to be 
participative – and potentially more participative of a judicial 
proceeding – the courts appear to be the least suited institutions in 
ordering beneficial directions, or the most appropriate directions. 
Moreover, the main issue in granting executive directions resides in the 
impossibility, for the judiciary, of guaranteeing compliance to the 
orders issued - a neverending problem in environmental litigation.  
This phenomenon of “creeping jurisdiction” has been observed 
particularly in cases concerning environmental litigation, as a result of 
the lack of measures by the legislature or the executive, or of a poor 
enforcement. Two leading cases before the Supreme Court, illustrative 
of the issues at stake when deciding cases presented through PIL, can 
                                                          
379 Sathe, S.P., Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, in Washington U.J.L. & Pol., 
No. 6, 2001, pp. 29-108. 
380 Anant, T.C.A., Singh, J., An Economic Analysis of Judicial Activism, in Economic 
and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 43, 2002, pp. 4433-4439. 
381 Faure, M.G., Raja, A.V., Effectiveness of environmental public interest litigation in 
India: Determining the key variables, in Fordham Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 
21, 2010, pp. 239-294. 
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be briefly analysed: the Delhi Vehicular Pollution case 382  and the 
Municipal Solid Waste Management case383. 
The Delhi Vehicular Pollution case is one of the litigations set by M.C. 
Mehta with regard to air pollution. Notwithstanding the enactment of 
the Air Pollution Act, the petitioner claimed the high levels of pollution 
in Delhi as threatening the health of the citizens, because of traffic 
conditions and the presence of hazardous industries within the 
territory of Delhi. M.C. Mehta thus filed two petitions asking the 
Supreme Court to issue directions for closing down those industries384 
and for regulating air pollution caused by vehicles. 385  The Court 
responded to these demands in a series of orders aimed at guaranteeing 
a certain access to information, in order to coherently issue directions, 
and at regulating the problems arising from the petition. 
In the framework of its creative judicial activism, in 1991 the Court 
directed the Ministry of Environment and Forests to establish a 
Committee with the task of studying the alternatives adapted to the 
reduction of polluting vehicles. After the issue of the report of the 
Committee – that suggested the introduction of low- and unleaded fuel 
and compressed natural gas vehicles – the Supreme Court ordered a 
phase-out of leaded petrol for all public buses in its order of 28 July 
1998, to be implemented by 31 March 2001.386 As indicated earlier, the 
fundamental issue in an order of a court containing environmental 
measures consists in its implementation. A three-year delay for 
converting public vehicles from diesel fuel to CNG was fought by 
executive agencies, apparently unable to cope with the situation in the 
time frame deemed sufficient by the Court. In this regard, the MoEF 
                                                          
382 M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India & Ors., SCR (1) 866, 1991, SCC (2) 353, 1991. 
This judgment deals with the closure of industries, as the writ petition 
concerning traffic conditions did not arrive at a final judgment. 
383 Almitra H. Patel & Anr vs. Union of India & Ors., 16 January, 1998. This case 
consists of a series of orders directed to the authorities concerned. 
384 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 4677/1985. 
385 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13029/1985. 
386 M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13029 of 1985, order 
dated 28 July 1998.  
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established an Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) 
Authority, that has been used by the Supreme Court as a sort of “fact-
finding commission” for issuing orders.387  
In light of the poor implementation of the order of 1998, the Supreme 
Court issued another order in 2002,388 blaming the Delhi Government 
for the slow progress toward a complete phase out and directed the 
replacement of buses at a pace prescribed in the very same order.  
It is apparent that this manifestation of judicial activism impinged on 
the prerogatives of the executive and of the legislature. In fact, the 
MoEF and the executive agencies of the Government of Delhi should 
have been the competent organs for directing the proper measures apt 
to redress the environmental situation. The passage to CNG has been 
considered by the Supreme Court as the measure that could diminish 
the alarming levels of pollution in Delhi, but the social and economic 
cost of the phase out was not foreseen by the apex tribunal. In fact, the 
fuel infrastructure of the city was not adequate for the change asked, 
since CNG stations had to be built anew. Moreover, the strong stance of 
the Supreme Court showed the inadequacy of Pollution Control Boards 
in managing hazardous situations. While the most appropriate 
intervention to tackle air pollution would have been an enhancement of 
the powers of the PCB, especially concerning enforcement, through 
legislative changes, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to pose as an 
“environmental manager”.   
A similar scenario applies for the Municipal Solid Waste Management 
case, that was deal with by the Supreme Court in the same period. The 
matter of the safe disposal of waste had been a longstanding 
environmental issue, being discussed by the apex court since 1980, in 
the Ratlam Municipality case, 389  under the law of torts. Here, the 
                                                          
387 Rosencranz, A., Jackson, M., The Delhi Pollution Case: The Supreme Court of 
India and the Limits of Judicial Power, in Columbia Journal of Environmental 
Law, Vol. 28, 2003, p. 223. 
388 M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, order dated 5 April 2002. 
389 Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand, AIR 1980, SC 1622, (1980) 4 SCC 
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petitioner presented the critical situation in Delhi, characterised by 
deficient conditions of waste deposal and disposal, and sought writ of 
mandamus against the competent authorities – and most specifically the 
Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the Delhi Municipal Council – for 
taking initiatives in order to solve the question of the collection, 
transportation, disposal, treatment and recycling of waste.390 As in the 
Delhi Vehicular Pollution case, the Court directed the establishment of a 
Committee, composed of eight members (including the petitioner), 
whose task was the examination and suggestion of methods to improve 
the conditions according to the need for “eco-friendly sorting, collection, 
transportation, disposal, recycling and reuse”, 391  the review of local 
regulation and the formulation of standards and time-limits for 
implementing rules on the management of municipal solid waste. The 
so-called Asim Barman Committee proved effective, as it delivered its 
report in six months392 and was at the origin of the notification of the 
Municipal Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules of 2000, 
issued by the MoEF.393  
Several relevant points can be singled out from the Municipal Solid 
Waste Management case. First of all, the resort to the creation of a body 
entrusted with the task of suggesting measures to overcome the 
environmental problems set by the petitioner, a tool of judicial activism 
that is considered by the Court as effective for pushing the respondents 
to implement solutions. Then, the enlargement of the scope of action 
ratione loci, since the order of the Supreme Court was directed also to 
other municipalities than Delhi, and the very same writ petition was 
later concerned with the implementation of MSW Rules in Mumbai, 
Chennai, Calcutta and Bangalore394 and to all State Pollution Control 
                                                          
390 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 888/1996. 
391 Almitra H Patel & Anr vs. Union of India & Ors., order dated 16 January, 1998. 
392 Solid Waste Management in Class I Cities in India, Report of the Committee 
constituted by the Hon. Supreme Court of India, March 1999, available at 
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393 See supra, Chapter II, Section III. 
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Boards for the draft of action plans on this issue.395 Finally, the length of 
the proceedings is a critical point, as the matter is still pending. The 
Court has certainly profited of this case for obtaining a result beneficial 
to the population, as the implementation of the MSW Rules is – 
considering that this was the outcome that the petitioner sought when 
filing a PIL. Nevertheless, the existence of a writ petition pending for 
almost two decades sheds light on the stimulating role of the Supreme 
Court – and of the National Green Tribunal, as the petition has been 
transferred to it in 2014396 – and on its possible abuses and deviations 
from a pure judicial function to the exercise of executive and quasi-
legislative prerogatives. 
Apart from the critical points of creeping jurisdiction and of the length 
of proceedings, the last issue raised by the use and abuse of PIL lies in 
the filing of frivolous petitions, a feature consistent with the practice of 
petitioners from the 2000s.397 Looking at this, the Supreme Court issued 
directions – in a case concerning the appointment of judges398 – on the 
resort to PIL and on the judicial method to handle the listing of this 
kind of petitions, that, if filed indiscriminately, cause “unnecessary strain 
on the judicial system and consequently lead to inordinate delay in disposal of 
genuine and bona fide cases.” Thus, by virtue of the constitutional 
obligation of the Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people, 
the apex tribunal indicated several rules centred on both monetary and 
non-monetary requirements.399 
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396 Almitra H Patel & Anr vs. Union of India & Ors., order dated 8 September, 2014 
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 Encouragement of genuine bona fide petitions and discouragement 
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In light of the theory and practice, Public Interest Litigation has proved 
to be a fairly effective method for guaranteeing access to justice and for 
obtaining suitable measures to redress harm and the violation of 
fundamental human rights, particularly the right to a healthy 
environment. Notwithstanding critiques concerning the absence of 
consideration for all the dimensions of sustainable development – as 
the cases analysed earlier show how the environment is deemed a 
higher value for the Supreme Court if compared to the economic volet 
of sustainable development – another aspect that is missing in the 
experiences surveyed beforehand is the question of participation. If the 
Supreme Court is to be seen as a “policy evolution forum”, 400  the 
participatory dimension of the judicial proceeding should thus be 
fostered. The role of technical instruments before the Courts thus soars 
to the attention as for its possible pertinence in enhancing participation 
and in devising more appropriate solutions. 
 
d) Technicalities and amici curiae 
The analysis of the procedural tools in environmental litigation would 
be incomplete without a glimpse at the role of technical expertise before 
the Supreme Court, a matter that triggered judicial reform. While the 
issue of locus standi has been thoroughly treated, another specific 
                                                                                                                               
 Prima facie verification of the credentials of the petitioner before the 
entertainment of a PIL; 
 Prima facie correctness of the contents of the petition; 
 Satisfaction of the involvement of a substantial public interest in the 
petition; 
 Insurance of priority for petitions involving larger public interest or 
petitions that are urgent or of highest gravity; 
 Verification of the aim of a PIL, that ought to be the “redressal of 
genuine public harm or public injury”, not involving any personal gain 
or private motive; 
 Imposition of exemplary costs for petitions filed by “busybodies for 
extraneous and ulterior motives”, in order to curb frivolous or 
extraneous petitions. 
400 Rajamani, L., op.cit., pp. 316-319. 
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feature of the actions before the highest tribunals comes to the 
forefront: the necessity of environmental expertise for allowing a 
judicial activism conscious of the results that it aims at providing. As 
seen for Public Interest Litigation, the expansion of the role of the 
judiciary has been guaranteed by the creative solutions presented by 
the Courts, that often included directions for the establishment of ad hoc 
committees charged with the task of studying the issue at stake in the 
proceeding and of presenting environmental and socio-economic 
solutions that the tribunals could refer to in its orders and final 
judgments.401  
Here, a distinction will be made between the creation of committees by 
the Supreme Court (and the High Courts) and the institutional feature 
of amicus curiae. Despite the homogeneisation that Chowdhury makes 
between the two,402 a differentiation has to be considered. On the one 
hand, amicus curiae could be defined as a person (individual or legal) 
that is not a party to the action and has an interest or a view in the 
subject matter of the dispute but is permitted by the tribunal to advise 
it because of relevant information that could be brought to the attention 
of the Court.403 On the other hand, the practice developed by the Indian 
Courts differs insomuch as it creates the party that is mandated to 
intervene in the dispute, while generally the tribunals resort to existing 
organisations dealing with public issues as amici curiae. The creation of 
committees is thus to be considered as an additional instrument, 
specific of the Indian proceedings. 
In fact, if one considers the development of the notion in international 
law, the submission of amicus curiae briefs is subject to an authorisation 
of the tribunal to existing legal organisations or individuals. 
                                                          
401 As in the Delhi Vehicular Pollution and in the Municipal Solid Waste cases.  
402 Chowdhury, N., Environmental risk regulation and the Indian Supreme Court: an 
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Notwithstanding the limited use of this tool, 404  the existence of 
organisations (in opposition to the creation of bodies), often non-
governmental organisations, authorised to participate in proceedings is 
not disputed. In constitutional law, Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court of the United States offers a similar understanding of the issue, as 
the filing of such brief is to be done according to specific norms that 
include the consent of the Court, the relevance of the intervention and 
the interest in the case, underlying the very prior existence of subjects 
able to present a brief.405 Apart from this feature,406 the significance of 
the role of amicus curiae lies in its possible beneficial effects to the 
decision of the tribunal. An amicus curiae should present additional 
information and a different perspective to the subject of the dispute, 
when the Court could be affected by informational asymmetries or 
incompleteness, as a brief submitted by such parties should be directly 
aimed at the particular case, with specific information different from 
those that the tribunal could derive from public opinion.407 
Notwithstanding the issues of accountability and transparency deriving 
from the resort to specific actors that do not seem to be legitimate to 
participate in judicial proceedings by the mere fact that the Court 
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requires them to do so,408 the intervention of legal organisations or 
individual possessing a specific expertise in the subject matter of the 
dispute should be welcomed as a sign of an enlargement of 
perspectives by the Courts. The participation of subjects that are not 
directly related to the proceeding is indeed a way of obtaining focused 
information with a high degree of technical expertise, with the added 
quality of a certain neutral character, as the briefs submitted should be 
in the sole interest of a fairer decision. 
In the practice of the Indian Courts, the resort to amici curiae has been 
limited by the introduction of a similar tool, the creation of specialised 
committees by the tribunals. While, in its broader sense, the resort to 
public amici curiae could be considered to be widely practised, with the 
appointment of independent expert committees,409 the resort to private 
parties has been seldom witnessed. Notwithstanding the fulfilment of 
the same function, the categorisation of such practice is thus to be 
analysed as different from the species of amicus curiae – as it is 
characterised by the appointment by the Court (at its own discretion) of 
different independent experts that are charged with producing single 
reports. The relevant cases studied earlier are emblematic of this 
practice: the Asim Barman Committee consisted of eight members, 
seven of whom were public officers (mainly members of municipal 
corporations and of Ministries, whether at the federal or at the State 
level); 410  the Bhure Lal Committee, for matters pertaining to 
environmental pollution, envisaged the participation of five members, 
four being appointed by virtue of their particular professionalism and 
expertise, and the fifth being the Central Pollution Control Board, ex 
officio.411 
                                                          
408  Boisson de Chazournes, L., Transparency and Amicus Curiae Briefs, in The 
Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2004, pp. 333-336. 
409  A practice started in the late 1980s. For instance, Rural Litigation & 
Entitlement Kendra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1989, SC 594, 1989 SCC Supl. 
(1) 537; Banwasi Sewa Ashram vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, AIR 1987, SC 374, 
1987 SCR (1) 336.   
410 Almitra H. Patel & Anr vs. Union of India & Ors., 16 January, 1998. 
411 M.C. Mehta vs. Union Of India & Ors, order dated 7 January, 1998. 
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A general overview of the composition of these committees has been 
proposed by Markandey Katju, former Supreme Court judge and 
Acting Chief Justice at the High Court of Allahabad – one of the High 
Courts that resorted to the creation of “citizen committees” as amici 
curiae endowed with a broader participatory basis. In a speech 
delivered in 2002 in Delhi, Katju indicated the presence of citizens 
(lawyers, doctors, teachers, businessmen) and bureaucrats as necessary 
to the formation of those committees, as well as technical experts.412 By 
means of this varied composition, it could be observed that such 
committees as more representative of the positions of the civil society 
while at the same time fulfilling the need for expertise. 
In this regard, the most recent practice of appointing committees has 
been characterised by an enhanced recourse to experts than to 
bureaucrats. As Chowdhury shows, the most debated cases pending 
before the Supreme Court in the last years have seen the creation of 
committees of independent experts separated from the classical 
appointment of member of PCB or municipal corporations. Thus, the 
result of this trend has been a rise of expert activities in the field of 
judicial activism. In Aruna Rodrigues & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., a 
case on GMOs, the Technical Expert Committee created in 2012 – 
following recommendations from the MoEF – comprised six Professors 
in the field of biology, biotechnology and food safety. 413  In T.N. 
Godavarman Thirumulpad vs. Union of India, 414  on deforestation, the 
Court established a Central Empowered Committee as a sort of 
dependence of the Supreme Court, insomuch as it functions as a 
tribunal of first instance and as a body entrusted with the monitoring of 
enforcement of orders.415 
This brief outline attempts at showing the pros and cons of the 
procedural devices of the Supreme Court. While the enlargement of PIL 
has certainly contributed to an enhanced access to justice, the practice 
                                                          
412 Sahasranaman, P.B., op.cit., p. 306. 
413 Aruna Rodrigues & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2012, SCW 340, order 
dated 10 May, 2012. 
414 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 202/1995, still pending.  
415 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad vs. Union of India, order dated 9 May, 2002. 
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of creating committees that disguise a choice of amici curiae by the 
Court itself raises methodological issues. The growing reliance on such 
bodies is to be welcomed as for the effective enforcement of 
environmental rights, but closes a series of roads that the 
administration and the legislator could pursue. The consequence of 
judicial activism, in order to ensure proper judgments, is the continued 
resort to experts, that impinge on the legislative and executive 
legitimacy. 416  Moreover, the case of T.N. Godavarman shows the 
drawbacks of procedural tools such as the writ of continuing mandamus, 
that is ongoing for 15 years. 417  A recourse to expertise is certainly 
fundamental for studying the issues at stake in the judicial proceedings 
dealing with environmental problems. Notwithstanding this need, the 
creation of quasi-permanent committees threatens the participation of 
the public sphere to environmental debates and on the deliberation of 
permanent and effective solutions. This very ambivalence – between 
judicial activism and expertise on one side and lack of regulation or 
implementation on the other – has proved to be the fil rouge of the 
debate around the role of courts in environmental policy and on the 
need for specialised environmental tribunals, with the Supreme Court 
as the leading actor in interpreting principles and in suggesting 
solutions.    
  
II) The Supreme Court between legal principles and scientific 
expertise   
 
a) The adaptation of international law principles: sustainable 
development in the Supreme Court 
Judicial activism as interpreted by the Supreme Court concretised not 
only thanks to procedural devices, as Public Interest Litigation, but also 
                                                          
416 Chowdhury, N., op.cit., p. 19. 
417 For a critical view of the case, Rosencranz, A., Boenig, E.,  Dutta, B., The 
Godavarman Case: The Indian Supreme Court's Breach of Constitutional Boundaries 
in Managing India's Forests, in Environmental Law Reporter News and Analysis, No. 
37 (1), 2007. For the use of the writ of continuing mandamus in environmental 
litigation, see supra, paragraph b). 
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as a result of the internal reflections of the Supreme Court on the 
environmental discourse taking place at the international level, from 
the Stockholm Declaration, and on the pieces of legislation enacted 
nationally. In fact, the main decisions of the apex tribunal on 
broadening the scope of action of the judiciary were also based on the 
transposition and elaboration of the principles developed in 
international environmental law and in legal doctrine. 
Apart from the instruments existing in the Indian legal system and 
borrowed from private law,418 the Supreme Court relied on several 
principles of environmental law as a basis of its judgments. As a 
general corollary of judicial action, notwithstanding the constitutional 
evolution of the 1970s, the public trust doctrine arises as the essential 
explanation of the role of the Supreme Court in environmental 
protection. This theory states that natural resources, namely water, air, 
earth and forests, are to be considered as part of a common good, and 
that the State has to be the trustee of this natural legacy and has thus 
the duty to protect them for future generations. The public trust 
doctrine finds its sources in ancient law, both Roman and Indian. 
Originally, it was developed by Emperor Justinian, on the 
understanding that in a rational classification of goods, natural 
resources were res communes and res nullius, pertaining to nobody but 
being part of a whole, common good that had to be protected on behalf 
of the public – a concept that was transmitted to English common 
law. 419  In parallel, traditional Indian texts, such as the Manusmriti, 
                                                          
418 Refer supra, Section I, paragraph a). 
419 Justinian, Institutes, Book 2, Part 1, 1-6. For a historical account, see Ryan, E., 
Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine 
for Natural Resource Management, in Environmental Law, 31, 2001, p. 477; 
Huffman, J.L., Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional 
Democracy, in American Environmental Law, Vol.19, 1988, p. 527.Sax, J.L., 
Liberating the public trust doctrine from its historical shackles, in Uc Davis Law 
Review, Vol. 14, 1980, p. 185; Sax, J.L., The public trust doctrine in natural resource 
law: Effective judicial intervention, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, 1970, pp. 
471-566. For an opposed perspective in American law, Lazarus, R.J., Changing 
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advanced the idea that rulers had to maintain common goods as 
natural resources are.420 
This traditional doctrine is clearly correspondent to the concept of 
intergenerational equity, as both theories sustain the necessity of a 
healthy environment to be maintained for future generations and the 
role of public authorities in fulfilling this need. In Indian law, the 
concept of public trust has been adopted by the Supreme Court in 
dealing with the landmark case M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath. 421  The 
question posed before the tribunal concerned the diversion of the river 
Beas, approved by the MoEF, by a private enterprise that had touristic 
purposes. Recalling the ancient origins of the public trust doctrine and 
the scope of the theory under English law for rivers and seashores,422 
the Supreme Court presented a clear definition of it: “The Public Trust 
Doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, 
waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole 
that it would be wholly onjustilled to make them a subject of private 
ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely 
available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The doctrine enjoins 
upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general 
public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial 
purposes.“  The Indian tribunal noted how American courts enlarged 
the application of it, if compared to the English system (limiting trust to 
navigation and fishing), and extended the qualification of public trust 
to ecologically relevant resources: “the State is the trustee of all natural 
resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at 
large is the beneficiary of the sea shore, running waters, airs, forests and 
ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect 
                                                                                                                               
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public 
Trust Doctrine, in Iowa Law Review, Vol. 71, 1986, pp. 631-716. 
420 Manusmriti, VII, 14. 
421 M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath & Ors., AIR 1997 (1) SCC 388. 
422 “Under the English common law, however, the Sovereign could own these resources 
but the ownership was limited in nature, the Crown could not grant these properties to 
private owners if the effect was to interfere with the public interests in navigation or 
fishing. Resources that were suitable for these uses were deemed to be held in trust by 
the Crown for the benefit of the public.” 
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the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be 
converted into private ownership.” Moreover, the Court recognised that 
the public trust doctrine is “part of the law of the land”, a crucial 
interpretive step in asserting the relevance of environmental principles 
and of the legitimacy for institutional action. 
By doing this, the Supreme Court recalled the role of the executive in 
protecting the environment and gave solid arguments for the 
interpretation of the public trust doctrine within the principles stated in 
Stockholm, as intergenerational equity is to be considered the 
complement of this doctrine.423  This view is confirmed even in the 
earliest decisions on environmental issues, paving the way for 
enucleating the public trust doctrine. In fact, in State of Tamil Nadu vs. 
Hind Stone, 424  on a case concerning the illegal grant of leases for 
quarrying black granite, the Court stated that “rivers, forests, minerals 
and  as such other resources constitute a nation's natural wealth. These 
resources are not to be frittered away and exhausted by any one generation. 
Every generation owes a duty to all succeeding generations to develop and 
conserve the natural resources of the nation in the best possible way.” This is a 
plain recognition of the principles of intergenerational equity and of the 
fact that the nation as a whole, and the Government as a trustee, has the 
obligation to preserve natural resources from exhaustion. 
From this doctrine, that aims at universalising the concerns for the 
environment, the application of the principles of international law that 
were foundational for the legislative interventions of the 1970s and the 
1980s is the logical progress in judicial thinking. Indeed, considering 
that the cases before the courts – as it is classic in environmental 
jurisprudence – deal with the comprehension of environmental 
concerns within litigation on economic and social hindrances, the 
elaboration of sustainable development as a key principle of domestic 
policy followed as a natural path for complementing decisions. On this, 
the turning point was achieved with the judgment Vellore Citizens 
                                                          
423 See supra, Chapter I, Section I, paragraph b) and Sahasranaman, P.B., op.cit., 
p. 40. 
424 State of Tamil Nadu vs. Hind Stone, AIR 1981 711, SCR (2) 742. 
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Welfare Forum vs. Union Of India & Ors,425 that was eventually decided 
by the Supreme Court in 1996. In this case, Justice Kuldip Singh, the 
“green judge”, delivered an innovative explanation of the international 
law principles of sustainable development, polluter pays and 
precaution as applied to the local reality of India. 
The matter concerned the pollution caused by the working of leather 
tanneries in Tamil Nadu, in particular for the untreated effluents 
deriving from the chemicals employed in the production of leather, 
whose discharge into waters endangered soils, thus agricultural 
cultures, and eventually drinking water as well as the environmental 
state of the river Palar. Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum, alarmed by the 
extent of pollution and by the situation of the people in the area, filed a 
writ petition that resulted in a series of orders directing the closure of 
the tanneries, absent the installation of pollution control devices. 
Pursuing such orders,426 the action of the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control 
Board in monitoring the directions showed an insufficient 
implementation of pollution control, as those devices were performing 
at a suboptimal level in some tanneries, while in other plants the 
directions were simply not complied with, in spite of the mandatory 
nature of the directions.  
In presenting the final judgment, the Court recalled its five years 
monitoring period through the Pollution Control Board and 
acknowledged the relevance of the leather industry for the economy of 
the region, as a source of employment and foreign exchange. 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Supreme Court directed a 
panoply of measures that included the imposition of pollution fines on 
the tanneries; the creation of an authority charged with the 
compensation for the damages produced by the tanneries, to the 
ecology and to the individuals; the closure of those industries not 
paying the compensation and, naturally, the request of installation of 
common effluent treatment plants. These comprehensive directions 
were set by a thorough review of constitutional provisions and 
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426  Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum vs. Union Of India & Ors, orders dated 15 
December 1995 and 9 April 1996. 
  192 
domestic legislation in light of the international law principles 
governing environmental issues. It is worthwhile to quote and analyse 
the excerpt of the judgment: 
“The traditional concept that development and ecology are opposed to each 
other, is no longer acceptable. "Sustainable Development is the answer. In the 
International sphere "Sustainable Development" as a concept came to be 
known for the first time in the Stockholm Declaration of 1972. Thereafter, in 
1987 the concept was given a definite shape by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in its report called Our Common Future. The 
Commission was chaired by the then Prime Minister of Norway Ms. G.H. 
Brundtland and as such the report is popularly known as "Brundtland 
Report".  (...) Finally, came the Earth Summit held in June, 1992 at Rio which 
saw the largest gathering of world leaders ever in the history - deliberating and 
chalking out a blue print for the survival of the planet. Among the tangible 
achievements of the Rio Conference was the signing of two conventions, one on 
biological diversity and another on climate change. (...) During the two 
decades from Stockholm to Rio "Sustainable Development" came to be accepted 
as a viable concept to eradicate poverty and improve the quality of human life 
while living within the carrying capacity of the supporting eco-systems. 
"Sustainable Development: as defined by the Brundtland Report means 
"Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of the future generations to meet their own needs". We have no 
hesitation in holding that "Sustainable Development' as a balancing concept 
between ecology and development has been accepted as a part of the Customary 
International Law though its salient features have yet to be finalised by the 
International Law Jurists. 
Some of the salient principles of "Sustainable Development", as culled-out 
from Brundtland Report and other international documents, are Inter-
Generational Equity, Use and Conservation of Nature Resources, 
Environmental Protection, the Precautionary Principle, Polluter Pays 
principle, Obligation to assist and cooperate, Eradication of Poverty and 
Financial Assistance to the developing countries. We are, however, of the view 
that "The Precautionary Principle" and "The Polluter Pays" principle are 
essential features of "Sustainable Development". The "Precautionary 
Principle" - in the context of the municipal law – means: 
(i) Environment measures - by the State Government and the statutory 
Authorities must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental 
degradation. 
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(ii) Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage lack of scientific 
certainly should not be used as the reason for postponing, measures to prevent 
environmental depredation. 
(iii)The "Onus of proof" is on the actor or the developer/industrial to show that 
his action is environmentally benign. 
(...) The "Polluter Pays" principle as interpreted by this Court means that the 
absolute liability for harm to the environment extends not only to compensate 
the victims of pollution but also the cost of restoring the environmental 
degradation. Remediation of the damaged environment is part of the process of 
"Sustainable Development" and as such polluter is liable to pay the cost to the 
individual sufferers as well as the cost of reversing the damaged ecology. The 
precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle have been accepted as 
part of the law of the land. (...) Even otherwise once these principles are 
accepted as part of the Customary International Law there would be no 
difficultly in accepting them as part of the domestic law. It is almost accepted 
proposition of law that the rule of Customary International Law which are not 
contrary to the municipal law shall be deemed to have been incorporated in the 
domestic law and shall be followed by the Courts of Law.  
Justice Kuldip interpreted sustainable development through an 
evolutionary perspective. Overcoming the definitional conundrums of 
the concept427 and the differentiation between the various principles of 
international law, the Supreme Court declared sustainable 
development as a principle of international law, with the possibility of 
becoming customary in a perspective de jure condendo. Although 
noteworthy for grounding the judgment in an international perspective 
and posing the bases for a strengthened protection of the environment, 
it should be noted that the Court relies on soft law instruments for 
recognising the “normative threshold” necessary for considering 
sustainable development as a legal principle.428 While the notion should 
have been classified by looking at the most relevant elements – 
intergenerational equity, sustainable use, intragenerational equity and 
                                                          
427 See supra, Chapter I, Section II, paragraph c). 
428 Boisson de Chazournes, L., Maljean-Dubois, S., Principes du droit international 
de l‘environnement, in Jurisclasseur Environnement et Développement Durable, 
Genève, 2011, pp. 1-20. 
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integration of economic, social and economic considerations429 - the 
tribunal assumes the existence of the principle of sustainable 
development, in spite of the absence of definition of its “salient features”, 
by looking at it as an “umbrella concept” integrally covering the 
principles stated in the Rio Declaration.     
Indeed, the difficulties witnessed by international law scholars and 
judges in developing the notion (that is not considered a principle by 
the International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros judgment, 
except by the separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry, that is posterior 
to the Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum case)430 are overcome by resorting 
to the other principles of international law whose status is more 
defined as far as normativity is concerned. Consequently, absent the 
definition of sustainable development, the polluter pays principle and 
the precautionary principle find a clear-cut meaning with certain 
contours as two fundamental features of sustainable development. 
Concerning the polluter pays principle, the Supreme Court derives 
from it a “restorative” leg of the notion of sustainable development. 
The principle is considered as two-fold: on the one hand, the duty to 
compensate victims of pollution, on the other hand, the reversal of the 
effects to the environment, thus acceding to a concept that has both a 
human- and an eco-centric nature. Moreover, the Court characterises 
the principle by the inherent necessity of encompassing absolute 
liability of the polluter. In doing this, the tribunal implicitly relates the 
international principle to domestic jurisprudence on the theory of 
liability, starting from the Shriram case.431 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court appears to be enlarging the scope of liability in the polluter pays 
principle by blurring the two concepts. In a previous, landmark case, 
Indian Council For Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union Of India (also known as 
Bichhri case),432  the Supreme Court ruled against the respondents – 
public authorities, but also the industrial entrepreneurs that led the 
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431 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086. 
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chemical plants causing water and land pollution in the area – on the 
basis of the Shriram case, of the Constitution (Articles 48A and 51A), of 
the domestic statutes dealing with this issue (Water and Air Acts, EPA 
and hazardous substances regulation), but relied on the polluter pays 
principle as a natural conclusion of domestic law. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court referred to it by quoting a definition of the principle (“The polluter 
pays principle demands that the financial costs of preventing or remedying 
damage caused by pollution should lie with the undertakings which cause the 
pollution, or produce the goods which cause the pollution. Under the principle 
it is not the role of government to meet the costs involved in either prevention 
of such damage, or in carrying out remedial action”) and stating that “once 
the activity carried on is hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person 
carrying on such activity is liable to make good the loss caused to any other 
person by his activity irrespective of the fact whether he took reasonable care 
while carrying on his activity. The rule is premised upon the very nature of the 
activity carried on" since the principle “has gained almost universal 
recognition, apart from the fact that it is stated in absolute terms in Oleum 
Gas Leak Case (the Shriram case). The law declared in the said decision is the 
law governing this case.” 
Notwithstanding the apparent coherence of the judgments, several 
observations can be presented. Firstly, the Court traces the 
jurisprudential origin of the principle already in the 1980s. Then, a 
substantial difference between absolute liability and polluter pays 
seems to be reduced: while in the Bichhri case the polluter pays 
principle is applied for hazardous industries, in Vellore Citizens Welfare 
Forum the application ratione materiae of the principle is widened by 
including traditional industries such as tanneries. This view is 
confirmed in the judgments chronologically following the decision in 
Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum, such as M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India433 
(Calcutta tanneries case, as an evolution of M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India 
of 1988,434 also known as the Ganga river pollution case). Finally, with an 
international law perspective, the Supreme Court focuses more on the 
matter of restoration (a necessity, since tribunals, notwithstanding the 
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judicial activism that characterises the Supreme Court, can issue 
directions ex post) than on preventive measures.    
In this regard, the role of the precautionary principle arises. The 
Supreme Court recognises three elements in domestic law that concur 
to its definition and operationalisation: the role of domestic authorities 
in preventing harm to the environment, the overcoming of the lack of 
scientific certainty for designing and implementing measures and the 
reversal of the burden of proof upon the polluter. The definition of the 
precautionary principle is possibly the least contentious: the Supreme 
Court adopts a meaning that is consistent with the practice it aims at 
establishing for the protection of the environment, in light with the 
Indian legal system. Moreover, in a judgment on mining operations, the 
Badkhal case,435  the Court extends the definition delivered in Vellore 
Citizens Welfare Forum by dwelling upon the domestic norms 
guaranteeing the existence of a precautionary approach for the 
protection of the environment. In fact, “the Precautionary Principle has 
been accepted as a part of the law of the land. Articles 21. 47, 48A and 51A(g) 
of the Constitution of India give a clear mandate to the State to protect and 
improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the 
country.” The principle “makes it mandatory for the State Government to 
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environment degradation.”  
Notwithstanding the solid roots acknowledged in these judgments, the 
Court delves into the analysis of the principle in order to clarify its 
defining elements, such as the matter of the uncertainty of scientific 
knowledge and the dimensions of risk, dealt with in Andhra Pradesh 
Pollution Control Board vs. Prof. M.V. Nayudu,436 where the Court infers 
that the precautionary principle assumes its highest relevance insofar as 
it concurs in preventing accidents by prohibiting certain activities or by 
directing appropriate safeguards.   
The peculiarity of the Indian judicial decisions lies in the theorisation of 
these principles as a unicum, or as a sort of triptych composed by the 
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concept of sustainable development, at the centre, as an opaque picture 
that is imbued of the two principles at its side, the polluter pays 
principle and the precautionary principle. In this sense, in most of the 
judgments of the Supreme Court dealing with sustainable development 
the occurrence of the notion is related to the need for a precautionary 
approach and the grounding of compensation in the broader scope of 
polluter pays. The Narmada Bachao Andolan case437 is emblematic of the 
orientation of the Supreme Court towards these international 
principles. In this case that attracted international media attention – as 
the Court was dealing with a petition concerning the construction of a 
dam in the fifth longest river of India438 - the apex tribunal relied on its 
earlier judgments to draw an application of sustainable development in 
environmental projects. The Supreme Court saw sustainable 
development and the precautionary principle as specular, the former 
being applied when the effect of a project is known,439 in order to soften 
the results on the environment, the latter coming into play before the 
implementation of the project,440 when lack of scientific data poses the 
onus of proof on the possible extent of pollution on the proponent. 
                                                          
437 Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union of India, order dated 18 October, 2000. 
438 See Rajagopal, B., Limits of law in counter-hegemonic globalization: the Indian 
Supreme Court and the Narmada Valley Struggle, in de Souza, B., Rodriguez-
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Notwithstanding this classification ratione temporis, the Supreme Court 
relied on the existence of sustainable development as “one of the 
principles underlying environmental law,” requiring “such development to 
take place which is ecologically sustainable. The two essential features of 
sustainable development are (a) the precautionary principle and (b) the 
polluter pays principle” in the Delhi Vehicular Pollution case,441 confirming 
the tripartite nature of the notion as seen according to the apex tribunal. 
In this framework, a clearer statement of the concept is contained in 
N.D. Jayal and Anr. vs. Union of India,442 where the Court acknowledged 
the multifaceted notion of sustainable development as a merger of the 
right to environment and the right to development, with the principle 
of sustainable development being a part of the right to life enshrined in 
Article 21 of the Constitution, supported and in its turn supporting the 
notion of intergenerational equity, the precautionary principle and the 
public trust doctrine. 443  This definition of sustainable development, 
settled in a considerable number of judgments, is thus at the origin of 
the application of the principle in connection with the legislation on the 
protection of the environment, as a strengthening factor for domestic 
statute law, as the linkage set in the rhetoric of human rights opened 
the way for the adjudication of landmark cases affecting both natural 
environment and human situations. 
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b) The operationalisation of sustainable development: the test of 
proportionality  
The peculiar construction of the Supreme Court, characterised by a 
tripartite notion of sustainable development and based on the 
transposition of international law principles through constitutional 
norms, starting from Article 21, has been put into practice in several 
judgments from the early 2000s onwards, dealing not only with human 
activities, but also with eco-centric purposes. 
Forest and wildlife protection has been the first field outside mainly 
human development purposes that the Supreme Court considered in 
the realm of sustainable development. In 2004, the Court decided the 
case Essar Oil Ltd. vs. Halar Utkarsh Samiti & Ors.,444 arising from a series 
of civil petitions, on the grounds of the relevant articles of the Wildlife 
Protection Act, the Forest Conservation Act and the Environment 
Protection Act and on an enlarged conception of sustainable 
development. Indeed, the Court opened to a more eco-centric vision of 
the principle while looking at the protection of sanctuaries in national 
parks. This judgement is a landmark of the international law oriented 
interpretive action of the Court, as it analysed Section 29 of the Wildlife 
Protection Act – on the restriction of entry in sanctuaries – taking into 
account Principles 2, 4, 8 and 11 of the Stockholm Declaration and 
integrating the prohibitions of Section 29 on wildlife and habitat, 
paving the way for an enhanced ecological vision of sustainable 
development.  
Starting from this renewed interpretation, the Court continued this 
emphasis on the blend of international and statute law with ecological 
concerns also in cases dealing with more classic issues of human 
development. In fact, the apex tribunal endorsed the principles of 
international law in a case dealing with urban development, 
                                                          
444 Essar Oil Ltd. vs. Halar Utkarsh Samiti & Ors., Appeal (Civil) 352-353 of 2004, 
arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 9454-9455 of 2001, with Civil Appeal Nos. 354-
357, 362-364 arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos.10008-10011, 17691-17693, 17694-
17696, 22137 of 2001, S.L.P. (Civil) No.5083, S.L.P. (Civil) Nos.10008-10011, 
17691-17694, 17695-17696 and S.L.P. (Civil) No.5083 of 2001. 
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Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,445 where 
the Court reconfirmed the public trust doctrine, enshrined it in 
international law as state responsibility446 and linked it to the principle 
of sustainable development.447 This reliance on international law as part 
of the law of the land is confirmed in Karnataka Industrial Areas 
Development Board vs. Sri C. Kenchappa & Ors.,448 that witnessed the aim 
of the Court of striking “a golden balance between the industrial 
development and ecological preservation, (...) in consonance with the principle 
of `Sustainable Development'.” Here, the Court accomplished a thorough 
review of the development of environmental protection and of the 
interrelated nature of the right to a healthy environment and the right 
to development from the Stockholm Conference to the World Summit 
in Johannesburg, while at the same time recalling legal literature 
(namely, sustainable development as defined by Philippe Sands). The 
Court aptly considered its earlier judgments on the matter in light with 
the declarations at the international level (including the UN Declaration 
on the Right to Development) insofar as it could indicate that “in order 
to protect sustainable development, it is necessary to implement and enforce 
some of its main components and ingredients such as Precautionary Principle, 
Polluter Pays and Public Trust Doctrine. We can trace foundation of these 
ingredients in number of judgments delivered by this Court and the High 
Courts after the Rio Conference, 1992.”  
                                                          
445 Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., arising out of 
S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 7196-7197/ 2001. 
446 “The responsibility of the state to protect the environment is now a well-accepted 
notion in all countries. It is this notion that, in international law, gave rise to the 
principle of "state responsibility" for pollution emanating within one's own territories 
[Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports (1949) 4]. This responsibility is clearly enunciated in 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 1972 
(Stockholm Convention), to which India was a party.”  
447 “What this Court should follow is a principle of sustainable development and find a 
balance between the developmental needs which the respondents assert, and the 
environmental degradation, that the appellants allege.” 
448 Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board vs. Sri C. Kenchappa & Ors., AIR 
2006 SC 2038, 2006 AIR SCW 2547. 
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This “judicial pilgrimage”, as the Supreme Court defines it, is 
fundamental in understanding the impact of the international law 
discourse in the judicial activism of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the 
Court confers a high relevance to the principle of sustainable 
development (garnished by the two pillars of precaution and polluter 
pays), considering its transposition into domestic law through Articles 
21, 47, 48A and 51A of the Constitution. As a consequence, in the 
Karnataka Industrial Areas case the apex tribunal endeavoured to 
consider the balance between developmental needs and ecological 
balance in the directions on the acquisition of lands. 
The concept of balance is a recurring theme, as the Supreme Court 
resorts to it when explaining the content of sustainable development, 
especially when industrial activities are concerned. In Susetha vs. State of 
Tamil Nadu and Ors.,449 on the preservation of water bodies from the 
construction of a shopping complex, it was recalled how the public 
trust doctrine implies a judicial scrutiny of governmental activities 
concerning alienation of properties comprising natural resources, and 
how this is an embodiment of the principle of sustainable development. 
Moreover, the pragmatic application of the concept is related to the 
definition of sustainable development with a view to integrate 
intergenerational equity and the balancing of developmental needs.450 
The operationalisation of sustainable development is further enhanced 
in Research Foundation for Science vs. Union of India and Ors.,451 on the 
working activities of a shipbreaking yard in Gujarat. Here, the Court 
operationalises the notion of sustainable development as for its 
                                                          
449 Susetha vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., Appeal (Civil) No. 3418 of 2006. 
450 “The development of the doctrine of sustainable development indeed is a welcome 
feature but while emphasizing the need of ecological impact, a delicate balance between 
it and the necessity for development must be struck. Whereas it is not possible to ignore 
inter-generational interest, it is also not possible to ignore the dire need which the 
society urgently requires." Here the Supreme Court relies on the judgment 
Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (3) vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group and 
Ors., AIR 2006 3 SCC 434. 
451 Research Foundation for Science vs. Union of India and Ors., order dated 11 
September, 2007, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 657 of 1995. 
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tripartite nature and the existence of a “condition of balance”. On the 
one hand, the interpretation of the Court on the derivation of 
sustainable development from international law and on the grounding 
of the notion in the Constitution is confirmed. The apex tribunal opens 
to the nature of the principle as customary, integrating also the 
precautionary principle and polluter pays principle, and states that 
those principles are implied in all environmental laws starting from the 
Environment (Protection) Act – by means of an evolutionary reading of 
the statutes, as sustainable development arises as a separated notion 
only in the Brundtland Report of 1987. 452  On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court relies on an earlier judgment, T.N. Godavarman 
Thirumalpad vs. Union of India and Ors.,453 in order to link the principle of 
proportionality to sustainable development, as a guarantee of the need 
for a balance between ecological protection and human development. 
Moreover, from this very same case, T.N. Godavaraman Thirumalpad vs. 
Union of India and Ors., in 2007,454 the Supreme Court raised the stance 
of sustainable development as a constitutional requirement. The 
pragmatic approach of the tribunal is seen insomuch as the Courts are 
to be guided by the principle of sustainable development in order to 
decide on the single cases concerning bodies or societies undertaking 
industrial activities potentially harmful to the environment, with an 
evaluation that aims at balancing the different interests at stake: “we 
may state that adherence to the principle of Sustainable Development is now a 
constitutional requirement. How much damage to the environment and 
ecology has got to be decided on the facts of each case. While applying the 
principle of Sustainable Development one must bear in mind that development 
                                                          
452 “The precautionary principle and polluter-pays principle have now emerged and 
govern the law in our country, as is clear from Articles 47, 48-A and 51-A( g ) of our 
Constitution and that, in fact, in the various environmental statutes including the 
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, these concepts are already implied. (...) These 
principles are accepted as part of the customary international law and hence there 
should be no difficulty in accepting them as part of our domestic law.”  
453 T.N. Godavaraman Thirumalpad vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2002 10 SCC 
606.  
454  T.N. Godavaraman Thirumalpad vs. Union of India & Ors., judgment of 23 
November 2007, arising from Writ Petition (Civil) No. 252/1995. 
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which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the 
future generations to meet their own needs is Sustainable Development. 
Therefore, courts are required to balance development needs with the protection 
of the environment and ecology. It is the duty of the State under our 
Constitution to devise and implement a coherent and co-ordinated programme 
to meet its obligation of Sustainable Development based on inter-generational 
equity. (...) Mining is an important revenue generating industry. However, we 
cannot allow our national assets to be placed into the hands of companies 
without proper mechanism in place and without ascertaining the credibility of 
the User Agency.” 
Hence, the Supreme Court grounded sustainable development to a 
case-by-case analysis to be delivered by tribunals. This evolutionary 
approach has been applied in cases still pending, such as M.C. Mehta vs. 
Union of India of 2009 (the case on mining leases arising from Writ 
Petition No. 4677/1985).455 In light of the earlier judgments and orders 
delivered in other cases, the Supreme Court read the situation of the 
mining leases and activities carried out in the Aravalli hills (on the 
border between Haryana and Rajasthan) through a comprehensive 
account of the international principles applying to the case, of the 
constitutional provisions and of Indian legislation enacted since the 
1970s.456 Following the continuous violation of the orders prohibiting 
mining activities, the Supreme Court explicitly interpreted the Mining 
                                                          
455 M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India & Ors., Interim Application No. 1967 in Interim 
Application No. 1785 dated 8 May, 2009, arising from Writ Petition (Civil) No. 
4677 of 1985. 
456 “Mining sector is regulated by a large number of environment and forest statutes. 
The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; Air (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 were enacted 
to implement the decisions taken in United Nations Conference on Human 
Environment in 1972 at Stockholm. These environment and forests statutes interact 
with mining regulations under Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) 
Act, 1957; Mineral Concession Rules, 1960; Mineral Conservation and Development 
Rules, 1988. On account of depletion of the forest cover, we have the Forest 
(Conservation) Act, 1980, which was enacted to regulate the diversion of forest area for 
non-forest purposes. Similarly, under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 we have 
several notifications, including Environment Impact Assessment Notification 1994.”  
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Act of 1957 in connection with sustainable development: “mining within 
the Principle of Sustainable Development comes within the concept of 
"balancing" whereas mining beyond the Principle of Sustainable Development 
comes within the concept of "banning". (...) Balancing of the mining activity 
with environment protection and banning such activity are two sides of the 
same principle of sustainable development. They are parts of Precautionary 
Principle.”      
The characterisation of sustainable development with the objective of 
balancing needs through a test of proportionality has been the object of 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court, especially in the field of 
mining.457 In Maharashtra Land Development vs. State of Maharashtra & 
Anr.,458 on mining and quarrying activities in forest lands, the Court 
reread the provisions of the Acts relevant in the judgment with the 
necessity of proportionality and with a teleological interpretation that 
looked at the intent of the legislator. Although dealing with a classical 
matter of administrative law – whether a State could consider the 
disputed forest land as owned by the Government – the tribunal relied 
on the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness to derive the 
principle of proportionality that allowed the public authority to protect 
that particular private forest land, “in the general interests of the public in 
tune with principles of environmental protection and sustainable 
development”.  
A similar approach has been taken in Deepak Kumar Etc vs. State Of 
Haryana & Ors., 459  on the question of sand mining and of its 
environmental dimension. Here too, the purpose of the Court has been 
to look at the environmental aspects of mining of minor minerals for 
ensuring sustainable mining and a balanced approach of environmental 
issues. Most recently, the Supreme Court has confirmed its orientation 
                                                          
457 A stream of repetitive cases that will also be the object of several cases 
adjudicated by the National Green Tribunal. See infra, Chapters IV and V. 
458 Maharashtra Land Development vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., Civil Appeal 
No. 2147-2148/2004, judgment delivered on 11 November, 2010. 
459 Deepak Kumar Etc vs. State of Haryana & Ors., Interim Applications No. 12-
13/2011 in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 19628-19629/2009. 
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in Samaj Parivartana Samudaya & Ors vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.,460 
where it stated, in a matter concerning illegal mining of iron ores, that 
“environment and ecology are national assets. They are subject to 
intergenerational equity. Time has now come to suspend all mining in the 
above area on sustainable development principle which is part of Articles 21, 
48-A and 51-A(g) of the Constitution of India.”    
The body of jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, especially from the 
2000s, shows an orientation at integrating sustainable development in 
the law of the land, in spite of its nature of notion, or principle 
according to Weeramantry, in international law. Sustainable 
development has been consistently read as a customary norm and has 
been elevated to the rank of constitutionally guaranteed principle, 
thanks to the elaboration of the precautionary and polluter pays 
principles within it. While it is acknowledged that the concept has a 
vague definition, apart from the tripartite integration and the 
occasional reference to intergenerational equity and the public trust 
doctrine, the Supreme Court endeavoured to operationalise the 
principle through the so called “test of proportionality”, aimed at 
finding a case-based definition by looking at the balance between 
ecological and developmental elements, an approach that stems from 
the original statement of the Brundtland Report. Notwithstanding these 
advances, this evaluation of balance and proportionality points out an 
essential question: the need for expertise within the Courts in order to 
properly assess the scientific data that are analysed in order to reach a 
decision. Although the Supreme Court has constantly been resorting to 
the mechanism of special committees as a preliminary step of judicial 
proceedings, the tribunal itself noted how the participation of experts in 
Courts could be  beneficial in enhancing the quality of decisions. This 
very request for expertise, coming from the judiciary itself, brought to 
the creation of the National Green Tribunal.  
 
 
                                                          
460 Samaj Parivartana Samudaya & Ors vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., judgment 
dated 18 April 2013, arising from Writ Petition No. 562/2009. 
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c) The need for expertise and specialisation 
As known, the question of specialising the tribunals, or some of their 
benches, on environmental matters, is considered as a possible solution 
to the incremental necessity of dealing with cases requiring 
professional, scientific skills that are not to be found in the general 
judiciary. 461  Apart from the procedural devices and the substantive 
elaborations developed while judging on environmental issues, the 
Supreme Court advised on tentative reforms of the judiciary as to 
integrate scientific knowledge already by the mid-1980s. In the 
landmark Shriram case, which involved the creation of an ad hoc body 
charged with the listing and examination of the conditions necessary 
for satisfying the requirements set by the Court (the Nilay Choudhary 
Committee), the Supreme Court explicitly noted how its prerogatives 
could not be adequate to the increasing challenges brought forward by 
technological advances. While the apex tribunal recommended policy 
measures dealing with the control of industries involved with the 
production of chemicals (such as the creation of a High Powered 
Authority entrusted with the regulation of hazardous industries), it also 
presented the increasing amount of PIL cases on environmental 
pollution as an occasion for considering an amelioration of the “toolkit” 
of the judge. 
Indeed, the Court acknowledged how it has dealt with these cases 
through the creation of special committees composed of experts,462 but 
how it faced difficulties in order to guarantee a high level of scientific 
competence as well as the indispensable neutrality these experts ought 
to possess. Two innovations were thus put forward: on the one hand, 
the establishment of “an Ecological Sciences Research Group consisting of 
independent, professionally competent experts in different branches of science 
and technology” that could provide the Court with the required scientific 
information in environmental cases; on the other hand, the creation of a 
system of environmental adjudication characterised by regional based 
“Environment Courts (...) with one professional Judge and two experts drawn 
from the Ecological Sciences Research Group keeping in view the nature of the 
                                                          
461 See infra, Introduction and Chapter III, Section I, paragraphs c) and d). 
462 See infra, Section I, paragraph d). 
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case and the expertise required for its adjudication”, 463  with appeal 
jurisdiction resting with the Supreme Court.  
The suggestions presented in the Shriram case – urging the Government 
to envision a proposed structure for environmental jurisdictions that 
could blend scientific and legal expertise while guaranteeing access to 
justice at a level proximate to the citizens – were reiterated in several 
landmark cases before the Supreme Court. In addition to 
comprehensively elaborate international environmental notions as 
interwoven in the fabric of Indian legislation, in Vellore Citizens the 
Court drew the consequences of the violations of the relevant statutes 
and of the directions ordered to prevent further infringements in two 
ways. In primis, the appointment of an authority under Section 3 of the 
Environment (Protection) Act that could follow the matter of the 
tanneries in Tamil Nadu, whose mixed composition (a retired judge of 
the High Court and several environmental experts) should ensure the 
necessary expertise for compensating damages and suggesting 
measures for reversing the results of pollution. In secundis, the 
constitution of a “special Green Bench” in the High Court of Madras, as it 
had been done in West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh.464  
This care for providing both doctrinal argumentation and pragmatic 
devices is further shown in a contemporary judgment, Indian Council 
For Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India of 1996. In this decision, the 
final directions of the so called Bichhri case, the evident links with the 
Shriram case 465  – in the definition of principles as well as in the 
longstanding absence of abidance to the orders of the competent 
authorities – brought to the suggestion of setting appropriate 
environmental courts to judge over those matters involving an 
enhanced professionalism from the part of judicial institutions. In the 
Bichhri case, the starting point of the direction of the Supreme Court is 
not only the lack of scientific expertise, but also the consequences of it, 
namely the immediate resort to courts by the industries and the length 
                                                          
463 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987(2) SCC 176. 
464 Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum vs. Union of India & Ors, AIR 1996 (5) SCC 647. 
See infra, Section II, paragraph a). 
465 Both cases dealt with chemical industries and hazardous substances. 
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of proceedings. 466  Thus, the apex tribunal recommended again the 
creation of specialised tribunals. While in the Shriram case the focus 
was on the specific actions of these tribunals and on their composition, 
here the Supreme Court addressed not only those matters, but delved 
into details concerning the proposed jurisdiction – “all matters, civil and 
criminal, related to the environment” – and the relation with the lack of 
enforcement, through the idea of an “environmental audit” for industries 
and for the officers themselves, in order to make them accountable.467  
These judgments are a testimony of the integrated vision that the Court 
wished to bring forward, as a positive spill-over of its judicial activism. 
In fact, the Supreme Court took into account not only the legal progress 
achieved from the late 1970s, re-elaborating the concepts and providing 
them a solid grounding in India, but endeavoured to suggest and 
sustain reforms in the ecological field, considering the unsatisfactory 
enforcement of laws and the problems of the administrative machinery, 
with “the ultimate idea (...) to integrate and balance the concern for 
environment with the need for industrialisation and technological progress”.468  
Again in the late 1990s, the Court repeated its call for the establishment 
of environmental tribunals in Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board vs. 
Prof. M.V. Nayudu, with reference to the Shriram and Bichhri cases and 
to the solutions found in the years for responding to the call for 
upholding the concept of good governance that mirrors environmental 
principles. While examining “the deficiencies in the judicial and technical 
inputs in the appellate system under some of our existing environmental 
                                                          
466 Indian Council For Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1996 1446, 
SCC 1996 (3) 212: “the prosecutions launched in ordinary criminal courts (…) never 
reach their conclusion either because of the work-load in those courts or because there is 
no proper appreciation of the significance of the environment matters on the part of 
those in charge of conducting of those cases. Moreover, any orders (...) are immediately 
questioned by the industries in courts. Those proceedings take years and years to reach 
conclusion.” 
467 Again, Indian Council For Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 
1996 1446, SCC 1996 (3) 212. 
468 Indian Council For Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1996 1446, 
SCC 1996 (3) 212. 
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laws”, 469  the Supreme Court bluntly noted that “things are not quite 
satisfactory and there is an urgent need to make appropriate amendments so as 
to ensure that at all times, the appellate authorities or tribunals consist of 
judicial and also technical personnel well versed in environmental laws”  and 
proposed the Australian Land and Environment Court of New South 
Wales as an ideal-type of environmental tribunal to be implemented in 
India. 470  In pointing out the absence of environmental courts, 
nevertheless, the Supreme Court acknowledged the results achieved in 
rendering directions aimed at creating authorities characterised by the 
double expertise – legal and technical – such as in the Vellore Citizens 
case471 and in S. Jagannath vs. Union of India,472  that are not judicial 
institutions but whose intent is the blend of juridical and scientific 
knowledge. 
The most relevant remark, however, copes with the specific legislative 
measures undertaken in the mid-1990s: the National Environment 
Tribunal Act of 1995 and the National Environmental Appellate 
Authority of 1997, the latter directly responding to the suggestions of 
the Supreme Court as far as appellate jurisdiction is concerned. Indeed, 
the call for specific pieces of legislation that could complement the Acts 
approved until the 1980s (and more focused on the actions of the 
executive) with the judicial side of environmental protection had been 
answered by the Parliament through the approval of those texts.  
                                                          
469 Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board vs. Prof. M.V. Nayudu, AIR 1999 SC 
812. 
470 See infra, Section III, paragraph c). 
471 Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board vs. Prof. M.V. Nayudu, AIR 1999 SC 
812: “in the notification So.671(E) dated 30.9.1996 issued by the Government of India 
for the State of Tamil Nadu under section 3(3) of the 1986 Act, appointing a `Loss of 
Ecology (Prevention and Payment of Compensation) authority, it is stated that it shall 
be manned by a retired High Court Judge and other technical members who would 
frame a scheme.” 
472  S. Jagannath vs. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 811, a case concerning 
aquaculture in which the Supreme Court directed the creation of a High 
Powered Authority constituted “by a retired Judge of the High Court and members 
having expertise in the field of aquaculture, pollution control and environment 
protection”. 
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In pursuance to the enactment of the Public Liability Insurance Act of 
1991, that introduced the notion of absolute liability in matters 
concerning hazardous substances and guaranteed the grant of a speedy 
relief to victims of accidents, the National Environment Tribunal Act 
was devised as to “giving relief and compensation for damages to persons, 
property and the environment”473 through the establishment of such court. 
The National Environment Tribunal was nevertheless restricted in 
scope, as it was designed with a competence regarding the mere 
compensation for damages to properties and the environment and for 
death or injuries (Section 3). As far as the composition is concerned, the 
idea of appointing judicial and technical members was surely the main 
innovation in the Act: under Sections 9 and 10, the Tribunal was to be 
composed of judicial members (former Judges of High Courts or people 
having relevant experience in the Indian Legal Service) and of experts 
(not only scientific, but also those having knowledge in the 
administrative and technical fields related to the environment), to be 
chosen by a Selection Committee. 
Procedurally, the court was endowed with a fairly wide degree of 
easiness – as the National Environment Tribunal ought not to be bound 
by the Code of Civil Procedure, but to the principles of natural justice 
(Section 5),474 and it was characterised by the peculiarity of sitting in 
benches composed of at least a judicial and a technical member (Section 
9). Moreover, the court was to possess all the powers of a civil court as 
far as execution of orders is concerned. Finally, the appeals to awards 
or orders should have lain before the Supreme Court (Section 24). 
In spite of the insufficiencies of the design, because of the limited 
jurisdiction, the National Environment Tribunal could have constituted 
a first step toward a specialised judicial institution blending the 
competences of law officers with the technical expertise of scientists 
and administrators. This legislative support, however, went 
unimplemented, as this court was never put into being.475 The second 
                                                          
473 National Environment Tribunal Act, Act No. 27 of 1995. 
474 An idea that was eventually incorporated in the NGT Act. 
475 Divan and Rosencranz, op.cit., pp. 62-63; Nain Gill, G., A Green Tribunal for 
India, in Journal of Environmental Law, Oxford, 2010. 
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legislative intervention then took place in 1997, with the enactment of 
the National Environment Appellate Authority Act (NEEA).476  
As a consequence of the poor enforcement of the Environment 
(Protection) Act of 1986 and of the judicial decisions on the impact of 
chemical industries and of plants dealing with the production and 
storage of hazardous substances and following the directions on the 
establishment of environmental courts, the NEEA was entrusted with 
the task of hearing “appeals with respect to restriction of areas in which any 
industries, operations or processes or class of industries, operations or 
processes shall not be carried out or shall be carried out subject to certain 
safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986”. The jurisdiction 
of the tribunal, under Section 11, concerned the appeals against orders 
on environmental clearance affecting people, associations or public 
institutions (both the Central Government and local authorities), with a 
view to defuse the workload of ordinary courts in these matters. As to 
ensure rapidity in the decisions, the NEAA was not to be bound by the 
Code of Civil Procedure, but should follow the principles of natural 
justice or its own procedural rules, as it was the case of the 
unimplemented NET (Section 12). Concerning the composition, the 
Authority should be made up of a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson and 
a maximum of three additional members possessing “professional 
knowledge or practical experience in the areas pertaining to conservation, 
environmental management, law or planning and development” (Section 5). 
In this case too, the experience proved unfortunate. Apart from the 
narrow jurisdiction for appeals in cases of environmental clearance, the 
NEAA had a short life, as since 2000 no members have been 
appointed.477 Indeed, in light of the poor implementation of the two 
statutes, the Supreme Court intervened again regarding this state of 
facts. In Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board II vs. Prof. M.V. Nayudu 
(Retd.) & Ors, the apex tribunal expressly referred to its previous 
judgment and to an academic study conducted by the University of 
Cambridge in 2000 to highlight once more the successful experiences of 
environmental courts in Australia and New Zealand and the proposal 
                                                          
476 National Environment Appellate Authority Act, Act No. 22 of 1997. 
477 Divan and Rosencranz, op.cit., pp. 85-86; Nain Gill, G., op.cit.. 
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for a “two-tier Environmental Court” that “would have jurisdiction and 
powers including judicial review and civil procedure powers while dealing 
with environmental matters”.478 Moreover, the Supreme Court invited the 
Law Commission of the Parliament to consider the “review of the 
environmental laws and the need for constitution of Environmental Courts 
with experts in environmental law, in addition to judicial members, in the 
light of experience in other countries”.479 
Thus far, the copious jurisprudence of the Supreme Court testifies of 
the increasing judicial awareness of the relevance of environmental law 
and of the challenges facing a proper enforcement. While the Supreme 
Court has been dealing with international law principles and domestic 
statutes in a way as to accommodate them in a harmonised ensemble, it 
has also proposed effective policy measures directed at diminishing the 
work load of the judiciary and at enhancing the application of the 
panoply of laws guaranteeing environmental protection. The invitation 
and expectation of the Supreme Court, indeed, was not left unsatisfied, 
as the path leading to the establishment of specialised environmental 
jurisdiction proceeded through a careful comparative study of the 
options on the ground. 
 
III) The creation of the National Green Tribunal 
 
a) Domestic elaboration: thinking, drafting and approving the 
National Green Tribunal Act  
In light of the repeated observations of the Supreme Court and of the 
explicit invitation set in Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board II, the 
Law Commission of India, chaired by Justice Jagannadha Rao, 
proposed a scheme for constituting environmental courts in the 
country. In September 2003, the 186th Report on proposal to constitute 
environmental courts was published. Acknowledging the necessity for 
such an institutional development, underlined by the apex tribunal in 
                                                          
478 Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board II vs. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) & Ors 
on 1 December, 2000, AIR 2001 (2) SCC 62.  
479 Ibidem. 
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the abovementioned cases,480 the Commission undertook a study that 
relied on the case law of the Supreme Court, on the experience of India 
concerning the attempts at instituting environmental tribunals and on a 
comparison of these legal systems already endowed with such bodies. 
After a thorough review of the current system of India, characterised by 
civil and criminal jurisdiction on certain matters concerning 
environmental nuisance or offences, on the basis of the Codes and of 
the specific Acts enacted that followed the Stockholm Conference,481 the 
Commission noticed the absence of appellate bodies with a sufficient 
knowledge of environmental matters, or even with a judicial nature, the 
NET and the NEEA being non-functional and with limited jurisdiction. 
Thus, grounding the proposal in Articles 252, 253 and 247 of the 
Constitution – the scope of the latter entailing the implementation of 
international decision, in particular Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
on access to judicial remedies, and the creation of additional Courts – 
the Commission designed several characteristics for the tentatively 
newborn courts. 
First of all, the focus was on the principles to be followed. On this, the 
Commission relied on the discourse taking place at the international 
level as well as on the developments of the Indian jurisprudence. The 
first principle coming into analysis is the polluter pays principle, as 
adopted by the OECD, the EU and the case law of the Supreme Court, 
notably the Bichhri and Vellore Citizens cases. Then, a mainly domestic 
ambit is taken by the notion of absolute liability, as elaborated from the 
Shriram case. At the international level, the Commission recognised the 
precautionary principle – from the Vorsorgenprinzip to Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, 
recalling how the Vellore Citizens case embodied precautionary and 
polluter pays principles as part of the law of the land – and, from 
international jurisprudence, the principle of prevention (the Train 
Smelter and the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros cases). 
                                                          
480 See supra, Section II, paragraph b). 
481 See Chapter II, Section II, and supra, Section I, paragraph a). 
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In addition to these, the Commission made a substantive reference to 
sustainable development, read with the Rio Declaration in connection 
with the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros judgment, as well as with Indian case law 
and the example of the Constitution of South Africa (Articles 24-B and 
30-D). Moreover, the Rio Declaration was the origin of the principle of 
intergenerational equity, that the Court read in the definition by the 
Philippines’ Constitution (Article 11) and the case Minors Oposa.482 
Having shed light on the principles to be applied and acknowledged 
the judicial interpretations purported by the Supreme Court – 
witnessing how the international sources permeated the reflections on 
institutional innovation in India – the Commission delved into the 
actual proposal for the implementation of environmental courts. The 
proposal foresaw the creation of specialised courts at the State level, in 
opposition with the previous NETA and NEAA, that suggested the 
installation of courts at the central level. 
As far as original jurisdiction is concerned, these tribunals would have 
been vested with the powers of a civil court for environmental matters, 
with the possibility of granting reliefs under the Code of Civil 
Procedure and with express provisions on jurisdiction over the 
enforcement of legal and constitutional rights on the environment, 
issues of pollution (water, air, noise) and cases dealing with sustainable 
development. These environmental courts, significantly wider in scope 
than their predecessors, would not have eliminated the competence of 
civil courts on matters concerning the environment, for reasons of 
proximity to the citizen, as the former would be present only in the 
capital or in the main cities of a State. 
With regard to appellate jurisdiction, the newly formed tribunals 
would have taken on board the competences provided for in the Water, 
Air and Environment (Protection) Acts. The jurisdiction on appeals 
would also have attracted the provisions of the National Environmental 
Tribunal Act and of the National Environmental Appellate Authority, 
that would have thus been repealed, as the new tribunals would have 
                                                          
482 Law Commission of India, 186th Report on Proposal to Constitute Environment 
Courts, 2003, pp. 121-140. 
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been responsible for cases of compensation for hazardous substances or 
under the EPA.  
The innovation of these institutions would have been the membership 
of both judicial (retired High Courts judges, members of the Bar 
entitled to stand before High Courts) and environmental experts, on a 
basis of parity. The scientific experts (so called “Commissioners”) 
would have been drained from the fields of engineering and 
environmental sciences, with an experience requirement on EIA and 
protection of environment, thus guaranteeing an enhanced 
professionalism if compared with the more succinct provisions of the 
NETA and of the NEEA. 
Moreover, the procedures would have also shown an attempt at 
devising institutions that would respond to the requirements witnessed 
in the corpus of jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the locus 
standi before these courts would have been kept in line with the practice 
before High Courts and the Supreme Court in writ jurisdiction, thus 
maintaining the role of Public Interest Litigation. In addition to this, 
specific provisions on the role of amicus curiae would have been 
inserted. As for the powers, the specialised courts would have been 
endowed with competences similar to those expressed by the Supreme 
Court in its judicial activism, since the power of designing and 
monitoring environmental schemes (for instance, directions to close an 
industry or to implement a plan for environmental protection) would 
have been part of the reform package. The courts would have also had 
the powers concerning the execution of judgments, as civil courts, and 
the power to deliberate an appropriate relief, typical of writ 
jurisdiction. The proposal would nevertheless have excluded criminal 
and judicial review jurisdiction. Finally, on the special topic of judicial 
review, the Commission relied on the fact that High Courts would not 
entertain writ petitions on matters already before environmental courts, 
considering that appeal to a decision of these tribunals would be 
possible before the Supreme Court.483 
                                                          
483 Law Commission of India, 186th Report on Proposal to Constitute Environment 
Courts, 2003, pp. 141-163. 
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The 2003 study marked a watershed in the tentative design of 
environmental courts in India. As known, out of the three models of 
adjudication of environmental cases – general jurisdiction, the creation 
of green benches within tribunals and the creation of specialised 
environmental courts484 - the Law Commission explicitly endorsed the 
third option, as the Supreme Court suggested. Although India already 
experienced a functioning second system, as green benches were 
introduced by the Supreme Court and by several High Courts (such as 
the High Court of Calcutta) since 1995, the increasing amount of cases 
and the indications of the judiciary inclined also policymakers to delve 
into the study of the third model. 
Environmental institutional policies were thus at a crossroad in the 
early 2000s, but it took six more years to crystallise into a proper 
National Green Tribunal Bill, introduced in the Lok Sabha by the 
United Progressive Alliance Government on the 29th of July 2009. In the 
meanwhile, the Supreme Court continued to adjudicate upon several 
relevant cases in environmental and sustainable development 
matters,485 while the Ministry of Environment and Forests approved the 
National Environment Policy of 2006, a fundamental document aimed 
at filling the gaps in previous strategies adopted by the executive at the 
central and local levels. While the policy paper acknowledged the 
challenges faced by the country in the environmental field – 
environmental degradation, loss of environmental resource base,  
global concerns – it also pointed out the institutional failures witnessed 
in the previous periods. In spite of the lack of mentions on the judiciary, 
the National Environment Policy indeed confirmed the need for 
capacity building, with an indication to “review the present institutional 
capacities at the Central and State levels, in respect of enforcement of 
                                                          
484  See Introduction and Amirante, D., Environmental Courts in Comparative 
Perspective: Preliminary Reflections on the National Green Tribunal of India, in Pace 
Environmental Law Review, 29, 2012, pp. 441-469. 
485 See infra, Section II, paragraph b). 
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environmental laws and regulations” and to “prepare and implement suitable 
programs for enhancement of the capacities”.486 
In light of these favourable conditions for the presentation of 
innovative institutions, the Minister of Environment and Forests 
presented the National Green Tribunal Bill,487 in a form that integrated 
the suggestions of the 186th Report of the Law Commission, but that 
proved amendable for several articles in a substantial way. As it could 
be foreseen from the debate in previous years, the tribunal was to be 
established with a broad scope of action. Indeed, in recalling the 
relevant international acts, the constitutional provisions and the 
requirement of a multidisciplinary approach, the preamble of the Bill 
indicated the role of the new court as an institution designed to speed 
up the disposal of environmental cases in an effective manner, 
considering protection and conservation of natural resources as well as 
enforcement of rights and compensation for damages. The Minister of 
Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, presented the Bill before the 
Lok Sabha as a “a major historic step forward in our country”.488 Indeed, 
Ramesh linked the institution of a specialised environmental court as a 
means to fulfil the Directive Principle on the protection of the 
environment set out in Article 48A of the Constitution and as a direct 
consequence of the calls of the Supreme Court on implementing such 
tribunals. Moreover, Ramesh drew the attention to the existing backlog 
of cases in ordinary courts (5,600 environmental cases) and on the aim 
of granting “ordinary citizens of India (…) access to quick justice when it 
comes to environment and forests”.489 
The Bill drew on previous statutes for definitions while enlarging the 
extent of action of the tribunal. Section 2 of the NGT Bill included the 
definitions of environment and handling of substances of the 
Environment (Protection) Act as well as the concept of accident derived 
                                                          
486 National Environment Policy, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2006, p. 
50 (http://www.moef.gov.in/sites/default/files/introduction-nep2006e.pdf). 
487 Lok Sabha, The National Green Tribunal Bill, Bill No. 63 of 2009. 
488  Lok Sabha Debates, Discussion on the motion for consideration of the Green 
Tribunal Bill, 2009, moved by Shri Jairam Ramesh, 15th of March, 2010. 
489 Ibidem. 
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from the Public Liability Insurance Act, applied to the damages to the 
environment. The same article provided for a broad definition of 
person, conceived as individuals, companies, associations, trustees, 
local authorities or generally any other juridical person (Section 2-j). In 
addition to this, the most relevant notion in the Bill is the “substantial 
question relating to the environment” – the cornerstone of the institutional 
design of the court, as it directly affects its activation. Section 2-m of the 
NGT Bill defines the notion with the fulfilment of two main 
requirements: on the one hand, the “direct violation” of an 
environmental obligation specifically provided for in statutes, that 
affect or could affect a community, whose damage to the environment 
is “substantial” or whose damage to public health is “measurable”; on the 
other hand, the instance should encompass “environmental consequences” 
in relation to identified activities or sources of pollution. 
As suggested in the 186th Report, the jurisdiction of the tribunal over 
these “substantial questions” was set as inclusive as possible, granting 
to the National Green Tribunal the powers of a civil court as far as 
matters related to the environment are concerned (Section 14), with a 
time limit of six months from the date of the arousal of the cause of 
action. Following the provisions of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 
relief and restoration is dealt with in Section 15, comprehending both 
compensation of victims and restitution of property and of the 
environment, subject to a limit of five years from the cause of action in 
order to file an application for relief/compensation. Concerning appeal 
jurisdiction, Section 16 listed the cases where an application to the NGT 
is authorised from an order or a decision rendered by State 
Governments or appellate authorities under the Water Act, the Air Act, 
the Forest (Conservation) Act or from orders granting environmental 
clearances under the Environment (Protection) Act.  
As for locus standi, the NGT Bill opened not only to the typical subjects 
enabled to file an application (person directly affected by the injury, 
owner of a property, agents authorised), but also to organisations 
dealing with environmental matters and governmental authorities 
(Central and State Governments, Pollution Control Boards). Moreover, 
the Bill left space for procedural innovations, as the court was designed 
as a special tribunal governed by the principles of natural justice 
instead of following the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of 
1908 (Section 19), despite its withholding the powers of a civil court. In 
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addition to this, specifically drafted Rules of Procedure should be 
approved by the Central Government following the enactment of the 
NGT Bill, as stated in Section 34. As a conclusive feature, Section 28 
commanded the bar of jurisdiction to ordinary civil courts on disputes 
adjudicated by the NGT, for original and appellate jurisdiction, and 
Section 37 ordered the repeal of the NETA and of the NEAAA, with the 
consequent dissolution of the National Environment Appellate 
Authority. 
To this initial draft, several criticisms were raised. The most 
accomplished study on the National Green Tribunal Bill has been 
delivered by the NGO “The Access Initiative”,490 putting together the 
contributions of three experts and submitting the study to Indian 
partners of the NGO at the local level. The long article issued in 2009491 
raised concerns about “the narrow and limited scope of jurisdiction” and 
“the narrow scope of remedial orders”, while recalling the absence of action 
from the Ministry of Environment and Forests as for the 
operationalisation of the NET and of the NEAA. Besides the obvious 
scepticism drawn from previous administrative experiences, the Access 
Initiative pointed out several possibilities of amendments that could 
improve the newly devised institution. 
Concerning the scope of action of the court, the main criticism is 
oriented toward the definition of a “substantial question relating to 
environment”, as this leaves the judge with a broad interpretive 
competence on matters to be heard, based on subjectivity. As for the 
access to the tribunal, the Bill generally comprehends the “community at 
                                                          
490 www.accessinitiative.org. As reported in the website, The Access Initiative, 
born in 1999, is “the world’s largest network of civil society organizations 
dedicated to ensuring that local communities have the rights and abilities to 
gain access to information and to participate in decisions that affect their lives 
and their environment.”  
491 The Access Initiative-India, How Green Will Be the Green Tribunal? Comments 
and Suggestions on the National Green Tribunal Bill, 2009, Delhi, 2009 (accessed 
from 
http://www.law.pace.edu/sites/default/files/IJIEA/How_Green_will_be_the_Gr
een_Tribunal.pdf). 
  220 
large”, without specifying whether individuals or groups of individuals 
could find their locus standi before the court. Moreover, the timeframe 
set for presenting a case is deemed questionable, for the short periods492 
granted in the Bill are considered insufficient with a view to protect the 
environment.493  
Concerning the principles governing the work of the National Green 
Tribunal, the study advanced the idea of inserting a provision that 
rendered mandatory the application of the principles of sustainable 
development, polluter pays and the precautionary principle when 
deciding an order or a decision (Section 19A). Finally, regarding the 
institution itself, the work of the Access Initiative manifested the 
worries about the choice of the “technical members” of the National 
Green Tribunal, fearing the appointment of retired bureaucrats. The 
study thus proposed the addition of ecologists, environmentalists and 
NGO activists in the list of professionals that are eligible for being 
nominated experts and advanced the need for transparency in the 
procedures of the Selecting Committee. 
Following parliamentary debates and the recognition of the need for 
substantial amendments, the text was adopted on the 18th of June 2010 
as the National Tribunal Act of 2010. 494  In spite of the pertinent 
observations raised on the definition of a “substantial question related to 
environment”, the Parliament retained the same wording provided for 
in the NGT Bill in Section 2. In this sense, the debate held at the Lok 
Sabha on the 30th of April 2010 sheds light on the approach and on the 
support of the legislature to the Bill. 
A comprehensive review of the relevance of the Bill, while 
acknowledging its shortcomings, was given by Supriya Sule, a member 
                                                          
492 6 months for disputes on substantial questions related to environment; 30 
days for appeals; 5 years for compensation and relief. 
493 A contrario, see Chapter IV for an analysis of the interpretation of these 
timeframes in the jurisprudence of the NGT. Nevertheless, the Access Initiative 
paper, at page 26, correctly envisions the possibility of the court taking a liberal 
approach at this issue. 
494 Lok Sabha, The National Green Tribunal Act, Act No. 19 of 2010. 
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of Parliament from Maharashtra and a scientist herself, specialised in 
water pollution. In her allocution, Sule maintained how the NGT Bill 
would be a landmark step in upholding the reasons for the right to life 
and environmental protection, but identified several flaws in the 
features and powers of the future Tribunal with respect to the situation 
of environmental litigation before the Supreme Court. First of all, access 
to the NGT would be hindered by factors such as the creation of only 
four regional benches (while a Tribunal in each State would have been 
a more opportune solution for enhancing access to justice to the 
common citizen) and by the removal of competence of civil courts from 
environmental cases, which would dilute accessibility for rural citizens, 
forced to address their grievances only to the NGT. Then, procedurally, 
shortcomings could arise from the absence of provisions concerning the 
powers of monitoring and follow up that the Supreme Court possesses 
for “framing schemes” for environmental solutions, and also from the 
provisions on amicus curiae, a role that could have been more 
extensively treated in the Bill, in light of the relevance of the researches 
of NGOs in specific cases. Finally, jurisprudential points could also 
present as far as the definition of a “substantial question related to 
environment” is concerned (since ecology, wet lands and lakes are not 
covered, according to Sule) and insofar as the NGT Bill seems to 
address only short-term projects, while leaving aside questions of relief, 
strict liability and, more generally, “the doctrine of public trust and inter-
generational equity”.495  
This thoughtful review, apprehending both the advances and the 
possible weaknesses of the new jurisdiction, was followed by a variety 
of critiques on the environmental policy of the last years, considering 
the unsuccessful experiences of the NETA and of the NEEA due to 
governmental inaction, on the need to envision general preventive 
measures - not only policies ex post such as the constitution of a 
Tribunal,496 on the lack of anticipatory powers of the NGT and on the 
                                                          
495 Lok Sabha Debates, Further discussion on the motion for consideration of the 
National Green Tribunal Bill, 2009 moved by Shri Jairam Ramesh on the 15th March, 
2010, 30th of April 2010.  
496 Ibidem, intervention by C. Sivasamy of AIADMK (Tamil Nadu). 
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insertion of the right to a clean environment in the Bill,497 and on the 
paucity of provisions for access to justice in favour of disadvantaged 
people (such as tribal people).498 Among many interventions, Maneka 
Gandhi of the BJP mainly pointed out the insufficient guarantees on the 
appointment of expert members, whose nomination could again be a 
haven for “senior retired bureaucrats”, without “provision in this Bill for 
ecologists, environmentalists, hydrologists and anybody from civil society or 
NGOs “, and on the risks of pantouflage at the end of the term. Thus, she 
called for a “transparent process of appointment of members and Chairman”, 
while also focusing on the need for amendments on the accessibility to 
the Tribunal for individuals and social organisations and on the 
question of prospective activities on environmental damage (not only 
on “retrospective jurisdiction”), 499  in order to ensure substantive 
improvements in environmental litigation - enhancements that are not 
purportedly seen in this Bill, because of the absence of provisions on 
the independence of expert members, on the possibility to quash 
environmental clearances and on criminal liability. 
To these critiques, the Minister for Environment and Forests, Jairam 
Ramesh of the Indian National Congress, replied by enucleating the 
environmental policy attempted by the Government, built on two 
pillars: on the one hand, a National Environmental Protection 
Authority endowed with the capacities of “ensuring proper 
implementation of the laws relating to environment and forest”; on the other 
hand, a judicial pillar, embodied by the National Green Tribunal. To the 
second aspect, the Minister responded by proposing ten amendments 
to the Bill, aimed at correcting the shortcomings pointed out by the 
Members of Parliament who took the floor. Among the amendments, 
the most relevant concern: 
 the expansion of the notion of “person aggrieved” to any individual, 
in Clause 18 (2) (e); 
                                                          
497  Ibidem, intervention by Prasanta Kumar Majumdar of the Revolutionary 
Socialist Party (West Bengal). 
498 Ibidem, intervention by Bibhu Prasad Tarai of the Communist Party of India 
(Orissa). 
499 Ibidem. 
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 the insertion of foundational principles in the Bill, as Section 19 
(namely sustainable development, precautionary principle, polluter 
pays principle and intergenerational equity);500 
 the possibility to appeal the decisions of the NGT before the Supreme 
Court; 
 the number of members (between 10 and 20 judicial and expert 
members, for each category).501 
Eventually, the Bill was approved with the promised amendments, that 
testify the vivid debate in the Parliament and the responsiveness to the 
potential drawbacks in the text. Concerning the composition of the 
Tribunal, Section 4 specifies the number of members of the court: a 
Chairperson, 10 to 20 judicial members, and an equal number of expert 
members, with the possibility of inviting persons having specialised 
competences in particular cases. Qualifications for becoming a judicial 
or an expert member have nevertheless been maintained as they stood 
in the NGT Bill, with the requirement of past administrative experience, 
assuming that the wide variety of professions listed in Section 5, 
paragraph 2, was sufficiently comprehensive (namely, “pollution control, 
hazardous substance management, environment impact assessment, climate 
change management, biological diversity management and forest 
conservation”). In order to guarantee independence and to refrain from 
the phenomenon of pantouflage, the term for accepting an employment 
related to previous activities as member of the NGT has been raised 
from one to two years. 
As far as jurisdiction in concerned, the NGT Act provides for the same 
norms set in the Bill of 2009, namely: 
 Section 14 for civil cases dealing with a substantial question 
relating to environment and arising from the implementation 
                                                          
500 Eventually, the latter is not mentioned in the Act. 
501 Lok Sabha Debates, Further discussion on the motion for consideration of the 
National Green Tribunal Bill, 2009 moved by Shri Jairam Ramesh on the 15th March, 
2010, 30th of April 2010, intervention by Jairam Ramesh, Minister of 
Environment and Forests. 
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of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; 
the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977; 
the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; the Air (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) 
Act, 1986;  the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; the 
Biological Diversity Act, 2002; 
 Section 15 for relief and compensation to victims of pollution 
and other damages arising from activities under the cited Acts, 
for restitution of property and for restitution of the 
environment; 
 Section 16 for appeals against orders or decisions rendered by 
the authorities or under the procedures set forth in the 
abovementioned Acts. 
It should be noted that, in spite of the criticisms arisen with regard to 
the time frames, these latter have been maintained as in the NGT Bill.  
Procedurally, the NGT Act provides for the possibility of making rules 
on the locus standi and on the sitting of the court in circuit procedure 
(Section 4, paragraphs 3 and 4 – an amendment that allowed a broader 
access to the NGT). In Section 18, paragraph 2, the list of the applicants 
to the court has been grosso modo maintained, with the exception of the 
access of representative environmental bodies. With the new 
formulation, the people being granted access to the NGT are those 
having sustained the injury, owners of damaged properties, 
representatives of deceased persons (if death occurred), their agents, 
governmental authorities and “any aggrieved person, including any 
representative body or organisation”.  
As in the Bill, the NGT enjoys a vast jurisdiction on all civil cases, with 
the powers granted to an ordinary civil court, and has the duty to apply 
“the principle of sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the 
polluter pays principle” (Section 20), a reference to international 
principles that was asked for by the civil society and that fully places 
the new institution within the path traced from Stockholm. 
Notwithstanding the criticism purported by environmental experts 
during the parliamentary proceedings, the NGT Act constitutes a 
stepping stone in the design and in the application of environmental 
justice. Although several provisions justify a certain scepticism in light 
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of past institutional experiences – such as the role of the Government in 
implementing the Act (in particular, the establishment of the court and 
the appointment of its members) and the matter of defining a 
“substantial question” relating to the environment502 - the amendments 
to the Bill enhanced the value of the tribunal as far as access (from 
individuals to representative bodies) and compliance with international 
principles are concerned. 
Contrary to the worries on implementation, the Government of India 
established the tribunal in a very short timeframe and issued its 
regulation on the 4th of April 2011. With the National Green Tribunal 
(Practice and Procedure) Rules of 2011,503 the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests published the procedural norms governing the functioning 
of the new court. In particular, the Rules grant the key roles to the 
Chairperson and to the Registrar. The Chairperson is entrusted with a 
wide organisational power, as he/she is competent for distributing the 
cases among the benches of the NGT and for directing the sittings of 
the court (also in other places from the ordinary seat) and the decisions 
on the adoption of the circuit procedure (Section 3). According to the 
same Section, the Chairperson is empowered of the constitution of the 
benches (consisting of at least one Judicial and one Expert Member).  
Following the traditional division of tasks in tribunals, the Registrar 
holds the reins of the circulation of documents. According to Section 7, 
he/she is entrusted with the tasks of receiving applications and 
appeals, of requiring amendments when necessary, of fixing the dates 
of hearings, of disposing of questions related to the service of process 
and of calling for information.   
As for access, the Rules provide for two different types of forms, to be 
filled in according to the cases – whether involving a question related to 
the environment or an application for relief and compensation (Section 
8). While an application should set forth the grounds for its filing, two 
provisions come to the forefront for simplifying access: on the one 
                                                          
502 See the points made by Nain Gill, G., op.cit., pp. 8-11. 
503 Ministry of Environment and Forests Notification, National Green Tribunal 
(Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2011. 
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hand, for matters relating to common causes or reliefs, the NGT allows 
to join the cases and file a single application (or appeal); on the other 
hand, the fees prescribed for filing an application are not due by people 
whose income is below the poverty line (Section 12). Moreover, under 
Section 18, the NGT shall possibly hear and decide finally upon a case 
within six months from the date of the application – a measure aimed at 
reducing costs and at granting justice in a reasonable period of time. 
The only restrictive feature of the NGT is the language, as the Rules 
provide for the use of English and permit the use of Hindi, without 
specification of other languages (Section 33) – a measure that could 
hinder access to justice to people whose mother tongue is a local 
language. 
Finally, the Rules set forth the procedures for liquidation of relief, 
compensation, restitution of property and restitution of environment, 
through the establishment of an Environment Relief Fund and the 
individuation of District Collectors and “Nodal Agencies” (in the case 
of restitution of environment) responsible for the follow up of the 
judgments (Sections 36-37). 
Hence, following the enactment of the Rules, the NGT was established 
with five places of sittings: New Delhi works as the principal seat, 
while Bhopal, Pune, Kolkata and Chennai stand as the other four place 
of sitting of the tribunal. After two decades of debates concerning the 
creation of an environmental tribunal, the vision indicated by the 
Supreme Court and studied by the Law Commission of India was 
embodied in an institution rooted in the international environmental 
principles as well as in the local reality of the country, with a 
ramification into five different seats and a circuit procedure that would 
allow a broader access to environmental justice, reflecting a fair 
approach in the organisation and in the composition of the court, made 
by judicial and technical experts. This degree of innovation and of 
openness is still more appreciated to the full if the National Green 
Tribunal is compared to the experiences outside the Indian system.  
 
b) Comparative profiles of environmental courts 
As known, the idea of an environmental tribunal dedicated only to 
cases dealing with issues arising from a number of laws on 
environmental protection and on prevention of pollution springs from 
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the experiences of the legal systems of Australia and New Zealand. 
Between the three paths identified on the adjudication of 
environmental disputes – the maintenance of general jurisdictions 
dealing with all cases, including those related to the environment; the 
internal specialisation of the courts, through the creation of “green 
benches” with judges trained in the domain of environmental sciences; 
the creation of environmental courts, with a partial composition of 
scientific experts, characterised by the speed of the proceedings, the 
efficiency and the competence of the organisation – the Indian 
Parliament chose the third solution, the birth of a specialised tribunal, 
allowing experts to classify this trend with the existence of an 
“Australasian” model, more eager to develop a pragmatic institutional 
way for environmental protection.504 
Indeed, Australia, New Zealand and India are nowadays the three 
peculiar and most developed examples of environmental courts. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of the differences between the three 
experiences is worthwhile, in order to appraise the salient features of 
the National Green Tribunal with respect to the two Oceanian 
predecessors. The first environmental court to be established is the 
Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, that started its 
activities in 1980. According to the statute instituting and governing the 
tribunal,505 the Land and Environment Court is an appeals tribunal 
specialised in several classes of disputes dealing with the environment. 
As far as its composition is concerned, the New South Wales 
Environment Court is the epitome of a tribunal comprehending judicial 
and technical expertise. While judges are appointed following special 
requirements (people having been judges in inferior courts or 
advocates with an experience of at least 7 years, as prescribed in Section 
8), the peculiarity of the NSW tribunal is the introduction of 
“commissioners”, members of the court possessing relevant experience 
and knowledge in a wide spectrum of fields that include local 
government, town and environmental planning, environment sciences, 
architecture, engineering and management of natural resources (Section 
                                                          
504 Amirante, D., op.cit., pp. 446-448. 
505 New South Wales Land and Environment Court Act, Act No. 204 of 1979. 
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12). Commissioners are appointed for a period of 7 years, with the 
possibility of renewing the term. 
Concerning the jurisdiction, the NSW Court has a competence that 
encompass a series of Acts on the protection of environment that are 
classified in eight categories: environmental planning; local 
government; land tenure; civil enforcement of environmental planning 
and protection; summary enforcement of environmental planning and 
protection; appeals from convictions related to environmental offences; 
other appeals and mining matters (Sections 17-21C). Although the Act 
provides for an enlargement of the scope of action of the tribunal, since 
Section 16 broadens the jurisdiction to “ancillary matters” related to 
cases falling within the competence of the Court, the classes of cases 
clearly curtail the action of this tribunal with respect to the NGT. 
Moreover, the jurisdiction differs not only for the subjects, but also for 
the legal fields and for the place of the court in the judicial system.  
Indeed, the NSW Land and Environment Court possesses both civil 
and criminal jurisdiction and it is an appeals tribunal, while the Indian 
National Green Tribunal enjoys only civil jurisdiction and is a court 
with original and appeal competence. In the pyramid of judicial 
institutions, the NSW tribunal acts as an appeals court that adjudicates 
civil matters concerning the first four classes of cases – generally arising 
from determinations of consent authorities (as in the case of 
environmental clearances in the Indian system) and as judicial review 
of environmental administrative decisions – and criminal matters 
concerning environmental offences from the Local Court of New South 
Wales. In this respect, the NSW Land and Environment Court stands 
between tribunals endowed with original jurisdiction and the Courts of 
Appeals of the State, that consequently have in the High Court of 
Australia their apex tribunal. 
Procedurally, the NSW Court is organised with a structure that bears 
certain resemblances to the system devised by the Indian Parliament. 
Indeed, benches for civil cases are composed of both judicial and 
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technical members (Section 33) 506  and are characterised by the 
informality of the procedure.507 Section 38 of the Act also permits the 
participation of experts in the proceedings (as in the case of the NGT, 
Section 4). Moreover, space is left for conciliation and arbitration, 
through the convention of conciliation conferences presided over by the 
commissioners, to be mandatory for certain cases (development 
applications and consents), as provided for in Section 34 – a possibility 
that is precluded in the Indian system devised by the NGT Act. 
While the National Green Tribunal and the Land and Environment 
Court of New South Wales differ in certain aspects, they certainly have 
common features, apart from the most evident mixed composition of 
lawyers and technical experts. As noted by Preston, the existence of 
such tribunals and the informality of their procedure contributed to the 
enhancement of public participation and of access to justice, especially 
thanks to the role of Public Interest Litigation (that proved fundamental 
also in the Australian case). Substantially, environmental tribunals as 
the NSW Court were also a stepping stone in building a truly 
elaborated jurisprudence on sustainable development and other 
environmental principles508 – a contribution that the Indian counterpart 
will certainly bring along in the years. 
In addition to the Australian case, the inspiration for the establishment 
of the National Green Tribunal was given by the New Zealand 
Environment Court. This most recent institution was created following 
                                                          
506 While this is not the case for criminal matters, that are adjudicated by judicial 
members only. 
507 Section 38: “little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the 
requirements of this Act and of every other relevant enactment and as the proper 
consideration of the matters before the Court permit”. 
508 Preston, B., Benefits of Judicial Specialization in Environmental Law: The Land and 
Environment Court of New South Wales as a Case Study, in Pace Environmental Law 
Review, 29, 2012, p. 396; Preston, B., Operating an environment court: The 
experience of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, in Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal, 25, 2008, pp. 385-409. 
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the enactment of the Resource Management Amendment Act of 1996.509 
This tribunal came as an innovation in the judicial system of New 
Zealand and as an enhancement of the environmental protection 
devices of the country. Indeed, the cornerstone of the system is the 
Resource Management Act of 1991 (RMA), a statute that aimed at 
creating a coherent legislative ground for a comprehensive 
environmental protection of land, water and air in the exploitation of 
natural resources.510 The Act was based on the principle of devolution 
to the local level and has been frequently amended:511 indeed, the RMA 
originally provided for the creation of a Planning Tribunal, that 
evolved as a proper Court with the 1996 amendment.  
Under the consolidated version of the Act,512 the RMA provides for an 
Environment Court as a court of record that blends the competences of 
judges with the expertise of technical members. Indeed, as far as the 
composition of the tribunal is concerned, Section 248 of the RMA 
dictates the presence of Environment Judges and Environment 
Commissioners. Under Section 250, the former are nominated by the 
Governor-General (on recommendation of the Attorney General and 
consultation with the Ministers for the Environment and for Maori 
Affairs) among District Court Judges, while the latter are chosen with 
the same procedure among a variety of categories that span from local 
government experts to environment specialists. 513  The differences 
                                                          
509 Parliament of New Zealand, Resource Management Amendment Act, Act 
No. 160 of 1996. 
510 Under Section 5 of the RMA, clearly inspired to the principle of sustainable 
development, the purpose of the whole Act is the “sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources”, intended as to enable “people and communities to 
provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being and for their health and 
safety”. 
511 17 Amendment Acts can be counted from 1993 to 2013. 
512 Parliament of New Zealand, Resource Management Act, Act No. 69 of 1991 
(reprint as at 23 September 2015, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1991/0069/latest/DLM230265.html).  
513 According to Section 253, the list is the following: 
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between the two figures regard the duration of the office (congruent to 
the length of office as a District Judge for the judicial members; 5-year 
terms for expert members) and in the prominence of judicial members 
for the leading role in the Court – since as in the Indian and Australian 
cases, the RMA prescribes the presence of a judge with the functions of 
President of the Court (a “Principal Environment Judge”). Moreover, 
the Act allows the presence of special advisors for assistance to the 
Court when required – a provision that was drawn in the Indian system 
too. 
As far as jurisdiction is concerned, the Environment Court adjudicates 
on matters coming under the Resource Management Act and under 
several statutes dealing with environmental subjects,514 with the powers 
of a District Court (Section 278). In the judicial system of New Zealand, 
the Environment Court thus stands between District Courts and the 
High Court: its decisions are final (Section 295), but cases can be 
referred to the High Court from the Environment Court suo motu – for 
opinions and questions of law (Section 287) –  or by the parties, 
proposing appeal if the matter deals with questions of law (Section 
299). In fact, the competences of the Court are mainly those of an 
appeals tribunal on decisions adopted by local authorities such as 
regional and district plans or projects on public works concerning land, 
air and water, with the power to grant orders and directions to amend 
                                                                                                                               
(a) economic, commercial, and business affairs, local government, and 
community affairs: 
(b) planning, resource management, and heritage protection: 
(c) environmental science, including the physical and social sciences: 
(d) architecture, engineering, surveying, minerals technology, and building 
construction: 
(da) alternative dispute resolution processes: 
(e) matters relating to the Treaty of Waitangi and kaupapa Maori. 
514 Namely, the Forests Act of 1949; the Local Government Act of 1974; the 
Public Works Act of 1981; the Transit New Zealand Act of 1989; the Crown 
Minerals Act of 1991; the Electricity Act of 1992; the Historic Places Act of 1993; 
the Biosecurity Act of 1993; the Maori Commercial Aquaculture Claim 
Settlement Act of 2004 and the Public Transport Management Act of 2008. 
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those plans and policies (Sections 292-293). The Court also deals with 
the environmental effects of certain activities (for instance, mining) and 
with the enforcement of proceedings. As it is apparent from this list, the 
Environment Court generally settles matters of an administrative 
nature and works as an institution based on reviewing decisions of 
local policy.515  
In spite of this apparent reduced jurisdiction, the most interesting 
provisions of the RMA concern the procedure. As in the New South 
Wales Court, benches are mainly composed of two members, a Judge 
and a Commissioner, with the former presiding the sitting and having 
the casting vote in case of absence of majority (Section 265).516 Apart 
from this resemblances, the relevant feature of this tribunal lies in the 
favour for mediation and alternative dispute resolution. Several 
procedural instrument are devised to this purpose in the Act: first of all, 
the possibility of convening conferences (Section 267) entrusted to 
Judges and to parties in the dispute; then, the role of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution itself (Section 268), when agreed by the parties517 - 
positive tools for deflating the workload of the Court that are shared by 
the Oceanian tribunals but that are not provided for in the NGT Act. In 
the same way, the New Zealand Court is bound by the purpose of 
promoting “timely and cost-effective” resolution of proceedings (Section 
269) and can hold hearings where it deems appropriate, including in 
localities close to the facts of the dispute (Section 271). Although the 
proceedings may differ, it is evident how the common goal of speeding 
up the disposal of cases dealing with environmental rights found 
                                                          
515 See also the institutional presentation of the activities of the Environment 
Court (http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/environment-court/about-the-
environment-court, accessed on 16 October 2015).  
516 Different procedures are set in Section 279 (Environment Judge sitting alone) 
and Section 280 (Environment Commissioner sitting alone). 
517 Under Section 268, “for the purpose of encouraging settlement, the Environment 
Court, with the consent of the parties and of its own motion or upon request, may ask 
one of its members or another person to conduct mediation, conciliation, or other 
procedures designed to facilitate the resolution”.  
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similar solutions in the three experiences, especially for the composition 
of the courts. 
Thus, the New Zealand example too concurred to the elaboration of the 
idea of the National Green Tribunal in India. From the comparative 
analysis of the institutions – as far as their design is concerned – several 
conclusions can be drawn. First of all, they all share the coexistence of 
mixed knowledge, with lawyers, scientists and technical experts as 
members of the tribunals. Then, in the three cases the choice for a 
specialised jurisdiction is bound to the need for a quick and efficient 
resolution of disputes. Finally, the birth of these courts is linked to the 
movement for an enhanced access to justice, that has materialised in 
India with a tribunal that is less bound on procedural obstacles and 
that, in spite of its central organisation, is composed of benches present 
not only in Delhi, but also on a regional basis (with hearings to be held 
also in Bhopal, Chennai, Kolkata and Pune). 
Nonetheless, these common features should not hide the peculiarity of 
the Indian construction. Indeed, the creation of the National Green 
Tribunal shows a number of differences from the Oceanian 
counterparts. While the New South Wales and the New Zealand Courts 
are apparently more focused on administrative affairs – as they were 
conceived as tribunals dealing with cases on plans and policy decisions 
– the NGT is endowed with the broadest possible civil jurisdiction on 
environmental matters. Moreover, the Indian Court is in fact bound by 
law to base its decisions on international principles and will be 
consistently adjudicating on environmental rights, because of the 
jurisprudential heritage of the Supreme Court, that linked international 
principles with the right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution and with the environmental rights constitutionally 
protected, and because of the broad provision that allows the NGT to 
scrutinise every “substantial question related to the environment”. In a 
different context – if compared with the affluent reality of two leading 
industrialised countries such as Australia and New Zealand – the 
challenges to be faced by the National Green Tribunal are manifold, 
ranging from the procedural ways of granting a fair access to justice to 
the effective necessity of enhancing environmental protection while 
keeping in mind the requirements of economic development and social 
welfare of a rising power.  
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Chapter IV 
Access to justice: technical and procedural features of the National 
Green Tribunal 
 
 
As witnessed in the debates within the Parliament and among civil 
society,518 one of the main concerns on the institution of the National 
Green Tribunal was the dimension of access to justice. Here, this crucial 
aspect of the environmental rule of law will be analysed by looking at 
two different components: first of all, its purest characteristic - namely 
the matters of jurisdiction and locus standi - focusing on the cases that 
have devised the competence of the Tribunal according to the subject 
(jurisdiction ratione materiae), the subjects allowed to file an application 
(ratione personae) and the time limits for filing a case (ratione temporis); 
then, its innovative feature, derived from the Australian and New 
Zealand predecessors, the role of expertise in improving the quality of 
the decisions. Since the inclusion of environmental experts was 
considered as a fundamental innovation in environmental litigation 
procedures, the aspect of technical expertise will be studied as a 
method for redefining the parts of the major administrative instrument 
for environmental law, the EIA procedure,519 and as a structural and 
institutional device for delivering judgments more connected to 
scientific expertise.  
 
I) Jurisdiction and locus standi: a liberal Tribunal 
 
a) Dividing competences: the Tribunal on its own jurisdiction 
The first question on the scope of the jurisdiction of the National Green 
Tribunal regards the relation with the other domestic courts, insofar as 
the NGT Act reserved all civil cases relating to the environment to this 
newly established Tribunal. Considering the complex and hierarchical 
                                                          
518 See supra, Chapter III, Section III, paragraph a). 
519 See supra, Chapter II, Section II, paragraph d). 
  235 
system of Courts in India, the constitution of a specialised jurisdiction 
would generate a rebalance of competences among ordinary civil 
courts, High Courts, the Supreme Court and the NGT, especially on the 
interpretation of the “substantial question related to environment” and on 
the time limits for filing applications. The issues at stake pertaining to 
this field thus include: 
 the competence ratione materiae, on the “substantial question related to 
environment”; 
 the competence ratione temporis, on the possible transfer of petitions 
to the NGT and on the limits for approachability of the Tribunal; 
 the competence ratione personae, concerning both the legitimacy for 
applying by certain subjects and the role of experts (such as amici 
curiae) within the procedures of the NGT.520   
However, before analysing the operation of the Tribunal according to 
this traditional tripartite classification of jurisdiction, it is noteworthy to 
review the competences of the NGT as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court and by the environmental court itself.  
On this matter, the Supreme Court expressed its views in the case 
Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan & Ors. vs. Union of India & 
Ors., in the order dated 9th of August 2012.521 In this landmark case, on 
the relief for the victims of the tragedy of Bhopal (and especially on the 
rights available under Article 21 of the Constitution to include free and 
proper medical assistance), the apex tribunal considered the pendency 
of certain questions and the possibility of a transfer of the case to 
another more appropriate tribunal for recurring directions. Thus, the 
Tribunal transferred the petition to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 
but referred to the role of the NGT in the obiter dicta. The Supreme 
Court operated a distinction between cases: not only those arising from 
the statutes listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act after the enactment of 
                                                          
520 The question of expertise will be approached in Section III of the present 
Chapter. 
521 Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., 
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 50 of 1998, order dated 9th of August 2012. 
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the Act stand to that Tribunal, but also those pending prior to its 
establishment can be transferred at the discretion of the courts, “as it 
will be in the fitness of administration of justice”. 
Moreover, the High Court of Rajasthan further elaborated in this sense 
by issuing an order on the 1st of October 2013 in the case M/S. Laxmi 
Suiting vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.522 – arising from Writ Petition No. 
8074/2010 (and other 57 petitions) – for transferring those cases related 
to the environment to the NGT. While the respondents supported the 
view that the transfer of cases is not mandatory, according to Articles 
322A and 323B of the Constitution of India, the High Court recalled the 
genesis of the NGT Act – with the purpose of redressing the situation 
before the High Courts and the Supreme Court on the quantity of 
environmental cases and the necessity of a specialised jurisdiction for 
multidisciplinary issues – and the provisions of Section 29 of that Act, 
on the bar of jurisdiction for civil courts, and of the inclusiveness of the 
notion of “substantial question related to environment”, as “a purposive 
interpretation has to be essentially provided to the relevant provisions of the 
Act so as to facilitate the wholesome implementation of its enjoinments lest the 
same is rendered otiose.” With a view to this reflections, the High Court 
confirmed the provisions on the transfer of cases also with respect to 
writ petitions ex Article 226 of the Constitution. 
Following these judgments, the National Green Tribunal itself reflected 
on this issue and stated in the Goa Foundation case 523  that the 
competence of the environmental tribunal does not expand to issuing 
directions for enacting laws. In making explicit reference to the 
prerogatives of the Supreme and of the High Courts under Articles 32 
and 226 of the Constitution, the environmental judge curtailed its 
competences and powers: “the Tribunal doesn’t have extraordinary 
jurisdiction. It has a limited jurisdiction, restricted by the implementation of 
the Acts stated in Schedule I to the NGT Act in relation to civil cases and/or 
the appellate jurisdiction (cases) provided under law. The Tribunal is a 
creation of a statute and is bound by the provisions of the statute i.e. the NGT 
                                                          
522 M/S. Laxmi Suiting vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Writ Petition No. 8074/2010 
and others, order dated 1st of October 2013. 
523 M.A. No. 49 of 2013 in O.A. No. 26 of 2012, dated 18th of July 2013. 
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Act, 2010.”524 This is an established view that has been confirmed in the 
Wilfred case, where the Tribunal sustained the interpretation given to 
the NGT Act on the overriding effect of the founding legislation.525 
However, the judges have also extended the category of powers of the 
Tribunal to judicial review, namely the power of examination of 
statutes or administrative acts in order to determine their validity 
according to a written constitution, as a supplement to the work of the 
Supreme Court and of the High Courts. The Tribunal hence affirmed 
that “the framers of the law intended to give a very wide and unrestricted 
jurisdiction to the Tribunal in the matters of environment. Be it original, 
appellate or special jurisdiction, the dimensions and areas of exercise of 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal are very wide. (…) There is no indication in the 
entire NGT Act that the legislature intended to divest the Tribunal of the 
power of judicial review”.526 What arises from the interpretation of the 
Tribunal is the assertion of a special jurisdiction related to 
environmental case, but also of implied powers that can extend by 
virtue of its role of administrator of justice and owing to the provisions 
contained in Section 19 of the NGT Act, affirming the prerogatives of 
the Tribunal to regulate its own procedure and to be guided by the 
principle of natural justice.527 
The speciality of the Tribunal was indeed the ratio followed by the 
legislature, after fifteen years of considerations on the different options 
for fostering a more efficient and fast environmental litigation system. 
This feature has also been highlighted by the NGT itself: in Braj 
Foundation vs. Union of India,528 on a case concerning the validity of a 
                                                          
524 Ibidem, paragraph 40. 
525 M.A. No. 182 of 2014 and M.A. No. 239 of 2014 in Appeal No. 14 of 2014 and 
M.A. No. 277 of 2014 in O.A. No. 74 of 2014 and O.A. No. 74 of 2014, dated 17th 
of July 2014, paragraph 30: “another very important provision is Section 33 which 
gives over-riding effect to the provisions of the NGT Act. The provisions of the NGT 
Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law 
for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other 
than the NGT Act.” 
526 Ibidem, paragraph 32. 
527 Ibidem, paragraph 44. 
528 O.A. No. 278 of 2013 and M.A. No. 110 of 2014, dated 5th of August 2014. 
  238 
Memorandum of Understanding for forest management, the Tribunal 
has confirmed its particular nature, as it has been founded as an 
implementing domestic institution with regard to the international 
principles related to the environment (starting from the UN Conference 
of 1972), ex Article 253 of the Constitution.529 In the words of the judges, 
the NGT “is a constitutional creature with a specific purpose on the basis of 
certain principles like sustainable development, precautionary principle, and 
polluter pay principle. The NGT which proceeds to adjudicate the disputes 
which involve substantial questions relating to environment, consists of 
Expert Members from various fields connected with environment apart from 
Judicial Members selected by a committee constituted as per the Act (…). 
Therefore there is no iota of doubt in our mind that this Tribunal has inherent 
power of not only enforcing its orders but also treating with any person who 
either disobeys or violates its orders,”530 on the basis of Section 26 of the 
Act. By asserting its speciality for  its origin, competences and powers, 
the judges have thus claimed their own niche in the judicial system and 
have guaranteed that the spirit of the NGT Act - in contrast with 
previous attempts at setting environmental judicial institutions - would 
not be embodied by a court deprived of prerogatives. 
Moreover, this principle of speciality has been grounded also for 
granting effective remedies in longstanding issues. Concerning the 
principle of res judicata, that should bar proceedings before the National 
Green Tribunal if a matter had been previously adjudicated by another 
court, the environmental judges advanced the application of the 
“constructive rule of res judicata”, considering that the nature of 
environmental litigation is not only adversarial, but also and chiefly 
inquisitive, thus allowing a review of a situation in cases where public 
interests are affected by continuous or recurrent environmental 
                                                          
529  Article 253 of the Constitution of India, Legislation for giving effect to 
international agreements: “Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of 
this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the 
territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other 
country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association 
or other body.” 
530 O.A. No. 278 of 2013 and M.A. No. 110 of 2014, paragraph 24. 
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problems. This was the case of Janardan Pharande vs. MoEF,531 on water 
pollution in the river Nira in Maharashtra: in spite of Writ Petitions 
already disposed, the Tribunal applied the constructive rule of res 
judicata (following the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court) 532  and 
allowed the application due to the existence of recurring problems of 
air and water pollution.533  
In this framework, the provisions of the NGT Act are naturally helpful 
in constructing the modalities of access to justice in environmental 
matters. As known, Chapter III of the Act, on the question of 
jurisdiction, presents several options for approaching the Tribunal: 
direct access for matters related to the environment under Section 14, 
appeals against decisions taken by administrative bodies under the 
Acts governing the management of water, air, forests and the 
environment under Section 16, and then the possible recourse to the 
Supreme Court for appealing the decisions of the NGT.534 The relevant 
point in defining the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is the distinction 
between original jurisdiction and appeals, as difficulties arise in posing 
                                                          
531 O.A. No. 7(THC) of 2014 (WZ), dated 16th of May 2014. 
532 Ibidem, paragraph 29: “in "V. Purushotham Rao Vrs. Union of India and Ors." 
(2001) 10 S.C.C. 305 the issue of constructive "res judicata" came up for consideration. 
(…) The Court further noted that even in the self same proceedings, the earlier order 
though final, was treated not to create a bar, inasmuch as the controversy before the 
Court was of grave public interest. After so saying this is what the Court observed. 
"In our considered opinion, therefore, the principle of constructive "res-judicata" 
cannot be made applicable in each and every public interest litigation, irrespective of the 
nature of litigation itself and its impact on the society and larger public interest which 
is being served. There cannot be any dispute that in competing rights between the 
public interest and individual interest, the public interest would override.” 
533 Ibidem, paragraph 32: “the subsequent unabated problem of Water Pollution or Air 
Pollution cannot be brushed aside on the ground that the earlier proceedings have been 
terminated by the Court on the basis of certain statement made by the Industry or that 
certain compliances which were found to be in order. (…) the cause of action may be 
continuing or may be recurring in such a case. Considering these aspects, we deem it 
proper to hold that the present Application is maintainable. There is no bar of "res- 
judicata" in dealing with the Application on merits.”  
534 See supra, Chapter III. 
  240 
clear lines of division: a question related to the environment could 
concern an appeal under Section 16 and an appeal proposed under 
Section 16, viceversa, could entail broader environmental matters than a 
simple need of revising a decision of an administrative body. Thus, 
there are critical points concerning the distinction of modalities for 
access to environmental justice: on the one hand, Section 14 is broader 
in scope, as it sets basic requirements ratione materiae (the “substantial 
question related to environment”) and leaves open as far as the 
entitlements ratione personae are concerned; on the other hand, Section 
16 is focused on the competence ratione personae, through the concept of 
“aggrieved person”, while setting strict legislative limits on the 
mechanism for appeals, arising only from decisions of administrative 
bodies. 
The pertinence of this reading of potential conundrum is demonstrated 
by a case adjudicated by the National Green Tribunal in its early stages: 
in Mayur Karsanbhai Parmar vs. Union of India & Ors.,535 the Tribunal was 
confronted to an application, filed under Section 14 read with Section 
18 of the NGT Act, whose cause of action was the potential damage to 
the environment created by the construction of a port and a thermal 
power plant in Gujarat, pending the grant of the environmental 
clearance by the competent authority. Considering the relevant facts 
presented before the bench of judges and the statutory provisions 
governing jurisdiction, the Tribunal dismissed the application on 
several grounds. First of all, the case could not have been filed as an 
appeal, since, under Section 16 of the NGT Act, appellants can present a 
case only when authorities (here, the MoEF) have already issued an 
order granting environmental clearance for a project. Then, under 
Section 14 read with Section 2(m), the jurisdiction of the Tribunal can be 
invoked only if “the matter in controversy is not under consideration of any 
Competent Authority and/or by afflux of time a project is likely to cause harm 
to the environment.”536 Thus, the environmental court made a distinction 
between the two modalities of access and ensured the possibility of 
resorting to the NGT only when damages to the environment are 
                                                          
535 O.A. No. 28 of 2011 and O.A. No. 9 of 2012, dated 20th of April 2012. 
536 Ibidem, paragraph 23. 
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present and proved before the grant of an environmental clearance. In 
Mayur Karsanbhai Parmar, as the applicants contested only part of the 
procedure (the conduct of public hearings), without showing actual 
harm to the environment, the Tribunal rejected their claims for the 
projects were still under consideration, pending the grant of the 
environmental clearance. 
The case Mayur Karsanbhai Parmar thus shows how the issues to be 
analysed are partly interrelated: since the Tribunal, as for its mandate, 
should be able to assert jurisdiction on civil environmental questions, 
but should also constitute an effective remedy against administrative 
decisions detrimental to the environment, a study of the competence 
according to the cases treated should comprehensively account for both 
classes of disputes. However, in order to guarantee a comprehensive 
reading of the working of the Tribunal, a traditional separation 
between competences has been made, while considering original 
applications and appeals through the paragraphs of this study. As the 
main issue arising from the Act - and the cornerstone of the entire 
construction of the NGT - is the definition of the “substantial question 
related to environment”, the jurisdiction ratione materiae will be the 
starting point for delving into the elaboration of the Tribunal on its own 
competences. The matter aforementioned is indeed crucial for 
understanding the maintainability of applications before the National 
Green Tribunal. Several decisions, since the early working of the 
Tribunal, incline in favour of the widest possible interpretation of the 
NGT Act, in order to assert a specialised jurisdiction that could 
effectively and rapidly dispose of civil cases related to environmental 
issues. 
The cases adjudicated by the Tribunal in its first years of activity show 
a concern for a systemic view of its jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
jurisprudence of the National Green Tribunal attests not only an 
investigative approach, due to the presence of expert members,537 but 
also a systemic view on how the legal instruments available to the 
applicant for the safeguard of the environment can be read in the whole 
framework, thanks to the awareness of the judicial members toward the 
                                                          
537 See infra, Section II, paragraph b). 
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existence of other judicial institutions, starting from the Supreme Court. 
In the National Green Tribunal Bar Association case, 538  on mining 
activities of minerals and sand in rivers, the Tribunal seised the 
opportunity of a miscellaneous application filed by the State of Madhya 
Pradesh to read the directions and the principles enshrined by the 
Supreme Court in Deepak Kumar & Others vs. State of Haryana539 with the 
legislation enacted to protect the environment in mineral quarrying 
activities. Upon the contention that “large scale illegal and impermissible 
mining activity (…) on the bank of Yamuna, Ganga, Chambal, Gaumti and 
Revati” was taking place, the State of Madhya Pradesh created its own 
institution for dealing with those issues, but this action was questioned. 
On this topic, the NGT enlarged its view to the whole construction 
beneath the environmental provisions in force in India: as the 
Environment (Protection) Act of 1986 “enabled co-ordination of activities of 
the various regulatory agencies, creation of an authority or authorities with 
adequate powers for environmental protection, regulation of discharge of 
environmental pollutants and handling of hazardous substances” 540  along 
with the implementation of controls and prevention of environmental 
pollution sanctioned in the Notification of 2006, the law of 1957 on 
minor minerals left space for activities with less restraint, provided that 
this activity was carried on in separate small areas. However, the 
Supreme Court having forbidden this enterprise for it rendered void 
the ratio of environmental protection behind the Environment 
(Protection) Act, the matter of implementation of the direction of the 
apex tribunal remained to be solved.  
Concerning the legal system related to the environment, while the State 
of Madhya Pradesh reacted by instituting its own implementing body, 
the NGT endeavoured to come across a solution within the 
constitutional ambit. As the Supreme Court had already adjudicated 
the same case, the NGT followed the path traced by the apex tribunal 
                                                          
538 M.A. Nos. 685 and 708 of 2013 in O.A. No. 171 of 2013, dated 28th of 
November 2013. 
539 Deepak Kumar & Others vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 629, dated 27th of 
February 2012. 
540 M.A. Nos. 685 and 708 of 2013 in O.A. No. 171 of 2013, paragraph 10. 
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and shielded the panoply of laws enacted at the federal level from 
possible intrusion by State Governments. Indeed, considering that the 
Acts of 1957 and of 1986 had been approved by the central level, and 
that only a strict edge is left to the States in matters concerning the 
environment and mining activities, the Tribunal rejected the approach 
of Madhya Pradesh that sustained the possibility of granting 
environmental clearances by local bodies such as a District Level 
Committee541, provided that such regulation would “wipe out the impact, 
effect and procedure prescribed under the Central law”. 
Hence, the Tribunal entered into the definition of administrative 
proceedings in a pervasive manner, directing central and local bodies to 
refer to and implement the legislation in force also with regard to their 
relationships. This pervasiveness of the judges is finally corroborated 
by the recent tendency of the Tribunal to start proceedings proprio motu, 
on its own motion. Although the Tribunal had initially refrained from 
exercising such powers, 542  the judges have enlarged their scope of 
action to adjudicate cases dealt with by the media in absence of the 
presentation of an application or of an appeal. The first case to be 
decided through this procedural device has been the matter of the 
vehicular traffic at Rohtang Pass, the “Crown Jewel” of Himachal 
Pradesh.543 Concerned about the devastating impact of mass tourism in 
the area, the Tribunal declared its jurisdiction from this “indisputable” 
fact 544  and issued comprehensive directions on pollution and 
                                                          
541 Ibidem, paragraph 24: “the State Government would not be competent to alter or 
completely give a go-by to the said statutory procedure and methodology and assume to 
itself any authority appointed by it to grant environmental clearance. The 
environmental clearance has to be granted by the authority specified under the Central 
law.” 
542  Appeal No. 18 of 2011, dated 20th of January 2012, paragraph 9: “it is 
mentionable that we are not conferred with suo moto powers to proceed with the case.” 
543 O.A. No. 237 (THC) of 2013 (CWPIL No.15 of 2010), dated 6th of February 
2014. 
544 Ibidem, paragraph 20: “it is indisputable that the glacier of Rohtang Pass is facing 
serious pollution issues and with the passage of time, is being degraded 
environmentally, ecologically and aesthetically. The time has come when not only the 
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afforestation, with regard to the constitutional provisions related to the 
environment and to the Environment (Protection) Act.545   
This proactive and intrusive approach - deprived of explanation on the 
legal methodology for attracting jurisdiction - was further repeated in 
several instances. In the case of the dolomite mining in Kanha National 
Park, threatening the tiger reserve located in the natural park,546 the 
Tribunal took again suo motu cognisance of an environmental issue 
from a news published in the ‘Times of India’ dated 10th of April 2013. 
The judges asserted jurisdiction in spite of the fact that the Wildlife 
(Protection) Act is not listed under Schedule I of the NGT Act - as the 
competence of the Tribunal was attracted by the Environment 
(Protection) Act of 1986 because of the comprehensive notion of 
environment, that includes wildlife. 547  Without analysing the 
appropriateness of the attraction of jurisdiction proprio motu, the 
environmental court directed the convention of a meeting among the 
concerned authorities with a view to settle issues of environmental 
clearance for mining activities undertaken in the proximity of the forest 
corridors for tigers and of streamline of administrative proceedings on 
the operation of mines.548 
                                                                                                                               
State Government, the authorities concerned but even the citizens must realize their 
responsibility towards restoring the degraded environment of one of the most beautiful 
zones of the country as well as preventing further damage.” 
545 Ibidem, paragraph 38: “This Tribunal must issue directions which would be in 
consonance with the Constitutional mandate contained under Articles 21, 48-A and 
51-A(g) and are the very essence of the Act of 1986. The State Government has neither 
formulated nor issued any specific guidelines - statutory or otherwise - on prevention 
and control of environmental degradation and damage in relation to the glacier of 
Rohtang Pass valley. “ 
546 O.A. No. 16 of 2013, dated 4th of April 2014. 
547 Ibidem, paragraph 22: “we are of the opinion that occurrence of Wildlife in a 
particular ecosystem having relation with the environment has to be considered as a 
part of environment and therefore the matters related to wildlife are liable for 
adjudication.” 
548 Ibidem, paragraph 34. 
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The usage of this expansionist, self-established prerogative was again 
activated in the issue of the contamination of groundwater in Delhi, 
finally disposed on the 10th of December 2015.549 Seising the occasion of 
a detailed article published in the “Hindustan Times” on the lack of 
supply of proper potable drinking water in several areas in Delhi, the 
NGT issued notice to the competent authorities for filing reports on the 
matter. Again, regardless of preliminary remarks on the jurisdiction, 
the Tribunal ordered, in its short judgment, to constitute a committee 
(composed of the representatives of the competent authorities, at the 
national and local level) empowered to submit a report on groundwater 
contamination, to direct the closure of water pumps extracting 
contaminated liquids and to provide information on the quality and 
quantity of water.550 
The development concerning proprio motu jurisdiction, although 
relevant for the protection of the environment, raises questions on the 
width of the powers of the NGT. If, initially, the environmental court 
restricted its ambits within the statutory competences, the three 
judgments aforementioned constitute an innovation deprived of solid 
legislative ground. From the start, the Tribunal has been conscious of 
its limits with regard to the other courts, as it considered that High 
Courts and the Supreme Court are endowed with the power of 
adjudicating matters related to fundamental rights ex Articles 32 and 
226 of the Constitution.  
However, the most recent interventions by means of suo motu 
applications have challenged such judicial equilibrium, through an 
activism that is not justified in the provisions of the NGT Act. With a 
view to these issues, the definition of “substantial question related to 
environment”, limited by the statutory restraint of the list of Acts 
contained in Schedule I, comes to the forefront in the present analysis 
for assessing the construction of the competence of the Tribunal ratione 
materiae.      
                                                          
549 O.A. No. 253 of 2015, dated 10th of December 2015. 
550 Ibidem, paragraph 8. 
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b) The jurisdiction ratione materiae: how to define environmental 
questions 
Notwithstanding the recent and controversial evolutions in the 
affirmation of an expanded jurisdiction, it is necessary to resort to the 
chronological unfolding of the court’s arguments in appraising its own 
competence with regard to the notion of environment.  
The very first cases adjudicated by the National Green Tribunal show 
how the newly created institution attempted to resort to the basic 
doctrine underlying the foundational Act, namely the protection of the 
environment through specific Acts and through international 
environmental legal principles, while keeping separated questions of 
possible concurrent to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and 
instances pertaining to private law that could have been incidentally 
considered within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. For the first case, in 
Application No. 26 of 2011,551 on the Ganga River pollution case, the 
longstanding issue of the pollution of the historical river was also dealt 
by the NGT by virtue of his powers on environmental litigation. Here, 
the applicants sought directions for a new environmental study (to 
follow the report of the Indian Institute of Technology) that would 
include activists, religious leaders and people in the hills affected by the 
construction of the hydropower dam. Indeed, after the order of the 
Supreme Court in the T.N. Godavarnam case, 552  the Union of India 
requested IIT to conduct a study on the cumulative impact of the dam. 
Consequently, the applicants alleged that the study was flawed by 
mistakes and conducted individually, while the respondents (Ministry 
of Environment and Forests and IIT) showed that the study was based 
on scientific parameters and written by a group of experts. Finally, the 
NGT dismissed the application, acknowledging the contentions of the 
respondents, also because a similar grievance had been presented 
before the Supreme Court, that rejected the claim. 
                                                          
551 Application No. 26 of 2011, dated 17th of July 2012. 
552  T.N. Godavarnam, Thirumulpad vs. Union of India & Ors., in Writ Petition 
(Civil) No. 202/1995, order dated 27th April 2007. 
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Moreover, the Tribunal considered possible parallelisms with actions 
brought before ordinary civil courts. In this regard, the Tribunal dealt 
with, and dismissed, Application No. 24 of 2012. 553  The NGT 
maintained its jurisdictional limits with regard to both civil action on 
damages and compensation and environmental clearance for a 
construction project in Karnal, Haryana. Indeed, in a matter concerning 
action on compensation regarding land acquisition, the Tribunal 
acknowledged the existence of a civil suit pending in Haryana, with an 
order dated 30th of May 2012, arising from the Land Acquisition Act 
(and not from one of the Acts listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act). As 
for environmental clearance, the NGT reconstructed the proceedings 
and the case: in fact, the applicant sought a relief under the 
Environment (Protection) Act, while it should have worked out legal 
remedies concerning the transfer of lands. 
From the two cases that testify the initial working of the Tribunal, it can 
be considered that a series of questions arose with regard to the 
competences on the subjects to be considered within the spectrum of 
environmental activities, especially if one looks at the broad 
construction of Section 14(1) of the Act.  
In this sense, the already cited Goa Foundation vs. Union of India & Ors.554 
was a landmark case in assessing the notion of “substantial question 
related to environment”. The Tribunal, faced to an application filed by a 
non-governmental organisation dealing with environmental protection 
and biodiversity, had to decide whether to have competence over a 
general question concerning the possibility of the competent 
institutions of granting environmental clearances in the area of the 
Western Ghats, one of the main biodiversity hotspots in India, and on 
the inaction on part of public institution concerning the safeguard of 
the region. If the respondents (MoEF, local Pollution Control Boards) 
affirmed that the application as such constituted an abuse of the 
process of the Tribunal, since it did not involve any dispute under the 
Acts listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act, the bench of judges addressed 
                                                          
553 Application No. 24 of 2012, dated 13th of July 2012. 
554 M.A. No. 49 of 2013 in O.A. No. 26 of 2012, dated 18th of July 2013. 
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the matter through a complete reading of the whole NGT Act in a 
purposive manner. 
Indeed, the Tribunal started by considering the Preamble of the Act - 
and not only the relevant provisions on jurisdiction, namely Sections 14 
to 18 - with a view to appreciate the width of jurisdiction conceived by 
the legislator. Since the Preamble posed the issues related to 
environmental protection and conservation as a pillar of the specialised 
court and further enlarged this provision as to include “matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto”, Sections 14 to 18 are to be 
interpreted keeping in mind the objectives expressed in the Preamble: 
the two conditions set in Section 14, the existence of a civil case and the 
requirement of a case being substantially related to the environment are 
to be read liberally. Thus, on the first feature, the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal on civil cases should be understood in an extensive way, so as 
to collect all civil cases, in opposition to criminal cases, that are not 
under the provisions of the NGT Act. 555  On the second point, the 
relation to the environment, the judges referred to Section 2(m) of the 
NGT Act by acknowledging its non-exhaustive character and by 
enucleating the essence of the competence ratione materiae of the 
Tribunal. 
The classification under Section 2(m) is conceived as to set several 
categories of substantial causes of attraction of the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal: 
 a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation 
producing serious environmental consequences; 
 a substantial damage to environment and property; 
 a measurable damage to health; 
                                                          
555 Ibidem, paragraph 20: “the expression ‘civil cases’ used under Section 14(1) of the 
NGT Act has to be understood in contradistinction to ‘criminal cases’. This expression 
has to be construed liberally as a variety of cases of civil nature could arise which would 
be raising a substantial question of environment and thus would be triable by the 
Tribunal.” 
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 environmental consequences arising from specific activities or 
sources of pollution. 
These categories are thus connected with the specific doctrine of the 
cause of action under the NGT Act and under Rule 14 of the National 
Green Tribunal (Practices and Procedure) Rules of 2011. According to 
the Rules, only one single cause of action is necessary for the attraction 
of the competence of the Tribunal, while the reliefs sought in the 
application/appeal can be one or more, provided that the plurality of 
reliefs are consequential. On this specific issue, the NGT relied on the 
precedents of the Supreme Court (especially Liverpool and London S.P. 
and I Asson. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I and Anr. of 2004)556 and guaranteed 
the maintainability of applications provided that the “claim discloses 
some cause of action or raises some question to be decided by a judge”, 
regardless of the weakness of the case or of its likelihood to succeed. 
Thus, logically, the Tribunal aptly associated the question related to 
environment, considered to be substantial according to the four 
categories aforementioned, to the existence of a dispute, as the 
respondents in the case denied the existence of contentions with Goa 
Foundation. In fact, the correlation between Section 14(1) and 14(2) is 
evident insofar as the court could not rule over a question, but on a 
dispute arising over such environmental issue. On this, the Tribunal 
departed from the traditional view of adversarial litigation and asserted 
its speciality as a socio-centric jurisdiction: since the competence is 
related to cases concerning a wide scope of issues described in the 
Preamble of the NGT Act, that do not necessarily involve 
confrontational litigation, the Tribunal set the machinery for a 
competence ratione materiae that include single situations, and not only 
pure enforcement of personal rights. 
                                                          
556 Liverpool and London S.P. and I Asson. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I and Anr., (2004) 
9 SCC 512, paragraph 140: “a cause of action is a bundle of acts which are required to 
be pleaded and proved for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the suit. For the 
aforementioned purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the 
evidence.” 
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As a conclusion, the National Green Tribunal asserted its jurisdiction 
on substantial questions related to the environment, following the 
reasoning exposed above, to be described as ex post facts, but it recalled 
its prerogatives in light of the principles of sustainable development, 
precaution and polluter pays, under Section 20, to include a fifth cause 
of action, “an anticipated or likely injury to environment”, in the list of 
causes attracting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.557      
With this authoritative precedent settled, the Tribunal pursued its in-
depth examination of this issue, with a view to enlarge its jurisdiction 
in a liberal manner while, in parallel, keeping in mind the different 
possibilities for access to other courts (chiefly, the Supreme Court). In 
Kehar Singh vs. State of Haryana,558 the applicant filed a petition under 
Sections 14, 15(b) and (c) read with Sections 18(1) and (2) of the NGT 
Act for challenging the validity of an environmental clearance for a 
sewage treatment plant. On this, referring to the Goa Foundation case,559 
the Tribunal plainly considered that the construction of a sewage 
treatment plant entailed its jurisdiction, as it resulted “in pollution of 
underground water besides causing emission of obnoxious gases and creating 
public nuisance” near residential and religious places. 
Moreover, the Tribunal again displayed the notion of “substantial 
question” with reference to the “cause of action” - namely, “the factual 
situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court 
remedy" - leading to the application. Indeed, according to the NGT, the 
cause of action “must have a nexus to such dispute which relates to the issue 
of environment/substantial question relating to environment”. In the 
                                                          
557  M.A. No. 49 of 2013 in O.A. No. 26 of 2012, dated 18th of July 2013, 
paragraph 42: “the applicability of precautionary principle is a statutory command to 
the Tribunal while deciding or settling disputes arising out of substantial questions 
relating to environment. Thus, any violation or even an apprehended violation of this 
principle would be actionable by any person before the Tribunal. Inaction in the facts 
and circumstances of a given case could itself be a violation of the precautionary 
principle, and therefore, bring it within the ambit of jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as 
defined under the NGT Act.” 
558 Application No. 124 of 2013, dated 12th of September 2013. 
559 M.A. No. 49 of 2013 in O.A. No. 26 of 2012, dated 18th of July 2013. 
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distinction between a stricter interpretation of the cause of action as 
“circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion 
for the action” and a wider understanding as the mere conditions for 
establishing the maintainability of an application, the Tribunal 
identified three elements required for a case to fall within its 
jurisdiction: the “relevancy to the dispute sought to be raised, right to raise 
such dispute and the jurisdiction of the forum before which such dispute is 
sought to be raised”. In proper terms, the dispute should be related to a 
civil case, regarding the “substantial question” on the environment, 
arising from the Acts listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act. 
On the matter of definition of access to the NGT according to the 
statutes listed in Schedule I, as well as on the legitimacy of the 
presentation of cases by non-governmental organisations,560 one of the 
leading decisions is “Kalpavriskha” & Ors. vs. Union of India. As the 
Tribunal itself recognised, Kalpavrishka is a “reputed environmental non 
profit organisation working since 1979”, with a record on advice for 
environmental governance, as the other two applicants, “Goa 
Foundation” and the individual Manoj Mishra, a civil society leader in 
organising rallies for environmental protection (i.e. on the protection of 
the river Yamuna).561  
Provided that an applicant should approach the NGT according to the 
ambits set in the NGT Act, the question of the maintainability of the 
application is here manifest, as the applicants request the Tribunal to 
adjudicate upon statutory and secondary legislation, an activity that the 
NGT may pursue only as judicial review, not under Section 14 of the 
NGT Act, since there is no evidence of a substantial question related to 
environment. 
Considering the power of judicial review, the Tribunal held in this case 
(as well as in Application No. 74 of 2014)562 that the NGT has a limited 
power of judicial review, as it shall not supplant higher courts in this 
                                                          
560 See also infra, paragraph c). 
561 Application No. 116 (THC) of 2013, dated 17th of July 2014. See infra, Section 
II, for a detailed analysis of the case. 
562 Application No. 74 of 2014, dated 17th of July 2014. 
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task. Thus, the NGT possesses this power - concerning validity, vires, 
legality and reasonableness - only for rules made in relation to the Acts 
listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act. 
Having settled the preliminary matter of maintainability, on the 
substantial question related to environment arising from the 
Notification of 2006, the Tribunal rephrased the question of Appendix 
VI in light with some amendments made in 2007, and enucleated the 
matter of the appointment of public administrators in EACs. For this 
issue, the Tribunal noted the necessity of the appointment of people 
with relevant experience, congruent to this specialised job, “rather than 
persons with experience of general administration or management, whose 
contribution to such process would be negligible”, and stated that the MoEF 
shall nominate people with experience related to environmental affairs, 
as this is the spirit of the legislation. 
Taking into account the existence of an environmental question, the 
Tribunal referred to the Goa Foundation case to explain the scope of 
Section 14 of the NGT Act, “construed in a liberal manner”. Thus, the 
construction of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is to be linked to the 
existence of fundamental rights arising from Article 21 of the 
Constitution, starting from the right to a clean environment, that can be 
claimed by anybody: “once a case has nexus with the environment or the 
laws relatable thereto, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal can be invoked”. It is a 
jurisdiction, thus, established according to three ingredients: civil cases; 
questions related to the environment, or to the enforcement of an 
environmental right; implementation of the Acts in Schedule I. 
In interpreting these ingredients, set in the Kehar Singh judgment, in the 
Kalpavrishka case the NGT puts to the forefront the third, namely the 
implementation of the Acts listed in Schedule I of the instituting statute. 
Indeed, the will of the legislature was to classify civil cases according to 
certain categories, reserving certain disputes to the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal as far as implementation is concerned. Drawing this 
interpretation from the enunciation of Original Application No. 12 of 
2014,563 the NGT confirmed the view that its jurisdiction is confined to 
                                                          
563 O.A. No. 12 of 2014, dated 17th of July 2014. 
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those disputes arising from the implementation of “the various 
provisions, rules, regulations and the notifications issued in exercise of 
subordinate or delegated legislation with regard to any or all of the Acts stated 
in Schedule I of the NGT Act”, even with an indirect nexus. 
As a conclusion, the question of the appointment of experts in 
committees was considered to fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, albeit with an indirect nexus, as it is linked with 
environmental clearances, “the ethos of environmental jurisprudence 
particularly with reference to the Scheduled Acts”. Further to this 
interpretation, the question is to be considered - for its impact on the 
environment and the legal rights underlying the project and the interest 
of the public - within the scope of Section 14 of the NGT Act, as it arises 
from delegate legislation in implementation of the Environment 
(Protection) Act. 
However, the Tribunal reached a different conclusion the very same 
day with reference to O.A. No 12 of 2014, M.C. Mehta vs. Union of 
India,564 in the litigation arising from the order of the Supreme Court of 
1991 concerning compulsory environmental education and 
dissemination of environmental information and awareness through 
mass media. While the NGT refrained from adjudicating the matter - as 
it maintained that orders of the Supreme Court should be challenged 
before the apex court - it repeated that under Section 14, the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal is activated on civil cases posing questions related to a 
substantial question related to environment arising from the 
implementation of the Acts scheduled in the NGT Act. Considering the 
three requirements, the bench of judges affirmed that “the expression 
‘implementation’ understood in its correct perspective cannot be extended, so 
as to empower the Tribunal to issue directions in relation to service matters 
involving environmental sciences”. The Tribunal differentiated between 
the terms “implementation”, related to the application of provisions 
included in the Acts of Schedule I, and “execution”. Thus, it stated that 
the matter of environmental education did not fall within its 
jurisdiction, as it pertains to the domain of the Supreme Court and it is 
not a substantial question under Section 14. 
                                                          
564 Ibidem. 
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If oblique questions such as environmental education do not fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the judges have, however, 
demonstrated a liberal construction of the scope of action of the 
Tribunal with regard to the environmental domain. A case adjudicated 
in 2014, Amit Maru vs. MoEF & Ors., 565  is clear in exposing the 
challenges faced by the NGT in interpreting the provisions related to its 
jurisdiction for both competences ratione materiae and ratione personae. 
The miscellaneous application filed by the project proponent (a 
company dealing with constructions) posed a series of critical points to 
the Tribunal insofar as its jurisdiction is concerned under various 
angles: first of all, the parallel filing of an application before the NGT 
and of a writ petition before the High Court; then, the absence of a 
cause of action to trigger the competence of the Tribunal for 
environmental matters and for time limits;566 finally, the insufficient 
requirements of the applicant as an aggrieved person. 
The NGT responded to these positions by confirming its extensive 
reading of the provisions of the NGT Act and its previous decisions in 
matters related to jurisdiction. On the competence under Section 14, the 
Tribunal established the principle of a jurisdiction prima facie in 
environmental matters according to the material available on record. 
Indeed, the judges holistically considered the concept of environment, 
without making a clear distinction between classical cases related to 
personal, property, individual or collective disputes: the Tribunal 
linked the requirements of locus standi by reason of both subject-matter 
and applicants.567 Provided that there is a cause of action that is linked 
to environmental damages, the person applying to the Tribunal should 
                                                          
565 M.A. No. 65 of 2014 in O.A. No. 13 of 2014, dated 1st of October 2014. 
566 The issue of time limits will be dealt with in paragraph d). 
567 Ibidem, paragraph 11: “Any person may raise environmental dispute irrespective 
of his being personally affected due to the act of wrongdoer/polluter or violator of 
environmental Law/Norms. The only barrier is that such a person shall not file the 
Application with malafide intention. Secondly, he shall not be totally alien. In other 
words, if it is demonstrated that the Applicant is a person interested in protection of 
environment, or at least restitution of environment, then prima facie, he has locus 
standi to maintain the Application.” 
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thus show two major qualifications: he/she should act bona fide and 
should demonstrate to be involved in environmental protection. Thus, 
the Tribunal rejected a restrictive approach even for the concept of 
“aggrieved person”, typical of appeals: insomuch as the applicant “is 
interested in protection, restitution or otherwise securing maintenance of 
environment” and such interest is related to environmental rights under 
Article 21 of the Constitution, he/she can entertain a case before the 
Tribunal.  
The NGT maintained the liberal approach also by looking at the Rana 
Sengupta case,568 different from Amit Maur insofar as the record of the 
application did not demonstrate the status of the appellant as a person 
with an interest in environmental matters and in the case, and at the 
Ankur case,569 as that application was deprived of evidence in favour of 
the position of the proponent. Finally, the Tribunal referred to Goa 
Foundation570 for extending the doctrine of the binding precedent to the 
jurisprudence of the NGT: the court maintained its approach and 
confirmed the conditions needed to file cases before the newly 
established environmental jurisdiction, namely that “a person aggrieved 
due to loss of environment, breach of environmental norms or like causes” can 
access the Tribunal, the sole limitation being “that his action shall not be 
baseless, ill-motivated or that outcome of vendetta nor shall he be a person 
disinterested in such cause of environment”. 571  For these reasons, the 
Tribunal allowed the application in the Amit Maru case. 
What arises from these judgments is a jurisprudential construction that 
attempts to separate issues of competences ratione materiae and ratione 
personae, but acknowledges the difficulties in discerning the different 
elements, due to the peculiarity of environmental litigation. Hence, the 
Tribunal has extensively considered the notion of environment, 
provided that there is a link to the statutes listed in Schedule I of the 
NGT and that the applicant/appellant has a sufficient ground for 
                                                          
568 Appeal No. 54 of 2012, dated 22nd of March 2013. See infra, paragraph c). 
569  Application No. 30 of 2012, dated 18th of December 2012. See infra, 
paragraph c). 
570 M.A. No. 49 of 2013 in O.A. No. 26 of 2012, dated 18th of July 2013. 
571 M.A. No. 65 of 2014 in O.A. No. 13 of 2014, paragraph 20. 
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approaching the Tribunal. As the competence ratione materiae has been 
constantly extended,572 the matter of locus standi too raised contentions 
for its tentative broad applicability.  
 
c) Locus standi: the competence ratione personae 
As previously analysed, the construction of the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal ratione materiae in a liberal manner has been constructed in 
parallel with a wide access to justice ratione personae: if questions related 
to the environment have been dealt with by looking at them through a 
teleological interpretation, locus standi before the Tribunal received a 
similar treatment too. 
On this, several cases concur to state that a wide access to the NGT has 
been guaranteed by a relaxation of the requirements concerning the 
configuration of the concept of “aggrieved person”. Since the beginning, 
the work of the Tribunal has been to draw the lines of the main 
concepts guaranteeing access to justice. In this sense, on the question of 
the maintainability of applications presented by various subjects, 
Appeal No. 5 of 2011 (Vimal Bhai vs. MoEF)573 has been one of the first 
examples of the role of the Tribunal in extending the notion of 
“aggrieved person”. As the Tribunal explicitly approached the question, 
as a preliminary matter, it set the scene by combining the reading of 
Section 2 and Sections 16 and 18 of the NGT Act.  
If, according to a restrictive view, the concept of person should entail 
the presence of a “substantial grievance as to denial of some personal, 
pecuniary or property right or imposition upon a party of a burden or 
obligation”, a liberal stance in the reading of the provisions would result 
in the access to the Tribunal to “any person whether he is a resident of that 
particular area or not whether he is aggrieved and/or injured or not”. The 
NGT adhered to the second theory, supporting the view that in 
environmental matters a relaxation of the requirements concerning the 
presentation of cases is beneficial. Moreover, on the combined 
                                                          
572  See, for instance, the recent practice of suo motu proceedings, supra, 
paragraph a). 
573 Appeal No. 5 of 2011, dated 14th of December 2011. 
  257 
interpretation of Sections 2, 16 and 18, the Tribunal distinguished 
between the activation of the clause provided in Section 18(2) – in cases 
where the person is injured and can “claim relief, compensation or 
settlement of disputes” – and the notion of “person aggrieved”, under 
Sections 14 and 16. In Vimal Bhai, this reading has been even 
substantiated through the reading of Articles 48A and 51A of the 
Constitution. Indeed, as citizens are required to protect and improve 
the natural environment, access to the remedies of the NGT is open to 
every citizen as a direct consequence. Thus, the Tribunal supported the 
maintainability of the appeal on the grounds that the notion of 
aggrieved person “must be given a liberal construction and needs to be 
flexible” and that it should be separated from the concept of “injured 
person”. Furthermore, the Tribunal confirmed this view in the Jaya 
Prakash Dabral case in the same day, on an application filed by the 
President of an NGO dealing with environmental issues of the 
Himalayas and by a former Professor of Environmental Economics, 
considered to be persons aggrieved from the damages to the 
environmental caused by the construction of an hydroelectric dam on 
the river Mandakini.574  
From these judgments, the Tribunal refined the notion of “aggrieved 
person” according to the different cases, in order to extrapolate the 
essential features of it. In Jan Chetna vs. MoEF & Ors.,575 the Tribunal 
rendered a decision on the necessity of granting environmental 
clearances to projects concerning the enlargement of existing sites576 
from an appeal filed by a social and environmental group against the 
MoEF and the proponent company (M/s. Scania). In this specific case, 
the preliminary objections advanced by the respondent concerned the 
maintainability of the appeal in light of the passage from the NEAA to 
the NGT and of the definition of affected person. On the first remark, 
                                                          
574 O.A. No. 12 of 2011, dated 14th of December 2011: “for all the above reasons, 
which arise under similar circumstances to this case, we are of the considered opinion 
that the applicants are persons aggrieved, in a matter of this nature. Therefore, the 
applicants are entitled to maintain an application of this nature.” 
575 Appeal No. 22 of 2011, dated 9th of February 2012. 
576 In detail, plants producing sponge iron. 
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the respondent supported the interpretation of the transfer of cases 
according to the provisions guaranteeing access to the NEAA, and not 
under the NGT Act: as the NEEA Act prescribed, as a rule of locus 
standi for appeals, access only to persons affected by the grant of an EC 
or to associations likely to be affected (Section 11), the NGT should 
dismiss the appeal insofar as Jan Chetna did not fulfil the requirements 
under any of the Acts. To this, the new environmental judge replied by 
setting the provisions of both the NEAA and NGT Acts in the 
framework of the international instruments approved from 1972 and of 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (especially Vellore Citizens’).577 
Hence, the Tribunal analysed Section 11 of the NEEA Act by drawing a 
distinction between directly affected persons and those affected not “in 
the manner traditionally understood”, considering the far-reaching effects 
of environmental pollution. The NGT, irrespective of the Act governing 
the procedure, thus confirmed the possibility of filing an appeal by 
organisations such as Jan Chetna, insofar as they participated in the 
proceedings for the grant of the environmental clearance, as a way to 
fulfil the “legislative intentions of granting access to justice". The Tribunal 
eventually established a link between the concepts of “affected” and 
“aggrieved” person and confirmed the maintainability of appeals from 
the NEAA to the NGT. 
Again, an aggrieved individual (or group) has been defined in the Goa 
Foundation case as “a person who has suffered a legal grievance, against 
whom a decision has been pronounced or who has been refused something. This 
expression is very generic in its meaning and has to be construed with 
reference to the provisions of a statute and facts of a given case”.578 Thanks to 
this liberal construction, the Tribunal admitted that access to 
environmental justice can be granted also in absence of “direct or 
personal interest in invoking the provisions of the Act” or  by showing that 
the cause of action “affects the environment”. 
However, this extensive reading has encountered limits posed by the 
Tribunal, in the interest of guaranteeing a fair access to justice and a 
disposal of environmental cases in a coherent and credible manner. 
                                                          
577 See infra, Chapter III, Section II, paragraph c). 
578 M.A. No. 49 of 2013 in O.A. No. 26 of 2012, dated 18th of July 2013. 
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Indeed, the Tribunal limited access to its remedies in order to avoid 
futile litigation derived by a lack of requirements for locus standi and 
also because of the absence of evidence supporting the applications. 
Hence, a series of applicants have been denied access to the Tribunal, 
whether they were individuals or groups that attempted to show their 
interest in the matter presented before the NGT. 
In this framework of prudence, the Ankur case 579  is peculiar: the 
applicant (a public trust) filed a request for revocation of environmental 
clearance of an open iron ore mine in Kalane, Maharashtra, and for 
restoration of the environment by removing mining wastes in 
agricultural lands. 
The NGT analysed the issues to adjudicate as follows: on the matter of 
locus standi, the Tribunal did not include the applicant trust among 
those who are entitled to file an application under Section 18, insofar as 
the trust, representing agriculturists, should be considered as an 
aggrieved person. In fact, Ankur was not registered as a public trust and 
the documents supporting the application do not show how it could 
represent the interests of farmers. Moreover, on the substantial 
question of the application, the maps presented did not show the 
encroachments of the mining activities on the agricultural fields and the 
applicant did not prove that the respondent caused air or noise 
pollution from its activities. Thus, the NGT dismissed the application 
and deprecated the use of PIL for such litigation. 
The case Rana Sengupta vs. Union of India580 is significant insofar as it 
demonstrates the logical and reputational approach that the NGT is 
employing in his activity. The Tribunal, on an appeal filed by a self-
defined “public spirited citizen, working for welfare of people” against the 
grant of environmental clearance for the expansion of a steel plant in 
West Bengal, returned on the matter of locus standi for aggrieved 
people. In this case, the Tribunal rejected the reasons proposed by the 
                                                          
579 Application No. 30 of 2012, dated 18th of December 2012.  
580 Appeal No. 54 of 2012, dated 22nd of March 2013. 
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appellant for access to the court,581 considering that no evidence was 
presented by the applicant to show that he is a person aggrieved and 
that his contentions are of a self-proclaimed nature, unsupported by 
public activity (for instance, representation of an NGO). As a 
consequence, the Tribunal not only dismissed the case, but ordered the 
appellant the payment of a sum in order to discourage frivolous 
litigation.  
Hence, the concept of “aggrieved person” has been elaborated by the 
NGT by showing both an enlargement of the access to justice - 
congruent with the purpose of the NGT Act - and a certain concern for 
balancing the requirements of locus standi - to avoid litigation 
detrimental to environmental protection. In this discourse, it is 
noteworthy to remark the possibilities granted to non-governmental 
organisations as key actors in the protection and enhancement of the 
environment thanks to the liberal approach undertaken by the 
Tribunal, that followed the tradition of the relaxation of requirements 
set by the Supreme Court with the tool of Public Interest Litigation.582 
This is further confirmed in the landmark judgment K.K. Royson vs. 
Union of India & Ors..583 As the respondents challenged the validity of 
the appeals presented against the environmental clearance granted for 
the construction of an airport in Kerala for absence of locus standi of the 
appellants, the Tribunal held that the latter, although individuals that 
would not be normally considered as aggrieved persons, they 
“constitute a social and environment group with the objective of working for 
the welfare of the local community and small land holders and have been 
creating awareness on environmental issues” and are thus affected by the 
project. Moreover, the Tribunal maintained the possibility of appeal 
also in cases where “the appellants have not participated in the proceedings 
                                                          
581 Ibidem, paragraph 13: the appellant declared to be “a public spirited citizen with 
working experience in steel and iron industry and has full knowledge of the impact of 
these industries on ecology, environment and human lives”. 
582 See infra, Chapter III, Section I, paragraph c). 
583 Appeal Nos. 172, 173, 174 of 2013 (SZ) and Appeal Nos. 1 and 19 of 2014 
(SZ), dated 28th of April 2014. 
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of the public hearing,” as “they would not lose their right to challenge the 
approval or the EC.”584 
The jurisprudence analysed so far shows the relevance of affected 
groups in promoting environmental protection in the same manner as 
non-governmental organisations or single individuals appealed to the 
Supreme Court for upholding the environmental rights enshrined in 
the Constitution of India. Indeed, the role of NGOs as applicants or 
appellants has been the subject of a series of judgments in the recent 
history of the Tribunal. Appeal No. 9 of 2011, dated 13th of December 
2013 - the so called Samata case585 - has been the occasion to settle these 
issues for the Tribunal. The Samata case originated as a transfer of an 
appeal filed before the NEAA after the constitution of the NGT. It was 
presented by two NGOs - Samata (focused on the rights of tribal 
groups) and Forum for Sustainable Development (active on social and 
environmental issues) - with the purpose of quashing an order for an 
environmental clearance granted for a project of a coal power plant in 
Andhra Pradesh. The grounds for quashing the EC, according to the 
appellants, comprise the presence of false statements on the project in 
the EIA Report and of flaws in the public hearing. 
The first point of contention before the Tribunal was, however, the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for an appeal presented by NGOs. On the 
preliminary objections questioning the maintainability of the appeal, 
the respondents (the MoEF, the local Pollution Control Board and the 
company in charge of the project) stated that no evidence was 
presented to the Tribunal so that it could confirm that the two 
organisations were persons affected or that they were concerned by the 
project by their nature of environmental bodies, especially because they 
were based 170 kilometres from the project. 
While the NEAA Act provided for a competence ratione personae that 
required the appellants to“be able to show they are ‘likely to be affected’”, 
Section 18 of the NGT Act also included such a provision, but its 
                                                          
584 Ibidem, paragraph 149. 
585 Appeal No. 9 of 2011, dated 13th of December 2013 (NEAA Appeal No. 10 of 
2010). 
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analysis has been the object of a substantial scrutiny by the Tribunal. 
Indeed, in the Samata case “aggrieved person” has been considered as the 
one who “must have suffered a legal grievance that he has been wrongfully 
deprived of something or refused wrongfully, (…) either directly or 
indirectly”, regardless of the fact that the appellants are resident of an 
area or have not participated in public hearings or similar procedures, 
provided that they fear a risk toward the ecology and the environment. 
Thus, the two NGOs, duly registered, have their own right of appealing 
before the NGT as aggrieved persons. 
The aforementioned cases are significant insofar as they present an 
environmental court that has proactively operated for extending the 
possibilities of applicants to accede to the statutory remedies. In line 
with the traditional openness of the Supreme Court in accepting cases 
presented by civil society through Public Interest Litigation, the 
National Green Tribunal has accomplished a similar interpretive effort 
in widening locus standi. However, the liberal construction of the 
environmental court must be coordinated with the provisions on the 
temporal limits for filing cases. As the legislature restricted the access to 
the Tribunal ratione temporis in order to ensure the effectiveness of court 
proceedings, the NGT has a duty to fulfil its mission also in this sense. 
 
d)   Time limits and time frames: the jurisdiction ratione temporis 
and the grant of orders     
The question of time limits is the last relevant characteristic to be 
analysed in the working of the Tribunal. What comes at the forefront of 
the practice of the NGT is, on the one hand, the strict adherence to the 
temporal requirements set in the founding Act and, on the other hand, 
the fulfilment of the aim of speedily disposing of environmental cases 
and the tangible maintenance of this disposal also as far as the grant of 
directions and orders is concerned. Indeed, the cases presented before 
the Tribunal are characterised by a rapidity in obtaining the decision 
and a bar of jurisdiction for applications presented beyond the 
prescribed time limits. 
The NGT Act, as known, presents three provisions on the limitations to 
approach the Tribunal according to time requirements: for access under 
Section 14, the limit set by the legislature for presenting a case is six 
months, with a possible extension of sixty days in case a “sufficient 
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cause” barred the applicant from submitting a dispute; for relief and 
compensation to victims of environmental damages, a five-year period 
is calculated from the date on which the cause for relief or 
compensation first arose (with the same clause on the sixty-days 
extension); finally, for appeals, the temporal limitation is restricted to 
thirty days from the administrative order allowing or prohibiting a 
certain activity under the statutes listed in Schedule I, with an extension 
of sixty days valid if the appellant proves he/she was prevented from 
filing a case.  
On its own jurisdiction ratione temporis, the NGT adjudicated a case, 
Baijnath Prajapati vs. MoEF,586 where it substantiated its views on the 
role of the Tribunal. Since the matter arose as a frivolous litigation 
presented by an appellant that eventually withdrew his case, the 
Tribunal confirmed its role in the judicial system as the guardian of 
“effective environmental management and conservation (…) and sustainable 
development” and the custodian of “relief and compensation for damages to 
persons and property and connected matters”, with a view to “avoid 
frivolous cases”, as the ratio for establishing the NGT was the speedy 
disposal of cases and the adjudication of environmental matters with 
due weight of environmental and scientific circumstances.  
Indeed, the competence ratione temporis has been a key element in 
furthering the work of the Tribunal, starting from the first cases 
adjudicated, especially as far as the transfer of cases from other Courts 
is concerned. In the POSCO case,587 the NGT stated its interpretation on 
the period of limitation for presenting an appeal. As the environmental 
clearance dated back to 2007, the Tribunal ought not to have 
competence over this case. To this, however, the NGT took note of the 
date of the final order on these projects (30th of January 2011, within 
the six-month period prescribed in the NGT Act) and maintained the 
application against this latter order. 
                                                          
586 Appeal No. 18 of 2011, dated 20th of January 2012. 
587  Appeal No. 8 of 2011, dated 30th of March 2012. See infra, Section II, 
paragraph a), for a detailed analysis of the case. 
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The relevant aspect in the three modalities of access to the Tribunal is 
the calculation of the possible extension for allowing a case to be filed 
in the special jurisdiction. As the sixty-days period is linked to the 
existence of a “sufficient cause” preventing the submission of the case, 
the Tribunal has extensively dealt with this matter in both 
miscellaneous applications, as preliminary objections to the 
admissibility of a case, and in applications and appeals. The general 
orientation of the Tribunal has been to avoid substitutions to the literal 
provisions, while attempting to ensure a reading of the time limits as 
extensive as possible, case by case, for guaranteeing the widest access to 
environmental justice. This is an approach that has been followed by 
the NGT in a range of cases varying from strict procedural limits to the 
presentation of an application or an appeal to more complex issues of 
environmental clearances and environmental questions relying on the 
concept of the “continuing cause of action”, that would allow - in 
principle - a relaxation of time requirements. 
On the strict procedural limit and the matter of condonation of delays, 
the NGT adjudicated the Consumer Federation Tamil Nadu case in 2012.588 
In this miscellaneous application, the Tribunal granted an order that 
dismissed the entire appeal on the ground of its late filing. Indeed, as 
the appellant attributed the delay to absence of information from the 
project proponent and elaborated on the possible condonation of the 
delay for the sake of a teleological interpretation that would safeguard 
environmental principles even though a technical provisions would 
limit the presentation of a dispute, the Tribunal asserted its speciality in 
a two-fold way: on the one hand, it stood to the time limits set in 
Section 16 of the NGT Act and rejected a possible application of the 
Limitation Act; on the other, it forbade to modify the provisions of the 
Act, as the Tribunal is not entrusted with the powers deriving from 
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.589 
                                                          
588 M.A. No. 21 of 2012 arising out of Appeal No. 33 of 2011, dated 30th of April 
2012. 
589 Ibidem, paragraph 11: “the Tribunal can condone delay only up to sixty days after 
expiry of thirty days, if it is satisfied with the reasons assigned. Thus, there is a 
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From this order, the issue of time limitation was again the object of a 
miscellaneous application in the Nikunj Developers vs. State of 
Maharashtra case,590 arising from the will of the applicants to present a 
dispute on the construction of buildings in Mumbai although the 
appeal had been filed beyond the 30-days delay prescribed in Section 
16 of the NGT Act. As the requirement for condonation of delay is the 
existence of a “sufficient cause” barring the applicant from presenting an 
appeal, the Tribunal endeavoured to elaborate the notion in an elastic 
manner, as to reserve its application according to the circumstances of 
each case. Also in this case, the judges aimed at constructing the 
concept in a liberal sense. However, the question of the existence of a 
sufficient cause has been answered by looking at the meaning of the 
notion with a link to the general connotation of reasonableness, as a 
doctrine guiding the legal system in its entirety. Indeed, through a 
scrutiny of the case law of the Supreme Court,591 that set the principles 
governing the condonation of delay, namely a test of reasonableness 
engaging to observe that a cause is sufficient if it could not have been 
avoided by the exercise of “due care and attention”, testifying of a bona 
fide behaviour of the applicant.  
In Nikunj Developers, the Tribunal did not find the existence of a 
“sufficient cause” for two reasons: on the one hand, the appellants were 
three and only one did not receive the questioned order; on the other, 
the 90-days time limit had already elapsed when the appeal was filed. 
In the words of the judges, the authoritative interpretation of Section 16 
of the NGT Act is that “once the period of 90 days lapses from the date of 
communication of the order, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the 
delay”. Hence, by both a literal and purposive interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                               
complete exclusion of Section-5 of the Limitation Act. That apart, the period prescribed 
under the NGT Act, 2010, which is a special Statute, shall over ride normal acts.” 
590 M.A. No. 247 of 2012, arising out of Appeal No. 76 of 2012, dated 14th of 
March 2013. 
591  Balwant Singh (Dead) vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 685: “Liberal 
construction of the expression 'sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial 
justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to 
whom want of bona fide is imputable.” 
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statute, the NGT refrained from possibly applying the principle of 
equity in this case, insofar as the legislative intent in drafting Section 16 
was manifestly clear.592  It is to be noted, however, that the test of 
reasonableness was applied in favour of the appellant in a specific case 
where medical problems have been reported to the Tribunal: in Ramesh 
Agrawal vs. Union of India,593 the judges condoned a delay in presenting 
an application due to the impossibility to travel to the Principal Bench 
of the Tribunal.594 
Notwithstanding the different possibilities facing the Tribunal on a 
case-basis, the matter of limitation was thoroughly examined by the 
Tribunal in the Kehar Singh case.595 The judges considered Section 14(3) 
of the Act by looking at the notion of cause of action and at the wording 
of the provision. Section 14(3) distinguishes between two possibilities: 
access to the NGT within six months from the cause of action and 
within a maximum period of eight months, provided that the sixty days 
delay is justified by the applicants with facts that prevented the 
presentation of the case in the prescribed time limit. Moreover, the 
mandatory time limit must be confronted with the existence of a cause 
of action linked to an environmental issue related to the Acts listed in 
Schedule I, otherwise the six (or eight, in specific circumstances) 
months period would not be triggered. As the cause of action in this 
case was the publicity of the project for the installation of a sewage 
                                                          
592 M.A. No. 247 of 2012, arising out of Appeal No. 76 of 2012, paragraph 25: 
“the legislative command must take precedence over equitable principle. The language 
of Section 16 of the NGT Act does not admit of any ambiguity, rather it is explicitly 
clear that the framers of law did not desire to vest the Tribunal with powers, specific or 
discretionary, of condoning the delay in excess of total period of 90 days.” 
593 Appeal No. 8 of 2013 (CZ), dated 22nd of August 2014. 
594 Ibidem, paragraph 27, I: “we are inclined to accept the same as the respondent too 
not controverted the facts or disputed the medical records of the Appellant who 
reportedly got injured in a shooting incident and had to undergo treatment for gunshot 
wounds as well as attend follow up procedures till February, 2013 and despite the fact 
that notice was sent to him by the Project Proponent, he was unable to travel to Delhi 
for filing this appeal.” 
595 Application No. 124 of 2013, dated 12th of September 2013. 
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treatment plant on the 19th of May 2013 - to be considered as the 
environmentally relevant fact - and the application was filed four days 
later, the Tribunal maintained the case.596  
Again, the same interpretation was given in the Kalpavrishka case:597 
concerning the time limits for the application, the Tribunal confirmed 
the maintainability of the case, as it had been transferred from the High 
Court of Delhi in 2013. Indeed, the case had been filed as a Writ 
Petition, on the 25th of April 2011, within the six-month period, as the 
question was known to the petitioners on the 11th of November 2010. 
Moreover, on the same topic, it is interesting to notice how the Tribunal 
guaranteed the transfer of petitions from apex courts to the newly 
established special jurisdiction also as far as temporal jurisdiction is 
concerned. In Ms. Betty C. Alvares vs. State Of Goa,598 the Western bench 
of the Tribunal asserted the maintainability of an application that had 
been transferred from the High Court of Bombay. In this case, as the 
parallel filing of a writ petition under Article 226 was deemed 
maintainable by the High Court, that subsequently directed the transfer 
of the case to the NGT, the Tribunal considered the case to be 
acceptable, since it was based on a substantial question related to 
environment, irrespective of the precedent filing of a petition before a 
High Court. 
Notwithstanding the strict conditions posed by the Tribunal concerning 
the six-month time limit, the environmental court also delved into the 
matter of continuous causes of action, one of the dubious points left by 
the formulation of Section 14(3) of the NGT Act. As a matter of fact, 
since the period for applying to the Tribunal indicated in the provisions 
of 2010 seems a categorical limit, the Tribunal has interpreted it on a 
                                                          
596 The respondent contested the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as it considered 
that the cause of action was the acquisition of the land in 2010, but the judges 
refused to consider the mere acquisition of land, from a notification issued 
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, to be per se a substantial 
environmental matter. 
597 Application No. 116 (THC) of 2013, dated 17th of July 2014.  
598 M.A. Nos. 32 and 33 of 2014, in O.A. No. 63 of 2012, dated 12th of February 
2014. 
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case by case basis. In Amit Maru,599 the applicant alleged the existence 
of a continuing cause of action insofar as the illegal construction 
activities challenged were still ongoing at the time of the application. 
The Tribunal, looking at the record of the case, confirmed the view of 
the applicant by dividing the reading of Section 14(3) into two options: 
the possibility of filing an application within six months from the 
“‘commencement of cause of action’ for “such dispute”” and a second 
circumstance, the ““first date of arising of cause” of action”. In this sense, 
the judges elaborated on the second usage of the concept of cause of 
action under Section 14(3) and enucleated the principle according to 
which such cause arises only when enough information and knowledge 
of an illegal action is at the disposal of an applicant.600 The Tribunal has 
thus confirmed a strict limit on temporal requirements, while allowing 
an interpretation on a case basis that could encompass a range of 
disputes with a view to guarantee access to justice when substantial 
environmental questions arise. 
This interpretation of the continuing cause of action had been the object 
of analysis in more cases, not always allowing the defence of the 
environment in circumstances where the initial project dated back in 
the years, but whose effects were ongoing at the time of the application 
to the National Green Tribunal. In Aradhana Bhargav vs. MoEF,601 for 
instance, a project on a dam approved in 1986 was reconsidered by 
looking at the activities of the project proponent in later years. If the 
counsel for the respondents clearly considered that the application was 
barred by time under Section 14(3) and 15(3) of the NGT Act, and that 
an interpretation contrary to the strict reading of the provision would 
lead to “serious, anomalous and undesirable consequences”, the Tribunal, in 
principle, upheld the view of the applicant, namely that “if there is 
continues injury affecting the fundamental right continuously, it cannot be 
said that cause of action would seize as it would amount to waiver or giving up 
of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.”602 However, 
                                                          
599 M.A. No. 65 of 2014 in O.A. No. 13 of 2014, dated 1st of October 2014. 
600 Ibidem, paragraph 30. 
601 O.A. No. 46 of 2013, dated 12th of August 2013. 
602 Ibidem, paragraph 14. 
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the NGT differentiated this case from Goa Foundation in two aspects: on 
the one hand, Goa Foundation was not focused on the question of 
temporal limits and, on the other, the case concerned an Act listed in 
Schedule I of the NGT Act, while Aradhana Bhargav is centred on 
previous statute law. Recalling another judgment on the matter of time 
limits, Medha Patkar & Ors. vs. MoEF,603 that curtailed the possibility of 
interpreting the issue of continuous causes of action, the Tribunal 
rejected the view that the application be admissible for its cause of 
                                                          
603 Appeal No. 1 of 2013, dated 11th of July 2013, paragraph 16: “The Tribunal 
must adopt a pragmatic and practical approach that would also be in consonance with 
the provisions of the Act providing limitation. Firstly, the limitation would never begin 
to run and no act would determine when such limitation would stop running as any 
one of the stakeholders may not satisfy or comply with all its obligations prescribed 
under the Act. To conclude that it is only when all the stakeholders had completed in 
entirety their respective obligations under the respective provisions, read with the 
notification of 2006, then alone the period of limitation shall begin to run, would be an 
interpretation which will frustrate the very object of the Act and would also cause 
serious prejudice to all concerned. Firstly, this completely frustrates the purpose of 
prescription of limitation. Secondly, a project proponent who has obtained 
environmental clearance and thereafter spent crores of rupees on establishment and 
operation of the project, would be exposed to uncertainty, dander of unnecessary 
litigation and even the possibility of jeopardizing the interest of his project after years 
have lapsed. This cannot be the intent of law. The framers of law have enacted the 
provisions of limitation with a clear intention of specifying the period within which an 
aggrieved person can invoke the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. It is a settled rule of law 
that once the law provides for limitation, then it must operate meaningfully and with 
its rigour. Equally true is that once the period of limitation starts running, then it does 
not stop. An applicant may be entitled to condonation or exclusion of period of 
limitation. Discharge of one set of obligations in its entirety by any stakeholder would 
trigger the period of limitation which then would not stop running and equally cannot 
be frustrated by mere non-compliance of its obligation to communicate or place the 
order in public domain by another stakeholder. The purpose of providing a limitation is 
not only to fix the time within which a party must approach the Tribunal but is also 
intended to bring finality to the orders passed on one hand and preventing endless 
litigation on the other. Thus both these purposes can be achieved by a proper 
interpretation of these provisions.” 
  270 
action started in 2012, when the applicants came to know about their 
right (as the authorisation for the project dated back to 1986 and a 
subsequent communication had been issued in 2005). The NGT thus 
limited its pragmatic approach with a view to safeguard the object of 
the Act and to revive the consciousness of tentative aggrieved 
persons.604  
The interpretation of the Tribunal with regard to time limitations has 
thus fulfilled a double objective: on the one hand, the extension of its 
competence in the widest possible manner, through the reading of the 
continuous cause of action; on the other hand, the maintenance of 
certain limits that could ensure the effective and rapid decision-making 
process provided for by the NGT Act. This second feature related to the 
temporal dimension - the speedy disposal of cases - has been another 
characteristic of the working of the Tribunal, that presented a series of 
instruments since the early days of working. The first cases of the NGT, 
indeed, show a variety of solutions aimed at ascertaining the 
jurisdiction - ratione personae and temporis - while engaging in a 
constructive way to fulfil the purpose of protecting the environment as 
comprehensively as possible, within the boundaries of the rule of law. 
In this context, the Tribunal extended its powers to imagining 
alternatives to plain orders, that range from the grant of interim 
protection to the usual resort to monitoring committees, despite 
refraining from maintaining jurisdiction.  
In M.A. No. 32 of 2011, dated 10th January 2012, arising out of 
Application No. 32 of 2011,605  the NGT posed the case of granting 
interim protection, embodied in the limits to pursue a project although 
environmental clearance has been granted, on the ground that it would 
cause irreparable damage to the ecology of a forest. The NGT referred 
                                                          
604 O.A. No. 46 of 2013, dated 12th of August 2013, paragraph 31: “a person who 
wishes to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or Court has to be vigilant and 
conscious of his rights and should not let the time to go by not taking appropriate 
steps.” 
605 M.A. No. 32 of 2011, arising out of Application No. 32 of 2011, dated 10th 
January 2012. 
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to the case Dalpat Kumar in the Supreme Court,606 that set the requisites 
of balance of convenience and irreparable loss as principles governing 
the grant of interim orders, and indicated the balance of convenience in 
favour of the respondent, while listing the final hearing of the case 8 
days after the discussion of the miscellaneous application. 
The applicant presented the case - on the operation of a coal based 
thermal power plant - again as Appeal No. 19 of 2011 (on the 
environmental clearance), as Appeal No. 37 of 2011 (on the CRZ 
clearance for the use of sea water) and as Application No. 8 of 2011.607 
In the last judgment, the NGT recalled its decision of the 8th of 
February - directing the company to either follow the terms of the 
environmental clearance of 2010 or apply to the competent authorities if 
the project were to change - and referred to the report of the State 
Environmental Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA) of Gujarat. As 
the latter observed that the project proponent started construction 
before the grant of CRZ and forest clearances, the NGT directed the 
SEIAA, in a time frame of four months, to start necessary proceedings 
against the project proponent and take action if violations were to be 
found. 
The concern for a speedy disposal of cases, however, has been balanced 
by the judges through a fair recourse to orders and directions when 
needed. The environmental court, in fact, endeavoured to find 
equilibrium in its decisions by using the powers at its disposal only if 
no other means to approach institutions competent in granting 
authorisations or staying proceedings were considered. In Application 
No. 28 of 2011 and No. 9 of 2012,608 for instance, the Tribunal joined 
proceedings on two cases presented by the same applicants on the 
construction of a port and on a thermal power project, considered 
composite insofar as the port should have been used to import coal 
used in the thermal power plant, but refrained from a decision on the 
case, as it would have amounted to a pre-judgment. The applicants, 
two citizens of Junagadh, Gujarat, asked for quashing of the public 
                                                          
606 Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1992, (1) SCC 719. 
607 O.A. No. 8 of 2011, dated 10th of May 2012 
608 Application No. 28 of 2011 and No. 9 of 2012, dated 20th April 2012. 
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hearings conducted for the projects and to request new environmental 
clearances. The NGT found itself confronted with a case still in 
progress, as no decision on environmental clearance had been taken by 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The Tribunal acknowledged 
the broad interpretation of Section 14 of the NGT Act, on the 
“substantial question related to environment”, presented by the applicants, 
but recalled the steps needed for the grant of an EIA609 and rejected the 
application, as the applicants had the possibility of approaching the 
Expert Appraisal Committee or the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests, since no environmental clearance had yet been granted. 
On the contrary, the Tribunal also acted in cases that considered as 
dismissed, with a view to uphold its mission of socio-centric court and 
guardian of the environment. In Application No. 1 of 2011, 610  the 
applicant, a citizen of Kozhencherry, Kerala, sought directions for the 
removal of solid bio-wastes treatment plant in the stadium of his city, 
that allegedly caused water pollution. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
NGT dismissed the application on the ground that consent to operate 
had been granted in 2010, the Tribunal studied a detailed report made 
by the district engineer, that showed that scientific parameters were 
congruent with the environmental clearance, and directed to continue 
monitoring those parameters once a month. Thus, the Tribunal allowed 
standing of a person directly - allegedly - affected by a question related 
to the environment and directed the local institutions to present a 
second report, in order to assess the case in a more precise way. 
Moreover, the question of maintaining a balance between ecological 
and economic concern was again faced with a coherent response in the 
case Adivasi Majdoor vs. MoEF, 611  where the Tribunal directed the 
repetition of an interim order granting the possibility of pursuing 
“acquisition activities for acquiring land by way of acquisition or negotiation 
and also to do activities in favour of the environment like plantation of trees 
etc., till the disposal of the appeal”, provided that the project proponent 
                                                          
609 See Chapter II and infra, Section III. 
610 Application No. 1 of 2011, dated 26th of March 2012. 
611 M.A. No. 36 of 2011, arising out of Appeal No. 3 of 2011, dated 30th of 
November 2011. 
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does not carry on industrial activities. Hence, the Tribunal has been 
solicitous in devising strategies for keeping an equilibrium between the 
concerns for the environment and the economic and social 
development produced by the projects submitted to its adjudicatory 
powers. As an amicus environment, the NGT coherently interpreted the 
statutory provisions on time limits and acted with a view to safeguard 
the speedy disposal of cases and to protect, on the one hand, the rights 
of access to environmental justice and, on the other, the prerogatives of 
project proponents, by setting procedures aimed at controlling that 
economic activities follow the correct environmental path.  
All things considered, the Tribunal asserted a broad jurisdiction in the 
field of environmental protection. The procedures so far analysed have 
shown how the judges have fostered the instruments provided for in 
the NGT Act for enlarging access to justice for a substantial range of 
matters and to a significant number of categories of subjects. In spite of 
its main mission as a court dealing with administrative proceedings, 
the Tribunal has the record of a socio-environmental guardian, through 
its decisions concerning environmental clearances. In parallel with the 
detailed elaborations made with regard to jurisdiction, the Tribunal has 
also extensively analysed the nature of this administrative procedure, 
referring to its single phases as well as to the role of expertise in 
decision-making, with a view to ensure the highest possible protection 
of environmental rights. 
  
II) The NGT and the EIA procedure: an enhanced expertise 
 
a)     The adjudication of matters of environmental clearances 
The cases concerning environmental clearances are certainly dominant 
in the working of the National Green Tribunal: the matters arising from 
poor implementation of the Notification of 2006 are proving to be the 
most relevant, as the misconduct of public administrations in dealing 
with the issuance of permits is the origin of multifaceted questions 
ranging from the interpretation of administrative provisions and the 
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invalidation of procedures to the relief to be granted for those 
contraventions and the role of international principles in dealing with 
such administrative issues.612  
As the Tribunal stated, “the Notification of 2006 is the regulatory regime in 
relation to protection and betterment of environment. It provides how and in 
what manner clearance is to be granted to various projects and activities to 
ensure adherence to maintenance of environmental standards.” 613  With a 
view to acknowledging the relevance of this administrative act and of 
enhancing its proper application, the enucleation of the different phases 
of environmental clearance procedures has been the object of an in-
depth analysis by the Tribunal, with a double purpose of redressing the 
damages attested by the NGT and, incidentally, of preventing future 
cases through specific directions to the competent institutions for 
changing provisions or guidelines. 
The general requirement of prior environmental clearance was 
analysed in Kehar Singh vs. State of Haryana,614 where the applicants 
affirmed that the construction of a sewage treatment plant should be 
authorised only after the four stages of an environmental clearance are 
completed. The issue at stake being the liberal interpretation of the 
Notification of 2006, as to include sewage treatment plant in the more 
general category of effluent treatment plants, the Tribunal allowed a 
comprehensive interpretation of the entries under the Notification, as it 
considered that a legislation favouring the enhancement and the 
protection of social and environmental conditions must be given the 
widest possible embodiment.615 Thus, after setting the legal parameters 
for maintaining the application, the judges delved into the scientific 
side of the matter616 and concluded that the project proponent should 
seek environmental clearance by the State Pollution Control Board. 
                                                          
612 See Chapter V. 
613 Application No. 124 of 2013, dated 12th of September 2013, paragraph 43. 
614 Application No. 124 of 2013, dated 12th of September 2013. 
615 Ibidem, paragraph 34: “The entries in the Schedule to the Notification of 2006 
have to be construed purposively so as to achieve the object of the principle legislation.”  
616 In particular, the judges analysed the concept of effluent (a notion that is not 
defined in any of the statutes) and concluded that the project is to be 
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Moreover, a general assessment of the role of Environmental Impact 
Assessment procedures has been the object of the landmark judgment 
K.K. Royson vs. Union of India & Ors.,617 that cancelled the environmental 
clearance granted to the controversial KGS airport project at Aranmula 
in Kerala. Here, the Tribunal noted how “the EIA is the important 
management tool for integrating environmental concerns in development 
process and for improved decision making” and considered the single 
elements constituting the process and their connections. Scoping is 
defined, by the respondents, as “the primary essential element of 
consideration of the application for prior EIA clearance by which the EAC 
determine detailed and comprehensive Terms of Reference (ToR) addressing all 
relevant environmental concerns for preparation of the EIA report”; 618 
logically, the Tribunal linked this initial phase with the rest of the 
procedure, and particularly with the respondence of the results of the 
appraisal of the Expert Committee to the Terms of Reference initially 
set. In the case of the airport in Kerala, to be built in an area covered by 
paddy fields and wetlands to be converted, the NGT   entered into the 
technicalities of the administrative procedure and the conditions of 
impact minimisation. With regard to the Terms of Reference,619  the 
                                                                                                                               
considered within the category of common effluent under entry 7(h) of the 
Notification of 2006, as it is conceived as a plant receiving not only waste 
waters from sewage, but also other effluents coming from human activities.   
617 Appeal Nos. 172, 173, 174 of 2013 (SZ) and Appeal Nos. 1 and 19 of 2014 
(SZ), dated 28th of April 2014. 
618 Ibidem, paragraph 77. 
619 Explicitly listed in the judgment: 
(i) baseline environmental quality along with projected incremental load to the proposed 
project activities such as ambient air quality, 
(ii) analysis and submission of details of comprehensive risk assessment and disaster 
management plan including emergency evacuation during natural, man-made disaster 
integrating with airport such as fire detection and fighting, bomb threats, earthquake, 
and oil spillage, 
(iii) Examining separately the details of construction and operational phases both for 
Environmental Management Plan and Environmental Monitoring Plan with cost and 
parameters, 
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Tribunal added to the EIA report a series of environmental issues that 
had not been raised in the administrative proceedings on air, biological 
diversity and noise pollution, 620  that rendered inadequate the 
environmental clearance. 
                                                                                                                               
(iv) Examining road/rail connectivity to the project site and impact on the traffic due to 
the proposed project/activities, 
(v) Examining the details of afforestation measures indicating land and financial 
outlay, landscape plan, green belts and open spaces, and a thick green belt has been 
planned all around the nearest settlement to mitigate noise and vibration etc., if any, 
(vi) Examining and submitting the details of noise modeling studies and mitigative 
measures, 
(vii) Examining the details of water requirement, use of treated waste water, 
preparation of a water balance chart and source of water vis-à-vis waste water to be 
generated along with treatment facilities to be proposed. 
(viii) Details of rain water harvesting proposals which should be made with due 
safeguards for ground water quality by maximizing recycling of water and utilization 
of rain water, 
(ix) Examining the details of solid waste generation treatment plant and its disposal, 
(x) Identification, prediction and assessing the environmental and sociological impacts 
on account of the project/activities and 
(xi) Submission of details of corporate social responsibilities etc.. 
620 Ibidem, paragraph 153: 
I. AIR 
 i) Prediction of emissions from combustion of aviation fuel (unburnt fuel droplets are a 
source of volatile organic compounds and give rise to odours) and their impact in the 
zone of influence. 
ii) Vehicular emissions inside the airport and from ground service equipment (tugs for 
aircraft and baggage, fuel and catering Lorries, buses and vans that transport 
passengers etc.). 
iii) Prediction of VOC emission from fuel storage tanks and transfer facilities and its 
management 
iv) Impacts of pollution from Aircraft and airfield maintenance activities 
v) Airport activities and Climate change 
II. BIOLOGICAL 
i) Habitat loss and habitat degradation due to ‘changed’ and ‘different’ activities in the 
zone of influence. 
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Moreover, the NGT contested the very presentation of the EIA report, 
as the subject charged with the draft of the analysis was not qualified to 
do so as a consultant. Indeed, the agency that materially wrote the 
report  - Enviro Care India Pvt. Ltd. - was not entitled to work on 
Category A projects (that includes airports) and thus was not qualified 
as a competent consultancy agency in view of the mandatory 
provisions of the EIA Notification, 2006. The procedure itself was 
flawed, additionally, by the conduct of the public hearing. The Tribunal 
set the requirements for this phase of environmental clearances, namely 
an arrangement “in a systematic, time bound and transparent manner 
ensuring widest possible participation”. 621  In K.K. Royson, the public 
hearing was postponed and was not respondent to the need for 
transparency and access. As a conclusion, the bench of judges found the 
appraisal phase, and thus the entire EIA procedure, inadequate: the 
NGT directed “the MoEF to take steps to restore the sanctity of important 
documents such as the EC”, vitiated by non-application of mind by the 
Expert Committees, and blocked the construction of the airport, citing 
                                                                                                                               
ii) Bird strikes/hits- prevention and management plan (Measures to control birds also 
extend beyond the airport boundary) 
iii) The sensitivity of wildlife and local domesticated animals to the noise of aircraft, 
airport ground operations and airport access roads. 
III. NOISE 
i) Prediction of Noise from aircraft and from traffic going to and from airports – 
modelling studies. Mitigation of effects and management. 
ii) Prediction of noise generated from taxiing aircrafts, the application of reverse-thrust 
(an optional braking aid on landing), engine tests and on-site vehicular traffic. 
Mitigation of effects and management 
iii) It is true that the ToR issued for the EIA study do not include the above. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the EIA consultant who claims long experience and 
expertise in the field should have addressed these issues. Undoubtedly, these issues 
deserve attention and analysis. Such an approach would have served the cause of 
environmental management at large. 
621 Ibidem, paragraph 158. 
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the public trust doctrine as a governing principle for action in the field 
of development.622 
According to this interpretation and implementation of the Notification 
of 2006, the question of the conduct of public hearings by the Pollution 
Control Boards and the Committees created following the text of 2006 is 
crucial in apprehending the social and environmental impact of the 
judgments and orders of the NGT - that already adjudicated upon some 
of the most relevant developmental projects in India, in spite of its short 
life. From one of these cases related to major projects, the so called 
POSCO case,623 the NGT derived clearer guidelines on the role of public 
hearings in EIA procedures. 
Appeal No. 8 of 2011 dealt with the environmental clearance of a steel 
power plant project and of a minor port project of M/s POSCO India in 
Orissa. Through a comprehensive analysis of the facts, the NGT 
showed its unwillingness to accept approvals coming by the MoEF 
without due consideration of the issues at stake. The projects, dating 
back to 2007, have been challenged by an environmental activist and an 
agriculturist - the Samantray - invoking the adverse impact on 
environment, agriculture and water resources, also with a view to the 
memorandum of understanding signed by the Government of Orissa 
and POSCO, that should have enabled the company to obtain a no 
objection certificate from the Orissa State Pollution Control Board in a 
restricted time frame by means of a EIA report presented by POSCO 
itself. 
Since, according to the applicants, the conditions and procedures set in 
the EIA Notification of 2006 were not followed, the Tribunal delved 
into the subject by analysing three critical points: time limits for filing 
an appeal; procedures for public hearings; the role of experts in the 
procedures.  
Concerning the last two aspects,  the Tribunal analysed whether the 
EIA followed the proper procedure concerning public hearings. In this 
                                                          
622 Ibidem, paragraph 186: “In a democracy like ours, all natural resources are wealth 
of the country and in the custody of the State as a Trustee”. 
623 Appeal No. 8 of 2011, dated 30th of March 2012. 
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sense, according to the submissions of the respondents (Orissa State 
Pollution Control Board and POSCO itself), public hearings were 
conducted according to the system of the rapid EIA in 2007. The NGT 
acknowledged the facts submitted by the respondents and further held 
that the allegations of the appellants were out of the scope of the review 
of the Tribunal, since they were focused on matters related to the EIA of 
2007. 
Then, factually, the NGT looked into the review report of the 
environmental clearance by the expert committee, that was central in 
granting the final order of 2011. In fact, two different reports were 
presented, the one submitted by the majority holding that the PH was 
not conducted properly and that the EC granted should have been 
annulled, the minority report being drafted by a person that had 
previously been Secretary of the MoEF, thus rendering the procedure 
flawed. 
Considering these issues, the NGT deemed the analysis of the 
concerned authorities as deprived of “any comprehensive scientific data 
regarding the possible environmental impacts” and “leaving lingering and 
threatening environmental and ecological doubts un-answered”. With a view 
to the relevance and the complexity of the project, the Tribunal 
requested the MoEF to draft guidelines for a single comprehensive EIA, 
to consider the optimisation of land requirements according to the 
industrial and infrastructural needs and to establish a special 
committee to monitor the progress and compliance to the conditions of 
the environmental clearance on a regular basis. 
Moreover, in light of the presence of expert members in the NGT, the 
same Tribunal asked scientific studies on certain matters, such as the 
impact of source of water requirement under competing scenarios, the 
evaluation of the proposed zero discharge proposal (while, according 
to the report, 47 cubic meter per hour of wastewater is to be discharged 
into the sea) and the impact on biodiversity of wetlands and mangroves 
and the risk assessment with respect to the proposed port project. 
As a conclusion, reformulating sustainable development as “keeping in 
view the need for industrial development, employment opportunities, etc. but 
not compromising with the environmental and ecological concerns”, the NGT 
directed the NGT to suspend the final order of 2011 until a fresh review 
would be finalised by the MoEF, to be undertaken by an expert 
  280 
committee with specialists and, generally, to draft clear guidelines for 
project developers needing to apply for a single environmental 
clearance and to request the EIA right from the beginning, for the full 
capacity of the project. 
The judgment in the POSCO case clearly shows how the Tribunal 
approached administrative matters in a way that is both respectful of 
the procedure and of the bar of jurisdiction and incisive toward the 
shortcomings arising from rapid decisions of the MoEF. The work of 
the Tribunal is also to be noted for the attempt at settling the 
environmental needs with a focus on developmental matters in a 
general sense, by requesting the competent authorities to undertake a 
review of their policies when they proved dysfunctional (here, through 
the suggestion of providing guidelines for single environmental 
clearances in case of composite projects of a considerable dimension, 
such as the projects by POSCO in Orissa).  
On a similar matter - the role of experts in the provisions of the 
Notification of 2006 - the NGT aptly conducted a survey of the 
legislative amendments and of its consequences in the“Kalpavriskha” & 
Ors. vs. Union of India case.624 The applicants approached the Tribunal 
with a memoire on the role of environmental clearances and of the 
Notification of 2006, recalling its main elements (screening, scoping, 
public consultation and appraisal of the project)625 and the role of the 
committees of experts for both categories of projects (A and B). 
Indeed, the controversy brought before the Tribunal relates in depth 
with the variation of requirements for the Chairperson and for the 
members of the Committees of experts, insofar as the rules of 1992, 
modified in 1994 and in 2006 with the last Notification (basically 
including only environmental policy experts), are considered more 
favourable by the applicants. In the words of the NGT, “the composition 
of the Committee as laid down in both the Notifications of 1992 and 1994, 
reflected the inter-disciplinary approach required”, as it included ecologists 
and NGO representatives too, while the text of 1994 already eliminated 
                                                          
624 Application No. 116 (THC) of 2013, dated 17th of July 2014. 
625 See infra, Chapter II, Section III. 
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the requirement of the interest in environmental conservation and 
sustainable development, and the Notification now into force shifted 
the focus to public administration management skills rather that 
expertise and interest in environment and sustainable development. 
The grievance before the NGT is thus connected to the potential conflict 
of interest between the members of the expert committees charged with 
the analysis of the documents necessary to grant an environmental 
clearance and the public institutions, as those committees are often 
constituted of public officials, in line with the determinations of the 
Notification of 2006. In this sense, the applicants documented the 
decision of the MoEF to appoint the Chairpersons for three Expert 
Appraisal Committees on River Valley and Hydro Electric Projects; 
Thermal and Coal Mining Projects and Infrastructure Building 
Construction Projects, as the persons appointed are deemed deprived 
of sufficient qualifications and have conflict of interest in light of their 
commitments in the private sector. As a conclusion to these factual 
elaboration on the working of expert committees according to the 
Notification of 2006, the applicants call for the elimination of Appendix 
VI to the Notification of 2006 (on the requirements to become an expert 
member of a committee), as being contrary to the same Notification, 
and to substitute that appendix with the text of 1994. 
The Tribunal confirmed the interpretation of the applicants. It thus 
highlighted the role of expertise in committees as a fundamental asset 
in guaranteeing a correct procedure of environmental clearance, with a 
direct impact on the environment. On the substantial question, 
Appendix VI of the Notification of 2006, on the criteria for eligibility of 
experts, the Tribunal exercised its ancillary powers concerning the 
issuance of guidelines and directions to achieve the objectives of the 
NGT Act - ensuring complete and effective justice. Thus, the Tribunal 
restricted the interpretation of the Notification of 2006, concerning 
experts coming from the public administration, and directed the MoEF 
not to appoint experts as members of committees “unless the said experts 
in the above field are directly relatable to the various fields of environmental 
jurisprudence”. Moreover, the MoEF was also directed to set criteria for 
the eligibility of candidates as Chairpersons. 
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The process of public hearings itself was the object of a specific case, 
Jeet Singh Kanwar vs. Union of India,626 on the installation of three coal-
based Thermal Power Plants in two villages of Chhattisgarh. Following 
the presentation of the project to the MoEF, an Expert Appraisal 
Committee was formed by the local Pollution Control Board with a 
view to analyse the EIA report of the project proponent (M/s. Dheeru 
Powergen Private Limited). In 2009, a public hearing for this project 
was conducted and eventually led to the approval of the project on the 
18th of January 2010. However, the appellants brought the case before 
the NGT to challenge the regularity of the proceedings as far as 
linguistic and temporal requirements are concerned - specifically, the 
publication of the EIA report summary in vernacular languages, not 
only in English, should have been published 30 days before the hearing 
- and the reading of the proceedings recorded and the consideration 
given to the observations of the public with regard to the project. 
The NGT recalled again the necessary phases for an environmental 
clearance to be valid: scoping, public consultation and appraisal. On the 
first, the determination of comprehensive Terms of Reference (ToR) by 
the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) in order to address the relevant 
environmental concerns, the Tribunal stated its necessity as well as its 
priority character. On the public consultation, the NGT raised the 
relevance of holding a hearing near the proposed site and of addressing  
“all the material environmental concerns expressed”. Finally, the phase of 
appraisal must be conducted by the EAC, so that the MoEF could 
deliver an order of clearance according to its recommendations. On the 
allegations of the appellants, the Tribunal found that copies of the 
Executive Summary of the EIA Report were furnished in Hindi as well 
as in English in due time (thirty-days prior to the hearing) and that the 
hearing was conducted in a convenient venue and attended by a large 
public, that did not raise environmental concerns. Indeed, the NGT 
defined the purpose of the procedure of public hearing as a way to 
“render the decision fair and participative”, a statement that is significant 
insofar as it connects environmental impact assessment procedures in 
the realm of the wider scope of the rule of law, understood as an 
                                                          
626 Appeal No. 10 of 2011, dated 16th of April 2013. 
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inclusive process. 627  However, the Tribunal eventually quashed the 
environmental clearance as the project was conducted in an area where 
the MoEF had forbidden the installation of power plants, in spite of it 
granting the permit.628 
The issue of proper conduct of public hearings has also been 
approached in the Samata case.629 Here, the case made by the appellants 
was particular as it concerned not only the matter of publication and 
languages, but more specifically the question of the areas affected by 
the project in two States - Andhra Pradesh and Orissa - with only one 
PCB being involved in the environmental clearance procedures. Indeed, 
the “term ‘local affected persons’” should not have excluded “people living 
in other States who are within the impact zone of the thermal power plant.” 
Although the topic of transboundary effects has been a classic in the 
history of environmental law and in this case it was even manifest 
within a federal jurisdiction, the Tribunal found that the respondents 
acted according to the EIA Notification, that did not provide any clause 
for the conduct of public hearings by different PCB, or obliging a PCB 
to enlarge its information activities beyond its territorial scope. 
On the phase of appraisal, the same judgment sheds light in 
interpreting the provisions of the Notification of 2006 in a coherent 
manner. Through its expertise, the NGT uncovered evidence that the 
EIA Report was eventually presented more “like an environmental 
management and mitigation plan”, instead of being a counter-document to 
the terms of reference of the project as drafted in the phase of scoping. 
Indeed, the Tribunal found that several scientific data had not been 
taken into account, such as the drainage of the area and the water 
regime. On the concept of appraisal, the Tribunal noted how “the 
appraisal of the project requires not only evaluation, but also estimation of 
works in order to make an assessment or determination of the same”, with the 
subjacent idea of the need for a “detailed scrutiny” for concluding with a 
“categorical recommendation”. Thus, the NGT set the requirement, in the 
                                                          
627 See Chapter I and, among many, Morlino, L., op.cit.. 
628 See Chapter V on sustainable development. 
629 Appeal No. 9 of 2011, dated 13th of December 2013 (NEAA Appeal No. 10 of 
2010). See supra, Section I. 
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phase of appraisal, of explicitly responding to the objections made 
during the public hearing and of stating the reasons for the objections 
to be negatived. Moreover, the Tribunal delved into the question of 
technicality, by stating that the record of technical discussions within 
the Expert Appraisal Committees is a task that helps guaranteeing 
transparency in the decision-making process, thus fostering the 
relevance of the environmental rule of law. Finally, the EAC was 
directed, in this case, to add specific conditions on the drainage system 
and on the discharge of treated wastewater, as well as to review the 
objections raised during the public hearing. The NGT thus safeguarded 
the validity of the EC, considering the huge entity of the project for the 
economy of the State, but suspended it for six months, in order to allow 
the EAC to review the phase of appraisal. 
The phase of appraisal is logically fundamental, as it is the last step 
before the decision of granting an environmental clearance, and it 
further acquires a higher relevance the more consistent the project is in 
terms of dimensions and environmental impact. In the Gau Raxa case,630 
the Tribunal overviewed the legality of a project of enlargement of a 
port in Rajula, Gujarat, that would entail the tripling of the logistic 
space of the infrastructure and an eight-fold augmentation of its storage 
capacity, to the detriment of the health of the villagers and of mangrove 
forest, migratory bird habitats, and various species of wild fauna. 
Considering the results of the public hearing held at the site of 
construction, that highlighted several flaws of the project, the Tribunal 
recalled the essence of the appraisal, “not a mere formality”, at “it does 
require the detailed scrutiny by the EAC or SLEAC of the application as well 
as documents filed such as the final EIA Report, outcome of the public 
consultation”.631 As for the formal requirements, the Tribunal asserted 
its interpretation that the appraisal should be completed in sixty days 
and that the document arising from this phase should contain the 
reasons at the basis of the choice of clearance or rejection of the project, 
as rigid rules that are necessary for the assurance of the objectivity of 
the procedure. In fact, the externalisation of the procedure to a 
                                                          
630 Appeal No. 47 of 2012, dated 22nd of August 2013. 
631 Ibidem, paragraph 27. 
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committee of experts finds its legal ratio in the tentative independence 
of this body for examining the material arising out the the three 
previous phases: a report on appraisal should thus state the reasons for 
the decision to be taken, whether positive or negative and should not 
be a mere echo of a technical meeting. Appraisal means, in the reading 
of the judges, a thorough scrutiny of the available material and also a 
comparison, if possible, with similar projects. However, showing 
pragmatism in acknowledging the correctness of the phases of 
screening, scoping and of the public hearing, the NGT only quashed 
stage four of the environmental clearance - appraisal - while keeping 
intact the previous stages.  
The result of such judicial activity has thus been a thorough definition 
of the single aspects of administrative authorisations for granting 
consent to pursue economic projects. It is noteworthy that the activism 
of the Tribunal has fostered basic safeguards contained in the concept 
of rule of law: by dissecting each and every phase of the proceedings, 
the judges have elaborated a body of legal decisions that helps 
orienting both the administration and private citizens in fulfilling the 
expectations of a real sustainable development that can bridge the 
socio-economic and the environmental dimensions, through the 
support of indisputable legal concepts. This is a result that has also 
been achieved thanks to the scientific expertise of the Tribunal, that 
comes to the forefront as a preliminary asset ensuring that legal 
decisions are taken on the basis of ascertained data. 
 
b)    Expertise for an investigative and systemic approach 
What arises from the analysis of the jurisprudence of the National 
Green Tribunal is an attention to the details not only of the 
proceedings, but also of the scientific data presented by the parties in 
the process. Clearly, this approach - that could be defined as 
investigative - derives from the expertise brought into the court by the 
presence of members coming from scientific backgrounds and 
constitutes the added value the Tribunal could draw from the mixed 
composition inspired by the Australian and New Zealander 
predecessors. 
The Tribunal itself claimed the special character of its composition and 
affirmed the independence of its members, whether judicial or expert (a 
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feature that had often been reported as insufficient with regard to its 
tentative predecessor, the NEAA):632 in the Wilfred case, the judges 
held that under the Rules of 2010 “the Government has to invite 
applications, screen and shortlist the same and the shortlisted candidates have 
to appear before the Selection Committee to be interviewed in terms of Rule 5 
(5). (…) The Chairperson, Judicial Members and Expert Members can be 
removed on the grounds stated under clauses (a) to (e) of sub- section (1) of 
Section 10 of the NGT Act by the Central Government, but only after a 
regular enquiry is conducted by a Judge of the Supreme Court, after receiving 
the preliminary finding of a Committee constituted by the Government in 
terms of Rule 21 of the Rules. (…) The misbehaviour or incapacity of the 
Chairperson or Judicial or Expert Member has to be in relation to his tenure as 
such. It has to be in relation to performing the functions of the office in respect 
of the post that the Chairperson or the Judicial Member or the Expert Member 
holds.” 633  The asserted independence of both judicial and expert 
members is a key factor that influences the operation of the Tribunal 
and testifies of the attempt at presenting the Tribunal as a reputational 
institution as well as it fosters a modality of judicial reasoning that is 
peculiar to this environmental jurisdiction. 
A variety of cases adjudicated in the history of the Tribunal shows how 
every order or judgment follows a pattern that initiates by the 
exposition of the facts and the possible procedural points leading to a 
rejection of the case for lack of jurisdiction, to end up with an in-depth 
analysis of the scientific evidence presented by the parties and an 
orientation of the case according to the constitutional and international 
environmental principles. Among these common features of the 
decisions of the Tribunal, the scientific analysis is patently the most 
significant insofar as it is the litmus test for apprehending the 
improvements in environmental justice. 
As Gill analysed in its comprehensive and innovative contribution on 
the role of expert members in the decision-making process of the 
                                                          
632 See supra, Chapter III, Section III. 
633 M.A. No. 182 of 2014 and M.A. No. 239 of 2014 in Appeal No. 14 of 2014 and 
M.A. No. 277 of 2014 in O.A. No. 74 of 2014 and O.A. No. 74 of 2014, dated 17th 
of July 2014, paragraph 34. 
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Tribunal,634 the involvement of experts in environmental sciences has 
been central in fostering the appropriateness of the decisions of the 
Tribunal, insofar as the expert members work with a methodology 
focused on problem-solving, an approach that complements the 
accurateness that characterises the legal reasoning of the judicial 
members. Drawing from literature deriving from the fields of political 
science and epistemic philosophy,635 Gill analysed several cases of the 
National Green Tribunal in 2014 and 2015 through a set of interviews to 
both judges and specialists of environmental legal issues. The result of 
the study has been an in-depth appraisal of the role of expert members, 
highlighting their intrinsic value, the legitimacy attributed to the 
judgments thanks to the neutrality of the experts, the instrumental 
approach aimed at problem-solving and consultative process and, 
finally, the strategic “political” use of knowledge focused at enlarging 
the powers of the Tribunal.636  Here, the aspect that will be mainly 
considered is the investigative approach of the judges - both judicial 
and expert members - as a trademark of the activity of the Tribunal in 
adjudicating cases: as noted in the previously cited study, 637  the 
collegiality of the decisions of the Tribunal is ensured through a 
division of tasks between judicial and expert members - the former 
drafting the order/judgment in legal terms, the latter preparing a 
                                                          
634  Gill, G.N., Environmental Justice in India: The National Green Tribunal and 
Expert Members, in Transnational Environmental Law, 1, 2016, pp. 1-31. 
635  Kuhn T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1970, and, specifically, Haas P.M., ‘Epistemic Communities’, in 
Bodansky, D., Brunée, J., and Hey, E. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 791–806; 
Schrefler, L., ‘The Usage of Scientific Knowledge by Independent Regulatory 
Agencies’, in Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and 
Institutions, 23(2), 2010, pp. 309–30; Schrefler, L., ‘Reflections on the Different Roles 
of Expertise in Regulatory Policy Making’, in Ambrus et al. (eds.), The Role of 
‘Experts’ in International and European Decision-Making Processes: Advisors, 
Decision Makers or Irrelevant Actors?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2014, pp. 63-81. 
636 Gill, G.N., op.cit., pp. 14-28. 
637 Ibidem, p. 19. 
  288 
technical note that is often plainly integrated in the decision - with 
phases of shared reflection and action. With a view to this 
methodology, the role of the “technicians” in shaping the final decision 
is indeed capital insofar as they are the sole actors in the proceedings 
endowed with the capacity of assessing scientific data through an 
investigative reading of the material (sometimes even complemented 
by inspections in site by the experts). 638  The investigative method, 
regardless of its direct or indirect application, has been and is one of the 
key factors in adjudicating cases. 
The Tribunal has thus entered the realm of environmental sciences and 
of planning with an investigative approach aimed not only at defining 
the administrative steps for environmental clearances, 639  but also 
through a comparative study of the options on the table for decision-
makers and of the scientific set of information available on record. The 
cases concerning environmental clearances are indeed a reservoir of 
precedents that display the correct assessment administrative agencies 
and Ministries should make on a range of development projects 
encompassing thermal power plants, urban constructions, forest 
management, infrastructure, etc.. Indeed, the NGT described its activity 
and the litigation originating from environmental issues as “not 
adversarial in nature”, but “rather quasi adversarial, quasi investigative and 
quasi inquisitive in nature.”640  
Several notable cases display this intense activity and capacity of the 
Tribunal in ascertaining the environmental situation and the possible 
damages behind projects presented for environmental authorisation. In 
M.P. Patil vs. Union of India, 641  the Tribunal decided on the 
environmental clearance granted to a thermal power plant project in 
Kudgi, Karnataka, in order to consider the potential and actual 
damages created by the project, in light of the Terms of Reference 
presented for the environmental impact assessment analysis. The ToR 
                                                          
638 M.A. Nos. 879 of 2013 and 403 of 2014 in O.A. No. 299 of 2013, dated 16th of 
October 2014.  
639 See supra, paragraph a). 
640 M.A. No. 37 of 2013 (WB), paragraph 7. 
641 Appeal No. 12 of 2012, dated 13th of March 2014. 
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of the project indicated a series of conditions to be checked for the 
authorisation of the activities that included an analysis of the land, a 
resettlement project, pollution monitoring stations and coal 
characteristics: over all these aspects, the Tribunal exercised a thorough 
review of the facts and of the data presented by the parties in the 
proceedings. Concerning land use, the project proponent had 
communicated that the territory to be used for the power plant was 
mainly rocky and unfit for agriculture, while the public hearing 
showed that the land acquired was mainly used for agricultural 
purposes, thus amounting to concealment of facts to be ascribed to the 
respondent, that hid the nature of the land in order to avoid 
reexamination at the stage of scoping.642 
As far as rehabilitation and resettlement policy is concerned, the 
Tribunal engaged in an enquiry on the adherence of the appraisal phase 
to the ToR. Indeed, in the different stages of the environment impact 
assessment procedure the necessity of a comprehensive rehabilitation 
and resettlement plan was clearly highlighted, due to the substantial 
number of people affected by the project. The order for the 
environmental clearance expressly integrated this plan as a condition to 
be complied with by the project proponent: the plan would have to 
encompass financial details on compensation and a framework for 
improvement of life conditions of those who had not been directly 
affected by the project but that would have suffered from the loss of 
land. As a matter of fact, however, the Tribunal found the inefficacy of 
the remedies provided by the project proponent, as it had not even 
                                                          
642 Ibidem, paragraph 35: “From the various documents on record, it is clear that the 
land is partly agricultural and partly barren/rocky. However, a larger part of the 
acquired land is agricultural – either irrigated or non- irrigated. A few photographs 
have also been placed on record showing that the over-burdened soil is varying from 0.3 
metre to 2.3 metres.” See also paragraph 38: “a perusal of the satellite imagery 
appended by the EIA Consultant to the EIA Report on record does not support the 
contention of the NTPC that the major part of the project area is barren. Further the 
revenue documents as well as the photographs of the area placed on record by the 
Appellant clearly indicate that the area under reference is mostly agricultural land.” 
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prepared a list of project-affected people, regardless of its mandatory 
character.643  
Finally, the conditions on pollution have been the object of a serious 
scientific evaluation: as the coal quality on which the project has been 
assessed has changed in the different stages of the EIA procedure, the 
potential effects on the atmosphere have varied in parallel. 
Notwithstanding these variations,644 the Tribunal has not censored this 
part of the environmental clearance, as the project proponent had 
presented also a worst case scenario that would fit within the air 
pollution limits.  
These decisions are a clear sign of the rationale behind the reasoning of 
the members of the Tribunal collectively acting: the significant and 
innovative feature of the NGT is the added expertise that encompass 
both scientific and managerial aspects of environmental issues. As in 
the aforementioned case, the Tribunal pragmatically acts in a way to 
both uphold the principles of environmental law and their adaptation 
to the single realities presented case by case.  
In the Asim Sarode case,645 for instance, the Tribunal faced the matter of 
air pollution caused by the burning of tyres, provoking the emission of 
toxic gases. Since the issue was not regulated under the Environment 
(Protection) Act or the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 
the applicants approached the NGT with the purpose of obtaining the 
issuance of directions toward the Pollution Control Boards for drafting 
                                                          
643  Ibidem, paragraph 57: “the authorities concerned should have taken into 
consideration the impact of establishment and operationalisation of the project upon the 
persons who were likely to be displaced, even though not the owners of the acquired 
land at the relevant stage, particularly at the time of public hearing, for formulation of a 
desirable R&R scheme.” 
644 Ibidem, paragraph 64: “the sulphur content was taken as 0.35% during the time of 
the preparation of EIA Report whereas at the time of grant of EC the sulphur content 
was mentioned as 0.5% which is higher.” Also paragraph 66: “this appears to have 
been deliberately done by the NTPC to project low impact on AAQ at the time of public 
hearing, as contended by the learned counsel of the appellant.” 
645 O.A. No. 43 of 2013 (WZ), dated 6th of September 2014. 
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scientific guidelines on the tyre re-trading and recycling business. The 
Tribunal responded to this expectation with a short analysis that 
accounts for the enhanced expertise and the consequent decision-
making capability: on the one hand, it delivered a scientific view of the 
problem and a technical assessment of tyre-burning activities within 
the applicable regulations; on the other, it aimed at tracing a path for  
the competent institutions so as to correct mispractices. To do this, the 
judges, thanks to the additional expertise of scientific members, 
thoroughly reviewed the threats to human health and considered the 
risks of the activity. 646  Then, they analysed the impact on the 
environment, confirming the danger arising from tyre-burning and 
calling for a systemic approach to deal with the issue on the long-
term.647 Finally, the Tribunal recognised the capability of environmental 
institutions in India (MoEF and PCBs) to frame regulation for tyre-
burning and divided tasks between them for improving the disposal of 
used tyres. As a conclusion, the judges ordered a study for the 
management of the life cycle of tyres, and prohibited the burning in 
open areas and public places as well as the re-use of tyres for industrial 
purposes.648  
This specific problem-solving approach was again reinstated in 
Pathankot Welfare Society vs. State of Punjab, 649  an application on the 
                                                          
646 Ibidem, paragraph 5: “Both criteria and HAP emissions from an open tyre fire can 
represent significant acute (short-term) and chronic (long- term) health hazards to 
nearby residents. Depending on the length and degree of exposure, these health impacts 
could include irritation of the skin, eyes, and mucous membranes, respiratory effects, 
central nervous system depression, and cancer.” 
647 Ibidem, paragraph 8: “Though, the used tyre is an opportunity in term of its 
contents and calorific value, there is need to systematically deal with the entire issue in 
a holistic manner based on “Life Cycle Approach”, considering the pollution potential, 
tyre generation data, technology options, techno-economic viability and social 
implications.” 
648 Ibidem, paragraph 19. 
649 O.A. Nos. 34, 36, 38 and 40 (THC) of 2013 and M.A. No. 1082 of 2013 in O. A. 
No. 106 of 2013 and M.A. Nos. 232 and 233 of 2012 in Appeal No. 70 of 2012, 
dated 25th of November 2014. 
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installation and working of Municipal Solid Waste Management 
facilities considered to be violative of the Municipal Solid Waste 
(Management & Handling) Rules of 2000. Insofar as the case at stake 
was significant as a pilot project, the Tribunal employed its expertise in 
analysing every step of the plan in order to avoid technical flaws and 
present a comprehensive solution for the problem of MSW site selection 
and construction, considering the litigations pending before the Punjab 
and Haryana High Court, then transferred to the NGT. In reviewing the 
plan presented by the environmental authorities of Punjab - based on 
several ecological and management principles650 - the Tribunal asserted 
its congruence with the concept of sustainable development and the 
precautionary principle as it “provides due scientific methods”. Hence, due 
to the strict control exercised over the authorities, the judges ordered 
the completion of the project in a two-year time frame and extended the 
directions of Appeal No. 70 of 2012 to all cases dealing with MSW 
matters in Punjab, as the judgment approved the model plan to be 
operationalised in the entire region. 
The investigative and scientific approach thus comes as a natural 
consequence of the “graft” of expert members within the body of a 
judicial institution. Notwithstanding the relevance of the jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court, helped by the resort to amici curiae for studying 
scientific and technical matters, the enhanced and comprehensive 
qualities of the National Green Tribunal can be observed in the 
construction of its decisions: as in Pathankot Welfare Society, the Tribunal 
possesses the inner capability of conducing to an environmentally 
sound solution by devising clear guidelines and directions for central 
and local authorities in charge of the environmental policy planning. 
This competence has been used, as the aforementioned cases testify, 
with a view to safeguard and improve administrative processes, but 
also as a method for strictly “coerce” environmental authorities to 
review decisions that are not in consonance with the environmental law 
principles. Moreover, the role of experts has been confirmed also with 
                                                          
650  Namely, effective segregation, collection and transportation; maximum 
resources recovery; effective treatment and safe disposal of Municipal Solid 
Wastes. 
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the classical device of the judicial amicus curiae (the only possibility for 
higher courts to scientifically assess the environmental problems 
arising in constitutional litigation), a methodology that has been 
employed by the NGT for inspection of sites prior to adjudication of 
cases, as in M/s. Sterlite Industries,651 when the judges appointed an 
Expert Committee to investigate on the air quality of a copper smelter 
plant and, specifically, on a precise incident concerning a gas leakage 
causing health issues to the population leaving in the surrounding 
area.652 
The role of the NGT as the watchdog of environmental principles has 
found material embodiment in several decisions where the judges 
quashed environmental clearances flawed by insufficient assessment of 
risks and impacts. In T. Muruganandam vs. MoEF,653 for instance, the 
project for a coal-based thermal power plant was deemed to be 
reviewed in order to present a cumulative impact assessment according 
to scientific parameters. In this case, the Tribunal delved into the 
methodology used for the impact assessment analysis in a comparative 
perspective and found that scientific data allowing a complete 
cumulative report had not been collected by the project proponent,654 as 
the minutes of the Expert Appraisal Committee advising in favour of 
the grant of the environmental clearance did not show a sufficient 
                                                          
651 Appeals Nos. 57 and 58 of 2013, dated 8th of August 2013.  
652  Ibidem, paragraph 34: “the Expert Committee appointed by that Bench (…) 
visited the ambient air quality monitoring stations, maintained both by the appellant-
company and the Respondent Board. (…) The Committee also conducted manual stack 
monitoring for all the 5 stacks to cross check the on-line results. The manually 
measured data and online data were compared and it was found that the SO2 emissions 
from all the stacks were well within the permissible limits.” 
653 Appeal No. 50 of 2012, dated 10th of November 2014. 
654 Ibidem, paragraph 48: “when one is expected to make studies regarding cumulative 
impacts of all the existing as well as proposed industries, it is expected to collect actual 
field data regarding each of the existing industry and together with information on 
proposed industry interpret its impacts on land, water, noise, terrestrial ecology and 
socio-economic environment. Nothing of such kind appears to have been done by the 
project proponent.” 
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analysis of the problems on the ground through mathematical 
models.655 Hence, censoring this “casual approach”656 of the Committee, 
the Tribunal ordered to conduct a new environmental clearance with a 
study including “impact prediction/assessment using appropriate 
mathematical models” and the proposal for “appropriate management plans 
for significant impacts including financial implications”.657 Appeal No. 50 of 
2012 is thus a demonstration of the investigative approach of the 
Tribunal based on scientific methods, not only on judicial logic. 
Moreover, the investigative approach of the Tribunal finds even 
evidence in peculiar cases where scientific evidence is lacking. In the 
Om Dutt Singh case,658 the NGT decided on a project concerning the 
construction of a dam in Uttar Pradesh that dated back to the 1970s. 
Having ascertained the maintainability of the application, as action was 
not taken by the project proponent in the years following the 
authorisation for construction and as the applicant did not challenge 
the order allowing such activity, 659  the Tribunal observed how the 
proposed construction required an environmental clearance that should 
follow contemporary rules governing such proceedings. Indeed, the 
Tribunal found absence of reports on soil erosion, afforestation, health 
problems and the socio-economic profile in general, in spite of a 
perceived necessity of such steps.660 Facing opposite contentions on a 
case started thirty-nine years earlier, the NGT - on the basis of 
photographs and other evidence - stated the mandatory character of a 
new environmental clearance that could account for scientific progress, 
                                                          
655 Ibidem, paragraph 58: “Logic and technique which could have probably outweighed 
submissions of the appellants striking at the very root of Cumulative Impact 
Assessment Study in question is not apparent from the entire text of EAC minutes.” 
656 Ibidem, paragraph 62. 
657 Ibidem, paragraph 64. 
658 O.A. No. 521 of 2014 and M.A. Nos. 902 of 2014 and 14 of 2015, dated 14th of 
December 2015. 
659 Ibidem, paragraph 11. 
660 Ibidem, paragraph 12: “the project of this nature and dimension, certainly requires 
unambiguously stated conditions for avoiding, and in any case, minimizing its adverse 
impacts on environment, ecology, rivers and biodiversity of the area in question.” 
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consequent technical parameters and changes in the implementation of 
the work.661 Thus, the Tribunal directed the constitution of a committee 
empowered to report on the environmental situation following the start 
of the project and on the compensatory afforestation required. 
Again, on the matter of forest protection, the Tribunal demonstrated its 
investigative cum scientific and jurisprudential approach in Sudiep 
Shrivastava vs. Union of India & Ors.,662 where the judges faced an appeal 
against an order granted by the MoEF - with a contrary advice of the 
Forest Advisory Committee (FAC) - for diversion of forest land 
(1898.328 hectares) in Chhattisgarh. As the disagreement between the 
FAC and the MoEF was based on six reasons enunciated in the order,663 
the Tribunal investigated at first on the possibility for the Ministry to 
                                                          
661 Ibidem, paragraph 19: “If the project of similar scale was proposed in the times 
when actual construction work had started after transfer of the required lands, it would 
have required serious considerations from various environmental perspectives and 
much harsher conditions would have been imposed on the project proponent. Some 
activities of the project, like the building of the roads, bridge and dams etc. would have a 
different impact at the construction stage and operation stage.”  
662 Appeal No. 73 of 2012, dated 24th of March 2014. 
663 Ibidem, paragraph 3:  
“(i) The coal blocks are clearly in the Fringe and actually not in the Bio-diversity rich 
Hasedo Arand forest region (a “No Go” area); and are separated by a well-defined high 
hilly ridge with drainage into Aten river flowing towards Hariyarpur in the opposite 
direction making it fall in totally different watershed; 
(ii) Substantial changes in the mining plans as originally envisaged” (…) “make it 
possible to link renewal for phase-II to performance on reforestation and bio-diversity 
management in phase-I; 
(iii) Wildlife concerns to be taken care of through a well prepared and well executed 
Wildlife Management Plan under the aegis of independent institutions;” (…) 
“(iv) Coal Blocks to be linked to super-critical thermal power generation stations 
making such linkage as an explicit pre- condition for approval; 
(v) Power generation plants of Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan being closely linked to the 
said coal blocks, the said States have been persistently following up; 
(vi) Imperative to sustain the momentum generated in the XI plan in terms of capacity 
addition in keeping with broader developmental picture and balancing of different 
objectives and considerations.” 
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disagree with the advice provided by the Advisory Committee, and 
then considered the congruence between the six points mentioned by 
the MoEF and the actual environmental situation.  
In this case, the jurisprudential approach of the Tribunal, an obvious 
feature of a judicial institution, comes to the forefront as a preliminary 
issue on the powers of the different administrative bodies. To the 
contention of the MoEF that the FAC constitutes a simple advisory 
body whose recommendations can be overridden by the Ministry, the 
Tribunal referred to landmark cases of the Supreme Court on executive 
powers for environmental issues664 and developed its reading of the 
Forest Conservation Act of 1980, granting to the FAC a mere advisory 
but authoritative power, whose purpose is the collation of a reasoned 
advice characterised by expertise and in situ inspections, in order to 
enable the MoEF to decide on the approval of projects with first-hand 
knowledge.665 However, the judges esteemed that for overturning the 
advice of the Advisory Committee, the MoEF should issue an order 
featuring “appropriate reasoning backed by data” sufficient enough to 
outweigh the pronouncement of the FAC.666 
Hence, the investigative and scientific part of the decision of the NGT 
stems from this jurisprudential reasoning: having duly studied the 
advice of the FAC and the order of the MoEF, the Tribunal discovered 
flaws in both documents. If the Advisory Committee did not 
recommend the diversion of forest land due to a lack of guarantees for 
original inhabitants and wildlife that had been assessed with a general 
study, the MoEF overrode such advice. However, the order of the 
MoEF, according to the Tribunal, did not pass the Wednesbury test of 
reasonableness on the ground that the decision was not “fair and fully 
informed and consistent with the principle of sustainable development.”667 
This conclusion was reached by investigating on the six points raised 
                                                          
664 Lafarge Umiam Mining Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., dated 6th of July 
2011, 2011 7 SCC 338, and T.N Godavarman Thirumulkapad vs. Union of India & 
Ors., order dated 4th of August 2010, 2010 13 SCC 740. 
665 Appeal No. 73 of 2012, paragraph 17. 
666 Ibidem, paragraph 21. 
667 Ibidem, paragraph 26. 
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by the same Ministry on the rejection of the advice of the FAC: indeed, 
the issues at stake - study of the areas, sequence of mining, wildlife 
protection - were not clear from either the advice or the order of the 
MoEF. Hence, considering that the FAC “failed to give due regard to these 
material issue/questions while tendering its advice to the Ministry and the 
Ministry largely over taken by the anthropocentric reasons ignored these 
material and relevant ecocentric issues”, 668  the Tribunal directed to 
Ministry to seek a fresh advice on all the missing issues and to 
subsequently grant a reasoned order on the basis of such advice. 
What arises from the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, and especially from 
this order, is a multifaceted methodology for assessing cases. As shown 
in the aforementioned applications and appeals, the Tribunal heavily 
relies on the expert members in order to consider and compare 
scientific data and to reach more reasoned conclusions. Moreover, the 
most apparent feature of these judgments is a dependence upon the 
principles enshrined in Section 20 of the NGT Act, whether explicitly or 
implicitly. If the environmental court often refers to the anthropocentric 
and ecocentric aspects of an environmental or forest clearance,669 this 
continuous appeal to the dimensions of development clearly shows that 
the discourse on the environmental rule of law and on the principles 
governing international environmental law has been integrated in the 
working of the NGT and in the minds of the judges, that are 
empowered to foster these legal aspects through their specific scientific 
expertise. The relevance of the Tribunal thus lies, indeed, in the 
interweaving capacity of judges to mix scientific and technical expertise 
with legal elaboration, so as to confirm and fashion the principles of 
sustainable development, polluter pays and precaution in the domestic 
cases.       
  
                                                          
668 Ibidem, paragraph 48. 
669 See, for instance, paragraph 48 of Appeal No. 73 of 2012. 
  298 
Chapter V 
The National Green Tribunal and international environmental law 
 
 
Under Section 20 of the National Green Tribunal Act, the newly 
established court “shall, while passing any order or decision or award, apply 
the principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the 
polluter pays principle.” By approving such a provision,670 the legislature 
empowered the Tribunal to refer to international environmental law 
and to elaborate a domestic vision of the principles governing 
environmental action and adjudication, an illustration of opinio juris 
that in turn shall influence the analysis and content of the international 
law concepts. This Chapter will enquire on the substantial 
interpretation delivered by the National Green Tribunal on sustainable 
development and on the correlated principles, by looking through the 
recent jurisprudence and the reference to the previous construction of 
the Supreme Court on the subject. 
As the prolific activity of the Supreme Court already laid the 
foundation for a reading of the Indian system of environmental 
protection whose cornerstone is Article 21 of the Constitution,671 the 
present analysis will follow such structure. Hence, after reviewing the 
relevance of Article 21 and of the constitutional provisions of the Forty-
Second Amendment, the focus will be centred on the principles of 
protection, sustainable development, precaution and polluter pays, so 
as to assess the role of the Tribunal in establishing international 
environmental legal concepts as a law of the land critically adapted to 
the domestic reality.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
670 See supra, Chapter III, Section III, paragraph c). 
671 See supra, Chapter III, Section II, paragraphs a) and b). 
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The right to environment 
 
a)     Right to life and environmental protection 
As known, the scope of the right to life sanctioned in Article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution has been broadened in order to include the right to 
a wholesome environment, understood as a right to ecological balance, 
the protection of the conditions of livelihood and the averment of the 
requirement of cleanliness of environment as a guarantee of such right 
to life.672 
According to statutory provisions, the birth of the National Green 
Tribunal is a consequence of the world conferences held from 1972 and 
of the transposition of international law instruments and principles in 
the domestic system, through statute law and thanks to the 
interpretation and the directions given by the Supreme Court in a 
variety of cases.673 The judges of the National Green Tribunal have 
often referred to the international, constitutional and legislative 
framework, so as to reinforce their judgments and strengthen the 
authority of decisions rendered on the civil cases presented in these last 
years. The activity of the Tribunal has also been an instrument in 
redefining the main concepts related to the right to environment and in 
confirming the construction ideated by the Supreme Court by blending 
Article 21 of the Constitution with the Amendments of 1972 and the 
integration of sustainable development in the fabric of the domestic 
legal system. 
The Tribunal has thus endeavoured to represent the legislative and 
judicial construction of the past years in a way to reinforce the links to 
international law. To do this, however, the starting point was the 
confirmation of the principles and concepts inherent to the 
interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Kehar Singh vs. State of 
Haryana,674 the Tribunal took the occasion to restate the coincidence of 
definitions between the Environment (Protection) Act of 1986 and the 
                                                          
672 See supra, Chapter II, Section I, paragraph c). 
673 See supra, Chapters II and III. 
674 Application No. 124 of 2013, dated 12th of September 2013. 
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National Green Tribunal Act of 2010. By doing this, the Tribunal 
applied the double construction of the right to environment as 
anthropo- and eco-centric and integrated the notion of environment 
with the right to health: 675  from the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court, indeed, there has been an expansion of “Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India to include the right to clean and decent environment. 
Right to live with human dignity, hence, includes the right to clean 
environment”. In this scheme, the role of the NGT is to guarantee the 
right to environment, equated to the rights enshrined in Chapter III of 
the Constitution, through the effective and rapid disposal of 
environmental cases - a mission inscribed in the Preamble of the NGT 
Act.  
The reference to the notion of environment as a corollary of the right to 
health constitutes the key to open the door of the wider domain of 
adjudication related to urban and industrial activities - a field where 
the plain reading of Article 21 and of environmental statutes could 
display its effects even in absence of international legal principles, as 
the environmental laws of India shall be - in principle - a sufficient 
deterrent for preventing actions detrimental to the environment, 
without resorting to international environmental law.676 The cases on 
                                                          
675 Ibidem, paragraph 27: “The word ‘environment’ is an expression of broad spectrum 
which inculcates in its sweep both hygienic atmosphere and ecological balance. The 
right to life with human dignity encompasses within its ambit the preservation of 
environment, ecological balance free from air and water pollution. It also includes 
maintaining proper sanitation without which it may not be possible to enjoy life. The 
conduct or actions, which would cause environmental pollution and disturb the 
ecological balance should be regarded as violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of 
India. Therefore, promoting environmental protection implies maintenance of 
environment as a whole comprising the man-made and the natural environment. It is, 
therefore, not only the duty of the State but also the duty of every citizen to maintain 
hygienic environment. Thus, there is a constitutional imperative on the State 
Governments and the municipalities to take adequate measures to promote, protect and 
improve both the man-made and the natural environment.” 
676  See supra, Chapter II, Section II, for a comprehensive review of 
environmental statutes (originated from the international discourse, but 
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air and water pollution are indeed significant in showing the cogency 
of those statutes and thus the application of the right to a wholesome 
environment as a result of domestic laws, even without making express 
reference to the constitutional provisions.  
In the M/s. Gokulam Blue Metals case, 677  for instance, the Tribunal 
upheld an order of the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board that 
established the immediate closure of the stone crushing plant of the 
company, on the ground that it contravened to the provisions of the Air 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1981. In its order, the 
Tribunal did not refer to any principle, but directed the company to 
install the necessary equipment for preventing air pollution generated 
by the stone crushing activity, with a view to guarantee environmental 
and health protection of the people living in the surrounding area.678 
Similar views on environmental protection have been expressed by the 
environmental judges in a considerable collection of decisions related to 
consent to operate. In M/s Krishna Stone Crushers et alii,679 a judgment 
rendered on nine appeals related to stone crushing activities in 
Haryana, the Tribunal dismissed the appeals because of temporal 
limitations but analysed one of them (M/s. Jai Mata Di Stone Crushers vs. 
Haryana SPCB)680 and found that, according to the parameters given by 
the State Pollution Control Board, the stone crushing units were not 
operating under the statutory limits and thus constituted a threat to 
human health.681  
                                                                                                                               
deprived of express reference to international environmental principles as the 
NGT Act). 
677 Appeal No. 42 of 2013 (SZ), dated 12th of July 2013. 
678 Ibidem, paragraph 14. 
679 M.A. Nos. 617 of 2013, 734 of 2013 and 735 of 2013, dated 9th of January 2014. 
680 Appeal No. 95 of 2013, dated 9th of January 2014. 
681 Ibidem, paragraph 9: “human health is of utmost importance and must prevail over 
a private business interest. These stone crushers give rise to substantial quantity of fine 
fugitive dust emissions and high level of noise which create health hazards to the 
workers as well as the surrounding population by way of causing respiratory diseases 
and hearing impairment. (…) Presence of stone crushers in the vicinity of villages can 
therefore be a serious environmental and health hazard. Assuming that these stone 
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However, the manifest environmental afflatus of the Tribunal has also 
found certain limits, when possible, due to the necessity to maintain a 
balance between environmental and economic concerns, as two recent 
cases demonstrate. In the M/s Balmer Lawrie case, 682  concerning the 
effects of pollution caused by the activities of a leather chemical 
industry owned by the government, the Tribunal reverted the decision 
of the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board insofar as it did not account 
for the change in technology for treating the trade effluents and for 
achieving a zero discharge objective in the medium term. Moreover, 
this approach was followed in the M/s Narayan Polishing case.683 In this 
appeal on the conduct of activities by electro plating industries, 
producing hazardous wastes, the decisions of the Delhi Pollution 
Control Board denying consent to operate were set aside by the NGT 
because of the pervasive consequences of the closure of an industry, not 
supported, in the case, by sufficient evidence on the effective pollution 
caused by the discharge of effluents.684 However, in both cases, the 
Tribunal  upheld the reasons of environmental protection by ordering 
strict measures of compliance: in the first case, the NGT inscribed in the 
order the mandatory control of the local PCB on the progresses in 
implementing the new technology for leather industries; in the latter, it 
directed the PCB to proceed with a new order within six weeks. 
The concern for balancing opposite reasons in environmental protection 
- which is the typical approach underlying the concept of sustainable 
                                                                                                                               
crushers were adhering to the parameters, which as per the report of the HSPCB they 
are not, even then it is an undisputed proposition that their cumulative effect would be 
injurious to the health of the villagers who are living within 400 or 800 meters of the 
location of these crushers.” 
682 O.A. Nos. 172 and 173 of 2014 (SZ), dated 29th April 2015. 
683 Appeal No. 132 of 2015 (M.A. No. 1188 of 2015), Appeal No. 133 of 2015 
(M.A. No. 1187 of 2015), Appeal No. 134 of 2015 (M.A. No. 1186 of 2015), 
Appeal No. 135 of 2015 (M.A. No. 1185 of 2015) and Appeal No. 136 of 2015 
(M.A. No. 1184 of 2015), dated 10th December 2015. 
684 Ibidem, paragraph 10: “passing a direction of closure under Section 33 (A) of the 
Water Act is an order of very serious consequence. In fact, it amounts to civil death of a 
unit.” 
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development - is also to be seen in the activities of the NGT aimed at 
enlarging its scope of action. For instance, the Tribunal acted in the 
field of environmental protection, with a view to widen the coverage of 
the relevant statutes as far as possible, also towards activities that were 
not deemed environmentally hazardous prima facie: in M/s Ardent Steel 
Limited vs. MoEF,685 the judges included pelletisation activities686 within 
the scope of enterpreneurial businesses requiring consent to operate 
under the Notification of 2006. Hence, with a view to uphold the 
principle of protection, embodied in the Environment (Protection) Act, 
the Tribunal stated the necessity to adjourn the list of activities to be 
subjected to environmental clearance and to include pelletisation 
within the realm of pollutant activities 687  (specifically, primary 
metallurgical processes) according to the doctrine of purposive 
construction that has been analysed with regard to the identification of 
the “substantial question related to the environment”.688 
This is a strategy that has been employed in matters that could not be 
classified as purely environmental at first sight, as those regarding 
noise pollution.689 From the first cases presented before the National 
Green Tribunal, the judges approached the matter of noise pollution 
with the integrated vision of the notion of wholesome environment, 
stemming also from the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act, 
that include noise among the sources of pollution.  
                                                          
685 Appeal No. 5 of 2014, dated 27th May 2014. 
686 Defined as “a process adopted for upgradation of low quality iron ore to make it fit 
for use in the process of making steel finished products,” ibidem, paragraph 14. 
687 Ibidem, paragraph 16: “Process of pelletization is gaining momentum in the steel 
industry as it helps in refining the ore for removal of impurities. But it is a direct source 
of environmental pollution. (…) The purpose of subjecting such an industry to obtain 
Environmental Clearance is to ensure prevention of pollution and also that higher and 
prescribed standards of anti- pollution measures are maintained in the interest of the 
environment in general rather than being case specific.” 
688 See supra, Chapter IV, Section I, paragraph b). 
689  See supra, Chapter II, Section II, paragraph d) on the Noise Pollution 
(Regulation and Control) Rules of 2000. 
  304 
Indeed, in Application No. 34 of 2011,690 presented by the Housing 
Societies of the Supreme Court and of the Indian Foreign Service, the 
Tribunal adjudicated a PIL transferred from the High Court of Delhi to 
the NGT on the use of loudspeakers and music systems by the All India 
Panchayat Parishad. Considering the Noise Pollution Rules of 2000 and 
the EPA, the applicants filed a request for diminishing noise, to be 
envisioned as a pollutant and as an offence to Article 21 of the 
Constitution. As a result of the contentions of the applicants, the NGT 
directed all concerned authorities to implement guidelines on noise 
pollution in Delhi and suggested - as a general method - a series of 
modifications to the Action Plan on noise pollution, including the 
establishment of a call centre, the draft of a standard operating 
procedure for noise control, a survey of religious places causing noise 
pollution and the provision of an adequate number of noise meters to 
all police stations. Notwithstanding the peculiarity of the decision of 
the environmental court, that did not direct, but only suggested 
measures to be taken by the different authorities in Delhi, the 
judgement set the scene for a broadened intervention of the Tribunal in 
matters related to noise pollution as a element causing adverse impacts 
on health. 
Further decisions concur to reconstruct this comprehensive vision of 
environmental protection that include air, water and noise among its 
elements: in this sense, the twin cases Dileep B. Nevadia are a 
demonstration of the approach undertaken by the NGT. At first, the 
applicant, a citizen living in Mumbai, alleged violation of the Noise 
Pollution (Regulation & Control) Rules of 2000 by government vehicles 
using sirens. Hence, in Application No. 36 of 2011, 691  the Tribunal 
acknowledged the health problems caused by vehicular noise (“high 
blood pressure, hearing loss, sleep disruption, speech interference and loss of 
productivity”) and directed the Ministry of Transports and the State of 
Maharashtra to notify standards of emissions and the Police 
Commissioner of Maharashtra prevent private vehicles to use sirens or 
multi-tone horns in residential and silent zones. Moreover, the same 
                                                          
690 Application No. 34 of 2011, dated 18th of December 2012. 
691 O.A. No. 36 of 2011, dated 9th of January 2013. 
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applicant presented a case on automobile noise before the Western 
Bench of the Tribunal the following year, contending the violation of 
the provisions of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 
1981, as well as the Environment (Protection) Rules of 1986 and the 
Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules of 2000. 692  Having 
attested the relevance of the matter and the effects on human health,693 
the Tribunal directed the local Pollution Control Board to notify the 
noise emission standards for vehicles at manufacturing and in-use 
stage and to communicate those standards for compliance by the 
concerned authorities.694 
Finally, the multidimensional nature of the anthropocentric vision of 
environmental protection is epitomised in the Neel Choudhary case,695 on 
the pollution of the environment caused by holding marriage parties in 
Bhopal. Again, referring only to the relevant statute law, the Tribunal 
intervened in a civil suit that dealt with pollution with a view to 
prevent further environmental degradation “with reference to the disposal 
of solid waste, discharge of sewerage, checking of noise pollution and air 
pollution levels”. 696  The judges responded to the contentions of the 
applicants by reviewing the previous cases in similar matters 
(including Application No. 34 of 2011) and by prohibiting the activity 
of the 24 marriage gardens violating norms of safe disposal of wastes 
and of noise standards. 697  The record of the Tribunal is thus 
consequential to the range of matters submitted by the applicants, but 
                                                          
692 O.A. No. 2 of 2014 (WZ), dated 23rd of September 2014. 
693 Ibidem, paragraph 20: “noise pollution is a significant environmental problem in 
many urban areas. This problem has not been adequately addressed and remedied 
despite the fact that it is growing in developing countries. (…) The effects of noise on 
human health and comfort are divided into four categories;physical effects, such as 
hearing defects; physiological effects, such as increased blood pressure, irregularity of 
heart rhythms and ulcers; psychological effects, such as disorders, sleeplessness and 
going to sleep late, irritability and stress; and finally effects on work performance, such 
as reduction of productivity and misunderstanding what is heard.” 
694 Ibidem, paragraph 38. 
695 O.A. No. 18 of 2013 (CZ), dated 6th of May 2014. 
696 Ibidem, paragraph 7. 
697 Ibidem, paragraph 24. 
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also to the scope of the concept of environment the judges are willing to 
define. In the aforementioned cases, on urban and industrial matters, 
the Tribunal has endeavoured to build a notion of environment that is 
in harmony with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on 
environmental issues and the right to life. 
So far, the study on the concept of environmental protection has been 
focused on the human activities hampering the enjoyment of the right 
to life, mainly in connection with health problems. However, in 
addition to these judgments focused on the anthropocentric vision of 
the concept of environmental protection, especially on the right to a 
healthy environment, the Tribunal had also enquired on the eco-centric 
understanding of the notion in one of its first landmark cases, 
Application No. 38 of 2011 (Rohit Choudhury vs. Union of India), 698 
presented by a resident of a village of Assam, aggrieved by the mining 
activities permitted in the Kaziranga National Park (home of 3/4 of the 
world population of one-horned rhinoceros). In spite of the definition 
of a “no development zone” (NDZ), stone quarries were 
indiscriminately set in the area, resulting in adverse impact on the 
environment and facing apathy from the concerned authorities. After 
demonstrating the blatant violation of environmental laws - the 
applicant showed GPS maps that presented seven stone crushing units 
within the NDZ - the MoEF indicated the existence of sixty-four units, 
including tea estates; the State of Assam denied such data, while 
acknowledging that writ petitions for certain units were pending before 
the High Court at Guwahati, and the owners of the units declared that 
those were located outside the NDZ.  
The NGT decided the case according to the precautionary principle and 
sustainable development, but having due regard to refer to the statutes 
granting environmental protection. 699  Concerning the facts, the 
Tribunal acknowledged the “stony silence” on the part of the Central 
                                                          
698 Application No. 38 of 2011, dated 7th of September 2012. 
699 Ibidem, paragraph 29 on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court: “it is with a 
view to protect and preserve the environment and save it for the future generations and 
to ensure good quality of life that the Parliament enacted the Anti-Pollution Laws, 
namely the Water Act, Air Act and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986" 
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and State Governments with regard to the implementation of the 
Notification of 1996 on the NDZ, that resulted in the illegal construction 
of stone-crushing units. On the units, the Central Pollution Control 
Board revealed the absence of clearance on those units (including brick 
kilns and tea factories) and the grant of consent for steel fabrication 
units and hotels within the NDZ. 
From the statement of the facts, the ecological impact that follows is 
clearly classified by the NGT: air pollution from stone units and brick 
kilns; use of pesticides and coal by tea factories and gardens, polluting 
air and waters; a general loss of biodiversity from these activities. The 
Tribunal thus referred to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
(Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action, M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India of 
2006, T.N. Godavarnam of 2012) to set the concept of environmental 
justice with reference to the eco-centric aspect and direct the authorities 
to remove the stone crushers and the brick kilns, to allow stone 
crushing units near the NDZ if pollution control equipments are 
installed and to stop operations of tea factories. Moreover, the MoEF 
and the Government of Assam were directed to draft a comprehensive 
plan and monitoring mechanism for implementing the notification of 
1996 on the NDZ, as well as paying the Kaziranga National Park two 
lakhs rupees of damage, to be used for biodiversity conservation. 
The key concept in the last judgment is indeed conservation, to be 
understood as the complement for protection in the eco-centric vision 
of the environment: if protection is more related to the anthropic 
dimension of the right to environment envisioned as cleanliness, 
conservation is characteristic of the right to livelihood and to the right 
to an ecological balance, in order to guarantee preservation of the 
ecological goods against harms and possible loss. This is an elaboration 
that can be derived by the aforementioned case as well from the 
landmark case Goa Foundation vs. Union of India,700 on the conservation 
of the ecology of the Western Ghats. In the specific case, what arises in 
the matter is the inaction of the authorities in the conservation of the 
                                                          
700 M.A. No. 49 of 2013 in O.A. No. 26 of 2012, dated 18th of July 2013. See also 
infra, Chapter IV, Section I, paragraph b). 
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environment,701 that calls for action on the part of the Tribunal, that 
considered the right to life also in connection with the question of 
ecological balance and conservation. Consequently, the judges held that 
“right to life includes right to environment within the meaning of Article 21 of 
the Constitution of India. To ensure that the environment is not degraded, it is 
the legal right of any person to raise issues arising from the constitutional 
mandate and or even the provisions of the Environment Act”.702 
The two judgments - as the decisions previously analysed - show how 
the Tribunal acted on the matter of environmental pollution and 
protection by following the doctrine of the right to environment under 
Article 21, in most of the cases even without making express reference 
to it. However, it stems from the Rohit Choudhury as well as from the 
Goa Foundation cases the inextricable nature of the principle of 
protection with the constitutional provisions and with international 
environmental principles, mentioned in the judgment as a necessary 
corollary for eco-centric purposes. Indeed, in spite of the subjacent 
acknowledgment of environmental protection within the legal 
discourse of the courts, the NGT has also explicitly referred and upheld 
the construction elaborated by the Supreme Court on the essence of 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 
 
b)    Article 21 and international principles 
In addition to the aforementioned cases Kehar Singh and Goa 
Foundation, 703  the Tribunal recognised the right to a wholesome 
environment with explicit reference to the safeguard of environmental 
rights enshrined in the Constitution, extending the applicability of 
international legal principles in the domestic domain. 
                                                          
701  Ibidem, paragraph 43: “the applicant has been able to make a case of non-
performance of the statutory obligation by the State and other authorities concerned on 
the one hand and that of the need for preventing degradation of the environment and 
ecology of these Western Ghats under the precautionary principle, on the other.”  
702 Ibidem, paragraph 43. 
703 See supra, paragraph a). 
  309 
First of all the Tribunal correctly interpreted the open nature of Article 
21 of the Constitution as far as the subjects covered by the 
constitutional guarantee are concerned. In Ms. Betty C. Alvares vs. State 
Of Goa,704 the NGT maintained the case presented by a person who was 
not a citizen of India, as it was considered an aggrieved person and 
since the guarantee of a dignified life “is not restricted only to a citizen of 
India”. 705  In the interpretation of the Tribunal, the constitutional 
provisions of Article 21, referring to persons in general, entail the sole 
existence of the requirement ratione materiae for filing an application. 
Moreover, in the case Jan Chetna,706 the Tribunal upheld the views of the 
Supreme Court in linking international environmental law principles to 
the law of the land, starting from the Constitution, as amended in 1972, 
to the legislative action of the 1970s and 1980s. As the NGT too 
interwove Article 21 of the Constitution to the environmental fabric of 
the Constitution and of statute law, it additionally integrated the notion 
of environmental information into the right to environment. In 
particular, the Tribunal apprehended the process of public consultation 
under the EIA Notification of 2006 within the broader scope of the right 
to know, as constitutionally guaranteed, and as a branch of the 
construction of the right to environment safeguarded under Articles 21, 
48A and 51A of the Constitution.707 
It is noteworthy to observe, again, that the elaboration of the right to a 
wholesome environment comes as a corollary on the applications 
related to pollution and to anthropic matters - such as urban activities, 
collection of wastes, man-made enterprises as tourism - and later 
                                                          
704 M.A. Nos. 32 and 33 of 2014, in O.A. No. 63 of 2012, dated 12th of February 
2014. 
705 Ibidem, paragraph 4. 
706 Appeal No. 22 of 2011, dated 9th of February 2012. 
707  Ibidem, paragraph 27: “It is no more resintegra that environment is a right 
guaranteed under Article-21 of the Constitution. The Environment (Protection) Act, 
1986 and EIA Notification are the means adopted, to protect the right in discharge of 
the obligations enjoined under Article-48 A of the Constitution. Citizens have a right to 
know and also equal right to object to any activity that may impair the right to 
environment.” 
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extends to a more eco-centric approach that includes international 
principles.708 In the Rayons-Enlighting Humanity case,709 for instance, the 
municipal solid waste management project proposed for the village of 
Razau-Paraspur was considered inadequate because of the selection of 
the site, occurred several years before the start of the project. As in the 
previous years a series of cultural, educational and economic 
institutions had come up, the installation of a municipal solid waste 
management facility in a site surrounded by human constructions 
would amount to a violation of the right to life and a denial of the 
principle of sustainable development, if one considers the balance 
between the risk of harm to human health and the public interest. In 
this particular case, the risk of air and water pollution greatly 
overcoming the benefits of constructing a site for wastes management 
in the selected area, in the interest of the citizens enjoying the 
constitutional right to a clean environment, the Tribunal ordered the 
closure of the site and prohibited the deposit of wastes, also with a 
view to uphold the principle of precaution for guaranteeing the health 
of future inhabitants.710 
Moreover, the right to a clean environment has also been upheld with 
regard to industrial activities. In the M/s. Sterlite Industries case,711 on 
the operation of a copper smelter plant in Tamil Nadu, the Tribunal 
was approached due to the complaints regarding health problems (eye 
irritation, breathing difficulties and throat suffocation) from people of 
                                                          
708 See also, supra, paragraph a). 
709 O.A. Nos. 86, 99 and 100 of 2013, dated 18th of July 2013. 
710 On the motivation for the closure of the site, ibidem, paragraph 47: “the site in 
which the plant is located, is bound to cause pollution of ground water, which is 
relatively at a higher level, by leaches. This is inevitable especially in the rainy season. 
The municipal solid waste, which has been dumped in the open area at the site without 
any laying of impermeable membrane lining. Therefore, the contaminated water is 
bound to seep into the underground water and even affect the adjoining water bodies 
apart from affecting irrigation water. Even the dumping sites have not been prepared in 
accordance with the rules. The foul smell arising from the dumping at the site is bound 
to pollute the air quality of the area.” 
711 Appeals Nos. 57 and 58 of 2013, dated 8th of August 2013.  
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the surrounding areas. As the company appealed to the NGT against 
the decision of the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board that held it 
liable for compensation of damages, the judges delivered a detailed 
examination of the scientific data collected by an ad hoc Expert 
Committee 712  and then linked the question of air pollution to the 
general doctrine established on Article 21 of the Constitution, 
“interpreted by the Indian courts to include (…) the right to clean and decent 
environment. Right to decent environment, as envisaged under Article 21 of 
the Constitution of India also gives, by necessary implication, the right against 
environmental degradation. It is in the form of right to protect the 
environment, as by protecting environment alone can we provide a decent and 
clean environment to the citizenry.”713 In addition to the interpretation of 
the right to a clean environment, the Tribunal also dealt with the 
relationship between environmental and economic rights, with a view 
to integrate environmental concern into the right to development.714  
Hence, after a meticulous analysis of the scientific data and of the legal 
jurisprudence in the field of pollution, the judges held that the State 
government and the company should have acted as to uphold the 
constitutional right of the people living in the vicinity of the industrial 
site to have a clean, healthy and pollution-free environment and 
directed the company to comply to the suggestions made by the Expert 
Committee and the local Pollution Control Board to monitor such 
activity.715 
The decisions of the NGT, as analysed also in the previous Chapter, 
maintain a focus on both the scientific side and the legal elaboration, 
with an implicit reference to the principle of sustainable development 
                                                          
712 See supra, Chapter IV, Section II, paragraph b). 
713 Appeals Nos. 57 and 58 of 2013, paragraph 113. 
714 Ibidem, paragraph 114: “the right to development itself cannot be treated as a mere 
right to economic betterment or cannot be limited as a misnomer to simple construction 
activities. It encompasses much more than economic well-being and includes within its 
definition the guarantee of fundamental human rights. It includes the whole spectrum 
of civil, cultural, economic, political and social process. (…) Development besides being 
inter-generational, must be balanced to its ecology and environment.” 
715 Ibidem, paragraph 148. 
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even in cases where the construction of Article 21 is regarded as 
predominant. However, the manifest embodiment of the construction 
elaborated around Article 21 has been delivered by the NGT in the case 
of the vehicular traffic at Rohtang Pass, in the first application 
presented on the own motion of the Court.716  
Facing the risk of rapid retreat of glaciers in the region of Himachal 
Pradesh because of the impact of black carbon, the Tribunal resorted to 
the classic notion of the right to a wholesome environment as 
elaborated by the Supreme Court. In spite of the absence of a right to 
environment in Part III of the Constitution, the Tribunal recognised the 
expansion of Article 21 to environmental matters. Indeed, “the citizens of 
the country have a fundamental right to a wholesome, clean and decent 
environment. The Constitution of India, in terms of Article 48A, mandates 
that the State is under a Constitutional obligation to protect and improve the 
environment and to safeguard the forest and wild life in the country. By 42nd 
Amendment to the Constitution, the Parliament, with an object of sensitizing 
the citizens of their duty, incorporated Article 51A in the Constitution, inter 
alia, requiring a citizen to protect and improve the natural environment 
including the forests, lakes, rivers and wild life and to have a compassion for 
living creatures. The legislative intent and spirit under Articles 48A and 
51A(g) of the Constitution find their place in the definition of 'environment' 
under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (for short the 'Act of 
1986’).”717 
The articulation of the right to a clean environment thus comes as a 
strengthening of the right to life, as a guaranteed fundamental liberty 
that entails obligations from the state and also from the citizens. In this 
framework, the environment is conceived as the medium that “enables 
people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the right guaranteed under 
Article 21”718, with a link to the predominance that ecological balance 
has over concerns related to economic development. The right to a 
wholesome environment is thus interwoven with the notion of 
                                                          
716 O.A. No. 237 (THC) of 2013 (CWPIL No.15 of 2010), dated 6th of February 
2014. See Chapter IV, Section I, paragraph a). 
717 Ibidem, paragraph 11. 
718 Ibidem, paragraph 17. 
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sustainable development and the judiciary is bound to apply a series of 
principles derived from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court: 
 the basic acknowledgement that the right to a wholesome 
environment is part of the right to life; 
 the obligation by state agencies to abide the provisions of 
environmental statutes; 
 the obligation upon state agencies to perform their environmental 
duties, regardless of impediments; 
 the existence of the polluter pays principle in the law of the land; 
 the role of the precautionary principle, that imposes the anticipation 
of the causes of pollution; 
 the necessity to consider ecological factors, including the notion of 
sustainable development and the  principle of intergenerational 
equity; 
 the obligation to exercise the powers given by environmental 
statutes only for environmental purposes; 
 finally, the public trust doctrine as the corollary of the 
environmental policy.719 
The case of vehicular pollution in Himachal Pradesh is thus the 
epitome of the integration of the elaboration on the right to life within 
the international environmental framework built around the notion of 
sustainable development. In fact, if the starting point is the action of 
state and citizens alike with a view to uphold sustainable development, 
which means that an action should be based on a balanced approach 
between the ecological and economic concerns, the logical consequence 
is the consolidation of the polluter pays principle, the precautionary 
principle and the principle of proportionality as complements to this 
approach.  
                                                          
719 Ibidem, paragraph 18. 
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If the piecemeal analysis of the jurisprudence of the National Green 
Tribunal is certainly helpful in devising the judicial strategies for 
affirming environmental rights - whether by a silent recognition of the 
right to a clean or wholesome environment, by the explicit reference to 
constitutional principles or by the integration of international principles 
within the legal system - the resort to this third way, starting from the 
implementation of the principle of sustainable development in the 
single cases, shall unquestionably constitute the selected method for 
assessing the effectiveness of a Tribunal that is proving to be more 
mindful of substantial issues of environmental justice - for its own 
nature of mixed body - rather than being moved by concerns over 
technical or heuristic classifications. 
 
I) Sustainable development in the jurisprudence of the NGT 
 
a)     A combined reading of the principles 
The National Green Tribunal immediately started its activities with the 
discussion of a series of appeals arising from its competence under 
Section 18 of the NGT Act and from the possibility to transfer cases.720 
Since the very first cases, the Tribunal endeavoured to implement the 
provision contained in Section 20 of the Act, in order to link its 
decisions to the principles of international environmental law. 
However, if the statutory aim of the Tribunal is manifest, the very aim 
of the Tribunal could result in a conundrum of its jurisprudence: the 
reference to the multifaceted notion of sustainable development - that 
bridges economic, social, environmental and legal dimensions - could 
have been the origin of a corpus of “asymmetrical” decisions, some 
reflecting a strict reading of environmental statutes, some accounting 
for a more economic-oriented approach.    
The first cases decided by the NGT show, in this regard, the application 
of the statutory provisions. On the 14th of December 2011, the Tribunal 
adjudicated Appeal No. 5 of 2011, a case filed for challenging a forest 
clearance granted by the MoEF for a development project in 
                                                          
720 See Chapter IV, Section I, paragraph b). 
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Uttarakhand. The case, resulting from an environmental clearance 
already granted in 2007 and regarding a major hydroelectric project on 
the river Ganges,721 had already been presented before the Supreme 
Court: the residual questions before the NGT thus only concerned the 
forest clearance, but was the occasion for a summary of the procedural 
steps undertaken by the project proponents. The judges, in organising 
the questions to be answered for delivering the decision, explicitly 
addressed the matter of the congruence between the project approved – 
involving the diversion of forest land – and the principles of sustainable 
development and precaution. Since previous administrative acts 
already comprehended the necessity to study the ecological 
sustainability of the project with reference to the aquatic eco-system 
and bio-diversity, the Tribunal entered into these issues by noting the 
good practice established in this case, as the project consisted of 
innovative initiatives such as the involvement of an NGO to act with 
locally affected communities, the use of less invasive technologies for 
pursuing certain works (e.g. tunnels) and benefits for the population in 
terms of educational training, employment and services. 
However, the Tribunal delved into the matter of cumulative effects of 
the project vis-à-vis sustainable development, considering that the 
alleviation of single aspects does not entail a comprehensive prevention 
of adverse effects, including “impacts such as quantum loss of agricultural 
land, barren land, river bed land, number of project affected families, villages, 
infrastructure, geological setting etc.”. Thus, the Tribunal concluded that 
“an integrated and comprehensive study for the purpose of a flawless 
approach” was necessary for establishing coherence with the principles 
of sustainable development and precaution. Finally, it directed the 
constitution of a committee charged of the redaction of a cumulative 
impact assessment report. 
On the contrary, the Tribunal confirmed the environmental clearance 
granted to the construction of a coal based thermal power plant in 
Maharashtra in Balachandra Bhikaji Nalwade vs. MoEF. 722  On similar 
                                                          
721 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad vs. Union of India & Ors., orders dated 27th of 
April 2007 and 20th of February 2009. 
722 Appeal No. 21 of 2011, dated 29th of November 2011. 
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allegations by the appellants, that argued the inconsistency of the 
project with reference to the impacts on the ecosystem and to 
sustainable development and the precautionary principle, the judges 
demonstrated a critical stance by applying their practical and heuristic 
tools to the specific case.  
First of all, the Tribunal upheld the effective integration of scientific 
data into the appraisal phase of the project, a preliminary condition that 
had been directed by the High Court that initially took notice of the 
case.723 Then, it analysed the contention on possible damages to mango 
orchards and aquatic life in light of the precautionary principle: another 
false allegation, as it stemmed from the records of the Expert Appraisal 
Committee that the MoEF included in the conditions of the project the 
construction of a desulphurisation system, the plantation of trees as 
buffer and the possible measures to be applied in case the levels of 
sulphur dioxide exceed the standards.724 Finally, it reviewed the coal 
plant project in connection with sustainable development and stated 
that since the “production of electricity is very essential for industrial growth 
apart from domestic need (…), in the light of the existing power scenario in the 
country, the project under consideration when operated within the eco-legal 
frame work may contribute significantly to sustainable industrial development 
in the area under consideration”.725  Hence, the Tribunal dismissed the 
appeal, while confirming the necessity of actions in conformity with 
environmental principles. 
                                                          
723  Ibidem, paragraph 9: “the sub-group of EAC specifically refers to Science & 
Technology Park (STP), Pune had compiled the information on impact of coal based 
power plants, particularly mango and aquatic ecology based on the published research 
and development papers. This was specifically evaluated and considered by the EAC. In 
the meeting held in the months of November and December 2009, the representatives of 
KKVD and Maharashtra Pollution Control Board considered their expert views prior to 
finalizing and forwarding recommendations. Apart from this, Prof. Saimullah of 
Aligarh Muslim University shared his expert knowledge and literature on the subject 
and his views were considered by EAC sub-group.” 
724 Ibidem, paragraphs 11-12. 
725 Ibidem, paragraph 14. 
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The relevance of these two early judgments is the way in which they 
laid the foundation for the judicial reasoning of the environmental 
tribunal. On the one hand, the multidisciplinary and scientific approach 
emerges as a constituting element of the decision and catalyses the 
impact of the judgment, reinforced by such scientific analysis.726 On the 
other, the judges attempt to integrate international and national sources 
with a view to create a truly comprehensive environmental rule of law: 
as in the Balachandra Bhikaji Nalwade case, the Tribunal considered the 
application of the precautionary principle within an administrative 
procedure. This is a methodology that embodies the essence of Section 
20 of the NGT Act - through a combined reading of international 
environmental principles - and that enables the Tribunal to undertake 
an activist strategy towards the adjudication of cases, while 
maintaining the respect of the rule of law.  
This activist approach is also to be seen in the case Jeet Singh Kanwar vs. 
Union of India,727 where the Tribunal quashed an order of the MoEF 
granting an environmental clearance for a coal power plant by 
rephrasing the principle of sustainable development and applying it to 
the project. While the NGT deemed the procedure of public hearing 
correct - another substantiation of the care the Tribunal applies with 
regard to upholding the rule of law - it analysed the action of the Expert 
Appraisal Committee and of the MoEF and considered these to be 
inconsistent with the environmental situation and the policies enacted 
by that Ministry. Indeed, the order of consent required a forest 
clearance and concerned an area that was not reserved for constructing 
polluting projects such as a coal power plant. The NGT thus 
condemned the general nature of the order granted and its conditional 
nature, as it subjected the project proponent to a series of restrictions 
that should have been solved beforehand. Namely, the Tribunal found 
the environmental clearance to be inconsistent with the principle of 
sustainable development and the precautionary principle. On the 
former, the NGT recalled the active nature of the concept of sustainable 
development as a “balancing act” that “requires proper evaluation of both 
                                                          
726 See supra, Chapter IV, Section II, paragraph b). 
727 Appeal No. 10 of 2011, dated 16th of April 2013. 
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the aspects, namely, degree of environmental degradation which may occur due 
to the industrial activity and degree of the economic growth to be achieved". 
On the latter, the EAC should have examined the “probability of 
environmental degradation (…) and the viability of the project (…) in an area 
declared as critically polluted” to a “project which involved “ifs & buts”. (…) 
Therefore, by applying precautionary principle, the EC should not have been 
granted by the MoEF”. Since the project proponent did not succeed in 
discharging its onus of proof by showing that the activities were not 
sustainable, the NGT quashed the order by highlighting the major 
principles arising from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, 
namely: 
“- environmental measures to be taken by the Government and statutory 
bodies must anticipate, prevent any attack which causes environmental 
degradation; 
- where there are threats of serious irreversible damage, lack of scientific 
certainty cannot be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent such 
degradation; 
- the onus is on the developer to show that his actions are environmentally 
benign.”  
Hence, the Tribunal confirmed its role as a watchdog of the 
environment and the heritage of the Supreme Court as far as the 
combination of the principles is concerned. Notwithstanding the 
analytical work of the judges is defining the single elements of 
sustainable development and the application of the principles 
complementing it,728  the main strategy of the Tribunal has been to 
advance the integrated reading of sustainable development, precaution 
and polluter pays within a comprehensive paradigm.729  
The role of the principles of international environmental law is 
highlighted also by the indication of them by the applicants filing a case 
before the Tribunal, an approach that accounts for the wiseness the 
                                                          
728 See infra, Section III, for the precautionary principle and the polluter pays 
principle. 
729 See also, as the most relevant example, O.A. No. 237 (THC) of 2013 (CWPIL 
No.15 of 2010), dated 6th of February 2014. 
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legislature used in including a redrafted Section 20 in the NGT Act and 
shows the awareness of the public with regard to the new judicial 
institution. In Ramesh Agrawal vs. Union of India,730 for instance, the case 
involving an environmental clearance was presented by the appellant 
as a flawed approval of a project due to the “clear violation of the 
'Precautionary Principle' and principle of 'Sustainable Development’”. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the coal-based super thermal power 
project to be built in Chhattisgarh was approved without a proper and 
detailed Rehabilitation and Resettlement plan that could account for 
the socio-economic challenges in the area, the Tribunal held that it is 
possible to single out the process of environmental clearance and the 
presentation of a rehabilitation and resettlement plan, provided that 
full information regarding key issues such as the nature of the land 
acquired for the project and the economic activities of project affected 
people.731 Hence, the Tribunal, after analysing all the scientific material 
reported in the different stages of the environmental clearance, 
dismissed the appeal due to the non-existence of the alleged violation 
of the principles of precaution and sustainable development.732 
Again, a similar approach was pursued by other applicants to the 
National Green Tribunal, that inserted the principle of 
intergenerational equity within the judicial construction of the concept 
                                                          
730 Appeal No. 8 of 2013 (CZ), dated 22nd of August 2014. 
731 Ibidem, paragraph 27 V: “if it is permissible for delinking the R&R from EC 
process then surely it cannot be a material defect by not providing this information in 
detail in the DEIAR so as to affect the grant of EC after final assessment.” 
732 A conclusion that is not clearly stated - the principles are not mentioned in 
the judgment - but that is elaborated on the basis of the acceptance of the 
procedure of approval of the project, provided that if flaws in implementing 
environmental standards occur, the aggrieved people can approach the 
competent Tribunal (ibidem, paragraph 34: “The PAPs can also in the event of non-
implementation of R&R measures or CSR measures approach for their implementation 
and seek additional measures if required in the interest of general public.”) 
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of sustainable development in the Wilfred case.733 In this application 
presented by fishermen aggrieved by the construction of the Vizhinjam 
deepwater port project in Kerala, the proponents alleged a direct 
violation of the principle of intergenerational equity since the project 
affected the ecology of the coastal area, albeit not protected by federal 
legislation.734  
The paradigm applied by the National Green Tribunal seems thus 
aimed at fostering the reasons for environmental protection - which is a 
statutory mission - to the detriment of economic and purely human-
centred concerns. Indeed, the purpose of the Tribunal is to set up an 
environmental adjudicatory mechanism that upholds the provisions 
contained in the most relevant statutes for environmental protection. 
However, the inclusion of sustainable development - and, thus, of its 
definitional conundrums735 - calls for an approach that could effectively 
account not only of the respect of environmental statutes, but also of 
the socio-economic conditions involved in the application of 
sustainable development, in order to foster a corpus of jurisprudence 
that assimilates a balance between human-centred actions and 
ecological safeguards. 
 
b)    A legally balanced approach? 
As stated in the general part on international law principles, the 
embodiment of the notion of sustainable development comes as a result 
                                                          
733 M.A. No. 182 of 2014 and M.A. No. 239 of 2014 in Appeal No. 14 of 2014 and 
M.A. No. 277 of 2014 in O.A. No. 74 of 2014 and O.A. No. 74 of 2014, dated 17th 
of July 2014. 
734  Ibidem, paragraph 15: “the Central Government has omitted to discharge its 
obligation with respect to preservation and protection of ‘coastal areas of outstanding 
natural beauty’. Intergenerational Equity is an integral element of ecological 
sustainable development and has been incorporated into international law as well. 
Applying that principle, it is the duty of all concerned with the present to ensure that 
the next generation is not exposed to undue hardship or ecological or environmental 
degradation.” 
735 See infra, Chapter I, Section III. 
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of the activity of domestic courts, on a case basis.736 Evidently, this is 
also the case of the National Green Tribunal, that applied the concepts 
derived from international law in the Indian context, in all the 
environmental issues presented since its establishment. Following the 
definition of sustainable development of the Brundtland Report and the 
interpretation of the Supreme Court since the 1990s, the Tribunal 
addressed the applications and the appeals filed within its competences 
with a view to identify the correct balance between economic reasons, 
social requirements and environmental concerns, aided by its 
specialised character and its enhanced expertise. Moreover, the 
National Green Tribunal developed its reading of the principles by 
complementing the decisions of the Supreme Court, so as to build an 
efficient relationship with the most recent pronouncements of the apex 
tribunal. 
One of the first cases before the Principal Bench of the National Green 
Tribunal epitomises the typology of judicial reasoning applied by the 
Tribunal. Appeal No. 7 of 2011 (T),737 on the expansion of a coal-based 
thermal power plant in Nagpur, is characteristic of the balancing 
approach. The appeal was presented by environmental groups and 
individuals affected by the project, on the ground that the 
expansion/substitution of the already existing power unit, in the 
vicinity of human habitations, would cause irreparable damages and 
ecological pollution. To analyse this case, the Tribunal initially 
confirmed the contentions of the respondent - namely, that the 
expansion of the plant would not provoke air and water pollution.738 
Moreover, the judges acknowledged that the impact assessment had 
been conducted by consciously considering the socio-economic 
                                                          
736 See supra, Chapter I, Section II. 
737 Appeal No. 7 of 2011 (T), dated 20th of September 2011. 
738  Ibidem, paragraph 3: “there is no danger for environment and human life in 
establishing the present expanded project. There is no wastage of water. The municipal 
waste water is proposed to be recycled and used. Thus there is no additional 
requirement of fresh water from the other source. The Koradi river is 1 km away from 
the project site. All the precautions as to controlling the fly ash and the utility of the 
bottom ash have been taken care of.” 
  322 
advantages arising from the implementation of the expansion project - 
the necessity of energy and the location of the site far from residential 
areas,739  as well as the benefits in technological advanced solutions 
applied to the new units.740 However, the Tribunal pointed out that the 
procedure did not take into account the possibility of nuclear radiation 
produced by the site: to analyse this health and ecological risk, two 
nuclear experts appeared before the judges in order to estimate the 
level of nuclear radiation in and around such plants. As a result, the 
Tribunal directed the the MoEF to study the question of nuclear 
radiation produced by thermal power plants and, in the specific case, 
stayed the project until consent to operate could be granted on the basis 
of cumulative impacts of nuclear radiation and water pollution are 
concerned, with a view to safeguard human health and ecological 
conditions.741 Therefore, mindful of the potential risks implied in the 
project, the Tribunal adopted a restrictive approach, implicitly invoking 
the precautionary principle: while the judges upheld the correctness of 
the EIA procedure, that followed legal provisions, they also pointed out 
the inaccuracy of certain parts, with a view to obtain a comprehensive, 
cumulative impact assessment. 
This delineation of approach - attentive to legal procedure as well as 
substantive reasons - was confirmed in later judgments. In the Samata 
                                                          
739 Ibidem, paragraph 6: “7 villages in the immediate vicinity of the power plant were 
taken up and it was found that: 
i) Energy/power station was and is a primary need to assure economic growth; and 
ii) Site selection of the present Environment Clearance was environmentally proper at 
the time of its installation because it was away from any residential area. It was then 
located near derelict and abandoned mica mine area and also close to proven coal 
deposits of Western Coalfield Ltd.” 
740  Ibidem, paragraph 8: “the existing plant has old technology and the entire 
machinery is worn out and has become outdated. When they were not able to meet the 
norms prescribed in maintaining various pollution standards, they are going for 
erection of new technology plant. As many as four units are proposed to be replaced by 
the new technology.” 
741 Ibidem, paragraph 10. 
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case, 742  an appeal proposed by two non-governmental organisation 
with the purpose of quashing an environmental clearance for a coal-
based thermal power plant in Andhra Pradesh, the project was 
analysed with regard to the satisfaction of the principle of sustainable 
development and the requirements of administrative correctness. The 
judges, after having read the contentions of the appellants concerning 
the environmental clearance procedure, delved into the appraisal phase 
and set administrative requirements for the analysis of a project. As the 
Tribunal noted a variety of environmental aspects to be appraised by 
the competent Committee - water issues, conservation of biodiversity, 
impact of fuel on the land743 - the judges took note of the work of the 
experts and ordered a review of every single aspect of the proceedings: 
“the EAC should record and maintain the details of technical discussion 
amongst its members. This procedure demonstrates transparency in decision 
making and helps framing not only sector specific, but also site-specific 
technical conditions, both during construction and operation phases of 
projects.” 744  Hence, the Tribunal considered the legal aspect of 
sustainable development, in order to guarantee a proper environmental 
rule of law.  
With a view to uphold this elaboration, the court decided on the 
balance between environmental, social and economic activities by 
suspending for six months the environmental clearance, in the highest 
                                                          
742 Appeal No. 9 of 2011, dated 13th of December 2013 (NEAA Appeal No. 10 of 
2010). See also Chapter IV, Section I, paragraph c) and Section II, paragraph a). 
743 Ibidem, paragraph 56: “the main objections raised were in respect of the existence of 
Janjavathi river within half a kilometre from the project site and the same was not 
shown in the site selection criteria, the land use of the study area as well as the project 
area, whether there were any national park, sanctuary, elephant/tiger reserve, animal 
migratory route exist within 15 km, that the EIA did not mention whether the site 
required any filling and if so the details of filling, the important drainage on the 
surrounds, the information regarding surface hydrology, non availability of data in 
respect of meteorology, the quantum of fuel required and non availability of a confirmed 
fuel linkage, no statistics is made available as to the availability and use of requisite 
availability of water, discharge of water not provided to the downstream users, non 
mentioning of ash pond impermeability and soil analysis report.” 
744 Ibidem, paragraph 58. 
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interests of the environment and ecology, so that the Expert Appraisal 
Committee could reappraise the single issues highlighted by the 
Tribunal. 745  This decision thus stroke a balance that could in turn 
safeguard the environment as well as the economic projects already 
undertaken: the work of the Tribunal has thus been, on the one hand, to 
scrutinise technical data and, on the other, to employ those data for 
ensuring a strict control of administrative procedures, based on 
transparency and the rule of law. Thus, the approach of the Tribunal in 
identifying the respondence of a project to sustainable development 
starts from the ascertainment of scientific facts, then includes a study of 
the legal provisions prohibiting or allowing such activity, in order to 
finally appraise the possible equilibrium between environmental and 
economic reasons. 
The same framework was derived by precedent cases adjudicated by 
the Tribunal, as in Gau Raxa746 and in Rudresh Naik vs. Goa Coastal Zone 
Management Authority.747 In the latter, the judges examined in detail the 
legal aspects pertaining to the construction of a marine slipway for 
touristic purposes and affirmed the arbitrariness of the decision of Goa 
authorities to forbid the construction of a dock, since the reasons 
presented by the administrative body were clearly out of the scope of 
the issue and not based on evidence.748 By adopting the Wednesbury 
principle and referring to the relevant jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court, the environmental judge set aside the order and maintained the 
coherence of the project with regard to ecological necessities. 
This balanced approach read in legal terms has again been expressed in 
the case of the sand quarrying activities in River Cauvery and River 
                                                          
745 Ibidem, paragraph 64. 
746 Appeal No. 47 of 2012, dated 22nd of August 2013. See also Chapter IV, 
Section II, paragraph a). 
747 Appeal No. 20 of 2013, dated 16th of May 2013. 
748  Ibidem, paragraph 12: “the proposal of the appellant has been rejected on the 
ground that execution of the proposal is likely to cause extensive damage by 
undertaking unauthorised hill cutting and would thereby cause irreparable damage to 
the hilly terrain. Thus, the sole ground on the basis of which the proposal of the 
appellant has been rejected is founded on the factum of the area being a hilly terrain.” 
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Coleroon in Tamil Nadu,749 where the Tribunal delved into the issue of 
the exploitation of minor minerals - a subject apparently considered of 
a limited relevance in comparison with the major developmental 
projects.750 After a first appraisal of the issue by the High Court of 
Tamil Nadu and of the Supreme Court, that acknowledged the 
combined impact of small projects on the environment, the National 
Green Tribunal was seised of the issue by a number of appellants 
concerning the grant of the environmental clearance to these projects.751 
Referring to the Deepak Kumar case before the Supreme Court, that 
enabled local Governments to issue such permits,752 the judges settled 
for the contentions of the appellants. As they pointed out the relevance 
of sand mining activities for the economy of the region, they also 
recalled the necessity of paying due respect and implement the 
principles of environmental protection: 753  hence, in absence of 
                                                          
749 Appeal Nos. 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 
84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89 of 2013 (SZ), dated 24th of February 2014. 
750  See, for instance, the judgments analysed in Chapter IV, Section II, on 
environmental clearances. 
751 Ibidem, paragraph 2: “the Hon'ble Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in 
W.P. (MD).No.4699 of 2012 directed to stop the operation of sand quarries. (…) The 
report on sustainable mining of minor minerals submitted in March 2010 to the 
Central Government clearly states that the mining of minor minerals individually is 
perceived to have lesser impact as compared to mining of major mines because of the 
smaller size of mine leases. However, the activity as a whole is seen to have significant 
adverse impacts on the environment.” 
Paragraph 3: “the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Special Leave Petition (C ) Nos. 
19628-19629 of 2009 has observed that the quarrying of river sand (…) may have an 
adverse effect on bio- diversity as loss of habitat caused by sand mining will affect 
various species, flora and fauna and it may also destabilize the soil structure of river 
banks and often leave isolated islands.”  
752 Deepak Kumar & Ors vs. State of Haryana, I.A. Nos. 12-13 of 2011 in Special 
Leave Petition Nos. 19628-19629 of 2009 dated 27th of February 2012. 
753 Appeal Nos. 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 
84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89 of 2013 (SZ), dated 24th of February 2014, paragraph 26: 
“indiscriminate sand mining without assessing the carrying capacity of the area and 
the environment and without a holistic and comprehensive assessment of the impact of 
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guidelines from the competent Ministry for this category of economic 
activities, the Tribunal extended the decision in Deepak Kumar to the 
cases in Tamil Nadu, while ordering the sole continuation of present 
activities for six months, under strict environmental conditions. The 
judges thus entered into the domain of the executive due to the inaction 
of the MoEF 754  and stroke a balance that guaranteed the economic 
needs of the districts, while pushing for a stricter local governance of 
the processes, in order to achieve an efficient compromise that would 
safeguard the reasons of ecological protection. 
The manifestation of efficient compromises is, however, not a constant 
characteristic of the implementation of sustainable development by 
state and private actors. The case Krishan Kant Singh vs. National Ganga 
River Basin Authority755 is an illustration of the challenges faced by the 
Tribunal, following the neverending litigation process pending before 
the Supreme Court on the pollution of the Ganges. In this application, 
the environmental judges considered the dramatic situation of the river, 
contaminated by pollution arising from multiple sources, 756  in 
                                                                                                                               
mining is contrary to the Principles of Sustained Development and Precautionary 
Principles. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Research Foundation for Science 
Technology and Natural Resources Policy vs. Union of India (AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 
852), has reaffirmed the 'Precautionary Principle' and 'Polluters-Pay' principles are 
part of the concept of Sustainable Development. The applications of those principles are 
well settled and they govern the law in our country as is clear from Articles 47, 48-A 
and 51-A (g) of the Constitution of India.”  
754 Ibidem, paragraph 48: “with regard to categorization of river sand mining projects, 
no guidelines were evolved by the MoEF from September 2006 to December, 2013. We 
are of the considered view that the present litigations would not have knocked the doors 
of the Tribunal if only the mandated guidelines were made available in time by the 
MoEF.” 
755 M.A. Nos. 879 of 2013 and 403 of 2014 in O.A. No. 299 of 2013, dated 16th of 
October 2014.  
756  Ibidem, paragraphs 1-2: “260 million litres of industrial waste-water, largely 
untreated, is discharged by these units while the other major pollution inputs include 
runoff from the agricultural fields. It is submitted that more than 6 million tonnes of 
chemical fertilizers and 9,000 tonnes of pesticides are used annually within the basin. 
(…) Sulphur dioxide is produced by fuel combustion and burning of sulphur about 3-4 
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particular from sugar mills, and attempted to respond to the requests of 
the applicants for prohibiting the discharge of toxic effluents. 
In light of the proven lack of compliance by the industries,757 confirmed 
by an inspection directed by the Tribunal,758 the judges acknowledged 
the corporate social responsibility of the sugar mills, that are bound to 
adhere to environmental rules, without raising financial issues on the 
                                                                                                                               
times daily, for sulphitation and sugar mills and distiller. The leakage of S02 causes eye 
irritation and if greater in amount, even leads to acid rains. Fly ash that escapes 
through chimneys with CO2 not only contributes to air pollution but causes immense 
harm to human health. The sugar mill discharges about 1.25 lakh litres effluents 
approximately per hour for lagooning. The seepage of the effluents pollutes the ground 
water. The water becomes harder, oily and greasy and unfit for consumption. Thus, the 
unit causes both air and water pollution.” 
757 Ibidem, paragraph 7: “the unit was to install incineration boiler for spent wash 
management, restrict total storage capacity of storage lagoons to 30 days of spent wash 
generation for composting and install Sewage Treatment Plant for management of 
domestic effluent" 
758 Ibidem, paragraph 27: “in the report, the Expert Members noticed various defects 
and shortfalls in the functioning of these units and that they still were a source of 
serious pollution. It was particularly noticed that the effluents flowing in Phuldera 
drain was having high level of pollution and that such level of pollution was not 
possible, especially the BOD, COD and TDS, except due to discharge of sugar mill 
effluents. (…) Such highly concentrated pollutants would only result from a sugar 
factory and not even from any sewage discharge. The distillery unit had provided 
treatment facility but the treatment units were not adequately working. The concept of 
Zero Liquid Discharge was also not adhered to. The unit had no separate arrangement 
for collection, treatment and disposal of leachate and storm water, therefore, the entire 
storm runoff gets contaminated by spent wash, press mud or bio-compost as it is all in 
open and is exposed to rain. The sugar mill ETP was found to be operational, however, 
the lagoon receiving its treated effluent was having very high level of pollution. (…) 
The Expert Members, taking advantage of the site inspection even provided a “way 
ahead”, giving different suggestions and steps that the Unit should undertake to ensure 
no pollution. Out of the 14 suggestions made, 13 related to the Simbhaoli Sugar Mills 
and Distillery Unit for preventing and controlling the pollution resulting from their 
activities.” 
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matter.759 As a result, the green court considered the responsibility of 
the industries and the financial liability for relief and compensation 
with regard to these violations of the precautionary principle and of the 
polluter pays principle, “in consonance with the principle stated under 
Section 15 read with Section 20 of the NGT Act”.760 Hence, the Tribunal 
fixed a compensation of 5 crores rupees and directed the company to 
fulfil its obligation concerning preventive measures. 
This judgment can be considered a stepping stone insofar as the 
domestic application of sustainable development is concerned. Firstly, 
it embodies the balancing test that is needed for implementing the 
principle: as the Tribunal stated, “right to carry on business cannot be 
permitted to be misused or to pollute the environment so as to reduce the 
quality of life of others. Risk to harm to environment or to human health is to 
be decided in the public interest according to ‘a reasonable person’s test’.”761 
As the sugar mills have constantly missed the equilibrium between 
social, economic and environmental reasons, in combination with the 
lack of legality on the whole procedure for consent to operate, the 
judges could not but censor the conduct of the company, that failed its 
obligations arising from corporate social responsibility. Moreover, the 
misconduct with regard to environmental statutes resulted in the 
violation of both the complementary principles, precaution and 
polluter pays. 762  Therefore, the judges implicitly affirmed the non-
compliance with sustainable development, with reference to the human 
side (the corporate social responsibility of the enterprise), but also of 
the ecological aspect, if one considers the environmental damages 
produced on the fluvial ecosystem of the Ganges. 
                                                          
759 Ibidem, paragraph 35: “the unit is a regular source of pollution till the time it 
achieves Zero Liquid Discharge. It cannot be stated that the unit would become a 
compliant or non-polluting unit. The plea of financial burden cannot be permitted to 
raise as a defence for non- compliance of law particularly, in the field of environment 
and secondly, such financial implication is indispensable part of the Corporate Social 
Responsibility of this unit.” 
760 Ibidem, paragraph 49. 
761 Ibidem, paragraph 51. 
762 See also infra, Section III. 
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The aforementioned cases are typical of a court that adjudicates 
environmental cases arising as appeals from local authorities involved 
in regulation of polluting activities: as businesses are not compliant to 
the environmental rules, and local bodies lack enforcement abilities, the 
Tribunal operates as a watchdog for ensuring the respect of the 
environmental rule of law in human activities and for guaranteeing the 
balance between economic and environmental rights of the citizens. 
However, this is not the only perspective of the issue, since purely 
ecological concerns too are introduced as a constant operationalised 
view of sustainable development.    
 
c)     Sustainable development and ecological concerns 
Although the Tribunal has frequently been focusing on the human side 
of sustainable development, the ecological part of the principle has not 
been neglected by the environmental judge. If many decisions reflect 
the anthopocentric view of the concept - due to the nature of 
applications, based on the relief toward situations affecting people 
living in a particular area - the Tribunal has also developed a 
jurisprudence devoted to purely ecocentric concerns. This constitutes 
another evidence of the multidimensional nature of the National Green 
Tribunal, that accounts for an enhancement of the quality of judicial 
decisions, producing in turn - on paper - an improvement in 
environmental protection and conservation. 
However, conscious of its powers, the Tribunal endeavoured to draw 
certain limits to its action on the basis of international law principles. 
Noting the pervasiveness of the principle of sustainable development, 
that could enable the judges to pronounce in each and every issue, the 
Tribunal stated the preeminence of statute law in small cases, allowing 
the display of international principles in adjudicating more substantial 
issues. This was the view presented in Devendra Kumar,763 a case on 
environmental degradation on the Aravalli Hills of Haryana allegedly 
caused by the activities of sale of marble, liquor and business of gas 
                                                          
763 O.A. No. 91 of 2012 and M.A. Nos. 26, 27, 35, 36,37,38,39 of 2013, dated 14th 
of March 2013. 
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godowns. As the case dealt with the contravention to a notification 
indicating the extent of forest area - and the subsequent prohibition of 
pursuing certain commercial and industrial activities - the Tribunal 
affirmed the non-necessity of resorting to sustainable development,764 
but only to the polluter pays principle in case the violations exceed the 
scope of law.765 
This judicial restraint is at any rate rarely applied by the Tribunal, 
especially when adjudicating issues more strictly related to the 
ecocentric aspect of sustainable development. The judges delved into 
plain ecological matters in Ossie Fernandes vs. MoEF,766 a case filed by 
Coastal Action Network, a group of organisations (representing fishing, 
environmental and legal interests) aiming at protecting bio-diversity in 
the coastal area of Tamil Nadu, against an environmental clearance 
granted to a project for the construction of a thermal power plant. As 
the appellant claimed the insufficiency of the public hearing and of the 
final Environmental Impact Assessment report leading to the approval 
of the project, citing irregularities in the procedure and substantial 
variation of data, the Tribunal analysed the procedure for 
environmental clearance step by step. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
judges did not find discrepancies in the modalities of conduct of the 
EIA report, 767  some ecological features of the project were deemed 
unsatisfactory, such as the protection of turtle nests,768 the impact of fly 
                                                          
764 Ibidem, paragraph 11: “these are not the cases, which need to be determined on 
principles of equity or sustainable development.” 
765 Ibidem: “it is a fit case where the intervener-applicant should be directed to take 
certain steps to correct and make good, the damage that has been caused to the 
environment of the area in question on the basis of the ‘Polluter Pays’ principle.” 
766 Appeal No. 12 of 2011, dated 30th of May 2012. 
767 Ibidem, paragraph 8a: “the procedures contemplated in the EIA Notification, 2006 
beginning with the submission of Application in Form I by the project proponent, 
issuance of ToR, EIA Study and Report by MoEF, GoI accredited consultant, PH by 
State Pollution Control Board and appraisal of proposal by EAC have been complied 
with in full.” 
768 Ibidem, paragraph 8b: “EAC has not verified and considered this issue and simply 
relied only on the presentation made which does not even mentions sources of study, 
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ash due to the use of coal in the plant769 and more generally the impact 
on marine environment.770 Hence, keeping in mind the provisions of 
Section 20 of the Act, the Tribunal only directed to update the EIA 
report according to the ecological requirements advanced by the 
appellants. 
The same approach towards ecological protection is to be seen in 
Shobha Phadanvis vs. State of Maharashtra,771 on the use of forests and 
natural resources in general. Despite the constant reference to 
sustainable development and the judicial argumentations analysed so 
far, 772  the explicit enunciation to the method for implementing the 
principle and the constitutional reference to natural protection and 
conservation have been delivered in this judgment. Indeed, on the 
prevention of illegal cutting and smuggling of seasonal wood in 
Maharashtra, the Tribunal affirmed that “natural resources are the assets 
of entire nation. It is the obligation of all concerned including Union 
Government and State Governments to conserve and not waste these 
resources. Article 48A of the Constitution of India requires the State shall 
endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forest 
and wild life of the country. Under Article 51A, it is the duty of every citizen 
to protect and improve the natural environment including forest, lakes, rivers 
and wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures. In the present case, 
the question is about conservation, preservation and protection of forests and 
                                                                                                                               
etc. May be Olive Ridley Turtles were not recorded, (…) but then there being no 
mention of Turtles sighting in proximity in the EIA report sudden inclusion of 
precautionary measures at the time of presentation before EAC raises some doubts.” 
769 Ibidem, paragraph 8c: “there appears to be a drastic variation in the ash content of 
the proposed coal use. This definitely creates a doubt in the mind as to what is the 
correct position of the usage of coal.” 
770 Ibidem, paragraph 8f: “the appraisal does not reflects consideration to the fact that 
how hot water would be brought to a temperature which is only 5 degrees Celsius above 
normal before discharging back into the sea. Similarly, what shall be the procedure for 
discharging ash pond slurry and its impact on marine environment needs to be 
examined appropriately.” 
771 O.A. No. 135 of 2013 (WZ), dated 13th of January 2014. 
772 Both in Chapter IV and V. 
  332 
the ecology.”773  Moreover, the constitutional safeguard of nature has 
been complemented by the confirmation of the “interactive” definition 
of sustainable development delineated by the Supreme Court as “the 
development, that can take place and which can be sustained by nature/ecology 
with or without mitigation,” taking into account a balance that “has to be 
struck, for the reason that if the activity is allowed to go, there may be 
irreparable damage to the environment and there may be irreparable damage to 
the economic interest.”774 
Mindful of this definition, the environmental judges directed the 
continuation of action plans related to forest management and 
preservation, the maintenance of interim orders based on the 
precautionary principle and the adoption of remote surveillance 
techniques.775 Therefore, the Tribunal reasserted the role of ecological 
principles - implicitly based on the public trust doctrine and on 
intergenerational equity - within the constitutional and international 
framework, an ecological approach that gradually - and only partially - 
shifts the equilibrium of sustainable development toward an eco-centric 
notion, or at least an “eco-aware” aspect. This is a view that has been 
occasionally advanced by the green judges, especially in cases 
involving conservation of biodiversity. For instance, the case of the 
dolomite mining in Kanha National Park, threatening the tiger reserve 
located in the natural park, that has already been mentioned as a suo 
motu proceeding, 776  is a consistent illustration of the eco-sensitive 
approach. 
In this framework, a series of decisions can be considered. Although the 
Tribunal should not be vested with jurisdiction on wildlife, as the 
correspondent Act is not part of Schedule I, the judges considered to be 
seised of the matter of the passage of tigers in the corridor between 
                                                          
773 Ibidem, paragraph 22. 
774 Ibidem, paragraph 21. 
775 Ibidem, paragraph 24. 
776 O.A. No. 16 of 2013, dated 4th of April 2014. See also supra, Chapter IV, 
Section I, paragraph a). 
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national parks due to the extensive definition of environment. 777 
Therefore, the Tribunal endeavoured to pragmatically study the 
interrelation between men and animals caused by the growing 
anthropic activities (in this case, mining between natural reserves) and 
concluded that “wildlife and its habitats are part and parcel of environment 
and preservation of environment shall form the centre stage of implementation 
of management practices and therefore it is for the authorities to examine how 
far the existing Dolomite mines in Mandla District are permitted to continue 
their operations as these mines are located in close proximity to the wildlife 
habitats”.778 As a result, the environmental court left to the competent 
administrations the decision on the steps to be undertaken for 
safeguarding wildlife - with a crystal-clear eco-centric inclination - that 
shall include penal action for those industries operating without 
consent and coordination among local and governmental actors in 
order to find a suitable solution for the problem.779 
Notwithstanding these decisions centred on the conservation of natural 
resources, in general judgments are focused on the human side of the 
matter, even though the ecological concerns raise awareness on the part 
of judges. This tentative ecological approach is also to be seen in the 
M.P. Patil case, 780  where the Tribunal ordered the rescrutiny of 
environmental conditions for allowing the continuance of operations on 
the big thermal power project in Kudgi, Karnataka. Having 
acknowledged the inconsistency of the analysis of the Expert Appraisal 
Committee with regard to the impact of the developmental project on 
the environment, the Tribunal elaborated several rules of sustainable 
development that included: 
 a complementary definition of protection (the maintenance of 
current environmental conditions) and conservation (the effort 
                                                          
777 Ibidem, paragraph 23: “wildlife is a part of environment and any action that is 
causing damage to the wildlife or that may likely to lead to damage to the cause of 
wildlife, cannot be excluded from the purview of this Tribunal.” 
778 Ibidem, paragraph 28. 
779 Ibidem, paragraph 34. 
780 Appeal No. 12 of 2012, dated 13th of March 2014. See also Chapter IV, 
Section II, paragraph a). 
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aimed not only at preserving, but chiefly at improving the state of 
environmental resources); 
 an administrative process based on the rule of law - a proper 
environmental rule of law - that accounts for participation, 
transparency, efficiency and reflects the needs of local populations 
(social as well as environmental) through consensus.781 
Hence, from the present analysis, the main points of purview of the 
eco-centric aspect are thus mainly related to human-based 
                                                          
781 Ibidem, paragraph 75: “Rapid and unchecked development would adversely affect 
the environment. Protection of the vital resources is the need of hour. Gandhian 
postulation recognized the rules for sustainable development and described them as 
follows: 
"1). CONSERVATION: Preservation and nurturing of the vital resources, that still 
remain, are the sine qua non for good environmental management. Conservation as an 
idea is not merely confined to retaining whatever that is left, but involves a whole range 
of activities aimed at rejuvenation and propagation. 
2). PROTECTION: Securing the resource and insulating it from any shocks of 
destruction and degradation is in contemplation here. 
3). NON-DEGRADATION: Ensuring the intrinsic quality of the resources is not lost, 
while putting the same to use, and constitutes the basic tenet of proper and scientific 
resource use. 
4). ADMINISTRATION that is TRANSPARENT, ACCOUNTABLE and 
PARTICIPATORY is a major requirement. This acknowledges the fact that the 
resources cannot be managed from above and finding local solutions to environmental 
problems would ensure effective and efficient environmental management. 
5). LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE in environmental management should emerge 
from and evolve out of people's needs and compulsions and be the result of crystallized 
home spun wisdom. 
6). EQUITABLE SHARING OF BENEFITS is another underlying principle of good 
environmental governance, and 
7). CONFLICT AVOIDANCE AND CONSENSUS BUILDING THROUGH 
CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES in Environmental decision-making is the crowning 
aspect of the system of administration. The litmus test for the existence of a healthy and 
wholesome environment, in any system, depends upon the internalization of these 
principles in the legal ordering.” 
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requirements: on the one hand, the necessity of guaranteeing 
intergenerational equity not only as a value in itself, but chiefly as a 
method for ensuring the future livelihood of mankind; on the other, the 
embodiment of ecological aspects into the framework of the respect of 
the rule of law. Therefore, in the comprehensive review of the notion of 
sustainable development in the interpretation of the National Green 
Tribunal, the main approach is constituted of a visible stance in favour 
of environmental protection - preeminently leaning towards the man-
centred concept - that confirmed the tripartite notion of sustainable 
development, precautionary principle and polluter pays principle. 
 
II) Precautionary principle and polluter pays: necessary 
complements 
 
a)  The precautionary principle as the embodiment ex ante of 
sustainable development 
If the Tribunal often refers to sustainable development as the principal 
goal to attain in adjudicating disputes presented before the 
environmental jurisdiction, the necessary complement to this concept - 
in order to replenish of content the decisions - is the implication of the 
principle of precaution and the polluter pays principle. Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court fostered the notion of sustainable development with 
reference to the other two pillars of international environmental law,782 
the National Green Tribunal followed the path opened by the apex 
court in devising an efficient strategy of decision-making by enriching 
its judgments through a constant reference to those international 
principles relevant to the analysis of the single cases - an approach that 
is also indicated in Section 20 of the foundational Act. Concerning the 
precautionary principle, the Tribunal endeavoured to construct a 
concept open to both anthropocentric and ecocentric visions, in spite of 
a general emphasis on the former aspect.  
Two “streams” of decisions adopting the principle of precaution as the 
focus of the analysis exemplify this approach: on the one hand, the 
                                                          
782 See supra, Chapter III, Section II. 
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judgments on environmental clearance for power projects show a 
tendency of the Tribunal toward the preservation of nature as a value 
in itself; on the other, the recurrent issues on municipal solid waste 
management clarify the man-centred content of precaution for present 
generations, in order to diminish pollution and health hazards. 
In this framework, the Tribunal started to pursue an international 
approach since its first judgments. In the case Sarpanch Grampanchayat 
vs. MoEF,783 whose decision was issued on the 12th of September 2011, 
the Writ Petition transferred by the High Court of Bombay on a case of 
environmental clearance granted for the project of mining at Tiroda 
Iron Mine was adjudicated following the precautionary principle and 
the polluter pays principle.784 As the Tribunal ascertained the absence 
of measures of precaution following the environmental clearance 
procedure, it ordered the respondent to seek a “fresh consideration” of 
the matter by the Expert Appraisal Committee, based on a “fresh report 
in so far as causing air, noise and water pollution keeping in view the 
proximity of the school as observed in this judgment and may recommend for 
relocating the school by constructing a new building at a safe location within 
Tiroda revenue village with similar accommodation and suitable playground 
around” and “as to existence of number of iron ore mines in Sawantwadi 
Taluk and their cumulative effect on the environment and ecology of the area 
particularly the Tiroda village.”785 
The same approach on precautionary measures is to be observed in 
several cases dating back from the first months of activity of the 
Tribunal. In Vimal Bhai, 786  a case on the adjudication of a forest 
clearance for a project of a diversion dam across a river in Uttarakhand 
for generating hydroelectricity power (involving a deforestation of 
80.507 hectares), the Tribunal acknowledged the contentions of the 
                                                          
783 Appeal No. 3 of 2011, dated 12th of September 2011. 
784 Ibidem, paragraph 11: “the EC ignored both the 'precautionary principle' and the 
'polluter pays principle' which is contrary to the pronouncements of the Hon'ble 
Supreme Court.” 
785 Ibidem, paragraph 21. 
786 Appeal No. 5 of 2011, dated 14th of December 2011. 
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appellant vis-à-vis the hydroelectric project,787 but recognised that the 
environmental flows fixed by the authority were in accordance with the 
principles of sustainable development and precaution,788 as well as the 
consideration of the impact on the ecology made by the Forest 
Appraisal Committee.789 Again, on a similar matter, Jaya Prakash Dabral 
vs. Union of India, 790  the Tribunal adopted an identical approach, 791 
although it refrained from deciding over the issue of an incident on a 
dam due to the parallel pendency of a Writ Petition before the High 
Court of Uttarakhand. 
Again, the scope of the principle of precaution was deployed in T. 
Murugandam vs. MoEF, 792  a judgement addressed to evaluating the 
validity of an environmental clearance for a coal based thermal power 
                                                          
787 Ibidem, point c: “negative impact of tunneling on water springs and its subsequent 
impact on forests and agriculture; Methane emissions from reservoirs; deterioration in 
water quality due to less absorption of beneficent chemicals; loss of aesthetic and 'non-
use values'; value of free-flowing rivers; breeding of mosquitoes in reservoirs and the 
negative impact on health; deprivation of sand and fish to local people; negative cultural 
impacts; and negative impact of blasting/ tunneling, etc.” 
788  Ibidem: “after examining the figures and facts and the arguments made and 
considering the provisions made in the stipulations in the FC based on a scientific study 
by IITR within the available timeframe and resources coupled with flexibility option for 
revising the same, we are of the considered opinion that the stipulations regarding 
environmental flow certainly follows the sustainable development and precautionary 
principles.” 
789 Ibidem: “the project is a national project undertaken by the Government of India and 
all the precautionary principles were incorporated in the EC and FC to meet the 
mitigative measures in handling the project; may be in the form of stipulations to 
implement all the measures as suggested by the respective institutions/authorities.” 
790 O.A. No. 12 of 2011, dated 14th of December 2011. 
791 Ibidem: “suppose, there is no possibility of improving the situation which resulted in 
environmental and ecological threats, appropriate steps may have to be taken by this 
Tribunal while keeping in view the principles of sustainable development; the 
precautionary principle and the polluter pay principle. May be the forest clearance 
cannot be directly dealt with but we can definitely examine the matter in the light of the 
above discussion.” 
792 Appeal No. 17 of 2011 and NEAA No. 20 of 2010, dated 23rd of May 2012.           
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plant in Tamil Nadu, allegedly causing damages to the marine 
environment as well as on the health of fishermen living in the 
surrounding areas. As in a number of decisions on environmental 
clearances,793 the Tribunal argued the absence of cumulative impact 
assessment of the project and directed the competent authorities to 
review the procedure for granting the authorisation only for proposing 
mitigative measures respondent to the precautionary principle for 
preserving the marine environment.794  
Moreover, the Tribunal confirmed the reading of the reversal burden of 
proof, 795  as in the Pandurang Sitaram Chalke case, 796  with the judges 
stating (in a case on mining activities) that the evidence that the change 
in the environmental status quo would not lead to pollution or 
ecological deterioration must be brought by the proponent of a 
developmental project, not by applicants interested in the safeguard of 
the environment.797  
                                                          
793 See supra, Chapter IV, Section II, paragraph a). 
794 Appeal No. 17 of 2011 and NEAA No. 20 of 2010, paragraph 20: “we strongly 
feel keeping in view the precautionary principle and sustainable development approach, 
cumulative impact assessment studies are required to be done in order to suggest 
adequate mitigative measures and environmental safeguards to avoid any adverse 
impacts on ecologically fragile eco-system of Pichavaram Mangroves and to the 
biological marine environment in the vicinity. We, therefore, direct that cumulative 
impact assessment studies be carried out by the Project Proponent especially with 
regard to the proposed Coal Based Power Plant (2x660 MW) of Cuddalore Power 
Company Ltd. and the Nagarjuna Oil Refinery and other industrial activities within a 
radius of 25 km from the Power Project of M/s. IL&FS Tamil Nadu Power Co. Ltd. 
(3600 MW).” 
795 See supra, Chapter III, Section II, on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. 
796 O.A. No. 14 of 2012, dated 1st of October 2013 
797 Ibidem, paragraph 17: “the environmental governance principle of 'Precautionary 
Principle' has led to the special principle of `Burden of proof' in the environmental 
cases where Project Proponent has been entrusted with responsibility of proving that 
the project activities will not cause any injurious effects of the pollution on the 
environment. This is very important principle as this is often termed as reversal of the 
burden of proof because otherwise in the environmental cases the common citizen will 
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The gist of the reasoning of the Tribunal is thus aimed at an 
enlargement of the administrative domains in which the precautionary 
principle can be applied, with a view to ensuring a sort of Drittwirkung 
of this principle. Indeed, by imposing administrative steps - such as the 
cumulative impact assessment - that force the competent authorities to 
take into account precautionary measures, the same approach has to be 
envisioned and implemented by private companies, in order to obtain 
environmental clearance. As a result, in the opinion of the 
environmental judges, the precautionary principle has thus to be 
integrated in public policies as well as in private enterprises - since 
every project potentially dealing with environmental issues has to pass 
an “environmental threshold” to be analysed by the competent 
authorities, thanks to the strict regulatory framework (at least on paper) 
defined in the Notification of 2006. Hence, if the precautionary 
principle shall be applied by state authorities, that under the doctrine of 
public trust must protect the environment for future generations and 
actively seek to prevent possible harm, 798  privates too shall aim at 
internalise precautionary measures.   
While the Tribunal has often adjudicated cases involving companies 
engaged in developmental projects (thermal or hydroelectric plants, for 
instance, as in the previous section), a “stream” of cases concerning 
public policies or projects testify of the insufficient implementation of 
                                                                                                                               
be asked to provide the scientific and technological data in order to preserve the "Status 
Quo" and for opposing or raising concerns of the environmental degradation.” 
798 Among many, refer again to the Pandurang Sitaram Chalke case (O.A. No. 14 
of 2012, dated 1st of October 2013), where the Tribunal stated, in paragraph 19 
of the judgment, that “all the Regulatory Authorities including the District Mining 
Officer and the State Pollution Control Board shall take enough precaution based on the 
'Precautionary Principle' to mitigate environmental impacts and damages. The 
Doctrine of the public trust is one of the settled principles of the environmental 
governance. This Doctrine is more an affirmation to the State Power for utilization of 
public property for public good. It is also an affirmation of the duty of the State to 
protect people's common heritage and environment and therefore, these Regulatory 
Authorities are expected to play a pro-active role in the enforcement and compliance of 
the environment regulations in order to avoid such conflicts.” 
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the panoply of environmental laws enacted since the 1970s. Among 
these streams of jurisprudence, a relevant part concerns the 
management of solid wastes, a never-ending issue that could not but be 
aggravated by the constants demographic growth.799 One of the first 
cases decided by the Tribunal in 2011, Gram Panchayat Totu (Majthai) vs. 
State of Himachal Pradesh,800 epitomises the difficulties of governmental 
authorities in devising strategies for managing a sustainable 
development that is mindful of economic and environmental needs. 
In the abovementioned case, local villagers of Totu, near Shimla, have 
challenged the construction of the solid bio-waste management plant 
due to the vicinity to the township. Although the operation of the plant 
would result in the degradation of the environment for the inhabitants, 
the project had already been approved and supported by the directions 
of the local High Court, that ordered the speedy construction of the 
waste management plant because of an accident involving another 
plant in Shimla. Recalling the relevance of the precautionary principle, 
as advanced in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court,801 the judges 
ascertained the non-compliance of the MSW Rules on the part of local 
authorities charged with the implementation of the directions of the 
High Court. However, the result of the order of the High Court of 
Himachal Pradesh was caused by the obsolescence of the regulations, 
dating back to 2000: in the view of the environmental judges, the 
directions of the court, imposing the construction of the plant in Totu, 
had been framed so as to identify a place where environmental 
damages could be avoided. The difficulties in fulfilling such directions - 
due to the large scope of action left to the authorities for managing 
solutions, without specific reference to preventive measures - resulted 
in a decision to maintain the project already approved (and suggested) 
by the High Court, with the obligation of pursuing the construction of 
the plant following the “mandatory requirement stipulated in Municipal 
Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000 as well as after 
                                                          
799 See also infra, paragraph b), on the Yamuna river case. 
800 O.A. No. 2 of 2011, dated 11th of October 2011. 
801 Ibidem, paragraphs 20-22. See infra, Chapter III, Section II, paragraph b). 
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obtaining EC under the provisions of EIA Notification, 2006”,802 but also 
with the recommendation to the MoEF to review the MSW Rules in 
order to integrate the precautionary principle into the regulation, in 
order to indicate specific requirements to implement environmental 
protection for the sake of the ecology and of human livelihood.803 
While the process of amending the Rules of 2000 is still ongoing,804 the 
authorities have undertaken several steps for inserting measures 
respondent to the precautionary principle within legislation and 
executive rules - a process that the National Green Tribunal has 
recognised and positively valued. This is the case of Jarnail Singh vs. 
Union Territory Chandigarh,805 where the Tribunal upheld the validity of 
the rules framed by the Chandigarh Authority that imposed the total 
ban on manufacture and use of polythene carry bags (although the 
Plastic Waste (Management and Handling) Rules of 2011 still permit 
the production of such bags). In spite of the apparent contradiction 
between a notification of a local government and central rules enacted 
in a three-year period, the Tribunal confirmed the local regulations as 
                                                          
802 Ibidem, paragraph 31. 
803 Ibidem, paragraph 30: “we feel that the MoEF should review the MSW Rules, 
2000, and make it more realistic and comprehensive in terms of the environmental 
requirement for protection of natural habitat, human settlement, water bodies and other 
sensitive areas etc. by specifying the minimum distance required to be maintained from 
the MSW Plant vis-à-vis those areas. Prescribing minimum distance criteria of 
ecologically sensitive areas and human habitation etc. from the proposed site will go a 
long way towards preventive measures to avoid environmental ramification, including 
the problem of obnoxious / foul smell / odour associated with such other hazards. The 
precautionary principle as enunciated under Section-20 of the NGT Act vis-à-vis the 
authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, (Supra) requires and 
mandates that the MoEF should prescribe criteria which are workable, unambiguous 
and not vague. This Tribunal therefore, call upon the MoEF to critically review the 
MSW Rules, 2000 and make it more pragmatic, and workable.” 
804  See supra, Chapter II, Section II, paragraph b). For a scientific yet legal 
analysis of the phenomenon, Mane A.V.,  A Critical Overview of Legal Profile on 
Solid Waste Management in India, in International Journal for Research in Chemistry 
and Environment, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 1-16. 
805 O.A. No. No. 26 of 2013 (THC), dated 8th of August 2013. 
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they stemmed from Section 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act, a 
provision that enables prevention of environmental harm; in this 
framework, the Rules of 2011 have been deemed equally valid, but with 
a mere regulatory aim that does not impede emergency or specific 
measures as the notification of the Union Territory of Chandigarh.806 
Hence, the Tribunal supported the action of local authorities towards 
the indication of specific measures embodying the precautionary 
principle - in this particular case, the introduction of recyclable bags - 
and recommended the adoption of similar steps in all the territory of 
the country.807   
Again, the matter of solid waste management was addressed in the 
Rayons-Enlighting Humanity case, 808  where the environmental court 
applied the test of reasonableness to the proposed project for a waste 
management plant only aimed at segregating and dumping. 
                                                          
806 Ibidem, paragraphs 14-16: “the emphasis on exercise of powers under Section 5 of 
the Environment Act is polluter centric. These powers could be exercised by invoking 
precautionary principle, polluter-pays principle or could even be prohibitory where the 
situation so demands. In the present case, the contention of the UT Administration is 
that they had conducted studies and tried various other measures despite which they 
failed to control the environmental hazards resulting from the manufacture and sale of 
plastic carry bags, which resulted in issuance of the above notification, has merits. The 
closure, prohibition or regulation referred to in Explanation to Section 5 of the 
Environment Act is relatable to an industrial activity, operation or process raising 
environmental issues or hazards. It is in exercise of this power that the notification 
dated 30th July, 2008 has been issued by the competent authority. On the other hand, 
the scheme under Sections 3, 6 and 25 of the Environment Act is distinct. The 
Environment Act has been enacted with the object of protection and improvement of the 
environment. (…) The scheme underlying these provisions clearly show that these 
provisions are regulatory and operate in a specific field. (…). It is with reference to 
these provisions that the Rules of 2011 were framed by the Government in exercise of 
its power of delegated legislation.”  
807 Ibidem, paragraph 35: “we also consider it appropriate to direct the authorities 
concerned in all the States to explore the possibility of introducing use of bio-degradable 
or compostable plastic bags as opposed to polythene plastic bags of any thickness.” 
808 O.A. Nos. 86, 99 and 100 of 2013, dated 18th of July 2013. See also supra, 
Section I, paragraph b). 
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Considering the poor results the project would produce on the 
residents, the NGT refused to maintain the plant at the proposed site 
and argued this decision with regard to the precautionary principle, as 
the balance between actual benefits from the  project and larger public 
interests - also for future generations - evidently tilted in favour of the 
latter.809  
The role of the precautionary principle in the decisions of the Tribunal 
is thus central for the construction of a concept of sustainable 
development that could truly reverberate the environmental and health 
needs of the citizens. In the aforementioned cases, pertaining to the 
stream of decisions regarding the management of solid wastes, the 
precautionary principle has been identified exclusively with reference 
to an anthropocentric vision of development. However, the principle of 
precaution entails by itself a concern toward the ecology proper, as the 
paradigm beneath it consists in the transition from an ex post approach 
of impact-assimilation of damages to the environment to an ex ante 
strategy of preventing possible harm to the nature (and to human 
health). Although the two dimensions are often interrelated, the 
Tribunal has dwelled more upon the study of health hazards than on 
the pure ecological side of the matter. 
In this regard, the question of ecological balance was analysed in Sarang 
Yadwadkar,810 on the construction of a road in a river bed in the region 
of Pune, allegedly “bound to cause massive environmental, ecological and 
social damage”.811 With a view to the possible advantages in building the 
road - diminution of traffic congestion and of vehicular pollution - the 
Tribunal ordered the completion of the project, but imposed 
                                                          
809  Ibidem, paragraph 48: “while applying the principle of balance as a facet of 
sustainable development, with reference to the facts of the present case, we have to keep 
in mind the precautionary principle as well. It is better to take precaution today than to 
suffer the consequences tomorrow. It is the future of thousands of students and 
residents of the villages which is at stake. (…) To us, the public health and future of the 
coming generations certainly weighs against permitting the MSWM plant to continue 
at the site in question.” 
810 O.A. No. 2 of 2013, dated 11th of July 2013. 
811 Ibidem, paragraph 1. 
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environmental conditions that responded to the imperative of 
precaution.812 The logic of the Tribunal was to follow the international 
principle of precaution, embodying the principle of intergenerational 
equity, and to define it, for domestic implementation, in the following 
terms: “the precautionary principle (…) contemplates that an activity which 
poses danger and threat to environment is to be prevented. Prevention is better 
than cure. It means that the State Governments and the local authorities are 
supposed to anticipate and then prevent the causes of environmental 
degradation. The likelihood of danger to the environment has to be based upon 
scientific information, data available and analysis of risks. Ecological impact 
should be given paramount consideration and it is more so when resources are 
non-renewable or where the end result would be irreversible. The principle of 
precaution involves anticipation of environmental harm and taking measures 
to avoid it or to choose the least environmentally harmful activity. Again it is 
based on scientific uncertainty.”813 The judges thus endeavoured to draw 
a “strategic” line of action for the application of the precautionary 
principle, based on the competences of federal and local authorities in 
anticipating ecological damages, in absence of certain results on the 
environment, and on the doctrine of public trust as a guide for 
ecological conservation.814 
Again, the ecological view of the matter and the “line of action” came to 
the forefront with the Goa Foundation case, 815  where the Tribunal 
recognised its jurisdiction with regard to precautionary measures to be 
implemented in favour of the safeguard of the environment of the 
                                                          
812 Ibidem, paragraph 39: “the precautionary principle, which is a part of the law of the 
land now and is a Constitutional mandate in terms of Articles 21, 48A and 51A(g) of 
the Constitution of India, that require the State to safeguard and protect the 
environment and wild life of the country. It is expected of Respondents No.1 and 3 to 
anticipate and then prevent the causes of environmental degradation.” 
813 Ibidem, paragraph 30. 
814 Ibidem, paragraph 33: “the doctrine of public trust (…) is more an affirmation of 
State power to creation of public property for public purpose. It is an affirmation of the 
duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands 
and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the 
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.” 
815 M.A. No. 49 of 2013 in O.A. No. 26 of 2012, dated 18th of July 2013. 
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Western Ghats. Indeed, the Tribunal interpreted inaction as non-
compliance of the principle of precaution, resulting in the attraction of 
its jurisdiction.816 Hence, in the final disposal of the application,817 the 
Tribunal censored the ambiguities of the MoEF on the matter, with the 
latter eventually deciding to thoroughly examine all issues related to 
ecological protection of the region, in order to issue a final notification 
on such protected areas.818 It is noteworthy that the Tribunal did not 
undertake direct action, but left the initiative to the competent Ministry, 
provided it acknowledged through an affidavit the necessity to rapidly 
and comprehensively create eco-sensitive areas.  
While the Tribunal recovered the ecological point of view of the 
precautionary principle in several judgments, ensuring an application 
in consonance with the double-sided concept of sustainable 
development, the missing link in the chain was the introduction of a 
                                                          
816 Ibidem, paragraph 42, and also supra, Chapter IV, Section I, paragraph a): “an 
anticipated action will also fall within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (…) 
The precautionary principle would operate where actual injury has not occurred as on 
the date of institution of an application. In other words, an anticipated or likely injury 
to environment can be a sufficient cause of action, partially or wholly, for invoking the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal in terms of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the 
NGT Act. (…) The precautionary principle is permissible and is opposed to actual 
injury or damage. On the cogent reading of Section 14 with Section 2(m) and Section 
20 of the NGT Act, likely damage to environment would be covered under the 
precautionary principle, and therefore, provide jurisdiction to the Tribunal to entertain 
such a question. The applicability of precautionary principle is a statutory command to 
the Tribunal while deciding or settling disputes arising out of substantial questions 
relating to environment. Thus, any violation or even an apprehended violation of this 
principle would be actionable by any person before the Tribunal. Inaction in the facts 
and circumstances of a given case could itself be a violation of the precautionary 
principle, and therefore, bring it within the ambit of jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as 
defined under the NGT Act. By inaction, naturally, there will be violation of the 
precautionary principle and therefore, the Tribunal will have jurisdiction to entertain 
all civil cases raising such questions of environment.” 
817 O.A. No. 26 of 2012 and M.A. Nos. 868 of 2013, 47 of 2014 and 291 of 2014, 
dated 25th of September 2014. 
818 Ibidem, paragraph 13. 
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sanctioning machinery eager to substantiate the precautionary 
principle. This was the object of the M/s. Sterlite case,819  where the 
Tribunal endeavoured to define the precautionary principle in relation 
with punitive measures. After having defined the precautionary 
principle as the concept within sustainable development that 
“essentially has the element of prevention as well as prohibition”, 820  the 
Tribunal indicated the “ingredients” of the principle: 
-  (a) There should be an imminent environmental or ecological threat in 
regard to carrying out of an activity or development; 
- (b) Such threat should be supported by reasonable scientific data; and 
- (c) Taking precautionary, preventive or prohibitory steps would serve the 
larger public and environmental interest.821 
If the judges confirmed the definition of the principle, they advanced a 
reading that distinguished between precaution and punitive actions, as 
the principles operate in different fields: the former is an action ex ante, 
while the latter is a measure ex post for damages and restoration of the 
environment, based on a nexus between an event, a source of pollution 
and the injury caused.822 This legal reflection has consequences on the 
operationalisation of both international principles and domestic 
statutes, as it derives different conclusions on the two necessary 
principles for sustainable development: on the one hand, the 
precautionary principle is more easily identified and applied, provided 
that sufficient technical data are at the disposal of the court. On the 
other, the question of punitive measures comes to the forefront in 
connection with the polluter pays principle. Several aspects concur to 
                                                          
819 Appeals Nos. 57 and 58 of 2013, dated 8th of August 2013.  
820  Ibidem, paragraph 120: “precautionary principle is one of the most important 
concepts of sustainable development. This principle essentially has the element of 
prevention as well as prohibition. In order to protect the environment, it may become 
necessary to take some preventive measures as well as to prohibit certain activities. 
These decisions should be based on best possible scientific information and analysis of 
risks.” 
821 Ibidem, paragraph 122. 
822 Ibidem, paragraphs 125-127. 
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advance a more detailed analysis of this principle: first of all, the 
necessary ex post character of polluter pays ensures an easier task for 
the judge in ascertaining damages; secondly, its essence of “case-based” 
principle enables a domestic vision that can help in elaborating legal 
strategies to implement it. However, the latter aspect is double-edged, 
insofar as the Indian legislation provides for penalties (as in the Water 
and in the Air Acts), but the mission of the National Green Tribunal is 
the disposal of civil cases related to the environment, not on criminal 
liability. Hence, a conundrum between an effective application of the 
polluter pays principle and the role of the Tribunal could arise, to be 
solved by looking at the single cases.  
 
b)    The polluter pays principle: a domestic construction 
As analysed in precedence, the Tribunal confirmed the construction of 
the Supreme Court concerning the three principles since the beginning 
of its operation. Nevertheless, with a view to its statutory limitations, 
the application of the polluter pays principle - the typical “punitive” leg 
of sustainable development - could become the object of self-restraint 
on the part of the environmental court: if civil liability is certainly 
included within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, punitive measures 
under criminal law cannot be enforced by the NGT. Thus, a particular 
care in devising judicial strategies for implementing the polluter pays 
principle.  
In this regard, the first landmark case adjudicated by the NGT was 
Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages vs. West Bengal Pollution Control Board.823 
As the company proposed an appeal against the direction of the local 
Pollution Control Board, that ordered the assurance of the continuous 
and smooth functioning of the pollution abatement system, the 
submission of an action plan concerning the treatment of liquid 
effluents and the deposit of 500000 rupees as a bank guarantee, the 
Tribunal relied on the jurisprudence of the apex court on placing the 
                                                          
823 Appeal No. 10 of 2011, dated 19th of March 2012. 
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burden to pay the cost of pollution abatement upon the producer824 and 
on Section 20 of the NGT Act to state that “the precautionary principle and 
the principle of polluter pays are the integral part and parcel of national 
environmental law” and that “a polluter is bound to pay and eradicate the 
damage caused by him and restores the environment. He is also responsible to 
pay for the damages caused due to the pollution caused by him.”825 However, 
the Tribunal linked to this general principle the necessity of 
ascertaining the damage caused by the polluter, in order to determine 
the amount required for restoring the environmental situation. As this 
requirement was not met by the directions of the West Bengal Pollution 
Control Board - having merely ordered the deposit of a bank guarantee 
without evidence on the source of water pollution - the judges allowed 
the appeal and ordered the PCB to renew the required analysis on 
water with a view to decide on consent to operate. 
The question of imposing costs by administrative or judicial institutions 
was indeed one of the key critical points in developing a coherent 
application of the polluter pays principle. In theory, Section 20 of the 
NGT Act should allow the environmental court to order reparation 
costs in cases concerning pollution. However, a strict reading of the 
relevant legal provisions would lead to an opposite conclusion, since 
the power to impose a penalty should be proper of a penal jurisdiction 
(unlike a Pollution Control Board or the National Green Tribunal). 
Apart from the Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages case, where the matter 
was not presented in all its aspects, the question resurfaced in Dvc Emta 
Coal Mines vs. Pollution Control Appellate Authority of West Bengal,826 on 
the direction to deposit 10 lakh rupees as pollution cost for non-
                                                          
824  Ibidem, paragraph 15: “several decision of Supreme Court dealing with the 
principles of sustainable development, precautionary principle and polluter pays 
principle were relied upon. The polluter pays principle, it is submitted is the ethos of 
international environmental jurisprudence in the matter of correcting a civil norm by 
award of cost / damages on a polluting industry. The core of the principle, derives from 
the fundamental proposition, that the person who generate pollution should bear the 
cost of abatement.” 
825 Ibidem, paragraph 17. 
826 Appeal No. 43 of 2012, dated 15th of March 2013. 
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compliance of the environmental norms for mining activities. As in the 
previous case, the Tribunal limited the power to impose directions 
under Section 33A of the Water (Prevention and Control) of Pollution 
Act of 1974: as the provision is general in nature but does not 
specifically entrust the Pollution Control Board (or its Appellate 
Authority) to levy pecuniary penalties, the Tribunal confirmed the 
interpretation maintained in Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages and allowed 
the appeal against the decision of the Appellate Authority of West 
Bengal. 
However, the Tribunal returned on the question of bank guarantees in 
the Tarun Patel case, on one of the most important waste water 
treatment plant of the country.827 The environmental court considered 
the decision of Gujarat Pollution Control Board to impose a pecuniary 
guarantee as a penal measure on small scale industries in the Common 
Effluent Treatment Plant of Vapi Industrial Estate, in order to fulfil the 
technical requirements for discharging effluents, as well as the record 
of the plant in non-complying with the standards set by the 
Environment (Protection) Rules. 828  Due to the peculiar history of 
absence of fulfilment of environmental standards, the local Pollution 
Control Board ordered a bank guarantee as an innovative measure for 
compliance: in spite of the existence of an established jurisprudence 
contrary to the imposition of penal measures under the Water Act, the 
Tribunal maintained the directions of the PCB as it considered the case 
as a question related to the environment that should be prevented.829 
As a result, the Tribunal allowed the use of bank guarantees as a 
                                                          
827 O.A. No. 34 of 2013 (WZ), dated 1st of April 2014. 
828 Ibidem, paragraph 23: “CETP at Vapi, is one of the major CETP in the country, 
however, it has been on the radar of the Regulatory Agencies, as well as, Judiciary, in 
view of continuous non-compliance of the standards. This takes us to Comprehensive 
Environmental Pollution Index of Vapi Industrial cluster, whereby Vapi, has been 
declared as one of the "Critically" polluted areas in the country.” 
829 Ibidem, paragraph 74: “we hold that the condition requiring the respondents to 
furnish the bank guarantee is not penal and encashment thereof is neither unjustified 
nor covered under any of the exceptions stated in the judgment of the Supreme Court in 
the case of Vinetec Electronics Pvt. Ltd.” 
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possible direction aimed at ensuring respect of environmental norms 
and as a way for compensating environmental damage only in cases 
where such infractions are declared following the correct penal 
procedures.830 
Hence, the Tribunal apparently posed harsh conditions for the 
deployment of the polluter pays principle. However, the statutory 
provisions are clear in assigning to the National Green Tribunal the 
power to grant relief and compensation for environmental damages 
occurred for human activities, as indicated in Section 15 of the NGT 
Act. Likewise, Section 20 includes the polluter pays principle among 
the international legal references of the action of the Tribunal, thus 
strengthening the provisions of Section 15 with an anchor that is 
reflected from international law. In Mr. Vitthal Gopichand Bhungase vs. 
The Ganga Sugar Energy Ltd.,831 on the continuous damage provoked by 
the toxic discharges of a sugar factory in Mannath lake where fishing 
rights had previously been granted, the Tribunal applied its mind in 
verifying the evidence brought by the applicants and decided to grant 
relief for environmental damages. Hence, having acknowledged the 
facts, 832  the environmental judge granted an order favouring the 
fishermen of the area, as it involved a deposit of 50 lakh rupees to be 
                                                          
830 Ibidem, paragraphs 75-76: “the Board should ensure that its order provides for a 
'time targeted action plan'. In default of which and upon inspection, such bank 
guarantee would be liable to be invoked/encashed for environmental compensation and 
restoration purposes. (…) GPCB can use the BG regime as per the defined policy of the 
Board to ensure the time-bound and well defined improvements in pollution control 
systems and the BG forfeiture shall not be done as a substitute for penal actions 
separately prescribed under the law.” 
831 M.A. No. 37 of 2013 (WZ), dated 20th December 2013. 
832 Ibidem, paragraph 20: “the material on record reveals prima facie that aquatic life 
in the 'Mannath lake' is being lost and the water is being contaminated, polluted and 
degraded due to the acts of the Respondent Nos.1 and 2. MPCB has already made a 
statement on 4-12-2013, that the Sugar Factory of the Respondent Nos.1 and 2, falls in 
the catchment area of the pond and there is no other Industry of which (J) Misc.Appln. 
No.37 of 2013 effluent is collected to the said pond. We deem it proper, therefore, to 
grant interim relief, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the present case.” 
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eventually disbursed in the event the case is adjudicated in favour of 
the applicants, so as to compensate for the loss of fish stock.833  
Following the miscellaneous application of 2013, the case of the 
Mannath lake was adjudicated in Godavari Magasvargiya Mastya vs. The 
Ganga Sugar Energy Ltd.. 834  Firstly, the Tribunal recognised its 
competence, as the application could not be barred by limitation: as the 
spillover of molasses in the lake had occurred in June 2010, the Tribunal 
maintained jurisdiction under Section 15 of the NGT Act, that provides 
for a 5-year limitation.835 Then, the judges confirmed that remedies 
were available under Section 18 of the NGT Act, including restitution, 
restoration and compensation and under Section 20 of the Act, in order 
to operationalise the polluter pays principle, to be read in the following 
terms. “The Polluter Pay's Principal is commonly interpreted as, the Polluter 
must pay for, the cost of Pollution abatement, cost of environment damage 
recovery, cost of incident management and compensation costs for the victims 
of the incident, if any, due to Pollution. It implies that those who caused 
environmental damage by polluting should pay the costs of reversing that 
damage and also controlling the further damage. Though the Principle is very 
simple, its implementation is rather difficult and complex mainly due to the 
difficulty in identification of the Polluters and apportioning their 
responsibilities. Another concern, in implementation of this principle is to how 
the polluter should pay. Even the difficulties in restoring the ecological system, 
once it is disrupted or contaminated makes the assessment of payment in the 
terms of loss (loss of bi-diversity, loss of habitat, loss of top soft soil so on and 
so forth) difficult. Moreover, the payment is, at the end of the day, probably in 
terms of money. It is well documented that the monetary compensation do not 
essentially fully make up for ecological loss or loss of resource such as ground 
water, top soil, biodiversity and therefore, in reality to some degree, at least, the 
polluter never pays the real cost of the pollution, even if, some restitution or 
compensation is possible. The environmentalist generally, therefore, advocate 
the importance of 'Precautionary Principle' over the 'Polluter Pay's Principle' 
in the enforcement policies. The environment damage costing is an evolving 
                                                          
833 Ibidem, paragraph 24. 
834 O.A. No. 30 of 2013 (WZ), dated 30th of July 2014. 
835 Ibidem, paragraph 14. 
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subject and can involve both non market valuation as well as market 
valuation.”836 
Hence, the Tribunal operated by discerning two different plans: on the 
one hand, it did not grant relief to the applicant, as it could not prove 
damages to his fishing activities; on the other, it ordered the sugar 
company to pay relief and restoration of environment under Section 15 
of the NGT Act.837 What is relevant in the definition of the Tribunal is 
the reference to separate functions of the polluter pays principle: as 
monetary compensation is deemed insufficient and not enabling a 
concrete reestablishment of the environmental situation, precautionary 
measures are considered more efficient in environmental policies. 
Additionally, the implementation of the polluter pays principle is 
questioned as far as pecuniary measures are concerned: if the use of 
bank guarantees has been restrained, the problem of identifying correct 
ways of funding relief and restoration is to be solved, whether by 
specific bodies entrusted with capacities of pointing out real measures 
to be funded, or by environmental studies aimed at preventing further 
damages. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to acknowledge the strategy 
advanced by the Tribunal: on the one hand, a strict obeyance to the rule 
of law, in order to provide certainty to the rules on liability and 
compensation, on the basis of Section 15 of the NGT Act; on the other 
hand, a precise operationalisation of the polluter pays principle, leaving 
to more specific committees the task of identifying measures when the 
Tribunal is unable to provide directions. 
This construction linked to Section 15 of the Act has been furthered in 
Ramubhai Kariyabhai Patel vs. Union of India, 838  on the compensation 
arising from the damages to the ecology caused by a toxic waste spread 
                                                          
836 Ibidem, paragraph 21. 
837 Ibidem, paragraph 27: “c) The Respondent No.1 shall pay the cost of replenishment 
of water in Mannat lake and cost of environment damages in the powers conferred upon 
this Tribunal vide Section 15(1) of National Green Tribunal Act. 
e) The Respondent No.1 is liable to pay Rs.5,00,000/- (Rs. Five lacks) towards the 
environment restitution costs to Collector, Parbhani who shall spend this amount for 
environment awareness initiative and also performances like plantation etc.” 
838 O.A. No. 87 of 2013 (WZ), dated 18th February 2014. 
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and spilled in 2012 in agricultural fields, due to the handling of 
hazardous wastes in a storage facility in a village of Gujarat. As the 
applicant claimed to be entitled for compensation of the loss to ecology 
and livelihood in accordance with the polluter pays principle, the 
Tribunal recognised the liability of the respondents and linked the 
restitution of the environment to the international principle by means 
of Section 20 of the Act. Moreover, the judges confirmed the polluter 
pays principle in the terms set in Godavari Magasvargiya Mastya.839 
Mindful of the difficulties in implementing the principle and 
acknowledging the deficiency of granting a mere monetary 
compensation, the Tribunal ended up by ordering the respondents to 
pay for the actual loss and non-pecuniary damages, but also for 
conducting specific studies on contamination as well as directing the 
local Pollution Control Board to develop capacity-building 
programmes for an efficient handling of incidents.840 It is thus evident 
the approach the Tribunal integrates in its judgements: on the one 
hand, a strict test on the restoration of damages if the polluter is found 
liable; on the other, a firm linkage to the international principles, to be 
understood as a coherent order. Indeed, the implementation of the 
polluter pays principles is to be effected so as to include precautionary 
measures - due to the patent limitation of a simple reference to 
pecuniary compensation, deemed insufficient for guaranteeing a true 
environmental justice. 
This double approach is also to be seen in cases involving mere 
compensation for environmental damages, as the decisions of the 
Tribunal always entail a part of measures dealing with prevention and 
protection. In Himanshu R. Barot vs. State of Gujarat,841 the operations of 
the company Anil Products Ltd., a business involved in the 
manufacture of starch products, were the object of the investigation of 
the Tribunal, from an application alleging the absence of safety 
measures and the use of harmful chemicals in the production of 
glucose. After a scientific review of the production methods of the 
                                                          
839 Ibidem, paragraph 24. 
840 Ibidem, paragraph 34. 
841 O.A. No. 109 (THC) of 2013 (WZ), dated 22nd of April 2014. 
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company and the examination of such aspect in relation with the Air 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1981 and the Water 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974, the Tribunal directly 
applied the polluter pays principle - without any reference to Section 15 
of the NGT Act - in favour of the public at large and ordered the 
deposit of 10 lakh rupees to be employed for environmental purposes842 
as well as the compliance to the recommendation made by the Gujarat 
Pollution Control Board, with a view to prevent further air and water 
pollution.843 
Again, the case of remedial measures to be considered as part of 
sustainable development - through Section 15 of the NGT Act and the 
polluter pays principle - was confirmed in Janardan Pharande vs. 
MoEF.844 As in the previous case, the applicants protested against the 
operation of a company (Jubilant Organic Ltd.) using chemical 
products in its molasses distillatory plant in a river, endangering 
human activities as well as biodiversity. Having appraised the 
conclusions of the local Pollution Control Board, that acknowledged the 
persistence of water pollution in spite of the installation of treatment 
facilities, 845  the Tribunal applied the polluter pays principle and 
ordered the company to deposit 25 lakhs rupees for compensating 
                                                          
842 Ibidem, paragraph 19: “this is a fit case in which "Polluters' Pays" principle will be 
applicable. The public members of the surrounding area are the victims of such 
pollution. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that Anil Products shall pay 
compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- in general (…). This amount shall be utilized for 
development of green belt or establishment of play ground or appropriate park with 
jogging track in the area of Bapunagar, Ahmedabad.” 
843 Ibidem, paragraph 20. 
844 O.A. No. 7 (THC) of 2014 (WZ), dated 16th of May 2014. 
845 Ibidem, paragraph 39: “After going through the result and physical observations, it 
is concluded that the ground water quality in the area is adversely affected by 
indiscriminate disposal of untreated/treated effluent in the past even though today 
industry has provided adequate waste water treatment facility. 
The quality of ground water still remains polluted in the nearby area. It will still 
require sufficient long time for restoration of water quality by natural process. 
It is observed that the riparian rights of the people for access to the good quality of water 
are violated and the people are deprived of quality water”." 
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damages, to be calculated in detail by a Committee charged with the 
evaluation of environmental loss.846  
Remedies and prevention are thus essential features of sustainable 
development, as part of international principles and thanks to the 
constant elaboration of Indian statute law by domestic tribunals. A 
comprehensive assessment of the doctrine of the Tribunal on the 
combination of the precautionary principle and of the polluter pays 
principle is the case of the Yamuna river, a recurrent environmental 
situation that has also been adjudicated by the National Green Tribunal 
in Manoj Misra vs. Union of India.847 The Yamuna, the historical river that 
flows through Delhi and reaches the Ganges at Allahabad, has a pitiful 
environmental record,848 due to the pollution caused by the insufficient 
management of wastes in the area and by the presence of polluting 
industries. Since 1994, the Supreme Court of India had been seised of 
the matter through Public Interest Litigations, in order to ameliorate the 
environmental conditions of the river and of the inhabitants of the 
region: however, “nothing mentionable was achieved for prevention, control 
                                                          
846 Ibidem, paragraph 51: “the net result of the foregoing discussion is that there is 
reliable evidence to draw inference about continuation of Pollution caused to water of 
'Nira' river as a result of discharging of Industrial effluent/spent wash by Jubilant 
Industry. The water pollution has remained unabated. The so called efforts taken by 
Jubilant Industry were inadequate and did not completely stop the water pollution. (…) 
The Committee shall cause evaluation of loss caused to the agriculturists, if any, due to 
discharging of industrial effluents in the water of River 'Nira' which assessment may 
be done after soil testing, examination of the past revenue assessment and other relevant 
factors.”  
847 O.A. No. 6 of 2012 and M.A. Nos. 967of 2013 and 275 of 2014, dated 13th of 
January 2015. 
848  Ibidem, paragraph 4: “river Yamuna is critically threatened by unrelenting 
encroachments on its flood plain and by increasing population load, emanating as much 
as from domestic refuse, as from the agricultural practices in the flood plains and 
industrial effluents from the catchment area draining into Yamuna. The flood plains 
and river bed of Yamuna are under increasing pressure of alternative land use for 
various purposes, which are driven primarily by growth of economy at the cost of the 
river’s integrity as an eco-system.” 
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and restoration of River Yamuna on behalf of the concerned authorities"849 as 
the environmental judges acknowledged in 2015, despite the issuance 
of directions by the Supreme Court for almost two decades. 
The matter was thus presented also before the National Green Tribunal 
under Sections 14 and 15 of the NGT Act, with a view to both obtain an 
adjudication on the environmental situation - considered to be a blatant 
violation of the right to life850 - as well as compensation for the damages 
created by the continuous pollution, primarily due to the dumping of 
debris and wastes into the river.851 As a new plan for restoration of the 
environment would be implemented (the “Maily Se Nirmal Yamuna” 
Revitalization Plan, 2017), the applicants called for action on the part of 
the competent authorities so as to implement the already existing 
regulation.  
Following a comprehensive study of an ad hoc Expert Committee, the 
Tribunal took note of the recommendations provided for by the special 
body and elaborated its views on the application of international 
principles to the case at stake, as “the Principle of Sustainable Development 
takes within its ambit the Principle of Inter- generational Equity. In fact, all 
these three principles, i.e. the Precautionary Principle, the Polluter Pays 
Principle and the Principle of Sustainable Development have to be collectively 
applied for proper dispensation of environmental justice”. 852  Firstly, the 
judges acknowledged the existence of agricultural degradation and 
indicated the necessity to halt agricultural production by virtue of the 
application of the principle of intergenerational equity, converted into a 
“principle of comparable hardship” that commands the termination of 
activities that would produce major health damages than actual 
                                                          
849 Ibidem, paragraph 1. 
850 Ibidem, paragraph 6: “the present case, according to the applicant, is a glaring 
example of total failure of both the constitutional obligation of the State and 
fundamental duty by the citizens under Articles 48A and 51A(g) respectively of the 
Constitution of India.” 
851 Ibidem, paragraph 6: “the applicant also invoked special jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
in terms of Section 15 of the NGT Act, praying for complete restitution of the 
environment and ecology of the river bed and for making Yamuna pollution free.” 
852 Ibidem, paragraph 68. 
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benefits.853 Then, the Tribunal endeavoured to apply the polluter pays 
principle with regard to the inaction of the authorities on the 
management of municipal solid wastes and to the liability of private 
companies. On the former, the judges suggested to identify measures 
for environmental compensation based on property or house taxes.854 
On the latter, the Tribunal ordered the establishment and maintenance 
of common effluent treatment plants, to be operationalised on the basis 
of the dimensions of production, the characteristics of the process and 
the consumption of water and electricity, as well as to pay restoration 
of damages (2/3 of the sum for the implementation of common effluent 
plants to be payed by public authorities, 1/3 to be allotted to private 
industries).855 Finally, as a preventive and precautionary measure, the 
NGT ordered the competent authorities in Delhi and Haryana to 
maintain the environmental flow of river Yamuna throughout the year 
through a fixed quantity of water that should be released so that 
                                                          
853 Ibidem, paragraph 52: “the principle of ‘Inter-generational Equity’ would require 
that todays’ younger generation should not be exposed to serious health hazards and 
thus, it will not only be desirable but essential that such contaminated 
produce/vegetables are not offered for consumption to the people at large. The Principle 
of Comparative Hardship would clearly mandate that where the injury is much greater 
in proportion to the benefit that would accrue as a result of such activity, the activity 
must be stopped in the larger interest of the public and of public health.” 
854  Ibidem, paragraph 62: “the safest criteria for determining the quantum of 
environmental compensation payable by people of Delhi, would be the certain 
percentage of the property/house tax payable by an individual. It may be noticed that 
certain kind of charges like education cess, sewage tax and certain other charges, do 
form part of the property/house tax payable by individuals, thus, environmental 
compensation can also form part of such property/house tax. But this, we would leave 
primarily at the discretion of the authorities concerned.” 
855 Ibidem, paragraph 72: “such industrial units within a particular industrial cluster 
have to pay these amounts on the ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle, for the pollution already 
caused by them and even which they are causing presently, as well as to prevent 
pollution in future on the Precautionary Principle. Major part of such costs, obviously 
have to be borne by the authorities concerned, let us say 2/3rd, while 1/3rd of the total 
costs should be borne by the industries.” 
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prevention and control of pollution could be guaranteed. 856  As a 
conclusion, concerning the actual cause of action of the application - the 
dumping of debris in the river - the judges prohibited such activity as a 
precautionary measure.857 
The Yamuna river judgment constitutes the epitome of the activities of 
the Tribunal in guaranteeing sustainable development through judicial 
means and delivers a reasoned summary of the implementation of 
international principles incorporated in domestic law. On the mere 
domestic side, by accepting the report of the ad hoc Committees 
(preservation and restoration of the river banks; drainage system in 
Delhi and revitalisation of the river) 858  and ordering their 
implementation by the 31st of March 2017, the Tribunal demonstrated a 
remarkable administrative capacity. On the one hand, the Tribunal 
followed the path traced by the Supreme Court in its traditional judicial 
activism, but maintained limits of application through the express 
definition of jurisdictional competences. On the other, its enhanced 
expertise guaranteed an essential second check on the work of the 
special committees: while a Supreme Court judgment would only have 
relied on this scientific work to adjudicate a dispute, the presence of 
expert members in the National Green Tribunal ensured the correctness 
of such contributions, enabling the judges to incorporate technical data 
with a higher degree of assurance. 
On the role of international environmental principles, the judgement 
reflects a well-established approach of the Tribunal in integrating all 
dimensions of sustainable development. First of all, it linked the 
international principle to the construction of Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution. Then, it confirmed the interpretation that indicates the 
precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle as  necessary 
complements to the application of sustainable development in the 
single cases. On the former, the environmental judge subsumed 
precautionary concerns as part of the very concept of sustainability. 
Concerning the latter, the Indian experience reflects the elaborations of 
                                                          
856 Ibidem, paragraph 85. 
857 Ibidem, paragraph 87. 
858 The “Maily Se Nirmal Yamuna” Revitalization Project, 2017. 
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international legal scholars insofar as the polluter pays principle has its 
main application in domestic law: the National Green Tribunal aptly 
used Section 15 of the NGT Act as well as Section 20 to ground its 
directions for relief and payment of damages within this framework, 
through strict tests on liability that reinforce the perception of a court 
that established an environmental rule of law, at least on paper.   
It is thus not a coincidence that the Yamuna river case comes as a 
conclusion of the path undertaken in the analysis of the Indian 
jurisprudence on environment and sustainable development. Indeed, 
the case highlights the positive aspects of the Indian experience, with 
an active judiciary that elaborated original views on environmental 
law, as well as the negative sides, such as poor implementation, 
excessive length of proceedings, lack of enforcement of decisions - 
critical points that the establishment of the National Green Tribunal 
shall have improved.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
The National Green Tribunal has been a major tool in advancing the 
reasons of environmental justice at the international and national level: 
as Gitanjali Nain Gill stressed in her works on the Tribunal,859  the 
newly established court has endeavoured to fulfil its mandate of 
ensuring a fast track approach to solve environmental disputes, thanks 
to procedural devices, wide powers and reference to international 
principles. Additionally, the working of the Tribunal has been 
accompanied by a constant attention of the Supreme Court to 
environmental rights and principles, as two recent decisions show. In 
Gulf Goans Hotels Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, 860  the Supreme Court 
recalled the relevance of international law principles as set in the 
Gramophone case of 1984861 - if it is not in conflict with domestic law, but 
                                                          
859  Gill, G.N., Environmental Justice in India: The National Green Tribunal and 
Expert Members, in Transnational Environmental Law, 1, 2016, pp. 1-31; Gill, G.N., 
The National Green Tribunal of India: A Sustainable Future through the Principles of 
International Environmental Law, in Environmental Law Review, 16 (3), 2014, pp. 
183-202; Gill, G.N., Access to Environmental Justice in India with Special Reference 
to National Green Tribunal: A Step in the Right Direction, in OIDA International 
Journal of Sustainable Development, 6(04), 2013, pp. 25-36; on the birth of the 
Tribunal, Gill, G.N., A Green Tribunal for India, in Journal of environmental law, 
22(3), 2010, pp. 461-474. 
860 Gulf Goans Hotels Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, Civil Appeals Nos. 3434-3435 of 
2001, dated 22nd of September 2014. 
861 Gramophone Company of India Ltd. vs. Birendra Bahadur Pandey & Ors., AIR 
1984 667, 1984 SCR (2) 664, judgment dated 21st of February 1984, paragraph 5: 
“there can be no question that nations must march with the international community 
and the municipal law must respect rules of international law even as nations respect 
international opinion. The comity of nations requires that rules of international law 
may be accommodated in the municipal law even without express legislative sanction 
provided they do not run into conflict with Acts of Parliament. But when they do run 
into such conflict, the sovereignty and the integrity of the Republic and the supremacy 
of the constituted legislatures in making the laws may not be subjected to external rules 
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ensuring a non-confrontational interpretation with international law as 
far as possible — but stated that environmental legal principles shall be 
necessarily embroidered in the fabric of internal law.862 
In this framework, the apex tribunal reaffirmed its view on the 
principle of sustainable development with a more nature-centred 
approach in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad vs. Union of India & Ors.,863 in 
partial opposition with the jurisprudence of the National Green 
Tribunal, that has mostly applied sustainable development through 
balancing environmental and socio-economic visions. In the 
aforementioned judgment, the Supreme Court maintained its 
established construction on the role of constitutional provisions 
(Articles 48A and 51A) and held that “environmental justice could be 
achieved only if we drift away from the principle of anthropocentric to 
ecocentric. Many of our principles like sustainable development, polluter-pays 
                                                                                                                               
except to the extent legitimately accepted by the constituted legislatures themselves. The 
doctrine of incorporation also recognises the position that the rules of international law 
are incorporated into national law and considered to be part of the national law, unless 
they are in conflict with an Act of Parliament. Comity of nations or no, municipal law 
must prevail in case of conflict. National courts cannot say yes if Parliament has said 
no to a principle of international law. National courts will endorse international law 
but not if it conflicts with national law. National courts being organs of the national 
State and not organs of international law must perforce apply national law if 
international law conflicts with it. But the courts are under an obligation within 
legitimate limits, to so interpret the municipal statute as to avoid confrontation with 
the comity of nations or the well established principles of international law. But if 
conflict is inevitable, the latter must yield.” 
862 Gulf Goans Hotels Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, paragraph 14: “the Stockholm 
Declaration in its core resolutions, merely enunciate very broad propositions and 
commitments including those concerning the sea beaches as distinguished from specific 
parameters that could have application, without variation or exception, to all the 
signatories to the declaration. The Stockholm Conference having nowhere expressed any 
internationally approved parameters (…), incorporation of any such feature of 
international values in the Municipal Laws of the country cannot arise even on the 
principle enunciated in Gramophone Company of India (supra).” 
863 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad vs. Union of India & Ors., judgment dated 13th of 
February 2012, paragraph 14. 
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principle, inter-generational equity have their roots in anthropocentric 
principles. Anthropocentrism is always human interest focussed and non-
human has only instrumental value to humans. In other words, humans take 
precedence and human responsibilities to non-human based benefits to 
humans. Ecocentrism is nature centred where humans are part of nature and 
non-human has intrinsic value. In other words, human interest do not take 
automatic precedence and humans have obligations to non-humans 
independently of human interest. Ecocentrism is therefore life-centred, nature-
centred where nature include both human and non-humans.” 
Notwithstanding this apparent contradiction, due to dealing with a 
case focused on wildlife protection, the Indian Courts have 
endeavoured to follow a balanced path between anthropocentrism 
and ecocentrism, according to the different cases and with a view to 
confirm the interpretation of the Constitution that poses the right to life 
as the cornerstone of environmental protection and the international 
triptych of sustainable development, polluter pays principle and 
precautionary principle as domestic complements. 864  The National 
Green Tribunal has not drifted away from these foundational 
indications, but has substantially complemented single domestic 
aspects of their implementation. Therefore, while constantly asserting 
that sustainable development is part of the law of the land, the 
environmental judges have contributed in interpreting the principles on 
a case basis, delivering concrete judgments that embody the existence 
of opinio juris concerning international law.  
If one considers the institutional innovation of the National Green 
Tribunal in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, it is 
apparent that the environmental court is an asset for “promoting peaceful 
and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice 
for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels”, especially with a view to achieve the targets of the development 
of participatory, accountable, transparent and efficient institutions. 
Considering the most famous terms ideated by Amartya Sen, the 
National Green Tribunal is evidently a tool for enhancing 
                                                          
864  Amirante, D., Post-Modern Constitutionalism in Asia: Perspectives from the 
Indian Experience, in NUJS Law Review, 6, 2013, pp. 213-229. 
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capabilities:865 the speedy track proposed by an environmental court 
endowed with a wide jurisdiction is an institutional experiment that 
aims at countering the manifold difficulties in achieving substantial 
justice, in a country that is characterised by a considerable resort to the 
judiciary and by an inherent slowness in proceedings.866  
Hence, two elements come to the forefront in positively consider the 
“third way” of constituting a specialised environmental court such as 
the National Green Tribunal: on the one hand, the inclusiveness of 
locus standi before the Tribunal - that effectively allowed the broadest 
possible access to justice to individuals and non-governmental 
organisations considered to be aggrieved by decisions or activities 
affecting the environment;867 on the other hand, the role of experts in 
the Tribunal and the prolific dialogue with judicial members constitutes 
an asset in guaranteeing decisions that are effectively sound with the 
environmental situation. 
The body of judicial decisions of the NGT demonstrates how the judges 
accept every plaint that is presented by a person even obliquely 
affected by a situation allegedly characterised by environmental 
degradation of by such threat. In this sense, the role of NGOs as 
watchdogs of the environment has been capital in strengthening the 
environmental rule of law that the Tribunal upholds, with a “fertile 
disorder” that contributes to protect environmental rights and to 
substantiate sustainable development.868 
                                                          
865 Sen, A., Development as freedom, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999; Sen, 
A., Development as capability expansion, in Journal of Development Planning, 19 (1), 
1989, pp. 41–58. 
866 Nariman, F.S., India’s Legal System: Can it be saved?, New Delhi, Penguin 
Books, 2006. 
867 On the role of NGOs and social movements in environmental litigation in 
India, see Khoday, K., Natarayan, U., Fairness and International Environmental 
Law from Below: Social Movements and Legal Transformation in India, in Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 25, 2012, pp. 415-441. 
868 Malaguti, M.C., Un (fertile) disordine economico mondiale, in Nuova Antologia, 
Vol. 615, Ottobre-Dicembre 2015, pp. 148-151. 
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As far as expertise is concerned, the main enhancement from the 
decisions of the Supreme Court has been the resort to precise analysis 
of scientific data in the corpus of orders and judgments, so as to 
internalise the technical reasoning and deliver decisions that are 
immediately applicable by the competent institutions or by privates. 
The result of this blend of legal and scientific expertise is a faster and 
more reliable approach on environmental matters, that should 
eventually produce effective judicial decisions. Indeed, as Robinson 
stated concerning the specialisation of courts, “environmental courts and 
tribunals facilitate speedier environmental adjudications and foster consistent 
rulings across time and the wide range of environmental law cases. Judges in 
environmental courts become well versed in environmental science, which is 
the foundation of environmental legislation, MEAs, and other treaties; this 
helps to ensure that judicial rulings are scientifically literate. These judges and 
court administrators come to have a sound understanding of environmental 
law itself, despite never having the opportunity to study it in their own legal 
education. Environmental ministries and non-governmental organisations 
alike find professionalism and independence in these environmental tribunals. 
These specialised courts ensure that States can meet their obligation to provide 
access to justice in accordance with Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration.”869 
Hence, the advances reached thanks to the enactment and 
implementation of the National Green Tribunal Act are mainly three-
fold: 
 an enhanced efficiency, due to the possibility to recur to faster 
judicial proceedings for protecting environmental rights (in a context 
characterised by a “low-yielding” judiciary, with delays, backlogs,  
insufficient capacities of case management and lack of environmental 
expertise); 
 a greater consistency of decisions, the added value of the institution, 
thanks to the centralisation of the jurisprudence on the environment 
and the problem-solving approach of the expert members of the 
Tribunal; 
                                                          
869 Robinson, N.A., Ensuring Access to Justice through Environmental Courts, in 
Pace Envtl. L. Rev., 29, 2012, pp. 363-395.  
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 the disposal of a “transformative tool”, that is adapted to the 
challenges and the objectives posed by the Sustainable Development 
Goals, insofar as it fosters the definition and application of 
sustainable development in the domestic system, for a variety of 
situations linked to the main purpose of poverty eradication. 
These aspects - highlighted in the outline of the present work - are, 
however, to be appraised in the context of each country, where 
different solutions have been devised in order to uphold the reasons of 
environmental protection, from the birth of specialised courts to the 
idea of specific procedures for addressing ordinary tribunals or even 
the highest jurisdiction - as the writ of kalikasan in the Philippines - but 
also to the resort to the old system of general jurisdiction, as in 
continental Europe.870 Hence, can the notion travel? The answer is not 
clear-cut: on the one hand, environmental jurisdictions concur in 
spreading a “green culture” for legal experts, that is fundamental for 
upholding the “environmental rule of law” presented in this work; on 
the other, specialised tribunals tend to resort to creeping jurisdiction in 
order to attract a higher number of cases and present the inherent 
danger of monopolising developmental subjects with a single-issue 
approach based on the mere ecological reasons. As the experience of 
the National Green Tribunal shows, the very notion of sustainable 
development is a blend of environmental, social and economic aspects: 
to “outsource” the responsibility of defining and applying the concept 
would result in the risk of jeopardising the attainment of a golden 
balance between industrial and social development and ecological 
preservation.   
In this regard, notwithstanding a general trend toward the creation of 
specialised tribunals, the very notion of green court is challenged also 
in India. With the publication of the T.S.R. Subramanian Report, the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests has proposed an Environmental 
                                                          
870 Pring, G., Pring, C., Increase in Environmental Courts and Tribunals Prompts 
New Global Institute, in Journal of Court Innovation, 3, 2010, p.11; Davide Jr., H.G., 
Vinson, S., Green Courts Initiative in the Philippines, in Journal of Court Innovation, 
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Laws (Management) Act that includes the creation of specialised 
environmental courts in every district, but also the implementation of a 
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) - and 
homologous bodies at the State level - endowed with the exclusive 
competence on environmental clearances, barring “any judgment, decree 
or order of any court” to have effect in cases of projects of “public 
importance” to be indicated by the Government and limiting the 
National Green Tribunal to barely review appeals from the Appellate 
Board created by the Act.871 
The proposal of curtailing the powers of the National Green Tribunal is 
probably the proof of its pervasiveness in its first years of working. 
Whereas the T.S.R Subramanian Report has the merit of repositioning 
the system of laws enacted from the 1970s into a more coherent body, 
the reduction of the role of the NGT (to be substituted by a series of 
institutions similar to the unsuccessful experiences of the NET and of 
the NEAA) would result in a loss of capabilities for citizens, unable to 
resort to a highly responsive jurisdiction in the environmental domain. 
This would deprive the legal system of an added tool for attaining Goal 
16 of the Sustainable Development Agenda and would lead to an 
“infertile” disorder conducive to increased environmental degradation.  
In consideration of the abovementioned reasons, it is apparent that the 
existence of a specialised environmental tribunal, absent provisions on 
judicial training on environmental matters and, more generally, on the 
speedy disposal of cases (coupled by devices to broaden access to 
justice), is an institutional innovation subject to be exported in legal 
systems lacking efficient mechanisms for environmental adjudication.  
  
                                                          
871 Government of India, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, 
Report of the High Level Committee on Forest and Environment, November 2014 
(http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/press-
releases/Final_Report_of_HLC.pdf). For a critical view, Ghosh, S., A better law 
for the jungle?, in The Hindu: Business Line, 27th January 2015.  
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